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1. Introduction 
With a total height of 829.8 metres, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, opened in 2010, is 
the tallest building in the world. It has 163 floors, 57 lifts and eight escalators. Up 
to 12,000 workers were involved in its construction, which took over six years. 
Given these numbers, we could rightly say that the Burj Khalifa represents one of 
the pinnacles of human technological and cultural advancement. We could also 
rightly say that no other animal on the planet could achieve such an impressive feat.  
Just as our ability to build skyscrapers, our capacity for language has no 
known parallel in the natural world. Other animal communication systems can be 
of exceptional complexity (see, e.g., Fitch 2010: 143-204; Hurford 2012: 3-99; 
Zuberbühler 2012 for reviews, but see Anderson 2004 for a sceptical view). Bees 
can indicate the location of flowers through dancing (e.g., von Frisch 1967). Several 
monkey species have a number of different alarm calls for different types of pred-
ators and situations (e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth 1990: 98-183; Zuberbühler 2012). In 
their study of the gestures used by wild chimpanzees, Hobaiter and Byrne (2014) 
found that they use 66 gestures to convey 19 different meanings, such as “groom 
me,” “move closer,” “initiate play” or “stop that,” which they use flexibly and in-
tentionally (see, e.g., Liebal et al. 2014: 77-84, 154-216; Genty & Zuberbühler 
2015; Moore 2016; Pleyer 2017a: 76-77 for discussion).  
Symbol-trained non-human animals have acquired an even more impressive 
inventory of form-meaning pairings, which they can use communicatively and in 
comprehension. Language-trained apes are reported to have acquired between 68 
to 256+ signs in peer-reviewed publications (cf. Lyn 2012). The grey parrot Alex 
(1976-2007) was able to label “>50 objects, seven colors, five shapes, quantities to 
eight, three categories (color, shape, material) and used ‘no,’ ‘come here,’ ‘wanna 
go X,’ and ‘want Y’ (X, Y being appropriate location or item labels)” (Pepperberg 
2012: 297). In addition, he was able to combine labels “to identify, request, com-
ment on, or refuse >150 items and to alter his environment” (Pepperberg 2012: 
297). Dogs also have been shown to be able to acquire a large number of sound-
item mappings, with border collie Rico (1994-2008) having been shown to have an 
inventory of about 200 of such mappings (Kaminski et al. 2004), and border collie 
Chaser (*2004) being able to retrieve 1,022 toys by name (Pilley & Reid 2011). 
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Non-peer-reviewed reports even claim that the gorilla Koko (1971-2018) was able 
to use around 1,000 signs, and that the bonobo Kanzi (*1980) is able to use around 
500 symbols and understand 3,000 spoken words (cf. Lyn 2012).  
However, these numbers pale in comparison to humans. Estimates for how 
many words an adult speaker knows range from between 50,000 to 150,000 items 
(Tallerman 2009; Hurford 2012: 261). If we look at the acquisition of this inventory, 
we find that at around 18 months of age, children know about 50 words (they reach 
this stage between 15-24 months; Fenson et al. 1994). By 24 months, their vocabu-
lary ranges from 100 to 600 words (Fenson et al. 1994). That is, by 24 months, the 
vocabulary of many children is already bigger in size than the inventories of lan-
guage-trained great apes in the peer-reviewed literature.  
Children’s vocabulary grows rapidly in childhood (see, e.g., Clark 2009: 75-
93; Hoff 2014: 138-167; Saxton 2017: 156-163 for reviews). This can be seen, for 
example, when analysing the type frequency of the Thomas corpus (Lieven et al. 
2009) and the Manchester corpus (Theakston et al. 2001) in the CHILDES database 
(MacWhinney 2000), which are the two corpora the current study is based on. For 
the twelve children in the Manchester corpus, the type frequency for all transcripts 
between age 2 and 3 ranges between 1,211 types to 2,425 types.1 In comparison, 
when we analyse the age range between 3 and 4 in the Thomas corpus, the type 
count of the one child in this corpus, Thomas, is 4,767. For the entire sampling 
range from 2 years to 5 years, Thomas produces 9,059 different word types in total. 
At the age of 6 children know an average of about 14,000 words (Templin 1957). 
This vastly outnumbers even the claims made for the vocabularies of Koko and 
Kanzi both in production and reception (cf. Pleyer 2017a: 78). Humans are an “an-
imal symbolicum” (Cassirer 2006: 31), and our species is clearly marked as “the 
symbolic species” (Deacon 1997). 
However, the human capacity for language goes well beyond merely storing 
large numbers of lexical items. Humans have knowledge of a vast number of 
constructions2 of differing degrees of schematicity and abstractness. These are 
 
1 This study will follow the usage in developmental psychology and will write ages as numbers (2) 
instead of words (two). 
2 As it is extremely hard to ‘count’ how many constructions there are, there are also no reliable 
estimates of how many constructions a speaker might know (William Croft, personal communica-
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connected in a structured network and enable them to produce an unlimited number 
of syntactically well-formed utterances that have never been uttered before (cf. 
Chomsky 1957: 13; Chomsky 1965: 8-9; Goldberg 1995: 7; Chomsky 2002: 88-
101), such as “colourless green ideas sleep furiously” (Chomsky 1957: 15), 
“wetting the sandwich is hereby explicitly relegated to a pretend mental space” (see 
Section 6.4.1), “we are the knights who say ni” or “hold the newsreader’s nose 
squarely, waiter, or friendly milk will countermand my trousers.” The key 
difference here is the following: There is evidence that some non-human animals 
can combine some of their signals to a limited degree into larger units with a 
meaning that is derived or transparent (e.g., Arnold & Zuberbühler 2006; Ouattara 
et al. 2009; Collier et al. 2014). However, in general, “no non-human has any 
semantically compositional syntax, where the form of the syntactic combination 
determines how the meanings of the parts combine to make the meaning of the 
whole” (Hurford 2012: 96).  
Clearly, then, not only the ability to build skyscrapers but the capacity for 
language is also uniquely human. However, as Tomasello and colleagues (2005: 
690) argue, 
[s]aying that only humans have language is like saying that only humans build skyscrapers, 
when the fact is that only humans (among primates) build freestanding shelters at all. Lan-
guage is not basic; it is derived. It rests on the same underlying cognitive and social skills 
that lead infants to point to things and show things to other people declaratively and in-
formatively, in a way that other primates do not do, and that lead them to engage in collab-
orative and joint attentional activities with others of a kind that are also unique among pri-
mates. 
On this view, it is children’s cognitive and especially social skills that enable them 
to learn language, which then enables humans to engage in complex human activi-
ties, from hunting together, to rowing a boat together, to building skyscrapers to-
gether.  
Decades of research on the development of social cognition and language 
have shed light on the sociocognitive foundations of language acquisition and its 
expression in interaction and development. One prominent strain of research has 
focussed on the importance of perspective-taking and perspectivation for human 
 
tion). However, it is to be expected that the number of constructions entrenched in a speaker’s in-
ventory would go well beyond the number of lexical items they know (see Pleyer 2017a: 78 for 
discussion). 
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social cognition and our unique forms of interaction. Although both of these terms 
are highly complex, in general perspective-taking refers to attempts of seeing a sit-
uation from a different visual or cognitive point of view, and perspectivation refers 
to the process of setting, establishing, or expressing a particular perspective in in-
teraction. In Cognitive Linguistics, our ability to adopt different viewpoints, and 
use language as an instrument for perspectivation, is often framed using the concept 
of construal (e.g., Verhagen 2007; Langacker 2015). These terms will therefore be 
of central importance to the present study. 
The phenomenon of perspectivation in language, cognition, and interaction 
is a fundamental feature of how meaning is constituted and how knowledge and 
experiences are shared in discourse. It therefore captures a vital dimension of mean-
ing construction. Both human cognition and communication are always tied to a 
particular frame of reference or perspective. We perceive and conceptualise objects, 
events and situations from a particular cognitive point of view, meaning that some 
aspects are highlighted while others are backgrounded. All conceptualisations, and 
meaning more generally, are therefore fundamentally perspectival in nature               
(Graumann & Kallmeyer 2002; Köller 2004: 3-27; Verhagen 2005: 1-27; Pleyer 
2014b: 236). 
This makes the notion of perspectivation an extremely important concept in 
cognitive science, for example in linguistics (Köller 2004), especially Cognitive 
Linguistics (e.g., Verhagen 2007; Langacker 2008: 55-89), as well as in historical 
linguistics (e.g., Fonteyn & Hartmann 2016; Hartmann 2016: 21-28; Fonteyn 
2019), first and second language acquisition research (e.g., Clark 1997; Robinson 
& Ellis 2008), developmental and comparative psychology (e.g., Piaget 1974; Moll 
& Tomasello 2007a), psycholinguistics (e.g., Barr & Keysar 2006; Brown-Schmidt 
& Heller 2018), conversation analysis and the study of talk-in-interaction (e.g., 
Graumann & Kallmeyer 2002) as well as language evolution research (e.g., 
Tomasello 1999, 2008; Pleyer 2012a; Pleyer & Hartmann 2014). The concept of 
perspective can therefore be used as an interdisciplinary and integrative concept at 
the interface of these different disciplines. Studying the development of perspective 
can enable a fruitful mutual dialogue and make important contributions towards a 
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more complete picture of the role of perspective and perspectivation in language, 
cognition, and interaction. 
The current study sees itself as part of this research endeavour. In contrib-
uting to this research, I will adopt a developmental approach. Taking such an ap-
proach is essential in order to fully explain aspects of being human such as language 
(Carpendale et al. 2018: 2). In doing so, I will therefore elucidate the phenomenon 
of perspectivation by investigating one of the four questions, or levels of analysis, 
proposed by Tinbergen (1963) when explaining behaviour: How does a particular 
behaviour work (mechanism/causation)? What is its function? How does it develop 
(ontogeny)? How did it evolve (phylogeny)? (cf. Butz & Kutter 2017: 23-24). 
This study investigates the acquisition of perspectivation using corpus data. 
Specifically, it does so within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics, sociocogni-
tive, usage-based and emergentist approaches (see Section 2.1). In such an ap-
proach, the notions of perspectivation and conceptualisation take centre stage (see 
Section 2.1.2). I will use the terminological tools and the analytical framework of 
Cognitive Linguistics to study the development of perspectivation in language ac-
quisition. In line with the interdisciplinary commitments of Cognitive Linguistics 
(see Section 2.1), I will integrate my analysis with research from other disciplines 
in cognitive science, especially developmental psychology and language acquisi-
tion research.  
From a usage-based perspective, language is learned from instances of ac-
tual language use in social, interactive contexts (Langacker 1987; Diessel 2015). 
One of the implications that follows from this is that the frequencies and distribu-
tions found in actual language use play a fundamental role in describing the process 
of language acquisition, which is why the current study is based on corpus data.  
Moreover, usage-based, and Cognitive-Linguistic approaches see language 
as being based on general cognitive abilities as well as sociocognitive abilities. 
Children’s developing ability for perspective-taking therefore plays a central role 
in their acquisition of linguistic construal. Another important concept within Cog-
nitive Linguistics is that of conceptualisation. Linguistic utterances express and 
evoke conceptualisations, or mental perspectives on situations in context (see Sec-
tion 2.1.2). From a developmental perspective, it is therefore of central importance 
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how children and their caregivers use language as an instrument of conceptualisa-
tion that enables them to establish and negotiate perspectives and how children ac-
quire this complex ability. 
 Overall, as Cognitive Linguistics sees language as tightly integrated with 
human cognition, treating the notion of perspective as an interdisciplinary, integra-
tive concept at the interface of these domains of research in cognitive science prom-
ises to be highly profitable. This will enable us to form an interdisciplinary, coher-
ent, psychologically grounded, developmentally sound, and Cognitive-Linguisti-
cally adequate theory of perspectivation. 
Although there is a wealth of research on language acquisition within these 
frameworks (see, e.g., Tomasello 2003; Clark 2009; Ambridge & Lieven 2011; 
Rowland 2014; MacWhinney & O’Grady 2015), only very few studies have taken 
an explicitly construal-oriented perspective (see, e.g., Kyratzis 2009). It is one of 
the goals of this study to contribute towards closing this gap in the research on 
language acquisition. Therefore, in its analysis, it will take such a construal-oriented 
approach.  
One area where construal, perspective, language acquisition and cognitive 
development intersect is that of play. Play is a frequent feature of children’s every-
day life, especially in Western cultures. For example, American children between 
0-5 years were found to engage in play activities for 30%-50% of their free time 
(Hofferth & Sandberg 2001). It has also been suggested to occupy an important role 
in children’s social and cognitive development (Pellegrini 2012; Smith & Roopnar-
ine 2019). Play has also been claimed to contribute positively to language develop-
ment (Levy 1984). Specifically, it is often hypothesised that language in play con-
texts is more complex than language used in non-play contexts (Bruner 1983; Weis-
berg et al. 2013) and can therefore be seen as a scaffolding for the development of 
more complex linguistic abilities (cf. Langley et al. 2020).  
This claim has especially been made for a special form of play, which also 
has been argued to be uniquely human in its complexity and expression, namely 
pretend play (Lillard et al. 2013; Quinn et al. 2018; Pleyer 2020, see Chapter 3).3 
 
3 For this reason, as noted by Quinn and Kidd (2019: 34), the terms ‘pretend play’ and ‘symbolic 
play’ “have been used interchangeably in the field.” Other terms that can be found in the literature 
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Pretend play can be defined as “[p]layful interactions where make-believe, or fan-
tasy, is invoked” (Pellegrini 2012: 126). In pretend play, objects, actions, situations 
and events are symbolically transformed to stand in for something else (Lillard 
2015: 432), as in “pretend this is the oven” (Thomas corpus, 03-04-02.cha4). Just 
as play in general, pretend play has an important role in children’s everyday lives. 
For instance, 2-year-olds spend approximately 5-20% of their playtime engaged in 
pretend play (Lillard et al. 2011: 287; see also Section 3.1.2). Crucially, most play 
behaviours are negotiated and coordinated through linguistic interaction. This 
means that the notion of perspective and construal plays a crucial role in pretend 
play (e.g. Dockett 1998; Rakoczy 2006; see Section 3.1.3).  
This study investigates how the symbolic transformations found in pretend 
play are negotiated and expressed linguistically during language acquisition. To be 
more precise, it looks at the development of how children and their mothers share 
and negotiate perspectives on pretend situations in pretend play using the lexical 
item pretend. To do this, it will analyse corpus data from 13 English children from 
the ages of 2 to 5 years of age. Specifically, as mentioned above, the study is based 
on data from the Thomas corpus (Lieven et al. 2009) and the Manchester corpus 
(Theakston et al. 2001) from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney 2000; see Sec-
tion 4.1). 
The situation type of pretend play was chosen both for its importance in 
children’s development of social cognition as well as for the high degree of per-
spective-taking and perspectivation that can be found. In pretend play, children and 
caregivers constantly negotiate what something should be seen as, and clarify the 
object and goals of the pretend play behaviour. For example, in the Thomas corpus 
(Lieven et al. 2009), we can find the following pretend play negotiation between 
Thomas, aged 3;00.11, and his mother:5 
 
 
are ‘fantasy’ and ‘imaginary’ play (cf. Quinn et al. 2018: 121). For further discussion, see Section 
3.1.1. 
4 References to corpus data will be made by citing the file name of the corpus transcripts, which 
have a “cha” (CHAT) file extension. So 3-04-02.cha refers to the file with the same name in the 
Thomas corpus (Lieven et al. 2019). 
5 In this study, in accordance with the usage in corpus linguistics, ages will be written in the format 
of YEARS;MONTHS.DAYS, so 3;00.11 means that at the age of recording, Thomas is exactly 3 
years and 11 days old. 
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(1)  CHI:   come on, big chicken. 
MOT:  am I a big chicken ? 
CHI:   I little chicken. 
MOT:   and you’re a little chicken. 
[. . . ] 
CHI:   you’re Daddy chicken, aren’t you, Dad? 
CHI:  I small chicken. 
CHI:  I 0am6 a baby chicken. 
CHI:   Mummy’s a big large chicken. 
MOT:  and you’re a small chicken.  
(3-00-07.cha) 
 
In this situation, Thomas and his mother negotiate and clarify a pretend play situa-
tion by using multiple terms for the same referent. That is, they try to construe ob-
jects and events from a certain perspective and in different relations. Thomas uses 
different construals and frames of reference in this situation to express his perspec-
tive on the pretend play situation. He first uses a construal related to size (‘big 
chicken,’ ‘little chicken’). As the interaction unfolds, Thomas introduces a second, 
related construal that introduces the frame of reference of family relations (‘daddy 
chicken,’ ‘baby chicken’).  
From a Cognitive-Linguistic perspective, Thomas profiles (Langacker 
1987: 183-189; Ungerer & Schmid 2006: 163-206; cf. Pleyer & Schneider 2014: 
40-41) or perspectivises certain aspects of conceptual content in his construals. In 
Thomas’ first construal, he uses the conceptual base of size and directs attention to 
the dimensions of ‘big’ and ‘little.’ In his second construal, he introduces a new 
conceptual base, that of family relations, and then profiles the dimensions of being 
a father or a baby (‘daddy chicken,’ ‘baby chicken;’ cf. Pleyer 2014b: 250-251, 
2017b: 179-180).  
Previous research has uncovered a number of linguistic features that are 
more frequently found during pretend play interactions, including higher sentence 
complexity, higher frequencies of temporal expressions, including past-tense and 
future auxiliary verbs, as well as modals verbs, question tags, and explicit refer-
ences to pretence (e.g. Giffin 1984; Garvey & Kramer 1989; Hall et al. 1995; Lillard 
 
6 “0” is used to indicate a missing word in the CHAT transcription format (MacWhinney 2019a: 
109). So “0am” in this contexts means that Thomas actually said “I a baby chicken.” CHAT tran-
scription markers will be explained in a footnote the first time they appear in an example. They can 
also be found in the List of Relevant CHAT Transcription Markers. 
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2011). However, apart from explicit references to pretence, these and other discur-
sive types of pretend construal as in (1) are hard to search for in corpus data in an 
automated fashion. In addition, apart from pretend these features only occur more 
frequently, but not exclusively in pretend play contexts.  
For these reasons, the current study limits its search to pretend play situa-
tions where, unlike in the example in (1), the lexical item pretend is searched for 
via lexical tracking. Moreover, as many previous studies were experimental in na-
ture, we still know relatively little about how children and caregivers use lexical 
items such as pretend in their everyday life (Bunce & Harris 2008). Therefore, the 
current study takes a corpus-linguistic approach, because as of yet, there have been 
no attempts to systematically verify and investigate the distribution of pretend ut-
terances by using data from larger, naturalistic, longitudinal corpora as the ones 
found in the CHILDES database (MacWhinney 2000, see Chapter 4).  
Of course, pretend play language also undergoes significant development, 
especially in children. For instance, explicit references to pretence such as “Let’s 
pretend that…” become much more frequent as children grow older (Garvey & 
Kramer 1989; Lillard et al. 2007). For this reason, the focus of this research project 
adopts a longitudinal, cross-sectional perspective to track changes in the pretend 
utterances used by children and caregivers. Although this method does not capture 
all, or in all likelihood, not even the majority of pretend play scenarios, it provides 
us with a valid corpus for the analysis of explicit pretence behaviour.  
Indeed, pretend is an important lexical item in English-speaking children’s 
cognitive and linguistic development. For example, it is part of vocabulary 
development checklists such as the MacArthur-Bates Communicative 
Development Inventory: Words and sentences (Dale & Fenson 1996), and it is also 
found on the 200-word Level II Short Form Vocabulary Checklist of the CDI for 
young children aged 16-30 months (Fenson et al. 2000: 108-109). Its importance is 
also evident in the corpus data used for this study, which contain 1,392 pretend 
utterances in total. Compared to the spoken part of the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA) and the spoken part of the British National Corpus 
(BNC), the relative frequency of pretend in the utterances made by mothers 
analysed in this study is 19 times higher. For children, its relative frequency is 16 
10 
 
times higher than in the spoken COCA and the spoken BNC, respectively. Given 
this centrality to children’s pretend play interactions, pretend can be said to occupy 
a special place in children’s developing pretend vocabulary, which is why the ac-
quisition of this lexical item is a central question in studies of cognitive develop-
ment (Lillard & Witherington 2004).  
In addition, this study elucidates the ways in which the lexical item pretend 
is used as an instrument of perspectivation in pretend play situations. Analysing the 
most central and important item in children’s pretend lexicon can therefore serve as 
a window into children’s cognitive development, especially their understanding of 
different perspectives. It also sheds light on how they use this item to negotiate 
perspectives on pretend play activities with their caregivers, and can yield insights 
into the kinds of concepts and activities children and caregivers evoke and relate to 
in their pretend play (cf. Hall et al. 1995). On this view, then, this study is explicitly 
cognitive-semantic in its approach. This study also adopts a construction grammar 
perspective on language and its acquisition. In construction grammar, language 
consists of form-meaning pairings that differ in their schematicity and complexity: 
constructions (e.g. Goldberg 2003; Diessel 2015). Importantly, constructions are 
associated with particular construal functions and are connected to each other in a 
network (e.g. Goldberg 2019). From this perspective, one of the key questions of 
this study is how children and caregivers use pretend constructions to perspectivise 
and construe pretend play situations and how children acquire the construal func-
tions associated with pretend. 
This study is structured as follows. It will first deal with the theoretical foun-
dations of the study, then move to its methodological foundations, before the corpus 
analysis of pretend and its development will be presented.  
Chapter 2 discusses the general theoretical framework of the study. It first 
deals with the concept of perspectivation in Cognitive Linguistics (2.1), focussing 
on the relationship between language and cognition in this approach (2.1.1), the 
central role of conceptualisation and construal (2.1.2) and its relation to the usage-
based approach (2.3). Section 2.2 discusses the concept of perspectivation in lan-
guage acquisition. Here, the relationship between word learning and perspectiva-
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tion is elucidated (2.2.1), before the chapter discusses perspectivation and its rela-
tionship to the development of pragmatics (2.2.2) and child-directed speech (2.2.3). 
The last section of this chapter elaborates on perspectivation in cognitive develop-
ment (2.3). Specifically, it discusses pointing as a form of perspectivation (2.3.1), 
describes different typologies of the development of perspective-taking (2.3.2), and 
discusses the role of interaction and cognitive artefacts for the development of per-
spectivation (2.3.3). 
Chapter 3 deals with research on pretend play. In Section 3.1 and its subsec-
tions I give a brief overview of the development of pretend play, elucidate how 
pretend play relates to the concepts of perspective and perspectivation and review 
proposals on the developmental functions and cognitive abilities associated with 
pretend behaviour. I also discuss cross-cultural aspects of pretend play, such as its 
universality and specific cultural expressions. Section 3.2 discusses the relationship 
of pretend play and language. Specifically, I elaborate on the ways that pretend play 
and language are related in development. For example, pretend play can be seen as 
an important context for language acquisition, and both pretend play and language 
are related to children’s developing ability for complex metacommunication. More-
over, pretend play and language both rely on children and caregivers being able to 
understand the contextual and pragmatic factors that influence interaction. Lastly, 
in this section I also mention some of the most important linguistic features of pre-
tend play that have been found in the literature so far. In Section 3.3, I present an 
overview of previous research on the acquisition of the lexical item pretend from 
experimental studies, as well as from corpus, questionnaire, and diary data. This 
concludes the discussion of the theoretical foundations of the analysis. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodological foundations of the analysis. Section 
4.1 describes the corpora used for the investigation. It first presents a general over-
view of the CHILDES database (4.1) and then describes the two corpora that are 
being used in turn, first the Thomas corpus (4.1.1) and then the Manchester corpus 
(4.1.2). Section 4.2 then discusses the methodology of the corpus analysis. Section 
4.2 deals with questions of representativeness as well as problems and limitations 
of the study. First, I will discuss the representativeness of the corpus chosen for 
analysis (4.2.1), and then to the representativeness of the results (4.2.2). Section 4.3 
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turns to the methodology of the analysis. 4.3.1 describes the research question and 
the way the data were coded, while 4.3.2 gives details on how development was 
measured. Finally, 4.3.3. discusses the statistical measures used to analyse the cor-
relations and relationships in the data. With the theoretical and methodological 
groundwork being laid, the next three chapters present the empirical investigations 
of pretend. 
Chapter 5 examines the distribution of the lexical item pretend. In Section 
5.1, I first present the frequency and distribution of pretend in the corpus as a whole, 
as well as in the Thomas corpus and in the Manchester corpus. I also analyse the 
differences in pretend distribution for the mothers and children in the dataset. Sec-
tion 5.2 investigates the distribution of different word forms of the lexical item pre-
tend and offers an analysis of pretend morphological constructions such as the pro-
gressive pretend construction (pretending) and the adjectival pretend construction 
(pretend [X], e.g., pretend eggs; Becky31b.cha). In Section 5.3, I look at the first 
occurrences of pretend in the corpus data for mothers and children. Lastly, Section 
5.4 discusses which factors might influence the distribution of pretend found in the 
corpus data. 
Chapter 6 analyses which target domains were evoked by, or formed the 
basis for, pretend utterances. I first give an overview of the pretend target domains 
chosen for the analysis, such as ACTION, ENTITY and STATE OF AFFAIRS, 
before analysing the distribution of pretend targets in the children’s (6.1) and moth-
ers’ (6.2) datasets. I then compare the distributions of pretend targets in the different 
subcorpora and contrast different age spans for the data on mothers and children 
(6.3). In Section 6.4 I present a qualitative analysis of perspectivation and pretend 
targets for two pretend target domains, namely STATE OF AFFAIRS (6.4.1) and 
BEING ENTITY (6.4.2). 
Chapter 7 focusses on pretend play and event schemas. Specifically, it uses 
the Cognitive Linguistic framework of event schemas (e.g., Dirven & Verspoor 
2004; Radden & Dirven 2007) and analyses the event schemas implicated in pre-
tend utterances. The chapter first discusses the types of event schemas and subsche-
mas proposed by Radden and Dirven (2007) (7.1) and then presents their overall 
distribution in pretend utterances (7.2). After that, I turn to a more detailed analysis 
13 
 
of the distribution of pretend utterances for event schemas in the material world 
(7.3), the psychological world (7.4), and the force-dynamic world (7.5). 
Chapter 8 offers a conclusion and a short summary of the overall results and 
discusses some future goals for research. I also will briefly relate the current study 
to broader issues of the relation of the emergence of perspectivation and pretend 
play to language, cognition and interaction. 
In conclusion, this study shows that the increasing complexity of children’s 
pretend utterances as well as their conceptual complexity can be captured in an 
interdisciplinary, Cognitive-Linguistic framework using corpus data. Importantly, 
this Cognitive-Linguistic methodology also succeeds in analysing children’s cog-
nitive development by describing the concepts associated with children’s pretend 
play. 
Overall, then, this study also demonstrates the effectiveness of an interdis-
ciplinary approach to perspectivation in child language which integrates research 
on cognitive development and corpus-linguistic methodology. It applies Cognitive-
Linguistic concepts to the study of language acquisition and combines these con-
cepts with supporting research from developmental psychology. More generally, it 
provides support for a Cognitive-Linguistic approach to language acquisition that 
focusses on children’s and caregivers’ conceptualisations in interaction and sees the 
trajectories of children’s cognitive and linguistic development as tightly interwo-
ven. This approach therefore goes beyond a purely language-internal analysis and 
provides additional validity to cognitive interpretations of perspectivation in lan-
guage acquisition through interdisciplinary integration.  
As such, it will not only contribute to these topics of inquiry, it will also 
demonstrate the fruitfulness of an interdisciplinary Cognitive-Linguistic approach 
to the study of the relationship between language, cognition, and interaction and 
their developmental interrelatedness in the framework of “Developmental Cogni-
tive Linguistics” (Ibbotson 2020).  
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2. Theoretical Foundations: Perspectivation 
As outlined in the introduction, this study investigates how children and caregivers 
express and negotiate perspectives in pretend play situations using the lexical item 
pretend. Specifically, the empirical part of the study offers a corpus-based analysis 
of utterances containing word forms of pretend. As I will argue below, such an 
analysis can contribute to the development of perspectivation in general. As such, 
the present study adds to a substantial body of research in linguistics and 
developmental psychology investigating the phenomena of perspectivation and 
perspective-taking.  
There are three research areas dealing with the concept of perspective that 
are of particular importance for the analysis of perspectivation in pretend play. 
Firstly, for the current study, it is relevant to elucidate the concept of perspective in 
language and cognition. This topic has been central to the theoretical framework of 
Cognitive Linguistics. Secondly, it is also relevant for the current study how chil-
dren acquire the capacity to express different perspectives using linguistic construc-
tions. This topic has been investigated in the area of language acquisition research. 
Thirdly, the ability to express perspectives in language relies on children’s ability 
to understand their own and others’ perspectives in interaction. This topic is of cen-
tral importance in research on cognitive development. In this chapter, I will there-
fore elucidate the role of the concept of perspective for these three disciplines in 
order to set the theoretical groundwork for this analysis.  
I will start by discussing the concept of perspective and concepts related to 
it from a more general theoretical point of view. In the following sections, I will 
then turn to the topics of Cognitive Linguistics and perspective (2.1), language ac-
quisition and perspective (2.2), and cognitive development and perspective (2.3.). 
The second concept central to this investigation, that of pretend play, will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, where I also deal with the relationship of pretend play and 
perspectivation (see Section 3.1.3). 
First, however, let us turn to the role of perspective in language, cognition, 
and interaction more generally. Human perception and conceptualisation are always 
tied to a particular spatial and cognitive point of view or frame of reference. When 
perceiving or conceptualising an object, event, situation, or state of affairs, we do 
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so from a particular vantage point so that only particular aspects are foregrounded 
cognitively. Conceptualisation, and meaning more generally, are therefore always 
perspectival in nature (e.g., Graumann 1993: 159; Graumann & Kallmeyer 2002: 1; 
Köller 2004: 9). When conceptualising or perceiving a car, for example, my per-
spective can differ according to whether I perceive, or conceive of, the car from a 
vantage point in front of the car or from the side. Moving beyond vision, it is vital 
that even from the same general visual vantage point, the same object can still be 
seen from different perspectives. Say I am sitting on my balcony, proofreading my 
PhD thesis, but I notice there is a little bit of wind going that might blow the pile of 
already corrected pages off the table. I might look around on the table to see if there 
is anything heavy enough I can put on the pile of papers to keep them from flying 
away. I will look at all the objects on my table (e.g., a Fritz Kola bottle, Langacker’s 
Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction, a glass, a coaster, some pens and mark-
ers, a lighter, my wallet, etc.). From the perspective of “things heavy enough to 
keep my pile of papers from being blown away” certain items will seem suitable 
for the task and others will not. However, let us say that instead, I notice that the 
table seems to be a little bit uneven and I want to put something under one of the 
table legs. From this perspective, the very same objects as before will appear quite 
differently. Whereas in the first scenario, Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar: A Basic 
Introduction might make a good candidate to put on my pile of papers, the coaster 
likely would not. In the second scenario, on the other hand, Langacker’s book, with 
its 562 pages, would not make a very good candidate for my task. The coaster, 
however, might. 
This basic fact about conceptualisation and meaning is also highly relevant 
to interaction (cf. Linell 2002: 41-53). In interaction, we very often have different 
perspectives on the situation, and we express and negotiate perspectives as we talk. 
For instance, I might call a particular group of people ‘terrorists,’ whereas my in-
terlocutor might call them ‘freedom fighters’ (cf. Niemeier 2017: 57). I might call 
The Great British Bake Off ‘delightful,’ whereas my interlocutor might describe it 
as ‘boring.’ Our social realities are therefore also always fundamentally perspec-
tival in nature (cf. Schütz & Luckmann 2012: 44; Pleyer & Galuschek 2016: 165). 
What lies at the heart of this view is the concept of constructivism: Meaning and 
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our perspective on the world are not simply given but are instead always con-
structed, and are in fact co-constructed in interaction (Schütz & Luckmann 2012; 
cf. Pleyer & Galuschek 2016). On this view, linguistic utterances are not simply 
decontextualised codes that transfer information which is then decoded, but mean-
ing is actively constructed in context and involves processes of conceptualisation, 
construal, perspectivation, ostension and inference (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1995: 3-
15; Geeraerts 2006: 25-28). Constructivism is central to approaches to language 
such as Cognitive Linguistics (Ziem & Fritsche 2018; see also Section 2.1), and 
those focussing on the centrality of pragmatics (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1995), and 
discourse (e.g. Felder 2013) in the constitution and situation of meaning and 
knowledge. 
When we try to see a given situation from a different point of view, this is 
called perspective-taking. Attempting to set, establish, or express a particular per-
spective in interaction has come to be called perspectivation. Negotiating shared 
perspectives – or making differences in perspective explicit – through linguistic 
strategies for perspectivation is one of the fundamental processes in interaction and 
the joint co-construction of meaning. What lies at the heart of view is the concept 
of constructivism: Meaning and our perspective on the world are not simply given 
but are instead always constructed, and are in fact co-constructed in interaction 
(Schütz & Luckmann 2012, cf. Pleyer & Galuschek 2016). On this view, linguistic 
utterances are not simply decontextualised codes that transfer information which is 
then decoded, but meaning is actively constructed in context and involves processes 
of conceptualisation, construal, perspectivation, ostension and inference (cf. Sper-
ber & Wilson 1995: 3-15; Geeraerts 2006: 25-28). Constructivism is central to ap-
proaches to language such as Cognitive Linguistics (Ziem & Fritsche 2018; see also 
Section 2.1), and those focussing on the centrality of pragmatics (e.g. Sperber & 
Wilson 1995), and discourse (e.g. Felder 2013) in the constitution and situation of 
meaning and knowledge. On this view, linguistic interaction can be described as a 
form of joint action that is rooted in common ground between interlocutors (Clark 
1996: 3-12). Interlocutors make “mutually manifest” which aspects of a perspective 
are relevant in their cognitive environment (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 41-46). These 
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processes are the preconditions for the intersubjective establishment of shared per-
spectives using language (Graumann 2002; Verhagen 2007: 53-54). 
In order to communicate successfully, we need to establish a shared back-
ground of what we know and think about a certain situation and what our stance 
toward the situation is. In short, one of the fundamental preconditions of interaction 
is the establishment of common ground through perspectivation (cf. Clark 1996; 
Köller 2004: 11-25). Put differently, interaction is the process of the interactive 
alignment and coordination of perspectives, representations and conceptualisations 
on a variety of levels (Pickering & Garrod 2004: 170; Barr & Keysar 2006: 903; 
Keysar & Barr 2013). In discourse, interlocutors establish their own perspective on 
a situation, elaborate on it, take their interlocutor’s perspective, relate to it or incor-
porate it into their own perspective to a certain degree (cf. Graumann 1989; Clark 
1996; Kallmeyer & Keim 1996: 286-287). As Callaghan and Corbit (2015: 286) put 
it: “sharing alternative perspectives is a fundamental goal of all forms of human 
communication.”  
The concept of perspective has been further elaborated in the theoretical 
framework of Cognitive Linguistics. Before we examine the concept of perspective 
in Cognitive Linguistics more closely, however, we will first turn to the general 
assumptions and commitments of the Cognitive-Linguistic framework.  
 
2.1 Cognitive Linguistics and Perspectivation 
The umbrella term of Cognitive Linguistics does not denote one particular approach 
per se, but instead refers to a general theoretical framework characterised by a 
number of core assumptions and linguistic practices shared by a variety of 
approaches under the general banner of Cognitive Linguistics (CL hereafter, e.g., 
Croft & Cruse 2004; Evans & Green 2006; Geeraerts 2006a,b; Ungerer & Schmid 
2006; Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007; Dąbrowska & Divjak 2015a; Dancygier 2017).7 
 
7 I follow Geeraerts (2006b: 3) and others in capitalising Cognitive Linguistics to distinguish it from 
uncapitalised cognitive linguistics, which is the cover term for all approaches that study natural lan-
guage as a cognitive phenomenon. As Geeraerts (2006b: 3) points out, “Cognitive Linguistics is but 
one form of cognitive linguistics, to be distinguished from, for instance, generative grammar and 
many other forms of linguistic research within the field of cognitive science.” 
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These core assumptions and foundational principles relate to the relationship be-
tween language, cognition, interaction and meaning construction. According to 
Dąbrowska and Divjak (2015b: 1), CL is characterised by the following three core 
assumptions: 
1. Language is based on general cognitive abilities. 
2. Meaning is conceptualisation. 
3. Grammar is shaped by usage. 
I will discuss each of these points in turn. 
 
2.1.1 Language and Cognition 
Regarding the first point, CL sees language as an integral part of cognition. Lan-
guage is seen as an instantiation of general cognitive abilities and processes. What 
follows from this is often termed the “cognitive commitment” of CL (Lakoff 1990: 
40; Evans & Green 2006: 40-41). The cognitive commitment refers to the fact that 
Cognitive Linguists aim to create cognitively informed theories of language 
(Casasanto 2017: 19). That is, in CL, theories and analyses of language need to take 
into account, and be compatible with, what is known about human cognition and 
conceptualisation from the other cognitive sciences (cf. Evans & Green 2006: 50). 
In addition, as observations from CL also feed back into a general theory of cogni-
tion, CL is also characterised by the complementary goal of building linguistically 
motivated theories of cognition (Casasanto 2017: 19).  
There are two other concepts that relate to the application of the cognitive 
commitment to the study of language. One is the “generalisation commitment” 
(Lakoff 1990: 40; Evans & Green 2006: 28), which states that CL is interested in 
general cognitive principles responsible for aspects found in human language. For 
example, the cognitive process of categorisation, the prototype structure of con-
cepts, the embodied nature of cognition, and the metaphorical foundation of lan-
guage relate to all aspects of linguistic structure (Evans & Green 2006: 27-40).  
The other is the “commitment to look for converging evidence” from other 
disciplines in cognitive science when studying language (cf. Evans & Green 2006: 
17). This goes beyond the general cognitive commitment in that Cognitive Lin-
guists are expected to actively search for what is known about their object of study 
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by other disciplines in cognitive science and integrate it into their analysis. In terms 
of the theoretical situation of the field, this also means that CL understands itself as 
being part of the cognitive sciences (e.g., Geeraerts 2006b: 3; Sinha 2007), or cog-
nitive science, understood as “the interdisciplinary study of mind and intelligence, 
embracing psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, and 
computer modelling (artificial intelligence)” (Thagard 2017: 188; cf. Butz & Kutter 
2017: 9-10). However, it has to be noted that in many regards the field of CL as a 
whole has not yet cashed in on this theoretical positioning within cognitive science. 
This means that – even after more than 30 years – the integration of results and 
methodologies from other cognitive sciences and the creation of a fruitful dialogue 
with these other disciplines is still underdeveloped and presents a desideratum for 
CL (Stefanowitsch 2011: 296; Bergmann 2016: 38-56). 
For a study of the development of perspectivation in language acquisition, 
the commitment to look for converging evidence relates to two questions in partic-
ular: First, what do we know about how children acquire perspectivation in lan-
guage? Secondly, how does the ability for perspective-taking and -sharing develop 
in the course of cognitive development? This is why Sections 2.2 and 2.3 will dis-
cuss these topics in more detail. More specifically, what this means for the present 
study is that the analysis of the development of pretend utterances presented here 
should not only be compatible with, but be actively informed by what is known 
about the development of pretend play from developmental psychology and cogni-
tive science. This is why we will discuss the cognitive development of pretend play 
in detail in Chapter 3.  
We will now turn to the second point, the assumption that “meaning is con-
ceptualisation.” In CL, conceptualisation is strongly tied to the concept of perspec-
tive, and especially to the Cognitive-Linguistic concept of construal. This will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
2.1.2 Conceptualisation and Construal 
In CL, language is seen as an interactive endeavour in which we try to express, 
share, and co-create meanings. To be more precise, what we share and express are 
conceptualisations. Consequently, the main function of language can be seen as the 
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collaborative, dynamic, and interactive co-construction of conceptualisations. Lin-
guistic utterances express and evoke conceptualisations. They can therefore be said 
to serve as prompts, or instructions, for the dynamic construction of a conceptuali-
sation in an interlocutor based on contextual factors, cognitive and cultural models 
and other cognitive resources (cf. Fauconnier 2004; Evans & Green 2006: 8; 
Schnotz 2006; Croft 2009). This has a number of important consequences for how 
we view meaning. From this perspective, 
[l]anguage does not hold or “convey” meaning per se, but simply provides cues for meaning 
construction in context. A conceptualization occurring in a specific instance of language 
use is evoked by the linguistic forms used, but is necessarily far richer than any information 
specifically associated with those forms; such information, as noted above, is merely an 
abstraction from experience or use of the forms (Kemmer & Barlow 2000: xxi). 
Taken one step further, this means that “meaning is not in the correlate of a word; 
rather, it emerges as part of the dynamic between interlocutors in a specific situa-
tion” (Müller & Carpendale 2010: 233; cf. Callaghan & Corbit 2015: 256). This 
also shifts the topic of investigation for a Cognitive-Linguistic analysis of construc-
tions. Instead of studying the ‘meaning’ of a linguistic structure per se, the object 
of study becomes how these structures are used in interaction in the dynamic pro-
cess of meaning construction.  
Instead of trying to find the ‘meaning’ of a linguistic structure, then, we are 
interested in its ‘meaning potential’ (Allwood 2003) and the specific processes of 
interactive conceptualisation the structure is involved in (e.g., Allwood 2003; Croft 
& Cruse 2004: 92-93; Du Bois & Giora 2014; Zima & Brône 2015). This point of 
view also informs the research question regarding the use and development of pre-
tend in this study. That is, when analysing and categorising usages of pretend and 
their development, the starting point will be the “micro-level of local meaning con-
stitution and co-ordination” (Szmercsanyi 2006: 22; cf. Brône & Zima 2014: 483).  
What is also essential is that conceptualisations are always tied to a particu-
lar perspective. In the view of dynamic meaning construction outlined above, social 
understanding is achieved through an ongoing, dynamic process of intersubjective, 
participatory sense-making, embodied interaction and mutual incorporation and ne-
gotiation of perspectives (Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009; Fuchs 2013; cf. Pleyer & 
Hartmann 2014: 102). In CL, the perspectival nature of conceptualisations is 
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reflected in the concept of construal, as “[l]inguistic meaning involves both con-
ceptual content and the construal imposed on that content” (Langacker 2008: 44). 
For example, the same conceptual content, a half-filled glass of water, can be con-
ceptualised in the following ways: “the glass of water” (focusing on the glass), “the 
water in the glass” (focussing on the water), “the half-empty glass” (focussing on 
the semantic domain of emptiness), and “the half-full glass” (focussing on the se-
mantic domain of fullness) (Langacker 2008: 43).  
In CL, this is captured by the term construal. It refers to “our ability to con-
ceive and portray the same situation in alternate ways” (Langacker 2015: 120). 
When a situation or state of affairs is conceptualised, speakers structure the situation 
in a specific manner and from a certain perspective (Langacker 1987: 126; Kleinke 
2010: 3347). That is, interlocutors construe the world in specific ways, and their 
linguistic utterances embody a particular perspective on it (Geeraerts 2006b: 6). 
More precisely, they select linguistic structures to assign salience to particular as-
pects of a conceptualisation, thereby organising conceptual content with respect to 
a specific perspective. In doing so, they direct attention to selected aspects of the 
conceptualised situation, highlighting some aspects while backgrounding others 
(Langacker 1987, 2008; Talmy 2007: 264-267; Verhagen 2007: 49). With respect 
to language, therefore, the concept of construal “refers to the different ways in 
which a given scene, guided by language, can be conceptualised” (Hart 2014: 167).  
Language, on this view, can be seen as a symbolic inventory which allows 
the same situation to be linguistically encoded in multiple ways (Langacker 1987: 
57; Radden & Driven 2007: 1; Evans 2012: 136). Much work in CL has focussed 
on elaborating on the kinds of construal operations and perspectival constructions 
used by language users for the construal and perspectivation of conceptual content 
(see, e.g., Langacker 1987, 2008; Talmy 2000; Croft & Cruse 2004; Verhagen 
2007; Radden & Dirven 2007: 21-30; Hartmann 2016: 31-37). 
It is important to note that in a Cognitive-Linguistic view, it is not only 
concrete lexical items that serve as mechanisms for perspectivation, but more ab-
stract and schematic constructions as well. In fact, many, if not most, Cognitive 
Linguists also take a constructionist approach to language (cf. Bergmann 2016: 43-
49). From the constructionist point of view, language consists of form-meaning 
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pairings, or constructions, of varying degrees of abstractness and schematicity (e.g., 
Goldberg 2003; Ziem & Lasch 2013; Hilpert 2014; Diessel 2015). “Constructions 
form a network of interrelated knowledge within our hyper-dimensional conceptual 
space” (Goldberg 2019: 36) and they are all tied to particular construal functions. 
This means that we can analyse the construal function of different lexical items, or 
word constructions (Goldberg 2003: 220), or more abstract constructions such as 
the active vs. passive distinction. 
The perspectival function of the passive relates to the phenomenon that in 
describing an event, different regions of it can be ‘profiled’ (Langacker 1987: 183-
189; Langacker 2008: 67-69) or put into the focus of attention. For example, re-
garding the active vs. passive distinction, in the Thomas corpus (Lieven et al. 2009) 
we can find instances of Thomas profiling or foregrounding specific aspects of a 
scene against the background of the whole experiential scene. Thus at 2;11 he uses 
the transitive subject-verb-object-construction to describe a prototypical scene in 
which an AGENT (Mummy) emits force to a PATIENT (balloons): 
 
 (1)  CHI:  Mummy has broken these 
(2-11-00.cha) 
 
However, in the same transcript, we can also find Thomas taking a different 
perspective on the same situation by using a subject-copula-complement construc-
tion, which focusses attention on the resultant internal state of the PATIENT: 
 
(2)  CHI:   these balloon is [*] broken  
(2-11-00.cha)8 
 
As a last example of alternative construals, in the Thomas corpus we also find in-
stances where Thomas uses early passive constructions that structure a scene in a 
manner that focusses on what is happening to a PATIENT: 
 
(3)  CHI:  the ceiling got cracked 
(2-10-06.cha) 
 
8 In the CHAT transcription format used for transcripts in the CHILDES database, such as the TC, 
the [*]-asterisk marks an error in the child’s utterance (MacWhinney 2019a: 76). 
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Overall, from a Cognitive-Linguistic and constructionist point of view, language 
can be characterised as a structured inventory of constructions – form-meaning pair-
ings that differ in their abstractness, schematicity and complexity – that enables 
language users to construe a situation from different perspectives (e.g., Croft 2012; 
Evans 2012). More generally, on this view, language is a communicative instrument 
for sharing and negotiating perspectives on a conceptualised situation in coopera-
tive interaction. 
As the examples from the Thomas corpus show, children possess some of 
these linguistic mechanisms for perspectival construal from relatively early on. 
From a developmental point of view, then, the question arises how children acquire 
the network of form-meaning pairings – i.e. the ‘construct-i-con’ (Hilpert 2014: 57; 
Goldberg 2019: 34-38) – of their language that is used to express different perspec-
tives on the same referent (cf. Tomasello 2003: 146-161; Langacker 2009; Diessel 
2013). Despite the importance of this question for a developmentally informed the-
ory of meaning, there is very little research on the acquisition of perspectival con-
structions and construal patterns and their sociocognitive and interactional founda-
tions. This is a point I will return to in Section 2.2, but before that, I will focus on 
the question of how, from a Cognitive-Linguistic point of view, constructions are 
acquired in general. Regarding this question, as mentioned above, Cognitive Lin-
guists adopt the position “Grammar is shaped by usage.” This is the so-called usage-
based approach, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
2.1.3 The Usage-Based Approach  
The term ‘usage-based approach’ refers to the fact that researchers adopting this 
approach hold that language and linguistic constructions are learned by abstractions 
from instances of actual language use (e.g., Langacker 1987; Barlow & Kemmer 
2000; Bybee & Beckner 2010; Diessel 2015). In this approach, then, language users 
build up their communicative inventories by deriving schematic patterns via the 
cognitive entrenchment of recurrent patterns of language use in social interactive 
contexts (Langacker 1987: 59; Langacker 2008: 16-17; Divjak & Caldwell-Harris 
2015: 60). The focus of usage-based approaches is how interpersonal cognitive and 
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communicative processes shape and feed into the emergence of linguistic structure 
(Bybee 2010; Ellis 2013).  
The cognitive capacity underlying this process is that of schema abstraction 
and analogy, whereby “people implicitly understand and structure everyday expe-
riences, and form abstract schemas over similar experiences” (Gentner & Smith 
2012: 136; cf. Tomasello 2003: 298). We can define a schema as “a cognitive rep-
resentation comprising a generalization over perceived similarities among instances 
of usage” (Kemmer & Barlow 2000: xviii; cf. Oakley 2007: 247). For the present 
study, this means that one of the main research goals is to describe, firstly, how 
children, in interaction with their caregivers, abstract a pretend schema from in-
stances of actual language use and, secondly, what cognitive categories and behav-
iours this pretend schema is associated with.  
More generally, in a usage-based approach, language processing, learning 
and acquisition are hypothesised to be based on two types of capacities: sociocog-
nitive capacities, on the one hand, and domain-general cognitive capacities, on the 
other (Tomasello 2003). Schema abstraction, analogy and cognitive entrenchment 
have already been mentioned as important domain-general cognitive capacities. 
Others include, for example: The ability to store exemplars in long-term memory 
so schematic abstractions can be generalised from them; categorisation; sequential 
and hierarchical processing capacities; processes of neuromotor automation, such 
as chunking; statistical pattern recognition; focussing and shifting attention; and 
perceptual perspective-taking (cf., e.g., Langacker 1987, 2008; Beckner et al. 2009; 
Bybee 2010; Ibbotson 2011; Pleyer 2017c: 317-323). 
In the sociocognitive domain, cognitive capacities and motivations which 
are the foundation for language processing, learning, and acquisition include, for 
example, cultural learning, sharing and directing attention, imitation, having joint 
commitments, understanding social conventions and social perspective-taking. 
(e.g., Tomasello 2003, 2008; Pleyer & Lindner 2014). This point will be discussed 
in more detail in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
All these capacities are interwoven and interact when people communicate 
with each other. This holds when people communicate in real time, but also over 
longer stretches of time, for example, in ontogeny or during cultural evolution and 
25 
 
the historical change of languages. All these factors and timescales feed into and 
shape the ‘complex adaptive system’ of language. What researchers adopting a 
usage-based approach mean when they state that “language is a complex adaptive 
system” (Beckner et al. 2009) is that language is a phenomenon whose global 
emergent structure arises out of the dynamic local interactions of a multiplicity of 
factors on different levels of analysis and on different timescales (cf. Beckner et al. 
2009; Frank & Gontier 2010; Steels 2011; Kirby 2012; Pleyer 2014b; Pleyer & 
Winters 2014; MacWhinney 2015a).  
Both CL and usage-based approaches, on this view, belong to the general 
framework of emergentism, which treats language as a complex adaptive system 
and sees linguistic structure as emerging from patterns of usage in interaction across 
time (MacWhinney 2015a: 1). From a cognitive perspective, it is one of the goals 
of these approaches to elucidate the ways in which “language is shaped by the 
brain” and has come to be shaped by the brain over different timescales 
(Christiansen & Chater 2008; cf. Deacon 1997, 2012). On this view, language usage 
and language structure are “shaped around human learning and processing biases 
deriving from the structure of our thought processes, perceptuo-motor factors, cog-
nitive limitations, and pragmatic constraints” (Christiansen & Chater 2008: 490) as 
well as around the general semiotic constraints of symbolic systems (Deacon 2012: 
17-32). From an interactionist perspective, the goal of these approaches is to shed 
light on the dialogic, online, in-vivo, pragmatic, interactive processes that are at 
work when individuals as embodied agents communicate with each other and co-
create meaning. And secondly, from this perspective, it is a crucial question how 
these processes lead to the emergence of structure at different levels and on different 
timescales (e.g., Croft 2009; Zima 2013; Du Bois & Giora 2014; Hopper 2015; 
Zima & Brône 2015).  
Of course, both of these perspectives are relevant. Language is grounded 
both in cognition and social interaction (Langacker 2008: vii). This must also be 
reflected in the current study. Specifically, from a Cognitive-Linguistic perspective, 
we might be interested in how the pretend schema develops, that is, which concep-
tualisations and construals become cognitively entrenched and associated with 
pretend utterances. From an interactionist, social perspective, however, the focus 
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would instead lie more on how pretend activities are co-created in interaction and 
how this dynamic, cooperative process changes over time. This includes a focus on 
the ways which pretend utterances are used as dynamic, in-the-moment, in vivo 
construals of meaning. As with both of these perspectives generally, both ap-
proaches are valid for the current study, and we have to acknowledge that in our 
analyses and theories, we might not actually be able to choose one over the other 
but instead see them as complementary, related perspectives. The question of how 
to integrate both perspectives, at present, is still problematic. As Dąbrowska and 
Divjak (2015b: 6) state, “fully integrating the cognitive and social perspective is 
probably the greatest challenge facing cognitive linguistics today.”  
The dual grounding of language in cognition and social interaction is also 
relevant for the next section, in which I discuss the role of perspectivation in lan-
guage acquisition.  
 
2.2 Language Acquisition and Perspectivation 
As we have seen, a Cognitive-Linguistic, constructionist, usage-based and emer-
gentist framework makes specific claims as to what it is children acquire in the 
course of language acquisition, and which cognitive abilities are involved in this 
process. As Diessel (2013: 357) summarises,  
[w]hat children eventually learn is a network of related constructions in which the same 
event is construed from different perspectives so that speakers can choose the construction 
that is most appropriate to realize their communicative intention in a particular situation. 
This summary clearly reflects the critical role attributed to perspectivation and con-
strual in a Cognitive-Linguistic framework. It also points to the importance of so-
ciocognitive abilities such as perspective-taking in the acquisition of perspectival 
constructions, and language acquisition more generally. Researchers in language 
acquisition working within this framework are therefore interested in the question 
of how children learn about the ways that different perspectives are expressed in 
linguistic interaction. They are also interested in the question of how children ac-
quire the ability to express different conceptual perspectives on the same referent 
(cf. Pleyer 2017b: 174; see also Tomasello 2003: 94-97). This acquisition process 
is multifaceted and quite complex. In fact, “full control over the use of grammatical 
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devices for perspective shifting is not complete until about age 10 (Franks & 
Connell, 1996; Karmiloff-Smith, 1979)” (MacWhinney 2015b: 322).  
There is substantial research in developmental psychology and language ac-
quisition which shows that the development of language and linguistic perspectiva-
tion is tightly connected to and dependent on children’s emerging sociocognitive 
abilities in the domain of understanding perspectives (e.g., Clark 1997; Moll & 
Tomasello 2007a; Pleyer 2014b, 2017b). The relevance of the concept of perspec-
tive for language acquisition is already evident from very early on. For instance, it 
can be argued that even the earliest uses of words require some degree of rudimen-
tary perspective-taking. As Tomasello (1999: 103-106; see also Tomasello 2003: 
27) argues, word learning requires the capacity for role-reversal imitation, as the 
child must learn that a symbol can be used toward the adult in the same way the 
adult used it toward them. Indeed, “some people have pointed out that it is no coin-
cidence that children’s word learning starts to take off at about the same time as 
socio-cognitive skills such as intention-reading come online (between 9 and 12 
months of age)” (Rowland 2014: 61-62). As word learning plays a significant role 
in this study, specifically the acquisition of word forms of pretend, we will discuss 
the sociocognitive processes underlying word learning and perspectivation in more 
detail in the next section. After that, we will turn to the acquisition of pragmatic 
skills and its relation to perspectivation.  
 
2.2.1 Word Learning and Perspectivation 
Word learning is an example of the acquisition of perspectivation par excellence, 
as words can be seen as invitations to form categories (Gelman & Roberts 2018: 
742-743; Perszyk & Waxman 2018: 234-237). The same of course also holds for 
constructions in general, which “like words, invite learners to form categories” 
(Goldberg 2019: 29). Both words and constructions more generally are therefore 
also invitations to view something from a certain perspective: “Words embody per-
spectives on things” (Tomasello 2019: 66). Linguistic symbols such as words are 
fundamentally perspectival, and when children learn them “they understand that the 
same objects and events are construed variously in relation to different points of 
view” (Martin 2008: 103; cf. Sokol et al. 2015: 301). 
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However, beyond this, sociocognitive capacities and emerging abilities for 
perspective-taking also play a crucial role in word learning (see, e.g., Bloom 2000; 
Tomasello 2003: 43-94; Baldwin & Meyer 2007; Ambridge & Lieven 2011: 70-83 
for reviews; for an alternative view see Hoff & Naigles 2002; Vihman 2018: 720-
723). The phenomenon of role-reversal imitation (Tomasello 1999: 103-106) has 
already been mentioned above, but this is only the starting point for children’s so-
ciocognitive strategies in learning words. For example, by 18 months, children as-
sociate a word they hear not with the object they are perceiving at the moment. 
Instead, they check the adult’s attention and associate the word with what the adult 
is looking at (Baldwin 1993; Baldwin & Moses 2001).  
By 24 months of age, children’s sensitivity to other people’s perspectives 
has already become more complex, as indicated by a study by Akhtar et al. (1996). 
They had 24-month-old children, their mothers and an experimenter play together 
in a room with three objects that were novel to them. When the mother left the 
room, the experimenter and the child played with a fourth novel object that was 
taken out of a box. The mother then returned, looked in the direction of the four 
objects and excitedly exclaimed: “Oh look! A modi! A modi!” Children understood 
that their mothers would not find one of the objects that they had already played 
with to be this noteworthy, but instead that they were excited about the object they 
were seeing for the first time. Accordingly, children learned the new word for the 
object that was new from the adult’s perspective, but not from their own perspec-
tive. In other words, at this age, children are aware of what is in the common ground 
of an interaction and what is not. 
Sociocognitive and rudimentary perspective-taking abilities therefore 
clearly play an important role in word learning. But when do children learn that the 
same situation or entity can be referred to by different words expressing different 
perspectives? Clark’s (2009: 138) diary data of the language development of her 
son Damon show different lexical items being applied to the same referent from age 
1;07 onwards: 
 
(4)  D (1;07.01, looking at his bowl of cereal at breakfast): Food.  
(A little later, still at the table, looking at his own and then his parents’ 
bowls of cereal): Cereal. 
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(5)  D (1;07.20, doing his animal puzzle; D named each animal type  
as he took it out [e.g., tiger, lion, zebra], then, on completion, with all of 
them back in, pointed and said): Animal back. 
 
(6) (2;1,27, when his mother asked what D was usually called)  
Mother: Are you ‘lovey’?  
D: No, I ‘Damon’, I ‘cookie’, I ‘sweetheart’! Herb ‘lovey’.  
 
(7)  D (2;5,4, putting the wastebasket, usually called basket when he throws 
anything into it, down over his head): That’s a hider. Hide me in there. 
 
In (4) and (5) Damon uses lexical items that construe entities at different taxonomic 
levels of granularity. In (6) and (7) he shows an understanding that the same entity 
can be referred to using different words (cf. Pleyer 2014b: 249).  
The precondition for these types of perspectivation is that children build up 
semantic domains. In the beginning, semantic domains in children’s language are 
“loosely structured sets of nouns and verbs for talking about a particular activity, 
such as eating and drinking” (Clark 2018: 21) or for talking about a particular situ-
ation or entity. As children accumulate more and more words in acquisition, they 
build up increasingly complex semantic domains and increasing relationship links 
between items within a domain (Clark 2018: 21). 
As they start to set up inventories of constructions that describe the same 
entity from different perspectives, children also begin to demonstrate the capacity 
to describe the same entity in terms of different domains. Clark and Svaib (1997) 
demonstrated this ability in an experimental setting. They found that from early on, 
children show some ability to take and express alternate perspectives, shift between 
perspectives on the same entity, and assign different identities to the same individ-
ual. In their experiments, children aged 2;02 to 4;08 were shown pictures with ani-
mals (cats, dogs, pigs, rabbits) that had different ‘occupations’ (such as painter, 
cowboy, nurse, firefighter) or were engaged in different activities. All the children 
accepted and produced multiple terms as applying to the same referent. So they 
understood that a ‘dog’ was also a specific type of ‘animal’ and that a ‘cat’ could 
also be a ‘cowboy,’ and vice versa.  
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2.2.2 The Development of Pragmatics and Perspectivation 
Another important aspect of the acquisition of perspectivation is that in order to 
express their own perspective, children need to be able to use language in pragmat-
ically and contextually appropriate ways. That means they need to be aware of 
which meaning potentials of a word are instantiated in interaction. According to 
Halliday (1973: 24), L1 acquisition is not only simply a matter of learning a lan-
guage, but means “learning the uses of language, and the meanings, or rather the 
meaning potential, associated with them. The structures, the words and the sounds 
are the realization of this meaning potential. Language learning is learning how to 
mean.” Learning how to mean requires sensitivity to context and one’s own and 
others’ perspectives. What follows from this is that the acquisition of 
perspectivation is closely tied to children’s acquisition of pragmatics and 
communicative competence (Hymes 1971), that is, learning the contextually 
appropriate use of language in social settings (see Ninio & Snow 1999; Matthews 
2014; Rollins 2017 for reviews). This includes sensitivity to the conversation’s 
social context such as social roles and cultural conventions, including factors such 
as register, status, age, formality and politeness. Just as learning how to mean more 
generally, contextually appropriate linguistic communication depends on children 
taking into account other people’s differing perspectives on situations. 
But what types of cognitive capacities and knowledge does the development 
of pragmatic skills rely on? O’Neill (2012) proposes that pragmatic skills draw on 
three types of knowledge that represent different types of perspective-taking: so-
cial-cognitive knowledge, cognitive knowledge, and social knowledge. In acquiring 
pragmatic skills, then, children need to learn how to draw from and dynamically 
apply these types of knowledge in interaction. Stating that children need to develop 
the ability to draw from social-cognitive knowledge in interaction is to state that 
they need to develop “an understanding of differing conceptual mental perspectives 
and expectations as they apply at a more individual or personal level with respect 
to interactants in a dialogue or conversation” (O’Neill 2012: 265-266). For the 
pragmatic application of cognitive knowledge, children need to learn to take “into 
account cognitive stances that apply more generally across situations and across 
different interactants (e.g., inferences regarding what is conventional or relevant)” 
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(O’Neill 2012: 270-271). That is, children need to come to understand that “for 
certain meanings, speakers assume that there is a conventional form that should be 
used in the language community” (Clark 2009: 143; cf. O’Neill 2012: 271). Finally, 
in order to successfully apply social knowledge in an interaction, children need to 
develop “an appreciation of knowledge having to do with people and groups that a 
speaker must take into account to better align with the perspective of the person or 
group” (O’Neill 2012: 274). 
 O’Neill’s (2012) taxonomy gives a first entry point to the cognitive founda-
tions of the acquisition of pragmatics, but many researchers have so far been more 
specific and fine-grained when investigating the types of cognitive abilities that un-
derlie the development of pragmatics. For example, in their review of over 50 stud-
ies on the development of pragmatics and their underlying cognitive and social 
skills, Matthews et al. (2018: 189) divide measures of pragmatic skills into four 
sub-skills: conversational skills, referential communication, narrative, and irony. 
These four skills are supported to different degrees by children’s emerging cogni-
tive capacities in the domains of formal language proficiency, mentalising abilities 
such as cognitive perspective-taking, and executive functions, including working 
memory and inhibition (Matthews et al. 2018: 187). Rollins (2017: 301) argues that 
during pragmatic development, children move from sharing emotions to sharing 
perceptions and pursuing goals, and then to sharing attention and intentions. Like 
Matthews et al. (2018), Rollins (2017: 305-307) mentions conversational skills and 
narrative as important domains of pragmatic development. On her view, pragmatic 
skills require capacities to understand and coordinate joint engagement, to under-
stand intentional actions, to understand and initiate joint attention, and to anticipate 
and internalise social routines and roles (Rollins 2017: 301-305).  
Pragmatics, and as a consequence, linguistic perspectivation, on this view, 
consist of quite a heterogeneous set of skills and different cognitive abilities that 
are differentially activated depending on the interactional context (cf. Ryskin et al. 
2015: 910). However, to master all aspects of perspectivation, children need to de-
velop the cognitive skills and types of knowledge mentioned above so they can 
adequately communicate their own perspectives and take others’ perspectives into 
account. 
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Of course, in most situations, these capacities and types of knowledge inter-
act. In both domains of conversational skills and referential communication, the 
pragmatic skills involved depend crucially on two factors: knowledge of the struc-
ture and use of the linguistic constructions employed in social situations, on the one 
hand, and the internalisation of social knowledge about the different identities and 
roles of everyday life, on the other (Bryant 2009: 185). This also holds for the con-
ventionalised ways of referring to entities that are inherent in a speech community 
or emerge in interaction as interlocutors align on specific referring expressions, and 
form so-called ‘referential pacts’ (e.g., agreeing whether a toy we play with should 
be called a ‘tree’ or a ‘bush,’ or whether to refer to somebody as a ‘robber’ or a 
‘thief’ when talking about them, etc.). As these pacts are always tied to certain per-
spectives, they can be seen as an important aspect of the construction and negotia-
tion of perspectives. Matthews and colleagues (2010) found that children show sen-
sitivity to the normativity of referential pacts from as early as 3 years on. 
Nevertheless, neither in 3- nor 5-year-olds was it clear whether they understood that 
referential pacts can be seen as agreements “made between two people to take a 
given perspective on an object, where this agreement is believed by both interlocu-
tors to be mutual, and its maintenance is understood to be cooperative” (Matthews 
et al. 2010: 749; see also Barr & Keysar 2006: 923-926). However, in cases of mis-
understanding, children often actively try to establish what has gone wrong from 
their perspective. For example, they might protest and explicitly negotiate the term 
for a referent (“you called this a turtle, but it’s really a tortoise;” Matthews et al: 
2010: 757). It can be argued that by engaging in these kinds of experiences in 
natural discourse contexts children come to understand and internalise that 
depending on situation, common ground, and social roles, different speakers may 
use alternate terms for the same entity and that they express different perspectives 
on the referent (e.g., in a game situation, one person might call a red, roundish toy 
‘an apple,’ but to another person the toy might rather look like ‘a nose;’ Matthews 
et al: 2010: 757).  
Importantly, it is not only children but also caregivers who are sensitive to 
children’s knowledge states in the co-construal of meaning in interaction. For in-
stance, caregivers  
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have been found to memorize not only which words a child already knows, but also which 
ones it is about to learn, and to adjust the length of their utterances accordingly (Roy, Frank, 
& Roy 2009). Thus, people can be shown to attend to knowledge about previous encounters 
with their communication partners and to reason about them (Fischer 2015: 582). 
This brings us to another critical aspect of the acquisition of perspectivation, namely 
that of caregiver input. As perspective-taking abilities and abilities for linguistic 
perspectivation develop in interaction, it is of course also relevant to investigate the 
properties and interactive mechanisms employed in child-directed speech. This is 
the topic we will turn to next. 
 
2.2.3 Child-Directed Speech 
Child-directed speech (CDS), sometimes also called ‘parentese’9 (Ramírez‐Esparza 
et al. 2014), shows a number of special features that differentiate it from ‘standard 
speech.’ For the purposes of this study, we can describe it as “a special register of 
English” (Ninio 2011: 5). This definition circumvents the discussion whether all or 
at least some of the features found in this special register are universal or to which 
extent CDS as a special register is a culture-specific phenomenon (see, e.g., Lieven 
1994; Narayan & McDermott 2016; Piazza et al. 2017; Sulpizio et al. 2018 for dis-
cussions of cultural differences and universality in CDS).  
In terms of prosody, CDS has a higher pitch, as well as a wider range of 
pitches, and intonation is often exaggerated. There are also shorter phrases and 
longer pauses and speech, in general, is slower and vowels are articulated more 
clearly (Hoff 2014: 98-100; Saxton 2017: 88). These features are particularly 
pronounced in infant-directed speech; their exaggeration diminishes in child-di-
rected speech (Liu et al. 2009; Hoff 2014: 100). Special communicative features of 
the CDS register include restrictions in the range of topics to the immediate context, 
a higher frequency of questions and a lower frequency of declarative utterances. In 
general, child-directed speech is also more repetitive. CDS is also very selective 
regarding the words and constructions it uses (Cameron-Faulkner et al. 2003: 846; 
Saxton 2017: 89-91). Another CDS feature is the higher likelihood of repeating a 
 
9 As these features were at first taken to be indicative of a specific maternal speech style Newport et 
al. (1977) originally named it “motherese,” but the terms “infant-directed speech and child-directed 
speech are currently more widely used” (Hoff 2014: 98). One of the reasons for this change is that 
features of child-directed speech are used by caregivers in general but also by other adults not related 
to the child (Hoff 2014: 98). 
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child’s utterance back to them, often also expanding the utterance “or recasting it 
into a more sophisticated grammatical form (so, for example, the child’s Daddy car 
might be repeated as yes, that’s Daddy’s car, isn’t it?)” (Rowland 2014: 208; cf. 
Saxton 2017: 102). Adults also often explicitly instruct children and provide infor-
mation about the meanings of words, offer new labels and correct them (Hoff 2014: 
99).  
 A substantial amount of research has shown that CDS has a positive effect 
on children’s language learning. For example, it has been shown to aid children in 
mastering turn-taking, word segmentation, learning word meanings, and learning 
and comprehending constructions and grammatical and syntactic structures (e.g., 
Cameron-Faulkner et al. 2003; Wagner & Hoff 2012: 191; Ramírez‐Esparza et al. 
2014; Rowland 2014: 208-210; Foursha-Stevenson et al. 2017). Overall, then, it can 
be stated that CDS “is structured in ways that facilitate language acquisition” (Hills 
2013: 586; however, see Tomasello 2003: 108-112 for a more critical view).  
The structure and complexity of caregiver speech have also been linked to 
both the structure and complexity of children’s language, as well as to their vocab-
ulary development (Hoff & Naigles 2002; Huttenlocher et al. 2002; Ninio 2011: 5; 
Wagner & Hoff 2012: 191). Both diversity and sophistication of caregivers’ vocab-
ulary and syntactic complexity are positively related to children’s vocabulary size 
and later language learning (Hoff 2003; Rowe 2012; Ramírez‐Esparza et al. 2014: 
880). 
However, it is not only the structure of CDS that influences children’s lan-
guage learning, it is also the quality and quantity of the input. Many studies (e.g., 
Hart & Risley 1995; Hoff 2003; Rowe 2012) demonstrate that “children who hear 
more speech develop language more quickly” (Rowland 2014: 209). Regarding the 
quality of the input, both Carpenter et al. (1998: 48) and Hart and Risley (1999) 
found that children learn language more successfully the more they are jointly en-
gaged in activities with their caregivers (cf. Rowland 2014: 210; Ramírez-Esparza 
et al. 2014: 880). Similarly, Tamis-LeMonda et al. (2001) examined the contribu-
tion of maternal responsiveness, including measures such as descriptions, play and 
imitations, on children’s language acquisition. They found that maternal respon-
siveness predicted the timing of children achieving language milestones such as 
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“early expressive language: first imitations, first words, 50 words in expressive lan-
guage, combinatorial speech, and the use of language to talk about the past” (Tamis-
LeMonda et al. 2001: 748). 
Moreover, in many respects, child language and caregiver language are 
structurally very similar. For example, Ninio (2011: 5) analysed global features of 
linguistic structures in parental and children’s speech, namely the distribution of 
“the three core grammatical relations subject-verb, verb-object, and verb-indirect 
object.” She found that “the child dialect is almost exactly identical to the parental 
register in the distribution of the three grammatical relations in the clausal core, 
despite children’s much smaller verbal repertoire” (Ninio 2011: 5). Both CDS and 
children’s language also display quite a high degree of schematicity. In their study 
of the 12 English-speaking children in the Manchester corpus, Cameron-Faulkner 
et al. (2003: 843) found that 51% of all utterances made by mothers started with 
one of 52 item-based phrases. Most of these consisted of phrases with two words 
or morphemes, with 45% of them beginning with one of just 17 words.10 Interest-
ingly, many of the same item-based phrases were also used by the children them-
selves, “in some cases at a rate that correlated highly with their own mother’s fre-
quency of use” (Cameron-Faulkner et al. 2003: 843). Similarly, in their study of 
children’s early syntactic creativity, Lieven et al. (2003: 333) found that only 37% 
of multi-word utterances in an hour-long sample of a child aged 2;01.11 “were 
‘novel’ in the sense that they had not been said in their entirety before.” What is 
more, out of these ‘novel’ utterances, in 74% of cases only one operation was re-
quired to match their utterance with a previous one. The great majority of such 
utterances in fact consisted of the substitution of only a single word, “(usually a 
noun) into a previous utterance or schema” (Lieven et al. 2003: 333).11 
What follows from these observations for the current study is that if we are 
interested in the acquisition and development of pretend utterances, we should also 
take CDS into account. On the one hand, mothers’ use of pretend can be seen as 
both the input as well as the target of children’s acquisition of pretend word forms 
 
10 These 17 words are: “What (8.6%), That (5.3%), It (4.2%), You (3.1%), Are/Aren’t (3.0%), I 
(2.9%), Do/Does/Did/Don’t (2.9%), Is (2.3%), Shall (2.1%), A (1.7%), Can/Can’t (1.7%), Where 
(1.6%), There (1.5%), Who (1.4%), Come (1.0%), Look (1.0%), and Let’s (1.0%)” (Cameron-
Faulkner et al. 2003: 863). 
11 This holds not only for monolingual, but also for bilingual language acquisition (Quick et al. 2019) 
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and their uses. In addition, mothers’ use of pretend also sheds light on pretend play 
activities and their semantic target domains. This is why in the current study, moth-
ers’ use and distribution of pretend in the corpus data will be analysed in equal 
detail. Mothers’ use of pretend is also of intense interest as it allows us to investi-
gate the structure of pretend play interactions. That is, it enables us to investigate 
the question of to what degree pretence behaviours are linguistically coordinated, 
negotiated and commented on by both mothers and children, respectively, and how 
these interactions might change.  
This way of looking at the structure of and changes in how children and 
mothers coordinate pretend play is consistent with the ‘linguistic tuning hypothesis’ 
(Yurovsky et al. 2016: 2093). According to this hypothesis, caregivers not only 
fine-tune “the semantic and syntactic content of their utterances to match their 
children’s level of understanding” (Tamis-LeMonda et al. 2001: 749), but also 
structure interactions in ways that facilitate children’s learning how to use language. 
In a way, caregivers try to ensure that they and the child “share a way of looking at 
the world” (Snow 1986: 77-78; cf. Tamis-LeMonda et al. 2001: 749). Clark (2014: 
105) summarises this process as follows: 
In talking with their children, adults display their uses of language in each context, and offer 
extensive feedback on form, meaning, and usage, within their conversational exchanges. 
These interactions depend critically on joint attention, physical co-presence, and conversa-
tional co-presence – essential factors that help children assign meanings, establish 
reference, and add to common ground.  
In this way, adults provide children with feedback on what linguistic structures 
mean and how they can be used (Clark 2014: 105). It is one of the goals of the 
present corpus study to elucidate how caregivers do this in the context of pretend 
play.  
 At the beginning of children’s pretence activities, we expect mothers to 
guide both the play process, but also to offer input for their children on how to talk 
about pretend play. However, as both children’s sociocognitive as well as linguistic 
capacities increase, we expect children to become more active communicators and 
coordinators of pretence activities. This is consistent with research on the linguistic 
tuning hypothesis, which has found “a high degree of mostly parent-led coordina-
tion early in development that decreases as children become more proficient lan-
guage learners and users” (Yurovsky et al. 2016: 2093). 
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 Throughout this chapter, it has been made clear that it is children’s socio-
cognitive capacities that take centre stage when examining children’s acquisition of 
linguistic perspectivation. In line with the cognitive commitment of CL, I will there-
fore review research on children’s sociocognitive development and perspectivation 
in the next section. 
 
2.3 Cognitive Development and Perspectivation 
This section will review some of the most important aspects of children’s develop-
ment in the domain of social cognition. The term ‘social cognition’ refers not only 
to the cognitive capacities that underlie how we think about other people and their 
intentions, desires, knowledge and beliefs, but also to skills for participating in 
shared social activities and endeavours (Carpenter 2011: 106). Infants’ and young 
children’s sociocognitive capacities develop increasingly as they grow older, and 
their abilities for social understanding and social interaction become more and more 
sophisticated and complex (see, e.g., Carpenter 2011; Meltzoff 2011; Carpendale 
& Lewis 2015 for reviews). Many of these changes in children’s sociocognitive 
skills and capacities are directly related to the notion of perspective and perspec-
tivation. Children increasingly develop an understanding of how their own perspec-
tive might differ from that of other people in an interaction, as well as an under-
standing that other people have perspectives on the world that are different from the 
ones they have (Moll & Tomasello 2007a). This understanding is related to socio-
cognitive developments in a number of domains, some of which I will elaborate on 
below.  
One crucial first stepping stone for understanding others and their perspec-
tives is understanding that others are in a way “like me” and also have similar per-
ceptual experiences. Brooks and Meltzoff (2002) showed that 14-month-olds, but 
not 12-month-olds, understand that adults cannot see through an opaque barrier and 
do not follow the head movements of an adult who is wearing a blindfold. In a 
follow-up study, Meltzoff and Brooks (2008) provided 12-month-olds with self-
experience wearing blindfolds. After a 7.5-minute training session they too did not 
follow an adult wearing a blindfold in a gaze-following study, as they were able to 
make inferences about the adult’s perception based on their own experience. By 18 
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months of age, children can make even more complex inferences. When presented 
with self-experience with a trick blindfold that looks opaque from the outside but 
that they could actually see through, infants did follow adults’ gaze when they saw 
them wearing a blindfold. These behaviours can be seen as primitive forms of per-
spective-taking (Meltzoff & Brooks 2008; cf. Meltzoff 2011: 62-66).  
Infants also show sophisticated skills of inference in the domain of imita-
tion. In a classic study, Gergely and his colleagues (2002) showed that 14-month-
old human infants imitate rationally. Infants were presented with the following ex-
perimental setting: An adult was sitting in front of a table with a light-box on it. The 
light-box could only be switched on by touching its top. In one condition infants 
saw an adult who had a blanket wrapped around her but had her hands free. She 
then leaned down and touched the light-box with her head, thus switching it on. In 
another condition, the adult had her hands occupied, holding onto the blanket 
wrapped around her as if she was cold. She then demonstrated the same action. 
When infants were given the opportunity to switch on the light-box themselves, 
infants used their head to switch on the light-box only when they had witnessed the 
hands-free condition, but not when they had witnessed the hands-occupied condi-
tion. After being presented with the latter condition, they just pressed down on it 
with their hands. Presumably, they understood that in the hands-free condition, the 
specific way of switching on the light-box was used intentionally. That is, they un-
derstood that the adult could have used her hands to turn on the light-box, but did 
not do so, so they imitated this behaviour. In their imitative behaviour, infants and 
young children therefore display rudimentary abilities to take the other’s perspec-
tive (Carpenter 2011: 108; for a review of children’s imitative behaviour in these 
kinds of tasks, see Hoehl et al. 2019).  
Interestingly, chimpanzees also show selective imitation in certain tasks, 
suggesting that humans share basic perspective-taking capacities with the other 
great apes in the domain of imitation (Whiten et al. 2009; cf. Call & Tomasello 
2008). What is more, both enculturated chimpanzees (Buttelmann et al. 2007) and 
domestic dogs (Range et al. 2007; Huber et al. 2018) show evidence of rational or 
‘over-imitation,’ which indicates an important role for socialisation and encultura-
tion for these early forms of imitative perspective-taking (cf. Pleyer 2017b: 77-78). 
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Already at a young age, children also display unique skills and motivations 
for collaborating in joint activities with others, aligning with them, and sharing psy-
chological states with them (Carpenter 2011: 122). In other words, from early on, 
children possess rudimentary skills and motivations to share perspectives and to 
make inferences based on an understanding of perspectives. This can be seen in the 
domain of pointing, which I will discuss in detail in the following section. 
 
2.3.1 Pointing and Perspectivation 
Directing and sharing attention via pointing is one of the most important behaviours 
emerging in infants’ social lives. It emerges between 8 and 15 months of age 
(Carpenter et al. 1998; Liszkowski et al. 2012; Carpendale & Lewis 2015: 385). 
There is convincing evidence that infants at this age really derive their gratification 
from sharing their perspective with others, instead of pointing only to get the adult 
to pay attention to them: When 12-month-olds point to an interesting event, for 
instance, they are only satisfied if the adult engages in joint attention towards the 
event with them, but not if the adult looks only at them or only at the event 
(Liszkowski et al. 2004). When presented with an interesting experience, such as 
Grover from “Sesame Street” suddenly appearing in a hole in a large piece of cloth, 
infants point to Grover and are only satisfied when the adult engages in joint atten-
tion with them towards the situation, not if the adult simply looks at Grover. At 12 
months of age, children therefore show clear abilities for joint attention. That is, 
they show the ability to attend to the same situation together with another person in 
triadic engagement that is directed at both the other and an event in the outside 
world (Eilan 2005). 
Comprehension studies also show that around this age, infants are able to 
grasp the relevance of pointing gestures as a cooperative signal in a joint activity 
characterised by a joint attentional frame or common ground (Clark & Murphy 
1982: 182; Moll & Tomasello 2007a: 122). The term common ground is used to 
refer to the sum of information that interlocutors assume they share (Clark 1996: 
92-96). It is inferred on the basis of three factors: a) physical or perceptual 
copresence, e.g., a movie, person or scene both interlocutors have seen or are seeing 
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at the moment;12 b) linguistic copresence or the ‘discourse record’ of what has been 
said in the course of a conversation; and c) community membership, e.g., 
membership in the community of all Parisians, students, linguists, and so forth, 
which involves a body of knowledge that is assumed to be universal in that 
community (Clark & Murphy 1982: 189; Barr & Keysar 2006: 903).  
Infants and young children are sensitive to common ground from early on. 
For example, in a series of studies, 14-month-olds gave an experimenter the toy that 
was unfamiliar and novel to the experimenter but not to the infants themselves when 
the adult ambiguously asked for ‘it’ (Tomasello & Haberl 2003; Moll & Tomasello 
2007b). They made this choice based on which toy they had experienced together 
with the adult, and which toy they had instead experienced with another adult. That 
is, they took the adult’s perspective into account instead of behaving egocentrically.  
These and other results thus run counter to Piaget’s (e.g., 1974: 139) famous 
claim that young children’s thinking is fundamentally egocentric. In fact, subse-
quent research has shown that the experimental tasks Piaget used to support his 
claim (e.g., Piaget & Inhelder 1956: 242) can be solved by children at a much earlier 
age when the tasks are more accessible, less complex, and involve fewer demands 
on cognitive performance (e.g., Masangkay et al. 1974; Light & Nix 1983; Gzesh 
& Surber 1985). Nevertheless, although there is much research supporting the po-
sition that quite young children in principle have a capacity for at least rudimentary 
perspective-taking, views on the degree of infants’ and young children’s egocen-
trism are still mixed. Some psychologists still see them as tending to be “profoundly 
egocentric” (Epley & Waytz 2009: 1228; see also Epley et al. 2004), whereas others 
judge their apparent egocentrism as an effect of high cognitive processing costs in 
unusual situations (cf. Bryant 2009: 357; see also Nadigy & Sedivy 2002). 
 
12 The following anecdote can serve to illustrate this: my friend and colleague Stefan Hartmann and 
I were once standing outside at a conference shortly after it had rained, when Ronald Langacker 
walked up to us and simply said “Rainbow.” This utterance was only interpretable to us because of 
our physical and perceptual copresence with Ronald Langacker, which prompted us to look up and 
see the rainbow in the distance. This example also shows that just as pointing, words and 
constructions are often used to direct attention to, or target things in the environment (Talmy 2017: 
2). 
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Regardless of the question whether young children might show egocentric 
biases in some domains, Akhtar and colleagues (1996) showed that similar pro-
cesses as the ones investigated by Tomasello and Haberl (2003) and Moll and 
Tomasello (2007b) are at work in word learning. This underscores the importance 
of an understanding of perspectives for language acquisition and the acquisition of 
perspectivation (see Section 2.2.1). In a similar experimental setting, infants even 
knew “which of these objects ‘we’ – and not just me or you alone – had experienced 
in a special way in the immediate past” (Moll et al. 2008: 89).  
Other evidence for children’s understanding of common ground comes from 
a study by Liebal and colleagues (2009), who engaged 14-month-old infants in a 
cleaning-up game with an adult. They found that infants only cleaned up the objects 
when the adult they were engaged in the game with pointed to them, but not when 
it was a different adult who had just come into the room. That is, they used the 
absence or presence of common ground to interpret the adults’ communicative ges-
ture. These data suggest that infants and young children develop a rich knowledge 
of sharing and taking perspectives. 
By 18 months, children also understand complementary roles in social 
games and cooperative problem-solving tasks. For example, in a game setting 
where one person rolls a ball down a tube, and another one catches it with a can, 
children readily switch roles and also encourage and actively reengage the adult to 
take their role when the adult ceases to collaborate in the shared activity (Warneken 
et al. 2006). This ability is based on the emergence of an understanding of different 
roles in simple cooperative activities in joint attentional formats (Bruner 1983: 39-
42), e.g., playing together, taking a bath, changing diapers, etc. (Moll & Meltzoff 
2011b). 
 The cognitive skills and motivations underlying these behaviours are called 
shared intentionality. Shared intentionality denotes the motivation and ability to en-
gage with others in co-operative, collaborative activities with joint goals, plans and 
intentions and to share attention, experiences and other psychological states with 
others (Tomasello et al. 2005; Tomasello 2008; Carpenter 2011). Children acquire 
conventionalised ways of how ‘we’ do things, and conventionalised ways of how 
‘we’ see things: a shared ‘we-perspective’ (Tuomela 2007: 3). As we have seen, the 
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shared intentionality infrastructure underlying these skills and motivations emerges 
most clearly at the beginning of infants’ second year of life. 
 Pointing is of special interest for accounts of the development of perspec-
tivation in that it can be argued that pointing gestures are already perspectival in a 
sense. Pointing gestures in themselves do not ‘mean’ anything, but instead, derive 
their meaning from shared context and common ground. For instance, when point-
ing at a log of wood, depending on context and the common ground we share, this 
pointing gesture can construe the log “as firewood, an obstacle that needs to be 
removed, a crutch if you just twisted your ankle, a suitable weapon for a pretend 
play swordfight, etc. (cf. Tomasello 2014: 57)” (Pleyer & Winters 2014: 26). What 
this indicates is that cooperative pointing “creates different conceptualizations or 
construals of things” (Tomasello 2014: 57; cf. Moll & Tomasello 2007a: 644).  
Two important implications follow from this. First, this view of pointing is 
very similar to the notion of ‘meaning potentials’ and the importance of interactive 
meaning construction outlined in Section 2.1.2. This strengthens our assumption 
that linguistic perspectivation and its development are based on general 
sociocognitive and interactional mechanisms, which can be argued to develop on a 
continuum with non-linguistic, pre-verbal meaning construal (cf. Pleyer 2014b: 
244). Secondly, as Tomasello (2014: 68) states, 
[c]ommunicators conceptualizing or perspectivizing things in different ways for different 
communicative partners (depending on judgements of common ground, relevance, and 
newness), and then recipients comprehending the intended perspectives through socially 
recursive inferences, is not the result of becoming a language user, but rather its prerequi-
site. 
However, as will be outlined below, linguistic interaction affords and facilitates 
much more complex modes of perspectivation. The development of communication 
and the development of social cognition are evidently interwoven, and this creates 
a feedback loop between the two: “Early forms of social understanding overlap with 
and underlie communication and language, and language then allows for more 
complex forms of social understanding” (Carpendale & Lewis 2015: 382). 
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2.3.2 Types of Perspective-Taking in Cognitive Development 
As we have seen in the previous two sections, children develop increasingly com-
plex sociocognitive behaviours, indicating increasingly complex capacities for per-
spective-taking. This also implies that perspective-taking is not a holistic, unitary 
entity, which children either possess or not. Instead, it consists of different skills 
and abilities that emerge in different time frames. This is why in this section, I dis-
cuss conceptualisations of different types of perspective-taking that have been pro-
posed in the literature. 
Tomasello (2019: 64-68), for instance, distinguishes three types of coordi-
nation of perspectives relevant to children’s interactions with others. These repre-
sent increasingly complex ways of engaging with other people’s perspectives and 
also constitute a developmental progression of types of perspective-taking.  
First, infants and young children attempt to align perspectives with others, 
which includes maintaining or re-establishing joint attention on a situation or activ-
ity. This they do, for example, by pointing, showing an object to an adult, or by 
simple utterances. Infants and young children are usually able to do this between 
14 to 18 months of age. Tomasello (2019: 66) argues that this should not be seen as 
full-blown perspective-taking. Instead, the simple alignment of perspectives re-
quires a basic understanding if a perceptual perspective is shared or not, but it does 
not represent an explicit comparison of perspectives on the child’s part.  
In a second step, children develop the ability to exchange perspectives. Ex-
changing perspectives differs from the simple alignment of perspectives in that it is 
done in conversations with brief back-and-forth turns. Interactants express different 
attitudes and perspectives towards a given situation, for example by using different 
words that embody different perspectives: “It’s a worm” – “No, it’s a stick.” These 
kinds of perspective exchanges in conversation emerge around 2 and a half years 
of age. Cognitively, what exchanges like these entail is “a shared focus on a mental 
construal of something, about which we express different perspectives or attitudes” 
(Tomaselllo 2019: 67). This description also points to the key differences between 
aligning and exchanging perspectives. The obvious difference is that when perspec-
tives are aligned, there is only one perspective, but when perspectives are 
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exchanged, there are different perspectives. The second difference is that when ex-
changing perspectives, we move beyond the here and now, and not only communi-
cate about the situation at hand, but about our perspectives and attitudes towards a 
situation. So instead of involving simple bouts of joint attention to a situation, per-
spective exchanges involve what O’Madagain and Tomasello (2019) call “joint at-
tention to mental content” (cf. Tomasello 2019: 67). 
The third and most complex way that children learn to deal with perspec-
tives is by coordinating conflicting perspectives. Coordinating conflicting perspec-
tives goes beyond exchanging perspectives in that children have to coordinate mul-
tiple perspectives that are simultaneously present and in conflict. One classic ex-
ample of these types of situations are false-belief tasks (e.g., Wimmer & Perner 
1983; Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Perner et al. 1987; Gopnik & Astington 1988). For 
example, Perner et al. (1987) and Gopnik and Astington (1988) presented children 
with a “Smarties” box and asked them what was inside, to which children, of course, 
answered “candy.” However, they then opened the box and found that it, in fact, 
contained pencils. Now they were asked what another person would say or expect 
the box contain. Only around their fourth birthday were children able to answer 
successfully that another person would expect the box to contain candy although, 
in fact, it contained pencils (cf. Wellman et al. 2001). This capacity to attribute 
complex mental states to others that can differ from reality and from their own per-
spective is often called theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff 1978; Wimmer & 
Perner 1983; Wellman 2011). The key problem children have with this task is that 
of coordinating conflicting perspectives. When the difference in perspective is less 
salient, and children or even infants just have to alternate between perspectives, or 
to simply reason or draw inferences about another person’s behaviour (e.g., which 
of two boxes will somebody choose) they fare much better. In fact, more than “30 
published studies using nontraditional false-belief tasks have now reported positive 
results with children between 6 months and 3 years of age (Scott & Baillargeon, 
2017; Scott, Roby, & Smith, 2017)” (Roby & Scott 2018: 10).  
This problem with the simultaneous coordination of conflicting perspectives 
is also evident in the so-called dual naming task. As we have seen in Section 2.2.1, 
children are able to adopt and express different perspectives on the same situation 
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by applying different words to referents from age 2 onwards. However, children 
seem to struggle with declarative, metalinguistic perspectival tasks involved in 
identity assessment and construction (‘knowing that’) until the age of 4 (and in 
many other contexts well beyond that age). Perner and colleagues (Doherty & 
Perner 1998; Perner et al. 2002, 2003), for example, found that children below that 
age have trouble in cognitively demanding experimental settings in which they have 
to judge whether a doll the children interacted with had used correct synonyms for 
a referent (e.g., “lady” for “woman”). They also had problems with choosing the 
right superordinate category for a referent (e.g., “animal” for “cat”) and with judg-
ing whether somebody else had used the right category. However, they seem to fare 
much better in naturalistic interactions that require performative, procedural lin-
guistic abilities (‘knowing how’) for perspectivation, that is, in interactions charac-
terised by shared intentionality within a joint attentional frame and a communica-
tive intention and pragmatic motivation to take, set or share perspectives. 
Moll and Meltzoff (2011b: 287) propose a slightly different, but largely con-
current model of the “series of social-cognitive steps taken by infants and young 
children on their way to a mature understanding of perspectives.” Their model is 
inspired by and expands on the model of stages of perspective-taking by Flavell and 
colleagues (e.g., Flavell 1977, 1988, 1992 for reviews).  
Moll and Meltzoff (2011b: 287) designate the capacities to engage in joint 
attention with others, which emerges around children’s first birthday, as “level 0 
perspective-taking.” At this age, as we have seen, children can share rudimentary 
perspectives in joint engagement but seem not to have an awareness of perspective 
differences.  
Children then progress to “level 1 perspective-taking” (cf. Flavell 1977: 46-
48, 1988: 250). This type of perspective-taking is divided into two skills, which 
emerge at different times during children’s development. First, children develop 
“level 1 experiential perspective-taking,” which reflects children’s ability to know 
what others are familiar with based on previous interactions and joint engagements 
with them (cf. the experiments by Tomasello & Haberl 2003; Moll & Tomasello 
2007b; Moll et al. 2008 described in Section 2.3.1 above). As we have seen above, 
children reach level 1 experiential perspective-taking between 14 to 18 months. 
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Around 2 years of age, children then reach the stage of “level 1 visual perspective-
taking.” At this age, “they know what, e.g., which objects in a room, others can and 
cannot see from their current visuo-spatial viewpoint” (Moll & Meltzoff 2011b: 
287; emphasis in the original).  
An understanding not only of what others see from their perspective, but 
also how other people see things, emerges when children reach “level 2 perspective-
taking” (cf. Flavell 1988: 250-251). As with level 1, Moll and Meltzoff (2011b) 
divide level 2 into two sublevels: 2A and 2B. At level 2A, children can take another 
person’s perspective on a situation, even when it differs from their own. However, 
at this stage they can only do so if they are not explicitly required to contrast and 
coordinate their own perspective with that of an adult, or when they do not have to 
explicitly contrast appearance and reality (“She thinks it’s a chocolate bar, but it’s 
really a sponge;” Moll & Tomasello 2012; see also Tomasello 2019: 71-72). An 
experiment by Moll and Meltzoff (2011a) suggests that level 2A perspective-taking 
emerges around children’s third birthday. In their experiment, children were asked 
for an object by an adult. However, adults saw the object through a tinted filter, 
which to them made the objects appear to be a different colour from the one the 
children perceived. Nevertheless, children at this age were able to hand adults the 
correct object, taking into account which colour the adult saw from their perspec-
tive. Moreover, when asked to make a blue object appear green for an adult, chil-
dren correctly placed the object behind a yellow filter so the adult would see it as 
green, even though they themselves saw it as blue. However, in a follow-up study, 
Moll et al. (2013) demonstrated that 3-year-old children were not able to judge ex-
plicitly in what colour an adult saw a picture, and, in contrast, which colour they 
themselves saw it, neither when asked to reply verbally or when asked to point. 
That is, whereas at age 3 they are able to take others’ perspectives, they are still not 
able to confront conflicting perspectives. This is what Moll and Meltzoff (2011b) 
refer to as “level 2B perspective-taking,” and Tomasello (2019: 67) as “coordinat-
ing conflicting perspectives.” This ability, as measured for example by the false-
belief task, the dual-naming task, and the appearance-reality task, only seems to 
emerge between 4 and 5 years of age with the development of a full-blown theory 
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of mind (Moll & Meltzoff 2011b: 299; cf. Wellman et al. 2001; Moll et al. 2013; 
Tomasello 2019: 67-76).  
I have discussed two mostly concurrent accounts of the development of per-
spective-taking. Although Meltzoff and Moll (2011b) frame their account of the 
development of perspective-taking in terms of stages, both their and Tomasello’s 
(2019) analyses show that perspective-taking consists of a quite complex set of sub-
skills that develop along different trajectories and with different influences. This 
picture is consistent with the multicomponent view of perspective-taking already 
discussed in Section 2.2.2: Infants’ and young children’s capacity for perspective-
taking and -setting consists of a complex network of different skills, with each skill 
developing differently in a complex web of developmental trajectories. This also 
means that there are different trajectories and performance levels for different sub-
skills, tasks, persons, contexts, domains, and cultures (cf. Fentress 2005: 495; 
Mascolo & Fischer 2005, 2015; Ryskin et al. 2015: 910). 
However, one key question that remains is how this development takes place 
and what factors drive and influence it. There is overwhelming evidence from the 
fields of comparative psychology and evolutionary anthropology that children’s 
sociocognitive development is based on a uniquely human set of skills and 
motivations such as shared intentionality that build the foundation for perspective-
taking and linguistic perspectivation (see, e.g., Tomasello et al. 2005; Call & 
Tomasello 2008; Hare 2011; Seyfarth & Cheney 2013; Scott-Phillips 2015; 
Tomasello 2019 for reviews). The sociocognitive and biological platform reviewed 
in this section is of crucial importance for the development of perspective-taking. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that this development is primarily driven by 
interaction and participation in shared practices using cultural and symbolic arte-
facts. This is in line with current views on cognitive development, which construe 
it “as a complex process that is grounded both in biological preparedness, and in 
the highly evolved cultural context that surrounds and nurtures the child from in-
fancy and beyond” (Callaghan 2005: 204; cf. Bjorklund & Causey 2018: 9-11). In 
addition, children also actively contribute to the shaping of their sociocultural and 
interactive environments on the basis of their biological characteristics (Carpendale 
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et al. 2018: 23). I will outline the cultural and interactive aspects of the development 
of perspectivation and perspective-taking in more detail in the next section. 
 
2.3.3 Perspectivation, Interaction, and Cultural Artefacts 
Summarizing the discussion so far, it can be stated that the development of perspec-
tive-taking and perspectivation has two main driving forces. One is interaction, and 
the other is children’s experience with perspectival cultural artefacts such as lin-
guistic constructions. I will discuss each one in turn. 
As outlined above, differences in perspective and attempts at coordinating 
and sharing perspectives are a fundamental aspect of all human interactions (see 
Barr & Keysar 2006; Brown-Schmidt & Heller 2018 for reviews). For children, 
such situations frequently occur when they are jointly attending to a situation with 
an adult, but each interactant has different attitudes, desires, experiences, and per-
spectives relating to the situation. As Barresi and Moore (1996), Moll and 
Tomasello (2007a), and Carpendale and Lewis (2015) argue, these types of inter-
action may enable infants and young children to ‘break into’ the concept of per-
spective by realising that people can see the same situation but have different per-
spectives on it. In summary, then, it is through social activity, shared practices and 
interactions with caregivers that infants come to be aware of different perspectives, 
leading “gradually to the development of an ability to relate to others’ perspectives 
on the world” (Carpendale & Lewis 2015: 389). The previous section has outlined 
some of the social factors and influences that are relevant to the development of 
perspective-taking. However, it is also important to note that “it takes two to tango; 
the child also contributes to the nature of the relationship. Children’s own charac-
teristics necessarily influence the extent and nature of their social experience within 
which they develop social understanding” (Carpendale & Lewis 2015: 402). 
As we have seen, one of the biggest challenges for children is that of dealing 
with conflicting perspectives. Children become aware of conflicting perspectives 
when they encounter what Perner et al. (2003) call ‘perspective problems.’ These 
occur when two people are jointly attending to the same referent but not only have 
a different experiential or visual viewpoint, but also different attitudes and beliefs 
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about the referent. It is through interactions like these that children develop an un-
derstanding of full-blown perspective-taking. To simultaneously keep conflicting 
perspectives in mind, children need to develop capacities for executive functions 
and inhibitory control (e.g., Diamond 2013; Devine & Hughes 2014; Hughes & 
Devine 2015: 586-589).  
In addition, there is substantial research indicating that language plays a key 
role in the development of advanced perspective-taking, especially when it comes 
to the capacity for theory of mind (e.g., Astington & Baird 2005; Hughes & Devine 
2015: 589-593). One contributing factor here is perspective-shifting discourse and 
‘perspective talk’ (Farrant et al. 2012) that helps children develop an understanding 
of different perspectives (Lohmann & Tomasello 2003; Hale & Tager-Flusberg 
2003; Perner & Roessler 2012; Tomasello 2019: 78).  
Regarding specific linguistic structures involved in the development of 
perspective-taking, a number of studies have shown that children’s experience with 
and mastery of complement clauses or ‘propositional attitude constructions’ 
(Tomasello & Rakoczy 2003; Tomasello 2019: 79), such as “she thinks that the toy 
is green,” are positively correlated with theory of mind and the ability to coordinate 
conflicting perspectives (e.g., de Villiers & Pyers 2002; Lohmann & Tomasello 
2003; Perner et al. 2005). On this view, such constructions encode perspective-
shifting within a single utterance. The matrix clause “she thinks” encodes the per-
spective that the proposition talked about is, in fact, subjective, whereas the com-
plement clause encodes the proposition that is held to be true by the conceptualiser 
(Tomasello 2019: 79). The amount of mental state talk and mental state verbs used 
in interactions with children has also been found to positively correlate with chil-
dren’s social understanding, their own mental state language and perspective-taking 
capacities (Ruffman et al. 2002; Taumoepeau & Ruffman 2008). The latter aspect 
is of course also highly relevant for our investigation of pretend utterances. 
 But even more fundamentally, it is language itself that facilitates children’s 
understanding of perspectives. As outlined above, words and linguistic construc-
tions embody perspectives on situations and in learning language, children build a 
complex network of constructions to express different perspectives. From a cultural 
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perspective, what children learn are specific cultural and symbolic artefacts. As 
Tomasello (1999: 8-9) outlines, 
[l]inguistic symbols are especially important symbolic artifacts for developing children 
because they embody the ways that previous generations of human beings in a social group 
have found it useful to categorize and construe the world for purposes of interpersonal 
communication. […] As the child masters the linguistic symbols of her culture she thereby 
acquires the ability to adopt multiple perspectives simultaneously on one and the same 
perceptual situation. 
This means that the shared symbolic storage of constructions of a culture has de-
veloped historically out of processes of cultural transmission and language change, 
and is the accumulated result of perspectivation attempts of previous generations 
(cf. Köller 2004: 390; Pleyer & Galuschek 2016: 180-182). These perspectivation 
attempts first become micro-entrenched in individual interactions. Based on this, 
they then become entrenched and conventionalised in a speech community (cf. 
Pleyer 2017a). They can therefore be seen “as solutions to recurrent tasks that indi-
vidual speakers, or groups of speakers, create (cf. Dąbrowska, 2010)” (Fischer 
2015: 581-2). Language users can employ the perspectivation potential a language 
has accumulated to share, express, and negotiate perspectives in interaction (cf. 
Köller 2004: 390-391; Pleyer 2017c: 326).  
Cultural artefacts such as linguistic symbols serve as tools that support and 
extend children’s thinking (Bjorklund & Causey 2018: 70-75). This means that ac-
quiring and internalising these cultural artefacts transforms human cognition in fun-
damental ways and enables children to become adept at processes of perspectivation 
and perspective-taking (Moll & Tomasello 2007a; Tomasello 2014: 100-101).  
Evidence for this also comes from comparative-psychological studies in 
cognitive science. For instance, chimpanzees’ performance in the so-called ‘reverse 
reward contingency paradigm’ enables us to draw important conclusions regarding 
the influence of cultural artefacts on human cognition and behaviour (cf. Boysen et 
al. 1996; Call 2011). In this paradigm, a chimpanzee has to pick between two dishes 
that contain different quantities of fruit. What is special in this paradigm is that the 
chimpanzees always get the dish they have not picked. However, they are unable to 
learn this contingency and keep picking the one with more fruit. They are not able 
to inhibit their initial response and cannot focus their attention on the nature of the 
problem-solving task.  
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Interestingly, the results are different when symbol-trained chimpanzees are 
presented with a version of the task that differs in one crucial aspect: Instead of 
having to pick one of the two dishes directly, they are presented with Arabic nu-
merals whose meaning they have previously been taught. In this setup, chimpanzees 
are able to learn that they have to pick the numeral representing the smaller amount 
of fruits in order to get the other dish.  
The use of symbols thus seems to allow chimpanzees to distance themselves 
“from the gravitational pull of their ordinary perception-action routines” (Clark 
2005: 240) and to adopt a relational perspective on the situation. Symbol use there-
fore enables humans and non-human apes to adopt a perspective that is ‘decoupled’ 
from an immediate reaction pattern and increases their ‘response breadth’ (Sterelny 
2003: 29-30; cf. Pleyer 2012b: 6). This perspective is less influenced by the direct 
incentive and motivational features of the reward and enables them to think about 
the task in relational terms. On this interpretation, symbols allow apes to focus their 
attention on relational aspects of the situation (cf. Clark 2005; Call 2011). It has to 
be noted, though, that replacing the rewards by other stand-in objects such as stones 
or colored boxes concealing the dishes has the same enabling effect. There are also 
some chimpanzees who do learn to solve the task after being exposed to it in enough 
trials (cf. Call 2011: 10-11). 
These results also allow us to draw inferences about the influence of the 
acquisition of linguistic symbolic constructions on children’s cognition (cf. Clark 
2005; see also Bruner 1983: 55). In Vygotsky’s (1978: 99) words, the acquisition 
of symbols promotes children’s “emancipation from situational constraints” (cf. 
Sokol et al. 2015: 301). Cultural artefacts such as linguistic symbols support ex-
tended forms of perspective-taking and facilitate the human ability to adopt a more 
schematic and relational viewpoint on a situation (cf. Gentner & Christie 2010: 
262). In addition, they also enable children to adopt and express perspectives in 
increasingly sophisticated ways by offering “new ways of parsing a scene into sa-
lient, attendable components and events” (Clark 2005: 240; cf. Tomasello 2011: 
244).  
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Becoming symbol users is also the key foundation for children’s ability to 
become socialised into a community and acquire its norms, values, and roles (cf. 
Maccoby 2015: 3; Monika Pleyer 2019: 50). Acquiring cultural and symbolic arte-
facts then builds the foundation for children’s further sociocognitive development. 
It also enables them to develop an understanding of institutional realities, moral 
values, and social norms such as an understanding of polite and impolite linguistic 
behaviour (cf. Monika Pleyer 2019; Tomasello 2019: 306).  
 
2.4 Summary 
In this section I have outlined some of the central concepts that play a role 
in children’s and caregivers’ everyday use of pretend. In pretend activities, inter-
locutors negotiate a perspective on a pretend play situation through instances of 
perspectivation and perspective-taking. Pretend utterances can be seen as instances 
of perspectivation, as they express a particular perspective on a situation. They also 
involve perspective-taking as interlocutors try to see the pretend situation from the 
point of view of their communicative partner. I then took a closer look at the theo-
retical foundations of perspectivations from the point of view of CL, language ac-
quisition, and cognitive development. CL stresses the close interrelationship of lan-
guage, cognition, conceptualisation and construal, with the latter two concepts also 
being tightly integrated with the notions of perspective and perspectivation. CL is 
also tied to usage-based, constructionist approaches, which highlight that perspec-
tival linguistic constructions such as those found in pretend utterances should be 
seen in the context of actual language usage. I then reviewed some of the key tenets 
of work on the development of perspectivation in language acquisition research. 
Specifically, word learning was described as an essentially perspectival task as chil-
dren have to learn that words embody specific perspectives and potential for con-
strual, with the perspectival uses of pretend being an example of one such word. 
Word learning is also fundamentally pragmatic in nature, and the development of 
usages of pretend is therefore also a matter of children’s overall process of learning 
how to use language in context. Lastly, child-directed speech serves as an important 
scaffold in children’s language acquisition, and both conversational turns as well as 
the pretend scenarios under investigation are jointly constructed in interaction with 
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caregivers. Regarding cognitive development and perspectivation, I reviewed some 
key aspects of the development of children’s social cognition. Key cognitive abili-
ties that underlie this development are an understanding that others are ‘like me,’ 
imitation, joint attention, pointing, an understanding of common ground and the 
shared intentionality infrastructure that enables children to collaborate with others 
and share perspectives with them. I then showed that perspective is not an all-or-
nothing category. Instead, perspective-taking can be differentiated into different 
types of perspective-taking, and its subcomponents exhibit complex developmental 
pathways. Importantly, these pathways are driven by interaction and by children 
engaging with perspectival cultural artefacts such as linguistic constructions.  
 Perspective-taking and perspectivation in CL, language acquisition, and 
cognitive development represent one strand of the theoretical foundations of the 
current study on perspectivation and pretend play. The second theoretical founda-
tion of this study relates to pretend play and how it develops in cognitive develop-
ment and language acquisition. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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3. Theoretical Foundations: Pretend Play 
In this chapter, I review research on pretend play and its relation to cognition, cul-
ture, interaction, and language. There is a vast literature on play and pretend play. 
As Fagen (2011: 89) states, “[a] comprehensive bibliography of human infant-adult 
play would exhaust the information storage capacity of most researchers, if not of 
their computers.” However, despite this vast literature, there are still many open 
questions. For this reason, there are many who feel that play is still not very well 
understood. Fagen (2011: 83) goes so far as to say: “Play is still so totally mysteri-
ous and intractable that we may need a whole new (or almost new) story about the 
universe before we can even start to get it right.”  
Nevertheless, there is much research which is relevant to the investigation 
of pretend play and its relation to cognitive development and language develop-
ment. This will be the focus of the following sections. Section 3.1 will focus on the 
interrelationship between pretend play, cognition, culture and interaction. Section 
3.2 will outline research on the relationship between pretend play and language. 
Section 3.3 will present previous research and data on the acquisition of the lexical 
item pretend, which is the focus of much of the analysis in the empirical part of this 
study. As such, it lays the foundation for the corpus analysis in Chapters 5, 6, and 
7. 
 
3.1 Pretend Play, Cognition, Culture, and Interaction 
This section will first discuss attempts to define pretence and pretend play. 
Although definitions are universally problematic, we will examine some features 
that are often seen as relevant in pretend play. As is commonly practised in Cogni-
tive Linguistics, these attempts should be seen as elucidating a prototypically struc-
tured concept that can be seen as being organised in a radial network characterised 
by fuzzy boundaries and a family resemblance structure of overlapping similarities 
(Ungerer & Schmid 2006: 19-42; cf. Wittgenstein 1958: 66f.). The subsequent sec-
tions will then present a brief general outline of the development of pretend play as 
a cognitive capacity (3.1.2), describe its relation to the notion and development of 
perspective (3.1.3), and then review the functions of pretend play that have been 
proposed in the literature (3.1.4). It has to be noted that most of the evidence on 
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pretend play comes from studies of children and caregivers in what Henrich et al. 
(2010) have dubbed WEIRD cultures, that is, Western, educated, industrialised, 
rich, and democratic cultures. This is why the next two sections will focus on pre-
tend play as a cultural activity. Section 3.1.5 will describe the role that mothers in 
Western cultures play in the development of pretend play, whereas Section 3.1.6 
will deal with cultural differences in pretend play. Finally, Section 3.1.7 addresses 
the cognitive abilities that are involved in pretend play. 
 
3.1.1 Definition and Features of Pretend Play 
By definition, pretend play is a form of play. However, the notion of play is notori-
ously difficult to define (Miller 2017: 330). One way of trying to define play is by 
spelling out its most important structural characteristics and in addition, to specify 
subtypes of play activity.  
In his definition of play, Miller (2017: 332) lists the following fundamental 
structural properties:  
(1) Unlike other behaviours, such as searching for food, there is no external 
reward to play. It is therefore internally motivated. 
(2) Play is more likely to be found in younger individuals. 
(3) Play is a voluntary activity. Individuals knowingly and intentionally 
choose to engage and participate in play behaviour.  
(4) Its nature is repetitive.  
(5) It occurs spontaneously. 
(6) It occurs when individuals are in positive health. 
(7) It represents incomplete or fragmented behavioural patterns. A pretend 
bite, for example, is a modified version of an actual bite. 
(8) It is exaggerated in nature. 
(9) It is accompanied by signals marking it as play that are species-specific.  
(10) Individuals engaged in play take turns in different roles.  
(11) Play is imaginative and therefore requires some kind of mental repre-
sentation mapped onto reality.  
(12) It is processual. 
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As further outlined in Section 3.1.7, play can be found in many different 
animal species, but it is especially pronounced in humans. Among human types of 
play, there is object play, physical activity play, like exercise play and rough-and-
tumble play, as well as pretend play and sociodramatic play (Smith 2005: 361). The 
latter two are often subsumed to fall under the category of pretend play. Moreover, 
the subtype of pretend play is generally easier to grasp than play in general (Lillard 
2011: 284). However, it still remains a somewhat ‘fuzzy concept’ (Lillard 2015: 
426; Lakoff 1987). 
Pretend play can be seen as the “signature form of childhood play” (Lillard 
2015: 432). As a form of play, pretend play also displays the characteristics of play 
more generally discussed above. However, when trying to define pretend play, 
some aspects deserve special emphasis and other properties might be specific to 
pretend play in particular. Both Lillard (2011: 284-285) and Kavanaugh (2011) 
have offered criteria for a definition of pretend play, which form the basis for the 
definition adopted here. At its core, pretend play is a form of action that enacts 
imagination (cf. Mitchell 2007: 56). Imagination is “defined as the capacity to men-
tally transcend time, place and/or circumstance” (Taylor 2013: 3). A second im-
portant characteristic of pretend play is projection. In pretend play, pretenders in-
tentionally project an alternative reality onto a target. This alternative reality might 
be similar to the reality interactants agree on in normal interactions, but in pretence 
it is treated and represented as a different reality. In this pretend reality, pretenders 
act ‘as if’ (Fein 1981; Leslie 1987). As Lillard (2011: 284-285; see also Lillard 
2015: 436) puts it, pretend play “occurs when an alternative reality is superimposed 
on the present one, so one is living in an as ‘as-if’ world. Objects in the real world 
‘stand in for’ or symbolize what is imagined.” In a way, then, pretend play can also 
be described as ‘symbolic play’ as “one object or situation is made to stand in for 
another, in a spirit of fun and amusement” (Lillard 2015: 432), and, as noted in the 
introduction, these terms have been used interchangeably in the field (cf. Quinn & 
Kidd 2019: 34), and will continue to be used interchangeably here. Importantly, this 
‘as-if’ and ‘stand in for’ relation is also mentally represented by pretenders, so that 
they can be said to possess a kind of ‘double knowledge.’ There is a debate to what 
extent children understand pretence as a mental or cognitive phenomenon (see 
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Friedman 2013), but it is clear that they do understand at some level that there is a 
superimposition of a different reality. That is, they know that a banana is still, in 
reality, a banana and that they cannot really call anyone with it.  
In summary, the following four features, then, can be seen as defining pre-
tend play: 
(1) The enactment of imagination. 
(2) The projection of an alternative reality onto a target reality. 
(3) A symbolic ‘as-if’ and ‘stand in for’ relation. 
(4) A mental representation or awareness of this pretend relation. 
Having defined the most important features of pretend play, there is one further 
distinction to be made between two subtypes of pretence behaviour. As Sachet and 
Mottweiler (2013: 175) argue, researchers should keep the distinction between ob-
ject-substitution on the one hand and role-play on the other when it comes to pretend 
play.  
Object-play involves the representation of pretend content that is not social, 
whereas role play can be defined as pretend play that does involve the representa-
tion of social content. Whereas object substitution plays an important and almost 
exclusive role at the beginning of children’s pretence activities, role play gains in 
importance especially as children grow older and start assigning emotions and men-
tal states to entities (Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 177).  
It has to be stressed that role play itself is further subdivided into a number 
of subtypes. Harris (2000; see also Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 177) distinguishes 
between three types of role play:  
(1) The creation and projection of a role onto a toy or doll that serves as the 
vehicle of the pretend identity. 
(2) Impersonating and enacting a role, with the self serving as the vehicle 
of the pretend identity. 
(3) Projecting a role onto an imaginary character. 
Role play occurs only at later stages of development, but will especially be of im-
portance when we study the BEING ENTITY pretend categories in Section 6.4.2. 
Having broadly defined pretend play, let us now turn to the question of how 
pretend play develops during childhood. 
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3.1.2 Cognitive Development and Pretend Play 
The first pretend play acts start to emerge in children’s behaviour around 14 months 
of age (Lillard 2015: 433; Pauen 2018: 327). Then, between 14 and 34 months of 
age, young children show a continuous increase in symbolic acts (Pauen 2018: 327). 
These at first are very basic object substitutions with single schemes. For example, 
children might pretend that they drink from an empty cup (Sachet & Mottweiler 
2013: 176). These are followed by simple actions such as ‘putting dolly to bed’ and 
‘pretending to sleep,’ which later develop into role play and longer narrative se-
quences (Smith 2005: 344). Object substitution increases dramatically between 15 
to 18 months of age (Rubin et al. 1983; Nicolopoulou 2019: 184). Pretend play can 
then be said to properly start around 18 months (Weisberg 2015: 250). By this age, 
between 90 and 95 percent of normally developing children in WEIRD societies 
engage in pretend play (Michaelis et al. 2013). At this age, children also normally 
begin to combine pretend actions. For example, they might first pretend to stir a cup 
and then drink from it (Sachet & Mottweiller 2013: 176). Pretend play can be said 
to be in full swing by 24 months (Lillard et al. 2011: 287; Weisberg 2015; 
Nicolopoulou 2019: 184). Action combinations normally become more complex at 
age 2 and can have more than one slot or scheme. For example, children might 
perform pretend actions such as first stirring a pitcher, pouring from the pitcher into 
a cup and then drinking from that cup (Sachet & Mottweiller 2013: 176). As already 
mentioned in the introduction, 2-year-olds spend approximately 5-20% of their 
playtime engaged in pretend play, so it clearly plays an important role in children’s 
everyday lives (Lillard et al. 2011: 287).  
As mentioned above, the earliest form of pretending is object substitution. 
According to Sachet and Mottweiler (2013: 177), 
object substitution in pretend play shows a relatively short developmental progression that 
is similar for the majority of children and that is correlated with other cognitive behaviours 
that have a clear developmental trajectory, such as executive function and verbal ability. 
Object substitutions have also been linked to developmental changes in the 
recognition of visual objects. Specifically, they have been linked to the ability to 
abstract from the structure of sparse models to recognise common objects, which 
occurs in children between 18 to 30 months. These changes, in turn, are also related 
to object name learning (Smith & Jones 2011). 
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 Regarding the development of object substitution, Bugrimenko and 
Smirnova (1992) have proposed five stages in the development of symbolic pretend 
play, spanning the developmental time span of 18 to 30 months. At Stage 1, children 
are not interested in adults’ object substitutions and only play with realistic toys. At 
Stage 2, children imitate object substitutions automatically if an adult initiates them. 
However, they do not seem to grasp the concept of object substitution. At Stage 3, 
children imitate object substitutions independently if an adult has previously 
performed them. When they reach Stage 4, children perform object substitutions of 
their own. However, they do not rename these objects and do not give them substi-
tute names. Only at stage 5, which children usually reach around 30 months, do 
they originate their own object substitutions and rename objects in pretend play 
situations (cf. Smith 2005; Smolucha & Smolucha 1998: 45).  
By 36 months of age, most children engage in extended bouts of pretend 
activity for durations of 10 minutes or more (Michaelis et al. 2013; Petermann et al. 
2018). As Smith (2005: 362) notes, before this age much of children’s early pretend 
play is still often very imitative. In Haight and Miller’s (1993) study, for example, 
75% of utterances of 12-month-old children were direct repetitions of their mothers’ 
previous utterances. For 24-month-old children, however, this figure dropped to 
30%. At this stage, it is still not clear whether children do have cognitive represen-
tations of pretend objects and activities or whether they are mostly imitating the 
acts of older children and adults. However, after this stage, direct repetitions hardly 
occur at all. Pretend play therefore becomes increasingly complex, with the child’s 
own role in the initiation, coordination and negotiation of the pretend play situation 
becoming ever more active.  
So although pretence emerges around 1 year of age, children’s pretend play 
peaks around 4 years of age. In Haight and Miller’s (1993) study, 4-year-olds en-
gaged in pretend play for about 45 minutes in 3- to 4-hour periods of observation 
(Lillard 2015: 433). In these later years, children show much clearer indications that 
they understand the cognitive nature of pretence. For example, at 2;6 years, children 
still have problems with pretence situations in which they do not have an object that 
can serve as a ‘stand-in’ for a pretend object. When they are 4 years old, for exam-
ple, when pretending to brush their teeth, they still use a body part to represent an 
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invisible pretend tool. At age 5 children start using invisible tools, so, for example, 
they might pretend they have an invisible toothbrush (Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 
176).  
Early pretend play is usually done with parents as well as with older siblings. 
In WEIRD cultures, parents often scaffold early pretend play. Between 3 and 4 
years, pretend play also becomes a common activity with children of the same age 
(Lillard 2015: 433). Lillard (2015: 433) notes that in cultures in which parents do 
not encourage their children to pretend, pretend play appears slightly later. How-
ever, “in every culture in which it has been studied symbolic play emerges by the 
age of 3 and peaks a few years later (Power, 2000)” (Lillard 2015: 433). This is a 
point I will return to later in Section 3.1.6. 
What is astounding about pretend play is that children start to engage in it 
at an age where they still often do not exhibit a clear understanding of reality and 
have trouble with hypothetical thinking (Lillard 2011: 285). It is interesting to note 
that there is some evidence that children start to enact pretence object substitutions 
before they seem to understand when others are pretending. Unlike in language, 
then, in pretend play, “pretence production with substitute objects appears to pre-
cede comprehension” (Lillard 2015: 442).  
However, more recent research indicates that children actually “seem to 
understand pretending in others as soon as they begin to pretend themselves” (Ma 
& Lillard 2017: 441). There are indeed some studies that date the recognition of 
pretence to as early as 15 or 16 months (Bosco et al. 2006; Onishi et al. 2007). At 
24 months of age, children seem to understand when someone is pretending based 
on behavioural cues (Ma & Lillard 2017). That is, they show a clear understanding 
of when an object is substituted and can understand the implications and follow 
along with pretend sequences, for example, when somebody is pretending to eat 
from a bowl (Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 176). However, they still have problems 
understanding pretend if the pretence activity is not anchored to a material object 
that serves as a realistic representation (Lillard 2011: 285; Ma & Lillard 2017).  
At age 3, children seem to be able to understand the boundary between pre-
tence and reality (Carlson & White 2013: 164; cf. Golomb & Kuersten 1996). As 
they grow older, they start to recognise more and more sophisticated pretend play 
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actions and situations (Walker-Andrews & Harris 1993; Harris et al. 1994; cf. 
Friedman 2013: 186). For example, they are increasingly able to understand pretend 
behaviours even if they are not supported by objects and increasingly take mental 
states and intentions into account when interpreting pretend play behaviours. How-
ever, children’s understanding of pretence is constantly developing and can still be 
quite malleable in early childhood. For example, children still sometimes mistake 
pretended or imagined situations for real or claim that things that are real are 
pretend. For example, when seeing a video of a woman eating, they might claim 
that she is only pretending to eat (Lillard 2015: 444). In addition, “children some-
times mistakenly recall what was pretended, believing instead that it actually really 
happened. This indicates that source memory traces for pretending and imagining 
are weak at younger ages and strengthen with age” (Lillard 2015: 445).  
Children’s struggle with the cognitive complexity of pretend is illustrated, 
for instance, in Lillard’s (1993) influential Moe the troll experiment. In this exper-
iment, children were told that Moe the troll does not know what a kangaroo is but 
that he was jumping up and down like a kangaroo. Even at age 4 and 5, many chil-
dren still claim that in this situation Moe is pretending to be a kangaroo, even though 
he does not know what a kangaroo is (cf. Friedman 2013: 188-189). It is therefore 
still a point of debate what representational abilities underlie children’s production 
and comprehension of pretence and how they develop (Friedman 2013).  
 
3.1.3 Pretend Play and Perspective 
Many researchers have proposed that there is a close link between pretend play and 
perspective-taking. Flavell (1988: 141; cf. Dockett 1998: 108), for example, sees 
an understanding of perspectives as a requirement for the participation in shared 
pretend play. To engage in pretend play, children need to understand that people 
experience things differently and that they can have different perceptual and con-
ceptual perspectives (Dockett 1998: 108). In pretend play, interactants need to 
recognise that there is a pretend perspective that differs from either their own or the 
other’s perspective. They also need to coordinate, negotiate, and decide to engage 
with this pretend perspective. In this sense, pretend play is built on the capacity for 
perspective-sharing.  
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However, children also need to be able to understand that their own perspec-
tive is not necessarily the same as that of others, and they might have to modify 
their own representation and perspective of reality. That is, children have to be able 
to confront different perspectives (see Section 2.3.2). By doing so, shared pretend 
play also gives them the opportunity to express and develop a conception of inter-
subjectivity and a shared understanding among pretenders (Dockett 1998: 122; 
Göncü 1993). What makes shared pretence especially challenging but also interest-
ing from the point of view of perspective-sharing is that children not only need to 
understand a pretend situation, they also need to be able to communicate their com-
plex understanding with other interactants (Dockett 1998: 115).  
One stage in which perspective-taking seems to be of particular importance 
is that of role-play. As Dockett (1998: 113), argues, role play requires that children 
communicate in a way that is consistent with the role they are portraying, a point 
we will explore more fully in Section 3.2. It therefore shows that children can adopt 
the perspective of others in role play. Social role-play is common by age 4 to 5 and 
can be argued to not only require but also help in thinking about the point of view 
of others. When children adopt a role and pretend to be someone else, they need to 
simulate the beliefs of others, their desires and also their emotional responses to a 
situation (Carlson & White 2013: 165). Goldstein and Bloom (2011) argue that both 
perspective-taking and pretend play require the development of an increasing abil-
ity of decontextualisation (see also Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 176 and Section 
2.3.3). As they grow older, children rely less on the external support of pretence 
and increasingly rely on their imagination. Increasingly, children use symbolic acts 
adopting an imagined role and perspective. This “facilitates the imaginative appre-
ciation of other people’s perspectives, and then, with practice, the ability to adopt 
alternative perspectives becomes internalised – engaged in symbolically – resulting 
in cognitive flexibility” (Carlson & White 2013: 165). Using language also plays 
an important role here, as speaking ‘as if’ and using language in the way required 
by a role can be described as the process of children using symbols as a mechanism 
to distance themselves psychologically from the real situation and adopt a pretend 
perspective instead (Carlson & White 2013: 168; see also Mischel & Rodriguez 
1993). Robson (2012: 96) puts it like this: 
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In pretend play, children step in and out of a role, represent situations and transform objects, 
talk about mental states (‘Okay, you be the mum, and you’re really cross’) and have to 
negotiate meanings and actions with others. They have to make the ‘leap of imagination 
into someone else’s head’ (Baron-Cohen 2004: 26), which characterizes empathy with an-
other person. This act of sharing an imaginative world with friends or siblings […] involves 
recognition of their intentions, shared perspectives and co-ordination of communications 
about the play, often termed intersubjectivity. This creates the potential for internalization 
of these perspectives, a process which Vygotsky (1978) suggests supports higher levels of 
understanding and the potential for abstract thought. 
As both Robson (2012) and Goldstein and Bloom (2011) argue, then, the 
internalisation of perspectives claimed by Vygotsky can be seen as one crucial con-
nection between pretend play and perspective-taking. Vygotsky (1978: 92-104) at-
tributed an important role in development to pretend and symbolic play, as it helped 
children with the task of psychological distancing, separating the referent from the 
object (Lillard 2015: 429).  
In a Vygotskian perspective, pretend play can also be seen as a form of so-
cially shared cognition and as a zone of proximal development (Dockett 1998: 113; 
cf. Vygotsky 1978: 102). The relationships mentioned above between perspective-
taking, pretend play and cognitive flexibility is a case in point. Pretend play can be 
seen as helping to internalise differing perspectives and thus promote cognitive 
flexibility, “the ability to consider and selectively attend to more than one aspect of 
a situation or problem” (Carlson & White 2013: 164). This is also supported by the 
fact that, as discussed in Section 3.1.2, parents and older siblings scaffold pretend 
play early in development and children engage in pretend play with same-age peers 
only later in development. Pretend play facilitates children’s learning about their 
social world by exploring how they would react to various situations. As such, these 
results clash with Piaget’s (e.g., 1962) views that parents do not contribute to chil-
dren’s ‘egocentric’ development of pretend play (Lillard 2011: 285, see also Sec-
tion 2.3.1). 
 
3.1.4 Functions of Pretend Play 
Looking at play generally, it can be said to have a number of functional character-
istics (Miller 2017: 332):  
(1) Play is rewarding for individuals engaged in it, leading to positive emo-
tions.  
64 
 
(2) There are no immediate benefits obviously increasing the individual’s 
likelihood of survival.  
(3) It is context-bound.  
(4) It is a facilitator for social interaction. 
(5) It has evolutionary benefits.  
Regarding humans, there has been a widespread debate about which function(s) 
pretend play may serve, as its developmental aetiology and architecture suggests 
that it is an evolved behaviour (Kavanaugh 2011; Lillard 2017). As we have seen, 
one of the possible functions of pretend play is the promotion of cognitive flexibil-
ity, increasing perspective-taking abilities and the internalisation of different per-
spectives sensu Vygotsky (1978: 52-57).  
One type of pretend activity whose cognitive function is often highlighted 
as being of particular importance is that of role play. For example, pretend play 
offers practice with both perspective-taking and social roles. Such experiences 
might help children to develop an increasing awareness of their abilities for self-
regulation. It might also help them develop an awareness of which behaviours are 
socially appropriate (Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 180). Role play behaviour focus-
ses on interpersonal interactions and social roles and therefore might help children 
develop more sophisticated skills in these areas (Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 180).  
Apart from perspective-taking and learning about roles, pretend play might 
also hone other skills that are important for children’s cognitive development. 
These include, for example, planning, problem-solving, metacognition, and social 
as well as individual decision making (e.g., Bergen 2002; Whitebread & O’Sullivan 
2012; Cabrera et al. 2017). In addition, children also learn about scripts and frames 
of many stereotypical situations (Gaskins 2013: 232). As Hughes and Devine 
(2015: 580) point out, 
shared enjoyment of pretend play is a powerful motivator for children to align their view-
points in order to initiate or maintain joint pretend play. Although often glad to enter chil-
dren’s imaginary worlds, adults are also quick to tire when the same pretend scenario is 
enacted time after time, whereas children often relish opportunities for repeat performances. 
This opportunity to rehearse and practice pretend scenarios may well be an important arena 
for children’s growing mentalizing skills. 
So it might be that pretend play not only requires and helps develop perspective-
taking skills but also more general and more sophisticated mental reasoning skills 
and theory of mind capacities. 
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However, this is where we have to turn to critiques of this position. For ex-
ample, so far attempts to relate pretend play and theory of mind to each other have 
yielded disappointing results (Smith 2005: 362; Hughes & Devine 2015: 580). Pre-
tend play is often seen as benefitting development (e.g., Ginsburg 2007; Hirsh-
Pasek et al. 2009; Miller & Almon 2009), but in a review of over 150 studies, Lillard 
et al. (2013: 27) arrive at the following conclusion: “Despite over 40 years of re-
search examining how pretend play might help development, there is little evidence 
that it has a crucial role” (see also Lillard 2015: 450-451). Lillard (2015: 450) reit-
erates this view in her review chapter in the Handbook of Child Psychology and 
Developmental Science, Cognitive Processes: 
The prior review by Rubin et al. (1983) devoted about 8 of its 69 pages to the correlates and 
outcomes of play, and concluded that although pretend play might provide opportunities to 
develop social and cognitive skills, there was no clear evidence of a direct benefit of play 
because of methodological problems. Thirty years and many studies later, the situation is 
unchanged. 
On this view, the current state of research does not allow us to make strong claims 
about the uniquely important role of pretend play in development (Lillard et al. 
2013; Lillard 2015). Moreover, what is questioned by Lillard and colleagues (2013) 
is whether pretend play has a causal role in children’s development, not that pretend 
play is closely related to cognitive and linguistic development. In fact, Lillard and 
colleagues (2013) argue that pretend play and correlated developments in the cog-
nitive and linguistic domain are expressions of other cognitive and interactional 
causal factors that underlie pretence. If we take perspective-taking as an example, 
this means that it is possible that pretend play directly aids the development of the-
ory of mind, social cognition, and perspective-taking. However, it is also possible 
that children’s advanced social pretend play is simply an epiphenomenal reflection 
of developments in these domains. This would mean that even though pretend play 
does not drive cognitive development, it still reflects it. So regardless of debates 
about its causal role in development, there is agreement that pretend play can serve 
as a window on the development of the social, interactional and cognitive factors 
that are implicated in it. Therefore, pretend play can still very much function as a 
window on children’s cognitive and linguistic development and their abilities for 
perspectivation. So even from a sceptical, critical perspective, taking the use of per-
spectivation in pretend play as reflecting and revealing children’s developing ability 
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for perspective-taking and -sharing, as well as their overall cognitive development 
is well-supported by the available evidence in developmental psychology. It is also 
very much consistent with the developmental cognitive linguistic approach of this 
research project. 
Here, however, it is also important to note the following: The claim that 
there is no convincing evidence for the importance of pretend play in development 
is not universally accepted (see, e.g. Nicolopoulou & Ilgaz 2013 and Harris & 
Jalloul 2013 for opposing views). This means that with the available evidence, we 
can still draw tentative conclusions, address general tendencies and use them to 
support arguments about pretence. Moreover, as I will discuss further in section 
3.2.1, language development and pretend play are closely related, which means that 
taking a closer look at this relationship can still tell us much about children’s cog-
nitive and linguistic development regardless of the question whether pretend play 
has a causal or correlational relationship with linguistic and cognitive development. 
In addition, Lillard (2017; Ma & Lillard 2017) herself has proposed a hypothesis 
on the evolutionary and ontogenetic function of pretend play, a point we will come 
back to in Section 3.1.7. Regardless, we should generally be aware that there are 
critical voices as well and keep in mind that there are many points of debate and 
open questions in the research on pretend play and that much of the evidence and 
suggestions for the functions of pretend play are highly contested. However, it is 
also important to remember what is not contested, namely that pretend play can 
serve as a window on the cognitive, social and interactional development of chil-
dren, regardless of whether it only reflects these developments or is also causally 
involved in contributing to these developments. 
 
3.1.5 Pretend Play and the Role of Mothers in Western Culture 
The development of pretend play also depends on cultural rearing practices and on 
cultural models of interacting with children in general. In this section, I focus on 
the role of mothers in Western cultures. This dimension is relevant for the current 
study as all 13 children in the corpus data were cared for primarily by their mothers. 
In general, some of these results may likely apply to fathers and other caregivers. 
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However, we have to keep in mind that to date, most research has explored hetero-
sexual two-parent families. In comparison, “data on adult-child play in diverse fam-
ily constellations (e.g., lesbian and gay families; extended family systems)” is 
mostly lacking (Roopnarine et al. 2019: 142). In terms of the generalisability of 
these results, it has to be noted, though, that there are also differences in the way 
fathers and mothers typically play with their children (cf. Lillard 2015: 431), a point 
I will discuss in more detail at the end of this section. 
For Western mothers, it can be stated that they display specific behaviours 
that support pretend play and also facilitate children’s imitation of pretend play ac-
tivities (Lillard 2011; Markova & Legerstee 2015). In the terms of Vygotsky (1978: 
84-91), parental involvement in pretend play is crucial for creating a zone of prox-
imal development that scaffolds children’s use of pretend language, imaginary ob-
jects, and cultural tools (Marjanovič-Umek et al. 2014: 855). Until their children 
are about 3 years of age, mothers tend to be the primary play partners of children. 
As Lillard (2015: 446) notes, “American mothers pretend in front of their children 
as early as it has been examined – 7 months (Kavanaugh et al., 1983). Haight and 
Miller (1993) found every mother (of the nine they observed) pretended with her 
12-month-old child.”  
Parents can be said to usher in the development of pretend play as they start 
pretending before children do it themselves. Pretend play therefore emerges socially 
and is very much supported by maternal engagement in at least some cultures 
(Lillard 2015: 447). At the beginning of children’s pretend interactions virtually all 
pretend behaviour is initiated by the mother (Haight & Miller 1993: 42; Lillard 
2015: 439). This changes around 24 months, when about half of the pretend play 
initiations come from mothers and half come from their children (Haight & Miller 
1993: 57). So although pretend play starts to emerge around their first birthday, 
only in the course of their third year of life does the inclusion of pretend acts become 
consolidated into children’s play repertoire (Nielsen & Dissanayake 2000: 609-
610). Before that, caregiver scaffolding and parental guidance are necessary fea-
tures for the emergence of pretend play scenarios (Lillard 2007a). Between 12 to 
15 months, children also do not respond very often in a way that is geared towards 
the pretend play to develop and continue. By 18 months, however, children “were 
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virtually certain to find some way to continue their mothers’ fantasy initiatives” 
(Kavanaugh et al. 1983: 52).  
However, especially at the beginning, maternal initiation and scaffolding are 
extremely important. Mothers actively suggest and demonstrate behaviours for the 
child to fulfil a pretend role (Dunn et al. 1977). In both Eastern as well as in Western 
cultures, mothers show different behavioural cues and act differently when they are 
pretending compared to when they actually perform an action. They therefore be-
haviourally signal that they are pretending to their children (Lillard 2015; 
Nakamichi 2015; Hoicka & Butcher 2016; Ma & Lillard 2017). Overall, mothers 
show a breadth of pretend-specific behaviour. They use more words in pretend than 
in non-pretend situations; they use more expressions referring to pretend objects 
and behaviours; they use more sound effects, smile more and their smiles last 
longer; their smiles also more often are associated with their (pretend) actions; they 
look at their child more often and predominantly look at their child during pretend 
play; they engage in more behaviour related to a pretend-scenario and also perform 
some of these behaviours faster than they would usually do. They also engage in “a 
‘social referencing sequence’, in which they locked eyes with their child, engaged 
in the pretend behaviour, and then smiled (as if to comment, ‘Take this as silly’)” 
(Ma & Lillard 2017: 442). The more mothers show these behaviours, the higher the 
strength of engagement children show in pretend situations (Lillard et al. 2007: 27). 
Indeed, these behaviours seem to have a positive effect on children’s understanding 
of pretence and children receiving these signals are more likely to engage in pretend 
play with their mothers (Nishida & Lillard 2007). 
With the help of these kinds of scaffolding, as children grow older, the 
degree of mutual responsiveness grows. Children start to engage in the active ne-
gotiation of a shared pretend frame. Their mothers demonstrate elaborative and con-
tingent responses to the pretend acts of their children (Haight & Miller 1993: 57-
58). Maternal participation becomes less and less important, and by 48 months, 
children’s pretence is 50/50 between their mothers on the one hand and solitary, 
sibling and peer play on the other (Haight & Miller 1993: 42; Lillard 2015: 439; 
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Lillard 2011: 286). The length of pretence activities also changes. By age 4, “pre-
tend play bouts with peers were twice as long as pretend play bouts with mothers” 
(Lillard 2011: 286).  
Overall, there are at least four differences between early mother-child play 
on the one hand, and pretend play alone, with siblings, or with peers on the other: 
(1) mother-child play is more advanced and complex than when children play on 
their own; (2) mothers are more often spectators than actors. They also move 
quickly into the role of spectator. Peers, on the other hand, remain equally engaged. 
Around 1 year of age, mothers initiate pretend play situations from a within-frame 
position. But by 2 years of age, they often take an off-stage role, where they make 
suggestions and comment on children’s pretend behaviour. However, they often do 
not participate themselves. (3) Mothers tend to use more replica toys and (4) when 
mothers pretend with their children, they more often re-enact actual cultural scripts 
and real events.  
With their peers, in contrast, children often make up imaginary situations 
and objects and create pretend situations that have never happened (Lillard 2011: 
286; Lillard 2015: 456). In Bretherton’s (e.g., 1984) terminology, mothers tend to 
use more as-if behaviour based on everyday activities, and with peers, children tend 
to use more what-if behaviour that transforms reality. Mothers’ pretend play with 
their children also differs from that of sibling play in that sibling play is not as 
complex and not as attuned to the other. Most middle-class parents are well-attuned 
to their children and scaffold their children’s pretence to increasingly high levels. 
In sibling play, on the other hand, the older siblings often explicitly assign pretend 
roles to their younger siblings and often even tell them what they should say in a 
pretence script (Dunn & Dale 1984; Lillard 2015: 456).  
If we regard the differences between mother and child pretend play on the 
one hand, and their play with others on the other, one question is why these differ-
ences exist. As outlined above, one suggestion is that the underlying goals of pre-
tend play differ in these situations. Pretending can be seen as an opportunity and 
mechanism to learn culture and cultural scripts. Indeed, even cultural acts like eat-
ing can involve very different components in different cultures. So if these kinds of 
cultural routines and everyday activities occur more often with mothers than with 
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others, this “supports the view that pretending with more knowledgeable others is 
a setting for the transmission of culture” (Lillard 2011: 290; cf. Tomasello 1999).  
In terms of caregiver engagement in pretend play, as mentioned above, 
mothers and fathers in Western cultures display different attitudes towards pretend 
play and they also differ in their pretend play (Haight & Miller 1993: 138). Gener-
ally, in terms of relative frequency, Western mothers seem to engage in more pre-
tend play with their children than do Western fathers, they show more commitment 
and deliberation in engaging in pretend play, and also have a more positive attitude 
toward pretence activities with their children than do fathers (Haight & Miller 1993; 
Haight et al. 1999: 138; Gleason 2005). Mothers also engage in more pretend play 
with their daughters than fathers do with their sons. Fathers, in contrast, more often 
engage in physical play, and do so more often with their sons than with their daugh-
ters (Lindsey & Mize 2001; Gleason 2005; Roopnarine 2011: 25; Amodia-
Bidakowska et al. 2020). 
 Interestingly, this also means that fathers’ and mothers’ pretend play with 
their children might each have different effects on cognitive development. For ex-
ample, Cabrera et al. (2017) found that low-income fathers’ playfulness with their 
24-month-old toddlers was related to children’s vocabulary skills, whereas low-in-
come mothers’ playfulness with their children was related to children’s emotion 
regulation.  
However, just as with the lack of data on diverse family constellations, there 
are only few studies which have assessed the attitudes and beliefs about play held 
by fathers, siblings, and so-called allomothers and alloparents, that is, adult care-
givers who are not the child’s parents. There are also very few studies on and how 
their beliefs translate into pretend play interactions with children. This is an im-
portant caveat, as in many cultural communities, all these kinds of caregivers “are 
quite involved in the care and education of young children” (Roopnarine 2011: 24). 
The contributions of people other than mothers therefore still remain understudied, 
which means that we have to be cautious about the conclusions we can draw from 
the limited set of studies there are on this topic. 
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3.1.6 Cultural Differences in Pretend Play 
Regarding cultural differences in pretend play, it can first be stated that pretend play 
itself seems to be universal: All children seem to play, and all children also seem to 
engage in pretend play that involves behaviours such as objects substitutions and 
enacting scripts and roles (Gaskins 2013: 224). In addition, most researchers agree 
that both in its appearance and timing pretend play seems to be universal as well 
(e.g., Fein 1981; Haight et al. 1999; Lillard 2015: 454). However, it is equally 
important to note that “pretend play does not look the same in all cultures (nor for 
that matter, in all subcultures of Euroamerican societies) nor does it serve the same 
purpose in children’s everyday lives or in their growing up” (Gaskins 2013: 226, 
emphasis in the original; see also Roopnarine et al. 2019: 152-153).  
This especially regards two points: the types of play partners and the content 
of pretence. The first point surrounds the involvement of parents. In many cultures, 
parents do not engage in pretend play with their children, as they are not seen as 
suitable play partners for young children. In some cultures, they even actively dis-
courage play (Lancy 2007; Roopnarine 2011; Gaskins 2013; Lillard 2015: 456; 
Roopnarine et al. 2019: 143-145). These attitudes are linked to cultural differences 
in folk beliefs about the contribution of play to children’s cognitive development. 
Whereas in WEIRD cultures play is generally thought to have a positive effect on 
children’s development, in other cultures adults see it as frivolous and of little value. 
However, even in WEIRD cultures, “differences exist in beliefs about play between 
ethnic groups within countries” (Roopnarine et al. 2019: 145). 
In addition, in many cultures, mothers are not the primary caregivers of chil-
dren. For example, in the 186 cultures they studied, Weisner and Gallimore (1977) 
found that 40% of infants and 80% of toddlers were not cared for by their mother 
but by someone else (cf. Lillard 2015: 456). In cultures where mothers are not the 
primary caregivers of children, they will of course engage in pretend play with their 
children significantly less often than in WEIRD cultures. 
Not only are there cultures in which parent-children play is virtually absent, 
such as the Yucatec Maya (cf. Gaskins 2013: 234-239) or the Kpelle of Liberia 
(Lancy 2007), in many other cultures, parents and children also engage in much less 
play in general as well as pretend play together (Lillard 2015: 456; cf. Singer et al. 
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2009). Generally, there seems to be considerable variation in the amount of play 
time adults spend with their children. For example, “Bornstein and Putnick (2012) 
found that among 127,000 families across 28 developing countries, 60% of mothers 
reported playing with their young children (under 5 years of age)” in the last three 
days (Roopnarine et al. 2019: 146). These estimates are below those reported for 
WEIRD cultures. In addition, in a large-scale analysis of data for 12 linguistically 
and ethnically diverse Carribbean and Latin American countries, the reported levels 
of play ranged from 85% of mothers who played with their children in the last few 
days in Uruguay to 47% in Suriname (Roopnarine et al. 2019: 146-148; cf. 
Roopnarine & Yildirim 2018: 68). However, the average for these countries, 68.4%, 
still showed that the majority of mothers engaged in regular play activities with 
their children. In contrast, in an analysis of 18 equally diverse African countries, on 
average, less than 40% of mothers reported playing with their children, with rates 
of play ranging from 71% in Tunisia to 4% in Kenya and even only 1% in Guinea-
Bissau (Roopnarine et al. 2019: 147-148). 
This differs quite sharply not only from most Carribbean and Latin 
American cultures, but also from Euro-American culture – as well as Japan 
(Bornstein 2007: 116-117) and some Chinese cultures (Haight et al. 1999). In these 
cultures, it is quite frequent that parents are play partners until the age of 3 to 4, 
which, as has been mentioned, is the age when children start to engage in more 
pretend play with their peers and siblings (Lillard 2015: 456).  
As such, Western children grow up in a much more child-centred social 
world that is mediated and structured by adults and contains social interactions with 
both caregivers and peers (Gaskins 2013: 237). As Callaghan and Corbit (2015: 
269) put it, parent-child pretend play might be present in a number of cultures, 
“[h]owever, nowhere in the world do parents manage and orchestrate objects as 
props for play or environments as backdrops, or devote so much of their own time, 
as they do in technologically advanced affluent cultures.” 
The second key cultural difference surrounds the content of pretence. Ac-
cording to Gaskins (2013: 230, emphasis in the original),  
[p]retending as interpretation of the children’s real world is found everywhere anthropolo-
gists have looked carefully at their play. Pretending as invention of things beyond the chil-
dren’s real world (or beyond reports they have received of other real places) is remarkably 
rare, if in fact it exists at all. 
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Revisiting Bretherton’s (1984) terminology, as-if behaviour that is interpre-
tive seems to be present in all cultures, whereas what-if behaviour that is imagina-
tive and inventive seems to be exceptionally rare. From this perspective, in many 
cultures pretend play seems to primarily serve as the rehearsal of many different 
roles, communication practices and activities, especially those which are valuable 
economically, have been observed by children and which they might perform them-
selves later on (Gaskins 2013: 227-228). Fortes (1976: 475, quoted in Gaskins 
2013: 227), for example, reports on children’s play of the Tallensi people of north-
ern Ghana:  
In his [sic!] play the child rehearses his interests, skills, and obligations, and makes experi-
ments in social living without having to pay the penalties for mistakes. Hence there is al-
ways a phase of play in the evolution of any schema preceeding its full emergence into 
practical life. 
In many cultures, children pretend to engage in everyday scenes centred around 
domestic rituals, economic activities, and family life (Fortes 1976: 479). These 
scenes include, for example, “child care,” “house,” “school,” “store,” “herding,” 
“house building,” “weaving,” and “hunting” (Schwartzman 1979; Gaskins 2013: 
227). In their time allocation study in a Botswana community, Bock and Johnson 
(2004) have found additional support for the argument that pretence serves the prac-
tice and rehearsal of cultural scripts. They found that children spend more time en-
gaging in pretending a certain activity if they are likely to perform this activity as 
adults. They also found that children engaged in pretend play for longer periods of 
time if the activity was acquired later in life and seemed to require more skills (e.g., 
using bow and arrow). Conversely, they spend shorter periods of time engaged in 
pretend play of activities that children acquire when they are younger (e.g., prepar-
ing grains) (Gaskins 2013: 231). Similarly, Boyette (2016) found that among the 
Aka, who live a hunter-gatherer way of life in the Congo Basin, “about a third of 
all the play he observed was pretend play, in which children typically acted out 
activities they observed regularly among adults” (Gray 2019: 92).  
However, children often do not exclusively pretend to perform activities that 
they have to perform later on, they also pretend to engage in activities that play a 
central role in their community of practice in general. Therefore, it can be argued 
that in these cultures, children engage in interpretive pretend play to explore “the 
full range of cultural knowledge that will constitute their adult worldview” (Gaskins 
74 
 
2013: 229). So in addition to helping children learn the knowledge, skills, and val-
ues of their communities (cf. Gray 2019: 90-92), pretend play also seems to be a 
fundamentally social phenomenon in these cultures, as it serves as “a communal 
way for children to make sense of the world they share today and the world they 
will come to participate in together tomorrow” (Gaskins 2013: 242). 
Gaskins (2013: 243) sums up her argument about the cultural differences in 
pretend play as follows: 
(1) social partners and environments provide different opportunities and limits to how 
pretend play is conducted; (2) the isolation of children from adult daily activities puts on 
play much more of the burden of keeping children occupied and of providing experiences 
that support their development; (3) cultural differences in how much agency children have 
in their everyday lives and in how bruised they are by everyday and extraordinary events 
leads them to have different affective templates to bring to play (and their social worlds 
provide different opportunities to express them); and (4) an emphasis on “subjunctive” or 
“fictional” stances is valued more in some cultures than others.  
What these cultural differences tell us about pretend play is that while inventive 
pretend play may be seen as the norm from a Western perspective, most children 
around the world do in fact not engage in it. Inventive pretend play should therefore 
not be seen as an innate feature of pretence but instead as a primarily Western cul-
tural amplification. What is more, the age at which pretend play starts and is at its 
peak, the pretend scenes children engage in, and the amount of time that children 
spend engaged in pretend play are also subject to cultural variation (Gaskins 2013: 
242). In other cultures, pretend play might generally not play an equally important 
role for children’s development and their daily lives as it does in WEIRD cultures. 
In WEIRD cultures, the development of social skills might indeed be correlated 
with and scaffolded by pretend play (though see Section 3.1.4 above), as it plays a 
central role in children’s lives. In other cultures, however, the development of social 
skills will very likely be supported just as well by engaging in other social experi-
ences such as working collaboratively from an early age on (Gaskins 2013: 244). 
 
3.1.7 Cognitive Abilities Involved in Pretend Play  
As we have seen, pretend play might be a phenomenon that is especially prominent 
in WEIRD cultures, so that the claims made about pretend play might not be appli-
cable to other cultures in the same way. However, it is still a very interesting ques-
tion which cognitive capacities underlie the phenotype of pretend play observed in 
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WEIRD cultures, with the caveat that it is at present not clear to what extent these 
capacities and requirements extend beyond the cultures we are investigating.  
As pointed out in Section 3.1.2, and as illustrated by the Moe the troll ex-
periment (Lillard 1993), it is still a matter of debate to what degree and in what way 
children represent pretence cognitively, especially at a young age (Friedman 2013). 
On a critical view, it can be argued that children see pretending first as an action, 
something we do, instead of as a mental phenomenon (Flavell 1988; Perner 1991: 
51-63; Lillard 2015: 434). This view is also supported by the lack of a strong cor-
relation between pretend play and theory of mind discussed in Section 3.1.4. In 
addition, “children do not infer the mental states involved in pretence until age three 
or four years the earliest (Hickling, Wellman & Gottfried 1997; Lillard 1993; 
Rosen, Schwebel & Singer 1997)” (Kavanaugh 2011: 297). However, on a more 
cognitive reading, pretence can be argued to require a number of different cognitive 
capacities. The degree to which children understand their own cognitive processes 
and the mental representations involved in pretend play is a related, but different 
question. Bergen (2002), for example, claims that 
[p]retend play requires the ability to transform objects and actions symbolically; it is 
furthered by interactive social dialogue and negotiation; and it involves role taking, script 
knowledge, and improvisation. Many cognitive strategies are exhibited during pretense, 
such as joint planning, negotiation, problem solving, and goal seeking. 
In addition, as already outlined in Section 3.1.3, pretend play both serves as an am-
plification of and requires psychological distancing (Carlson & White 2013: 169). 
It was already noted in Section 3.1.2 that at the age that they engage in pretend play, 
children struggle with hypothetical thinking (cf. Lillard 2011: 285). However, when 
they are as young as 2 years of age, they fare much better with problems that require 
deductive reasoning when they are presented in a pretence frame (Carlson & White 
2013: 169). Interestingly, if it is presented in a pretence frame, children also fare 
much better in the reverse contingency paradigm, a task which, as we have seen in 
Section 2.3.3, chimpanzees have significant problems with. Generally, then, pre-
tence seems to be positively related with top-down executive functions such as in-
hibitory control, self-control, -monitoring and -regulation, selective attention, 
working memory, and cognitive flexibility, as well as the higher-level executive 
functions of reasoning, problem-solving and planning (Carlson & White 2013: 169; 
cf. Diamond 2013; see also Section 3.1.4). 
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Other cognitive abilities required for pretend play are the ability to step out 
of the play frame to negotiate the different perspectives of interactants and the sim-
ultaneous representation of an object or situation from a real and a pretend perspec-
tive. Children therefore need the capacity to understand and engage in metacommu-
nication and metaplay, “the process of suspending actual role playing to think or 
communicate about pretend” (Trawick-Smith 1998: 433; see also Section 3.2.3). 
Pretend role play also requires the ability to act out and portray the actions and 
thoughts of others, as well as the expression of emotions that are appropriate for the 
given situation and given role (Lillard 2015: 430). This suggests that in order to 
pretend, children need to possess at least some capacities for cognitive representa-
tion (Bergen 2002). And indeed, although there seems to be no direct relationship 
between pretend play and theory of mind, there is an association between the fre-
quency of role play and social play on the one hand and theory of mind development 
on the other (Astington & Jenkins 1995; Youngblade & Dunn 1995; however, see 
Lillard 2015: 437-438 for a critical view). 
The growing complexity of pretend themes, something we will have a closer 
look at in our analyses in Chapter 6, has also been argued to be a result of “chil-
dren’s increasing ability to imaginatively manipulate various event scripts in a 
broad representational format” (Carlson & White 2013: 166). 
The most essential cognitive implication of pretend play probably results 
from its intrinsically social and cooperative nature, as has already been noted in 
Section 3.1.3. Rakoczy (2006) has argued that early pretend play is the first genuine 
form of shared intentionality as it is an intrinsically joint and shared cooperative 
activity based on a ‘we-perspective’ (cf. Section 2.3.1). Pretend play can be seen as 
a co-constructed activity in which individual agendas are negotiated. It is therefore 
fundamentally intersubjective (Göncü 1993; Gaskins 2013: 237).  
From an evolutionary standpoint, it is also an important question what the 
evolutionary foundations of pretend play are and which cognitive capacities 
children engaging in pretend play share with other animals. First of all, play can be 
found in all primates. Pellegrini et al. (2007: 272) state that for primates, play can 
be seen as a prolonged phase of free exploration, providing “a low cost way to de-
velop alternate responses to new and challenging environments” (cf. Kavanaugh 
77 
 
2011: 296). Regarding object play, it seems that human children and wild young 
chimpanzees engage in it to a similar degree (15% for human children vs. 10% for 
young chimpanzees; Ramsay & McGrew 2005; Callaghan & Corbit 2015: 271).  
Social play also occurs in non-primate species (Palagi 2011: 71). Pellis and 
Pellis (2011), for example, argue that in rats, early social play has important positive 
effects on the development of the coordination of social interactions and emotional 
regulation. They hypothesise that social play in young human children might serve 
a similar function (Callaghan & Corbit 2015: 271).  
Lillard (2015: 442-443) also posits that there might be an evolutionary con-
nection between pretence and the play fighting observed across many animal spe-
cies. She argues that both behaviours create a frame in which actions possess mean-
ings not identical with their meanings and consequences in the real world. There-
fore, some kind of boundary that separates reality and pretence must be maintained 
by animals when they engage in play fighting. There might therefore be some evo-
lutionary foundations connecting human and non-human play and pretend play in 
humans.  
However, the evolutionary functions of pretend play are less clear. Lillard 
(2015: 459) holds that we still do not know why children engage in pretend play or 
why they engage in different forms of play at all. However, as mentioned before, 
pretend play possesses features that indicate that it is an evolved behaviour. 
Namely, there is a predictable developmental sequence to it, and it appears univer-
sally in all cultures, albeit in different expressions and with different frequencies 
(Lillard 2017: 826). Lillard (2017) hypothesises that pretend play might have been 
an exapted by-product of animal play fighting. Play fighting probably evolved in 
animals as it represented a way to practice and rehearse fighting skills. “Play 
fighting involves signaling that one is only playing, and these signals and the ac-
companying play acts share the structure of other symbolic acts” (Lillard 2015: 
459). Pretend play in human children and play fighting in animals can be seen as 
analogous as they share a number of isomorphic properties: “both involve an as-if 
world, reading signals that indicate this as-if status, and understanding that 
behaviors and objects in the as-if world stand for or are symbolic of behaviors and 
objects in the real world” (Lillard 2017: 832). Both play fighting and pretend play 
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therefore involve metacommunication and symbolic relationships. One 
evolutionary function of pretend play might therefore be that it raises children’s 
sensitivity to social signals and the symbolic interpretation of social behaviour. 
This, in turn, would aid language acquisition and also the development of social 
understanding and theory of mind. 
We have already seen that parents use specific cues to signal pretence, both 
behaviourally and later linguistically. Many other animals, especially other mam-
mals, also have ritualised ways to signal to conspecifics that their behaviour is 
pretend – i.e. that it is different from real fighting. For example, rats use ultrasonic, 
high-pitched vocalisations that signal that they are play fighting and also nuzzle a 
different area of their conspecific than if they would really bite them (Pellis & Pellis 
2011, 2017). Dogs use ‘play bows’ as a signal that they are play fighting (Bekoff 
1995), and primates such as chimpanzees, gorillas, baboons, and macaques use a 
so-called ‘play face’ (Liebal et al. 2014: 137-138) to indicate that they are not en-
gaged in actual aggression (cf. Lillard 2017: 828). However, the claim that the struc-
ture of these acts can be seen as symbolic is controversial, as is the claim that non-
human animals perform symbolic play at all (Callaghan & Corbit 2015: 270; see 
Mitchell 2002 for discussion).  
Play fighting is also positively related to the development of executive func-
tions in a range of animals, especially self-regulation (Pellis & Pellis 2017). It is 
also positively related to the development of social skills (Gray 2019: 96-98; 
Yanagi & Berman 2019: 75). As mentioned above, there is evidence that the devel-
opment of these capacities is also supported by pretend play (Lillard 2017; Pellis & 
Pellis 2017). However, at the moment the evidence on proposed evolutionary ben-
efits and functions of play is still far from conclusive (see Sharpe 2019 for discus-
sion).  
One other possible function for pretend play might be that it helps children 
“to exercise the imagination which could help with other activities like problem 
solving” (Lillard 2015: 459; see also Gray 2019: 94-96; cf. Suddendorf & Corballis 
2007). A number of researchers have also highlighted the role of pretend play in the 
evolution of language (e.g., Donald 1991; Knight 1998; Edwardes 2010: 17-18; 
Ginsburg & Jablonka 2014; Pleyer & Hartmann 2017). In accordance with Piaget 
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(e.g., 1962: 1-2), who argued for a common origin of language and symbolic play, 
these researchers posit that both language and pretend play require similar 
representational and sociocognitive capacities. Therefore, pretend play might have 
played an important co-evolutionary role in the evolution of language. As Parker 
(2002: xv) puts it, “[g]iven the developmental and evolutionary proximity between 
pretense and early language, perhaps it is inevitable that interest in the developmen-
tal and evolutionary emergence of language lurks behind much of the work on pre-
tense.” We will have a closer look at the relationship between language and pre-
tence in the next section. 
 
3.2 Pretend Play and Language 
It seems obvious that pretend play and language are closely related. After all, both 
children’s emerging ability to talk and their emerging interest in ever-more complex 
ways of playing are highly salient for both parents and researchers alike. This ‘evi-
dently manifest’ relationship is vividly expressed, for example, on the cover of the 
fifth edition of Erika Hoff’s textbook Language Development (Hoff 2014), which 
depicts a toddler sitting at a table and holding a banana to their ear as if talking into 
a telephone. It is therefore not surprising that, as Lillard (2007a: 136) notes, “[l]in-
guistic cues to pretending are the most researched topic in the area of how pretend 
differs from real.” This section will outline some of the most important aspects of 
the relationship between pretend play and the language enabling and creating it. 
Section 3.2.1 discusses research on the relationship between pretend play and lan-
guage. The subsequent sections will then elaborate on specific links between pre-
tend play and language. Section 3.2.2 debates to what degree pretend play can be 
seen as a special context for language acquisition. Section 3.2.3 spells out the rela-
tionship between metacommunication and pretend play, which was already briefly 
mentioned in Section 3.1.4, in more detail. Section 3.2.4 addresses the question of 
how pretend play and language rely on contextual factors. The last section, 3.2.5, 
then deals with research on linguistic features of pretend play. 
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3.2.1 The Relationship of Pretend Play and Language 
Many studies have found strong relationships between pretend play and language 
(Tamis-LeMonda & Bornstein 1994; Laakso et al. 1999). For example, Fein (1981) 
found that high language comprehension at 18 and 24 months was positively 
correlated with the frequency of pretence. In Rosenblatt’s (1977) study of 12- to 
24-month-old children, children who were more advanced linguistically for their 
age also engaged in more pretend play. Finally, in Bates et al. (1979), the use of 
gesture and language was best predicted by the amount of pretend play children 
were engaged in (cf. McCune-Nicolich 1981: 793). In their review of pretend play 
research, Lillard et al. (2013: 18) find that indeed, most studies show “that children 
who are more advanced in their play around 1 year of age are more advanced in one 
or more aspects of their language around 2.” Correlations have also been found for 
children under the age of 4. As Lillard et al. (2013: 18) summarise, researchers have 
found such correlations for many different aspects of language. They 
have looked at different aspects of language (vocabulary size in comprehension and/or pro-
duction, syntax) measured in different ways (checklist, free speech, elicited speech), and 
different aspects of pretend play (object substitutions, doll-directed acts, length of play se-
quences) measured in both free and elicited play situations. The evidence that pretend play 
and language are related early in development is compelling. 
Quinn et al. (2018) came to a similar conclusion in their recent quantitative meta-
analytic review of 35 studies published between 1978 and 2016 that investigated 
the relationship between pretend play and language acquisition (n = 6,848).13 They 
observed “a significant small-to-medium association between the two domains 
(r=.35)” (Quinn et al. 2018: 121).14 
However, the question of how exactly language and pretence are related has 
not been answered. In their review, Lillard et al. (2013: 1) conclude that the corre-
lation between pretend play and language can be due to a number of factors. It is 
possible that (1) pretend play is a crucial driving force in language development, or 
that (2) it affords opportunities for children to acquire and develop certain linguistic 
skills, but represents only one route and context for the development of these skills, 
something which Lillard et al. (2013: 1) term equifinality, or (3) both language and 
pretend play are epiphenomena that are both supported by the development of an 
 
13 The study with the highest sample size in their review was McEwen et al. (2007), which comprised 
data on 5,070 2-year-old children (cf. Quinn et al. 2018: 127). 
14 For an explanation of the correlation coefficient r, see Section 4.3.3. 
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underlying, shared factor, and this is the reason why they are related. According to 
Lillard et al. (2013), the research conducted to date is consistent with all three po-
sitions but insufficient to draw conclusions. The same holds for the relationship 
between pretend play with narrative development, and emotion regulation, respec-
tively.  
Many researchers investigating the relationship between language and pre-
tend play tend to favour an epiphenomenal explanation that sees both domains as 
linked to an underlying symbolic function whose development undergirds their par-
allel development (McCune 1995; Lillard et al. 2013; Lillard & Kavanaugh 2014; 
Lillard 2017). Pretend play requires symbolic thinking due to the ‘stand-for’ rela-
tionships often found in pretend scenarios. This, in turn, might foster children’s 
symbolic and linguistic skills.  
In terms of developmental sequences, both McCune (1995) and Ogura 
(1991) found that new complexity in pretend play emerged before analogous or 
comparable levels in linguistic skills, with new pretend play levels preceding new 
linguistic levels by roughly two months (cf. Lillard et al. 2013: 18). This is espe-
cially true for object substitutions (e.g., pretending a banana is a telephone), which 
has been strongly linked to language acquisition (McCune 1995, 2010). For exam-
ple, Casby and Della Corte (1987) show that the ability to use substitute objects in 
symbolic play is correlated with the mean length of utterance in 19- to 32-month-
old children (cf. Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 178). Generally, object substitution 
also seems to be related to both receptive and expressive language skills in pre-
schoolers (Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 178). Sachet and Mottweiler (2013: 179) 
explain this relationship in terms of the development of psychological distancing, 
as both object substitution and language skills invoke “the representation of items 
that are not immediately present” (see also Section 2.3.3). Language and pretend 
play can therefore be said to exhibit a developmental architecture that is quite sim-
ilar. In both areas, children start out with the most basic forms and progress to forms 
that are more advanced. For both pretend play and language, we can speak of an 
increase in the hierarchical combinatoriality and number of slots that can be 
combined in order to create a meaningful, coherent symbolic unit (Orr & Geva 
2015: 148; McCune 2010; Zittoun 2010).  
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McCune (1995: 198) proposes “a theoretical sequence of cognitive devel-
opments […] influencing representational play and language in the second year of 
life.” According to McCune’s (1995) data, pretend play develops sequentially, start-
ing with presymbolic play schemes, such as pretending to drink, with the child 
simply putting an empty cup to their lips. It then moves on to self-pretend, where 
children also imitate sound effects and exaggerate gestures, for example, those 
made when drinking. The next sequence in McCune’s (1995) analysis is other pre-
tend, such as a child feeding a doll, which is different from when the child would 
feed herself. The next, higher sequential step is that of combinatorial pretend, where 
pretend actions are combined, e.g., the child might first drink from a cup and then 
pour some pretend liquid into the cup or offer the cup to the doll or their mother. 
The final stage in McCune’s (1995) proposed sequence is hierarchical pretend, 
which requires a structured mental representation of the pretend act and is less cou-
pled to perceptual aspects of an object. For example, a child picking up a doll, 
searching for a bottle, and then pretending to feed the doll requires a mental repre-
sentation of the hierarchical organisation of this pretend scenario (McCune 1995: 
199).  
McCune (1995) argues that these developmental stages are closely related 
to comparable stages in language acquisition, with coupled capacities emerging in 
similar timeframes. In her analysis of these capacities, the onset of symbolic pretend 
behaviour was related to the development of word use, both of which required sym-
bolic understanding. The emergence of combinatorial pretend behaviours coincided 
with the use of linear early word combinations such as “allgone cookie,” which still 
rely on context for their interpretation (McCune 1995: 199). Finally, the beginning 
of hierarchical pretend acts was associated with the onset of hierarchical combina-
tions in language. As McCune (1995: 204) summarises, 
[a]nalyses of language and play performance supported the McCune hypotheses that chil-
dren who made specific representational transitions as indicated by their performance in 
play were more likely to evidence language milestones that were hypothesized as requiring 
the same underlying representational skill than children who had not demonstrated the play 
transition. 
On McCune’s (1995: 204) view, both symbolic play and language are functions of 
the underlying mental capacity for symbolic representation, indicating that early 
language acquisition is integrated with other cognitive capacities, a view that is 
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highly compatible with the Cognitive-Linguistic, emergentist, and usage-based 
view of language acquisition espoused here (see Section 2.1), and which can also 
be found in the works of Piaget (e.g. 1974). 
 More recently, Lillard and Kavanaugh (2014) also found a relationship of 
symbolic understanding with pretend play, language and theory of mind, suggesting 
that the development of symbolic understanding is the foundation for all these do-
mains. However, language, pretence, and executive function are also related to each 
other, and executive functions in turn also are related to theory of mind, suggesting 
that the complete picture of the cognitive and developmental interrelations of these 
abilities is a very complex one (Carlson & White 2013: 171).  
Even though the complete picture might be quite complex, a number of re-
searchers have strongly argued for pretend play being an important context for lan-
guage acquisition, and we will turn to this research next. 
 
3.2.2 Pretend Play as a Context for Language Acquisition 
Weisberg et al. (2013) argue that symbolic play, and also play in general, is an 
essential context for the development of language and enhancing linguistic skills. 
For example, pretend play has been shown to positively contribute to vocabulary 
acquisition in pre-schoolers (Weisberg et al. 2013; Toub et al. 2018). An even 
stronger position is adopted by Miller and Almon (2009: 63), who claim that pre-
tend play “contributes greatly to language development” (cf. Lillard 2015: 449). 
This is the case because the complexity of play and its cognitive and interactive 
elements foster the development of strategies negotiating complex pretend play sce-
narios, including the coordination of pretend actions and the assignment of pretend 
roles.  
This complexity is evident from very early on. Quinn and Kidd (2019), for 
example, studied the pretend play interactions of 18-month-old infants with their 
primary caregivers. They found that at this age, pretend play was characterised by 
a greater frequency of joint attention and a more frequent use of representational 
gestures than in non-pretend play contexts. Their “results suggest that symbolic 
play provides a rich context for the exchange and negotiation of meaning, and thus 
84 
 
may contribute to the development of important skills underlying communicative 
development” (Quinn & Kidd 2019: 33). 
As they become more competent language users, children also show more 
active involvement in negotiations of perspectives in pretence contexts than in non-
pretence ones (de Lorimier et al. 1995). This point has also been made by Garvey 
and Kramer (1989). They argue that pretend play requires the explicit assignment 
of pretend roles to different pretend play interactants, the linguistic skills in negoti-
ating and performing pretend activities and the ability to inform interactants of what 
is happening in a pretend situation. These affordances of pretend play contexts 
“might be expected to encourage the use of linguistic devices specialised, to some 
extent, to that type of activity” (Garvey & Kramer 1989: 365). Garvey and Kramer 
(1989) found that older children’s pretend play features more diversity in terms of 
relationships and roles, as well as more variation in activity types. They also found 
that children showed not only very similar developmental trajectories regarding 
what kind of pretend situations they communicated about, “but also remarkable 
similarity of communicative techniques in comparable age groups” (Garvey & 
Kramer 1989: 365). Howes and Matheson (1992: 962) argue that in pretend play, 
children need to be able to coordinate and assign pretend play roles with their play 
partners and that they also need to be sufficiently verbally fluent, coherent and ar-
ticulate to coordinate the planning and maintenance of play (cf. Dockett 1998: 113). 
Similarly, Trawick-Smith (1998: 433) notes that many researchers see pretend play 
as an important context for children to acquire linguistic competence and social 
skills because it requires them to “regularly negotiate shared symbolic meanings 
and coordinate ideas and intentions within make believe.” This echoes Bruner 
(1983: 65), who argued that “the most complicated grammatical and pragmatic 
forms of language appear first in play activity.” There is indeed evidence that chil-
dren’s use of language is more complex in play than in non-play contexts (Weisberg 
et al. 2013: 43; cf. Singer 1998). Internal state language, such as “This is a bad dog, 
you know” (Howe et al. 2005), as well as the linguistic co-construction of shared 
meanings have been shown to be positively related with pretend play (Howe et al. 
1998, 2002, 2005). 
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Studying preschool children ranging from 3;3 to 4;7 years of age, Hughes 
and Dunn (1997) found a relationship between mental state talk and pretend play. 
First, children with higher rates of pretend play also used more mental state terms 
more generally. In addition, children also used more mental state talk in pretend 
play situations than outside of them. Nielsen and Dissanayake (2000) found that 
there was a relationship between children’s increasing use of mental state terms and 
the increasing complexity of their pretend play with their parents. Melzer and 
Palermo (2016) also found that a more frequent use of mental state terms correlated 
with the complexity of pretend play situations children were engaged in. As they 
note, “parent-child interactions and the language used during pretend play are two 
important factors related to the complexity of play exhibited by children” (Melzer 
& Palermo 2016). However, it is important to acknowledge that play is very likely 
not the only context with these features. Complex negotiations of different perspec-
tives and the coordination of interaction using complex language can of course also 
occur in other situations, for example in joint activities that require complex coor-
dination and in conflict scenarios (e.g. Kyratzis 2009). Other discourse settings in 
which especially complex language can often be found are activities that are geared 
towards supporting children’s language development either at home, or in pre-
school and school classroom settings (Dwyer & Harbaugh 2020). These include 
shared bookreading (Yont et al. 2003; Cameron-Faulkner & Noble 2013) and the 
use of monologic, expository discourse specifically designed to convey infor-
mation, as opposed to simple conversational discourse (Nippold et al. 2005). Over-
all, certain situational contexts might favour the more frequent occurrence of certain 
linguistic features, with pretend play being one context favouring a higher fre-
quency of a cluster of specific linguistic structures. 
 
3.2.3 Pretend Play and Metacommunication  
Dockett (1998: 113) distinguishes between pretend communication on the one hand 
and metacommunication on the other, which is thought to emerge around 3 years 
of age (Vriens-van Hoogdalem et al. 2016). In the context of pretence, metacommu-
nications can be defined as “verbal statements or actions that explain how messages 
about pretend play should be interpreted” (Farver 1992: 502). Metacommunications 
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signal that activities are play and thereby assist in the creation of shared pretence 
meanings and perspectives (Dockett 1998: 113). This view goes back to Bateson 
(1956), who argued that play functions as a frame that is based on metacommuni-
cation making clear its play-status. Pretend communication is ‘within-frame’ com-
munication, whereas metacommunication represents stepping out of the frame and 
expressing a meta-perspective on it to ensure shared understanding. According to 
Whitebread and O’Sullivan (2012: 203), children use metacommunication in pre-
tend play “to establish the play frame, to provide ongoing messages as to how be-
haviour should be interpreted, and to manage any alterations to this frame” (see also 
Vriens-van Hoogdalem et al. 2016).  
As already discussed in Section 3.1.3, when they use pretend communica-
tion, children demonstrate “their ability to take on another’s perspective, and to 
think about how that person might act, and what they might say” (Robson 2012: 
145). The same holds for metacommunication as well, which is also tied to chil-
dren’s emerging understanding of perspectives in interaction (Vriens-van 
Hoogdalem et al. 2016). Eva Hoff (2013: 408) uses a theatre stage metaphor to 
illustrate the capacities involved in pretend communication and metacommunica-
tion. As she writes, children 
need to be able to direct their play through stage management techniques as well as act out 
their own roles. Therefore, children need to be both directors (and also narrators) and actors 
at the same time. They negotiate the content of play by stepping out of the actual role-
playing for a while, for example, by the use of storytelling as a stage management technique 
(now the dragon attacked me and you had to help me and bring me my sword (see 
Bretherton & Beeghly 1989)). 
Gaskins (2013: 241-242) points out that when talking about metacommunication, 
we should be careful to distinguish inventive and interpretative play (see Section 
3.1.6). In interpretative play, play partners can often rely on shared knowledge of 
frames and routines if they are frequently repeated. This is a typical pattern of much 
play: “In such situations, although frames are still introduced, negotiated, and 
repaired, the whole process is much more efficient, and therefore 
metacommunication is a less dominant aspect of the play event” (Gaskins 2013: 
243).  
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Explicit pretend communication strategies probably also are less important 
in interactions with caregivers, who, as described in Section 3.1.5., are much more 
attuned to their children’s perspective and use many implicit strategies that high-
light the pretend nature of situations. Implicit strategies to initiate pretend play 
therefore seem to be just as successful in this age range so that explicit strategies 
are not needed. In Harris and Kavanaugh’s (1993) and Reissland’s (1998) studies, 
mothers often just verbally requested actions relying on an implicit referent that 
was not explicitly marked as pretend. Kavanaugh and Harris (1991) found that in 
their interactions with 18- to 24 month-old children, mothers most often did not feel 
compelled to step outside of the pretend play framework (Reissland 1998: 366). For 
example, they might ask a child if they wanted to eat a hot dog, without explicitly 
asking them to pretend that the brick they were playing with is a hot dog. This also 
holds for younger children. As Reissland (1998: 371) has shown, when mothers 
engage in pretend play with their 11- to 15-month-old-children, they mostly do not 
step outside of the pretend play framework either. Instead, in her study, they only 
use indirect means to persuade their children to play-feed a doll and do not use 
metacommunicative strategies (Reissland 1998: 371).  
These arguments also tie in with mothers’ strategies when interacting with 
their children more generally. Caregivers often construct discourse frames that help 
their children to acquire language (Snow et al. 1987; see also Section 2.2.3). They 
do so by repeatedly creating predictable context-dependent frames. With time and 
through this repetition, children learn to recognise different contextual frames. For 
pretend play, caregivers/parents create and construct frames that make it clear to 
children when a situation is pretend without explicit metacommunication 
(Reissland 1998: 372). However, as we will see in our analysis of explicit uses of 
pretend in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, naturalistic situations often exhibit a higher degree 
of complexity and a lower degree of clarity than experimental settings, so that ex-
plicit metacommunication about pretend entities and behaviours plays a larger role 
in these contexts. In addition, the frequency of metacommunication and degree of 
explicitness also rises with age, as pretend play becomes more complex, as we will 
see both in the corpus analysis and also in Section 3.3. This will also be the topic 
of the next section.  
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3.2.4 Pretend Play, Language, and Context 
Karniol (2016: 17) notes another reason why the frequency of explicit pretend ut-
terances rises with age: ambiguity. Often it is not entirely clear what children are 
pretending from the onset (Veneziano 2002: 60). As Veneziano (2002: 60) puts it, 
“given the subjective nature of pretend, the intended meanings of the child’s play 
are not necessarily evident for a third party and sometimes only their verbalization 
may provide clarifying or even essential information to understand the child’s 
pretend.” Often, therefore, interactants rely on “verbally encoded indications of 
what roles, objects, settings, and actions are ‘on the stage’ at any point during a 
pretend engagement” (Garvey & Kramer 1989: 264).  
Children first observe the reduction of ambiguity in their mothers’ utter-
ances, who use language to ensure shared understanding with their children: “moth-
ers repeatedly emphasize ‘I’m pouring’ and ‘we’re eating a good snack now!’ of-
fering an interpretation of acts that could be ambiguous given the lack of real con-
tent” (Lillard 2011: 293). Later in their development, children show the same be-
haviour. For example, Karniol (2016: 17) cites a case of a 30-month-old child who 
is being told that there is no water in her cup, to which she replies “You can just 
pretend there’s water in here.” In cases like this, children can indicate the transition 
to a pretend situation with the explicit use of a pretend term.  
Pretend play requires children to negotiate their own symbolic meanings 
with those of their play partners. Trawick-Smith (1998: 343) also points towards 
the ambiguous nature of pretend play contexts, which fosters complex linguistic 
interactions. Not only do pretend play, and especially sociodramatic play, provide 
children with the opportunities to use complex language, they also support the de-
velopment of pretend communication and metacommunication (Dockett 1998; 
Robson 2012: 145-152). Support for this view also comes from studies by Creaghe 
and colleagues (2020), who found that both caregivers and children between 18 to 
24 months use communicative and linguistic behaviours that help the fluid negoti-
ation and assignment of meanings in pretend play contexts, thereby reducing the 
inherently ambiguous nature of pretend play. Moreover, they also found that lin-
guistic features found in pretend play, but not in play situations that did not involve 
pretence – namely more frequent turn-taking, and a higher degree of questions and 
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onomatopoeia – at 18 months in fact positively predicted language development at 
24 months.  
Veneziano (2002: 63-64) distinguishes between four different functions that 
pretend utterances can have:  
(1) They can be duplicates of previous pretend utterances of other interact-
ants. 
(2) They can enrich a pretend play scenario. 
(3) They can specify a pretend situation more precisely, or  
(4) they can create a pretend situation. 
Based on her analyses of French-speaking children, Veneziano (2002) distinguishes 
two periods in the development of children’s pretend language: A low-informative 
period, and a high-informative period. When children start talking about pretend 
behaviours, they start out with a low-informative period, which lasts around 2 to 6 
months. In this period children exclusively make pretend utterances belonging to 
categories 1 and 2. Veneziano (2002: 65) describes this period as a phase in “which 
more than 50% of the children’s verbalisations refer either to nonpretence aspects 
or to pretend meanings that have a clear counterpart in the actions and/or objects 
acted upon.” Between 18 and 23 months, children enter a high-informative period, 
“during which more than 50% of the children’s verbalizations are used to specify, 
enrich, create or announce pretend meanings, contributing decisively to make them 
understood” (Veneziano 2002: 65). 
As in other studies, Veneziano’s (2002; see also 2009) results show that 
children start using language in pretend situations quite early. Language is therefore 
a significant part of pretence from early on. What Veneziano also shows is that the 
aspects that children perspectivise and construe in pretend play change in develop-
ment. She sees these changes as “a specifically pragmatic acquisition, independent 
of children’s advances in lexical or morphosyntactic language knowledge” 
(Veneziano 2002: 66). Veneziano (2002, 2009) sees this development as a more 
general cognitive-pragmatic development in which children realise that perspec-
tives on situations need to be explicitly shared and negotiated. Children therefore 
learn to use language to express different perspectives on a situation, marking it as 
pretend or real (Hall et al. 1995; Garvey & Kramer 1989).  
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Evidence for this view comes from the fact that explicit talk about the sym-
bolic, pretence dimension of pretend play emerges around the same time in children 
as references to past events and as linguistically providing justifications for their 
own actions (Veneziano 2009: 30). Such justifications can also often be found in 
children’s language in pretence scenarios. For example, in the Thomas corpus 
(Lieven et al. 2009), pretend frequently occurs in constructions such as just pre-
tending; just pretending it’s/that’s X (e.g., <just pretending> [<]0that [*] this is 
coffee; 3-07-03.cha)15 that serve to justify or explain the child’s actions. Another 
construction that is quite frequent is just pretend PRONOUN COPULA X (e.g., just 
(pre)tend it's very high, Mum, 3-06-03.cha),16 which serve as imperatives or direc-
tives for participating in a pretend play situation (see also Pleyer & Lindner 2014: 
249). 
 
3.2.5 Linguistic Features of Pretend Play 
Many studies have looked at the strategies used by children to establish shared pre-
tence scenarios (e.g., Giffin 1984; McCune-Nicolich 1981; Garvey & Kramer 1989; 
Lloyd & Goodwin 1995; McCune 1995; Melzer & Palermo 2016). For example, 
studies have investigated specific linguistic features that occur in pretend play. Lin-
guistic features that appear more often in pretend scenarios than in non-pretend sce-
narios are sentence complexity, past-tense verbs, future auxiliary verbs, modal 
verbs (such as modal uses of will and gonna), quasimodals (Giffin 1984; Gee & 
Savasir 1985), temporal expressions, tags, subjunctive tense and formal proposals 
to pretend (Garvey & Kramer 1989; Lillard 2007a: 136).  
Other constituents of pretend play utterances that develop with age are the 
use of metacommunication, explicit linguistic transformations of objects and situa-
tions into pretend objects and situations, the complexity of action plans in pretence, 
and the diversity of the types of roles that are part of pretend play situations (Garvey 
& Kramer 1989: 264). Symbolic transformations of these kinds require interactants 
 
15 The symbol [<] “indicates that the text enclosed in angle brackets is being said at the same time 
as the preceding speaker’s bracketed speech” (MacWhinney 2019a: 74).  
16 The brackets in (pre)tend indicate that the word pretend was not completely pronounced. The part 
in brackets was left out, so that the utterance was actually just tend it’s very high, Mum (MacWhin-
ney 2019b: 47). 
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to “define those transformations verbally to each other in order to establish a shared 
frame of meaning” (Robson 2012: 123).  
All these features of course also occur in other contexts. For example, tem-
poral expressions are also frequently found in mealtime family conversations, es-
pecially in those of Western middle-class families who often talk about their day 
and past and non-present situations and events during mealtime (Snow & Beals 
2006). They are also found more frequently during more decontextualized discourse 
strategies such narrative storytelling, which is removed from the here and now (Nel-
son 1989; Demir et al. 2015). Here it is particularly important that from a usage-
based perspective, the use and acquisition of linguistic structures is always tied to 
the particular contexts in which they are instantiated (see Section 2.1.3). This means 
that certain structures can be tied to different contexts in which they occur espe-
cially frequently (see also Section 4.2.1.2). Given this theoretical background, we 
can state that, for example, “modals, as children express them, are associated with 
the pretend function” (Hall et al. 1995: 232). This means that modal verbs have a 
number of associated functions in child language, with one function being their use 
in pretend play contexts. 
As Hoyte et al. (2015: 19) stress, in the context of pretend play modality is 
a particularly interesting linguistic feature because when “speakers use modality 
they foreground not only the fact that their utterance is based on their own perspec-
tive but also that they realise different perspectives are possible.” They are therefore 
a vital linguistic tool to create and extend cohesive perspectives on pretend play 
situations.  
In general, it seems that children have a pretend lexicon of words they are 
more likely to use in pretend situations. That is, there is a network of words that 
constitute children’s entrenched strategies to initiate, respond to, negotiate and cre-
ate pretend play (Hall et al. 1995). This is also consistent with a usage-based ap-
proach to language and language acquisition (e.g., Tomasello 2003; Diessel 2013; 
see also Section 2.1.3).  
Lillard (2007a: 136), however, cautions that many of the more complex lin-
guistic features of indicating and negotiating pretend might be present in pre-school 
children, but might be unlikely to help children just learning language, that is, at the 
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time when pretend is just starting to develop as well. This is consistent with Hall et 
al.’s (1995) observation that when children talked about pretend play and pretend 
transformations, they expressed pretend play situations in ways that were relatively 
non-reflective and unsophisticated. Hall et al. (1995) found that children encode 
pretend actions mostly through the verb to be and aspectual constructions like I’m 
building, I’m putting dolly to bed. Importantly, these could not be understood as 
pretend without context. Children focussed on the creation of pretend play situa-
tions rather than on commenting on them, 
and the identity and action words that predominantly expressed that creation can only be 
accurately interpreted as referencing a pretend world by an examination of the conversa-
tional context in which they were embedded. Words, or more generally, communicative 
levels that would allow for reflectivity or for decontextualized awareness of the representa-
tion of pretence were rarely used (Hall et al. 1995: 243). 
Most sophisticated uses of pretend language by children were found to mirror the 
usage patterns of their mothers. Children only used such complex linguistic strate-
gies when “relatively more sophisticated words of pretense and more sophisticated 
levels of pretense were needed in everyday discourse” (Hall et al. 1995: 246).  
Mothers themselves were also found not to use sophisticated pretend dis-
course more frequently than their children but instead used it at a similar level. 
Here, mothers seemed to interactively align with their child in the frequency and 
form of pretend utterances, thereby establishing linguistic routines during dialogue 
that children could use as model utterances (cf. Pickering & Garrod 2005). Children 
therefore mostly mirrored the pretend language they were exposed to. This suggests 
that they were learning the language of internal cognitive states through exposure 
to an adult model. This again makes sense from a usage-based perspective. In 
Taylor’s (2012) words, we can say that children are keeping track of pretend utter-
ances they encounter, as well as their contexts, and store them in their ‘mental cor-
pus.’ This then enables them to generalise over instances of pretend utterances and 
contexts in a bottom-up-, data- and frequency-driven manner and to build up a net-
work of pretend constructions. However, as we have seen, given the context de-
pendency of most pretend constructions, this makes them very hard to find in an 
automated fashion in large corpora. In addition, explicit references to pretence ac-
tivities are cognitively extremely interesting as they tell us that children understand 
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the situation as an instance of pretence, something we cannot infer from more im-
plicit references to pretence. What is also important to remember here is that most 
constructions that children acquire are polysemous and polyfunctional, occurring in 
multiple contexts where they often serve different but related functions (Floyd & 
Goldberg 2020). Explicit references to pretence are therefore of special interest in 
studying children’s specialised pretend vocabulary, as they have the closest and 
most unambiguous connection to pretend situations and also shed light on chil-
dren’s and caregivers’ explicit ways of establishing and negotiating pretend play 
situations.  
Children’s language use does indeed become more explicit as they grow 
older. Between the ages of 3 to 5, social pretend play becomes more and more ex-
plicit in terms of children’s negotiations of complex perspectives on pretend sce-
narios: 
As children initiate, organize, and conduct social pretending, they use a differentiated vari-
ety of language to communicate not only differences in interpersonal orientation but also 
subtle differences in stances toward their pretend and nonpretend worlds (Garvey & Kramer 
1989: 379). 
Analysing pretend play situations using the Linguistic Word Count Programme 
(LIWC; Pennebaker et al. 2001), Lillard (2011) showed that mothers were more 
likely to repeat the same words when engaged in pretence. They also used more 
forms like we and us in pretend situations than in non-pretend situations. Both these 
tendencies can be seen as ways to achieve joint attention and confirm joint under-
standing. These strategies ensure that both mother and child share the same pretend 
world and participate in the same act of shared meaning-making and sharing a per-
spective (Lillard 2011: 291).  
One example case is the progressive. Not only do children themselves use 
progressive constructions in their pretend play, but it can also be argued that child-
directed speech in pretend play also fosters the acquisition of progressive construc-
tions. Progressive constructions are used in situations in which an event that is 
described is just unfolding, and is temporally limited, something which is generally 
the case in pretence. This view is also supported by the fact that, as observed by 
Lillard et al. (2007), mothers talk more during pretence situations and use more 
repetitive language. This might increase the salience and comprehensibility of pro-
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gressive forms for children, in this case the fact that one aspect of progressive con-
structions is to refer to non-permanent, temporally limited, unfolding actions, 
events, and situations. 
From a Cognitive-Linguistic and constructionist perspective, Cook-
Gumpertz and Kyratzis’ (2001) study is of particular interest in this context. In their 
study, they investigate the development of aspect within pretend play situations. 
Grammatical aspect provides a powerful means to conceptualise the unfolding of 
events in different ways (cf. Croft 2012: 4). According to Comrie (1976: 3), 
“aspects are different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a 
situation.” Differences between perfective and imperfective aspectual framing in 
English (e.g., She worked vs. She was working) have been discussed extensively in 
Cognitive Linguistics. In Cognitive Grammar, aspectual framing is characterised in 
terms of viewpoint. For example, in the English progressive, “the position from 
which the situation is viewed is contained in the ongoing process itself (so that any 
boundaries are not ‘in view’)” (Verhagen 2007: 153). This ‘involved viewpoint’ 
plays a pivotal role in acquiring progressive aspect. In child-directed speech, 
progressively framed utterances tend to be used to denote events that are still 
unfolding (Ibbotson et al. 2014; see also Pleyer & Hartmann 2014). 
Cook-Gumperz and Kyratzis’ (2001) study provides evidence that pretend 
play situations serve as scaffolding and training ground for the acquisition of pre-
sent simple and present progressive constructions. They investigated the utterances 
of 3- and 4-year-olds engaged in pretend play. As their analysis shows, the simple 
present and progressive constructions used by children are contextually tied to par-
ticular types of pretend play as well as particular perspectives and viewing arrange-
ments (cf. Langacker 2008: 73). Progressive constructions such as I’m making soup 
or pretend I’m making food, for instance, are tied to the child taking an involved 
viewpoint on the pretend action that they themselves are part of. On the other hand, 
the simple present is tied to pretend play that is collaborative or manipulative. Sim-
ple present constructions are used when the child wants somebody else to do some-
thing (e.g., somebody’s on the ice-skate rink, and you say, ‘Sarah have you got 
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pins’), or when the child establishes a habitual role in pretend play (e.g., I’m a Chi-
nese sister, and I look pretty; I come from Korea) (Cook-Gumperz & Kyratzis 2001: 
56-57).  
The language of pretence is thus a specialised use of language as it differs 
from language use in other contexts. This means that specific linguistic features 
occur more frequently in pretend contexts than in other contexts, and as such have 
a strong statistical associative link with pretend scenarios. As noted above, this is 
consistent with a usage-based view of language acquisition, in which constructions 
are stored together with associations of memories of their usage contexts. They 
therefore also have the potential of aiding children in the acquisition of these con-
structions. 
Generally, observations like these are consistent with the view that the 
meaning of these constructions is intricately linked to certain discourse-pragmatic 
and perspectival functions. From a constructionist point of view, then, they are to 
be seen as part of the constructional meaning of simple present and present progres-
sive constructions in cooperative, collaborative pretend play situations. 
 
3.3 The Acquisition of the Lexical Item Pretend 
Words like pretend are central to experimental investigations of children's under-
standing of pretence, imagination, fantasy, and reality. Therefore, how children 
acquire pretend is an important issue for research in cognitive development (Lillard 
& Witherington 2004). Hall et al. (1995: 233) even go so far as to claim that  
[k]nowing what words children include in their pretend lexicons may help provide the key 
that unlocks the door to understanding the relationship between the internal representation 
of pretence, the cognitive internal state lexicon, and the development of theory of mind.  
However, little is actually known about how children use these words in their eve-
ryday life (Bunce & Harris 2008: 446). Pretend occupies a special part of this pre-
tend lexicon in a bigger network and will be the focus of the corpus analysis. Elu-
cidating patterns of the use of pretend using the CHILDES database is one of the 
main goals of the corpus studies in Chapters 5 to 7, but before we look at these data 
in the empirical part of this study, let us take stock of some of the results of previous 
studies regarding the use of the lexical item pretend. One caveat that we have to 
keep in mind, however, is the fact that children’s first use of particular words and 
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constructions might only reflect a partial understanding of their meaning that differs 
from adult usage. This is especially the case in the domain of mentalistic verbs 
(Carpendale & Lewis 2015: 403; cf. Shatz et al. 1983; Budwig 2002). So, as men-
tioned in Section 3.1.7, children’s early use of the word pretend might not reflect a 
mentalistic understanding of a perspective on a play situation yet, but might instead 
be focussed on the action of pretending (see also Section 7.2.1). 
Nevertheless, previous studies indicate that the expression pretend is found 
significantly more often in older than in younger children (Garvey & Kramer 1989; 
Hall et al. 1995). Previous studies have found that pre-school children do use the 
word pretend to indicate something as pretence, but that they do not regularly do so 
until they have reached age 5 (Lillard 2007a: 136). Some previous studies of pre-
tend play in children seem to have been too focussed on the decontextualised use 
of this particular item as a window into children’s pretend play, prompting Lillard 
(2002: 111) to remark that  
[o]ne might question whether children’s problem in some experiments is only with the word 
“pretend” (Woolley, [1995]; P. Mitchell, 1996). Perhaps children simply mismapped the 
word pretend to the characteristic component of the activity, while neglecting the defining 
one (Lillard, 1993), but they are well aware, when watching people pretend, that minds and 
even mental representations are involved. 
What this indicates is that it is of crucial importance to not only look at occurences 
of pretend in isolation, but at the contexts and pretend play activities in which they 
occur and the way that children use this lexical item to coordinate and negotiate 
perspectives on pretend play, which is one of the key goals of the current project. 
In the following sections we will first discuss experimental data on the acquisition 
and use of pretend (3.3.1), and then review existing corpus, questionnaire and diary 
studies on the acquisition of this lexical item (3.3.2). In the last section of this 
chapter, I summarise what is known about the function of the lexical item pretend 
in acquisition and interaction. 
 
3.3.1 Experimental Data on the Acquisition and Use of Pretend 
On the comprehension side, according to Fein (1981: 1101), 4-year-old children 
understand the word pretend and its implications, and they can also describe their 
own activities using the verb pretend. On the production side, as Garvey and Berndt 
(1977) found in their study, 3- to 5-year-olds are more likely to communicate their 
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own activities and intentions (e.g., I gotta drive to the shopping centre) than they 
are to communicate shared plans they have with interactants. As Garvey and Kra-
mer (1989) note, pretend statements increase dramatically during the age span of 
2;10 to 5;7 years of age. These include transitions that instruct others to pretend 
(you pretend…), that aim to draw others into shared pretend (Now we hafta pretend 
the tea-party; Gerhardt 1991: 545), or to locate a space where the pretend activity 
is going to take place (let’s play in the doll corner; Paley 1984: 66) (cf. Karniol 
2016: 17). In their study, formal proposals using the verb pretend did not occur very 
often in children between 2;10 to 4;4 years of age, but were used quite frequently 
by children between 4;8 to 5;7 (Garvey & Kramer 1989: 375).  
Similar results were obtained by Lloyd and Goodwin (1995). They com-
pared how young children starting school played together in pretend scenarios at 
two stages in development: at the beginning of school and six months later. They 
separated their analysis into two groups: The first recordings were done with chil-
dren aged 4;2-4;6 in the autumn term, and the second recordings followed when the 
children were between 4;8-5;0 in the summer term. Lloyd and Goodwin (1995) dis-
tinguished four different activities young children employed in setting up and 
organising pretend play situations:  
(1) assigning roles to themselves;  
(2) assigning roles to others; 
(3) designating objects as pretend objects that stood for something other than 
they were;  
(4) establishing a unified theme for a pretend play scenario.  
In the autumn term recordings, only one instance of pretend was found. In the sum-
mer term recordings, on the other hand, they found 54 overt uses of pretend, which 
made up for 20.5% of all utterances organising pretend scenarios. Out of the overt 
uses of pretend, 81% were used for scene setting and establishing a shared theme 
for a pretend scenario. Claiming a role for themselves, assigning a role, or assigning 
pretend status to an object, on the other hand, only accounted for less than 8% in 
each case. Overall, in Lloyd and Goodwin’s (1995) study, pretend could be said to 
be common among children in the age span from 4;7-5;7, but not before. Interest-
ingly, the functions employed by children to organise pretend did not change in 
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frequency. It was just their linguistic realisation that differed. For example, scene 
setting occurred at a similar frequency in the autumn recordings and the summer 
recordings, with the difference being that scene setting in the autumn recordings 
was not done with overt uses of the verb pretend. Non-overt strategies of establish-
ing pretend play therefore seemed just as efficient in establishing shared pretence 
scenarios as an overt strategy. However, as the data in Chapter 5 show, the same 
might not hold true for situations where it is less clear whether children are pretend-
ing and what they are pretending. 
Garvey and Kramer (1989) also found instances of pretend in their data. It 
was often used as a metacommunicative device in sociodramatic play with the func-
tion of stepping outside of a pretend situation and adopting a pretend stance by 
explicitly stating Let’s pretend. As with Lloyd and Goodwin (1995), Garvey and 
Kramer (1989) found this explicit use most frequently in older, school-aged chil-
dren. 
However, children’s abilities to engage in and negotiate shared pretence are 
already highly complex and developed when they start school (Furth & Kane 1992; 
Lloyd & Goodwin 1995). This led Lloyd and Goodwin (1995) to the conclusion 
that children’s frequent use of pretend at age 4;7-5;7 reflected not a cognitive de-
velopment, but a linguistic one. They speculate that teachers repeatedly use explicit 
scene setting strategies during group activities, and that this makes children aware 
that explicit verbs like pretend can serve the function of publicly announcing and 
thereby initiating imaginary scenarios. The rise in the frequency of pretend could 
therefore also reflect children’s growing awareness of the verb as a metacommuni-
cative scene setter, or, as Karniol (2016) calls it, an epistemic operator.  
Looking at even younger children, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) showed 
that 2-year-olds already possess the ability to use nonliteral language and have lin-
guistic ways of talking about pretence or initiating pretend situations. However, as 
with the studies by Lloyd and Goodwin (1995) and Garvey and Kramer (1989), 
younger children used the lexical item pretend significantly less often. Dale and 
Fenson (1996), based on the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory 
(see Section 3.3.2), even reported that among 2-year-old children, only about 7% 
used it in everyday speech (cf. Bunce & Harris 2008: 446). Bunce and Harris (2008: 
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452), however, used different methods with higher ecological validity and came to 
different conclusions. Studies with higher ecological validity try to ensure that the 
“methods, materials and setting of the research study closely approximate the real-
life situation that is under investigation” (Rowe 2012: 206). In this case, Bunce and 
Harris (2008) not only asked parents if they remembered their children using the 
lexical item pretend, as was done by Dale and Fenson (1996), but also asked them 
to record uses of the target word pretend when it was produced by the child. Using 
these methods, they found that all 80 of the 2- to 3-year-old children in their study 
used the lexical item pretend.  
This is also a caveat for much data found in the CHILDES database. Often, 
data were collected during toy play, which means that in such situations a pretend 
or play context might already be established. This might therefore reduce the need 
for children to explicitly announce or negotiate that they are pretending (cf. Bunce 
& Harris 2008: 453; see the discussion in Section 4.3). Nevertheless, as the data in 
Chapter 5 show, corpus evidence supports the observation by Bunce and Harris 
(2008) that in naturalistic settings, children use the lexical item pretend more fre-
quently and earlier than experimental and observational research that looks at 
smaller datasets suggests.  
As in the Lloyd and Goodwin (1995) and Garvey and Kramer (1989) stud-
ies, Bunce and Harris (2008) also found that pretend is used more often by older 
children aged 4 to 7 years. In contrast to Lloyd and Goodwin (1995), they do not 
see this as a purely linguistic development. Instead, they interpret these results in 
light of Piaget’s (1962) argument that as children grow older, their pretence 
acquires a more orderly fashion. Their more frequent use of pretend later in devel-
opment can then in part be explained due to the need of interactants to negotiate 
with their play partner to establish a shared perspective on the pretend play situation 
(Bunce & Harris 2008: 452).  
Regarding the development of internal cognitive state language, including 
pretend, Hall et al. (1995: 249) found that “[c]hild and adult production of the cog-
nitive internal state word lexicon was tightly woven together.” As mentioned above, 
and consistent with a usage-based approach to language acquisition, children 
mostly mirrored the language they were exposed to. This also means that at this 
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age, the use of pretend and other internal state language is not driven by children’s 
cognitive development but by the way and frequency these words are used by adult 
models in different contexts. As also indicated above, explicit expressions such as 
play or make believe are not very frequent in children’s utterances. In addition, 
“[w]hen the word pretend was used, it rarely signaled evaluation or metacognition. 
Instead, it was used to simply further the action” (Hall et al. 1995: 251).  
This contrasted with Hall and colleagues’ initial speculation that “the word 
pretend should lead development of cognitive internal state words and that in this 
domain also child and adult usages should be minimally connected” (Hall et al. 
1995: 251). This, however, was not supported by their data. They also found that 
mothers did not use pretend as a marker of cognitive state very often either (Hall et 
al. 1995: 252). Lillard and Witherington (2004: 289) also found very few instances 
of the verb pretend in their study of the interactions of 18-month-olds with their 
mothers: “On average, the explicit labelling of the event type was used once in 
every pretend session, but many mothers did not use the word at all.” In fact, it was 
only used by about half of the 29 mothers in their study. Instead, mothers more 
often used different strategies. In Lillard and Witherington’s (2004) study, for in-
stance, mothers talked more and in more detail about the activities they were en-
gaged in in pretend play situations than in non-pretence situations. They also found 
that children’s understanding of a pretend situation did not improve or deteriorate 
regardless of whether the word pretend was used. As Rakoczy et al. (2006: 371) 
summarise, “in talking about pretend play, explicit ‘pretend that’ and ‘pretend to’ 
constructions are not used very often, as there are other more implicit ways of mark-
ing discourse as being about pretence events” (cf. Garvey & Kramer 1989; Lloyd 
& Goodwin 1995). However, as we will see, uses of pretend in other types of con-
structions that are less complex do occur significantly more often. 
Hall et al. (1995: 248-248) did find that pretend was used more often by 
children in free-play situations. However, they generally did not use more internal 
cognitive state words in pretend play situations than in other situations. As Sobel 
and Lillard (2001) have shown, 4-year-olds still do not explicitly connect the word 
pretend with mental states. Lillard (2011: 111) speculates that children first need to 
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become aware that pretending involves cognitive activity before they extend the 
meaning of pretend to include this (see Section 3.1.7). 
In summary, experimental studies indicate that children display quite com-
plex abilities to set up and organise pretend play from quite early on. Only as they 
grow older do they start using more overt, explicit and linguistically more complex 
ways of organising pretend play, for example, through the use of the lexical item 
pretend. However, even though the usage of pretend is less frequent in younger 
children and increases with age, it still has an important place in children’s everyday 
lives and their interactions with caregivers. This is especially the case because the 
lexical item pretend is instrumental in explicitly marking activities as pretend, 
something that is particularly important when it is not clear that pretend activity is 
taking place. For these reasons, focussing on the usage of pretend in this study can 
still yield important insights into how the lexical item is used to negotiate perspec-
tives on pretend play situations. The fact that pretend does indeed occupy a special 
place in children’s everyday lives is also supported by corpus, questionnaire and 
diary studies, to which I will turn next. 
 
3.3.2 Corpus, Questionnaire and Diary Studies of Pretend 
Probably the most reliable source for the development of the lexical item pretend 
is the data from the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventories 
(MBCDIs or CDIs; Fenson et al. 1994, 2007). The CDIs are “standardized, parent-
completed report forms designed to assess language and communication skills in 
young children aged 8 months to 37 months” (Fenson & Dale 2014: 365). As 
Fenson & Dale (2014: 366) point out, 
[t]he reliability and validity of the CDIs for the assessment of key language milestones is 
well documented in the literature and generally comparable to, if not better than, existing 
structured tests and measures based on transcription and analysis of language samples. 
CDIs by now exist in several languages. For the present research question, however, 
the CDI that is most relevant is the one that features pretend in its questionnaire 
assessment test. This is the CDI: Words and sentences (W&S; Dale & Fenson 
1996). W&S is a 680-item expressive vocabulary checklist assessing aspects of 
children’s grammar (79 items), sentence complexity (37 items) and their production 
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of semantic lexical items (564 items). The lexical item list is divided into 22 seman-
tic categories. One such category is a list of 102 “Action words;” pretend is one of 
them (Fenson et al. 2007). Pretend is also on the 200-word Level II Short Form 
Vocabulary Checklist of the CDI for young children aged 16-30 months (Fenson et 
al. 2000: 108-109). The fact that pretend can be found in these lists can already be 
seen as a testament to the relative importance of pretend play in language acquisi-
tion.  
Information on the acquisition of the semantic lexical item pretend, based 
on the norming dataset of the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development In-
ventory for American English (Fenson et al. 2007; Fernald et al. 2013; Thal et al. 
2013), can be freely accessed through the Crosslinguistic Lexical Norms Database 
CLEX17 (Jørgensen et al. 2010). Data on the lexical item pretend can also be found 
in the Wordbank database (Frank et al. 2017), “an open database of children’s vo-
cabulary growth, featuring data from contributors around the world.”18 Wordbank 
is an archive of data from the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development In-
ventory and at the time of writing contained “data from 75,144 children across 29 
languages.”19  
Table 3.1 maps the linguistic development of the lexical item pretend based 
on data from a number of different CDIs. Specifically, the table contains infor-
mation on what percentage of the children who were assessed using the CDIs pro-
duced the lexical item pretend in a certain age group. The table collects data from 
the American cross-sectional CDI studies: W&S (Dale & Fenson 1996) as found 
on the CLEX website. This dataset covers the age of 16-30 months and includes 
1,461 children. For the other datasets, item-level responses were extracted from all 
available forms in English from Wordbank (Frank et al. 2017).20 These were the 
Wordbank data for the developmental trajectory of pretend in the Wordbank data 
for American English21 (Fenson et al. 2007), which consists of data for 5,846 chil-
dren (age range: 16-30 months), the Wordbank data for British English (Dale et al. 
2003), which consist of data for 11,150 children (age range: 20-35 months), and the 
 
17 http://www.cdi-clex.org/ (last accessed 18/05/2018). 
18 http://wordbank.stanford.edu (last accessed 18/05/2018). 
19 http://wordbank.stanford.edu (last accessed 18/05/2018). 
20 Downloaded 15/03/2018. 
21 These data include the American CDI: W&S data. 
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Wordbank data for Australian English (Kalashnikova et al. 2016), which consist of 
data for 1,520 children (age range: 14-30 months). In total, then, Table 3.1 below 
contains data on the developmental trajectory of the lexical item pretend for three 
English varieties and 18,516 children.  
Table 3.1: Wordbank and MBCDI data for the development of the lexical item pretend from 14 to 
30 months. Percentage gives the percentage of children producing the word pretend at a given month 
as judged by parent questionnaire reports 
As we can see, in every age group apart from the American CDI: W&S at 16 months 
and 21 months, there are at least some children who produce pretend. However, on 
average, the number of children using pretend does not approach 10% before 24 
months of age. This number goes up to 20% by 26 months of age, but only by about 
30 months do around half of all children produce the word. What we can also ob-
serve is that once the number of children reaches around 10%, the percentage rises 
quite quickly, with twice the number of children using pretend two months later, 
 Months 
American 
CDI: W&S 
American 
Wordbank 
British  
Wordbank 
Australian 
Wordbank Average 
14       0.90%   
15       2.90%   
16 0% 0.10%   1.67% 0.59% 
17 1.20% 0.37%   0.96% 0.84% 
18 1.90% 0.68%   0.92% 1.17% 
19 3.10% 2.13%   1.61% 2.28% 
20 0.90% 2.92% 0.00% 3.85% 1.91% 
21 0% 2.46% 14.29% 2.94% 4.92% 
22 7.80% 6.00% 12.31% 9.59% 8.97% 
23 8.70% 11.83% 10.70% 7.04% 9.57% 
24 6.70% 14.07% 13.41% 9.21% 10.85% 
25 14% 16.82% 14.37% 10.59% 13.95% 
26 22% 25.41% 15.96% 16.88% 20.06% 
27 17.70% 23.59% 24.16% 29.17% 23.65% 
28 25% 32.41% 23.66% 25.37% 26.61% 
29 36.30% 39.59% 41.11% 38.46% 38.87% 
30 43.80% 49.83% 53.06% 43.40% 47.52% 
31     45.83%     
32     51.85%     
33     53.33%     
34     20.00%     
35     40.00%     
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and almost twice the amount of children using it another three months later. How-
ever, even with the British Wordbank data, which has the longest age range with 35 
months, still only half of all children use the word, and the highest frequency is 
53.33%. 
Pretend therefore is not a universal lexical item for English-speaking chil-
dren, although the behaviour itself is, as shown in the discussion above. As we will 
see in the corpus analysis of the Manchester corpus in Chapter 5, this result also 
holds for the corpus used in this analysis, as only 9 out of 12 children in the Man-
chester corpus data use this lexical item. In addition, in the Thomas corpus, there 
are no instances of pretend before age 3.  
Fig. 3.1 illustrates even more clearly that in all CDI item datasets, there is a 
clear rise in the percentage of how many children use the term pretend as they grow 
older.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Wordbank and MBCDI data for the development of the lexical item pretend from 14 to 
35 months. Percentage gives the percentage of children producing the word pretend at a given month 
as judged by parent questionnaire reports 
This rise in relative frequency is also borne out statistically. If we take the average 
of all percentages for ages where we have more than one dataset (16-30 months), 
there is a very strong positive correlation between age and percentage of usage that 
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is statistically highly significant (r = 0.93; p = 0.00000077).22 The same holds if we 
measure the correlations in the American CDI: Words & Sentences (16-30 months; 
r = 0.9; p = 0.0000038) and the American Wordbank (16-30 months; r = 0.94; p = 
0.00000018). For the Australian Wordbank (14-30 months; r = 0.88; p = 0.0000035) 
and the British Wordbank23 (20-30 months; r = 0.88; p = 0.00037) we have a strong 
positive relationship that is also statistically highly significant.  
Although the percentage of pretend clearly rises in the CDI data, it is not 
clear if and to what extent the usage of pretend continues to increase after 30 
months. For the British Wordbank, where we also have data for 31-35 months, the 
frequency of pretend does in fact plateau at 30 months and does not rise in the 
months after. For the 13 children investigated in this study, we will come back to 
the question of how and if pretend frequency increases as they get older in Chapter 
5. However, it is interesting to note here that, as discussed above, in the TC, Thomas 
does not start using the lexical item pretend before 3;0 or 36 months of age. 
Other diary and corpus studies support this general picture, but also shed 
light on developments in somewhat older children. In a study by Bretherton and 
Beeghly (1982: 914), 30% of mothers reported that by 28 months of age, their chil-
dren used the word pretend, as in Those monsters are just pretend, right? The cog-
nition word with the highest number of children who had acquired it by 28 months 
was know (66%), with remember, forget, think, maybe and dream being the second 
most frequent group, all with approximately 30% (Bretherton & Beeghly 1982: 
915). Karniol (2016: 17) notes that in her diary study of her own two children, who 
grew up bilingually with English and Hebrew, pretend also emerged at 28 months. 
This is also the age that, according to a corpus study by Shatz, Wellman and Silber 
(1983; see also Bartsch & Wellman 1995), children use mental state terms to set up 
contrasts with reality (cf. Karniol 2016: 9). This is also noted in Bretherton and 
Beeghly’s (1982: 915) survey, where they found that children “who used real and 
pretend were concerned with distinctions of make-believe and reality (especially 
with regard to monsters).” As Shatz et al. (1983: 309) explain, “[c]ontrastives are 
 
22 Regarding the use of statistical measures to investigate correlation, see Section 4.3.3. 
23 The British Wordbank data actually cover a time span of 20-35 months, but for the comparability 
of results the time span of 31-35 months is omitted here. 
106 
 
those sentences which mark an understanding of a difference or discrepancy be-
tween some mental state and present or observable reality.” For example, “‘I’m just 
pretending’ in response to the question ‘Are they really dead?’ is an explicit refer-
ence to reality or lack of it” (Shatz et al. 1983: 309). 
In an unpublished study reported in Lillard (2007a: 136) and Lillard (2007b: 
155), Pinkham and Lillard (2007) analysed children’s use of the word pretend in 
the CHILDES database (MacWhinney 2000). They investigated the use of pretend 
in ten children, three girls and seven boys. In total, Pinkham and Lillard (2007) 
found 227 spontaneous uses of the word. Their main findings were that the word 
first appears shortly before age 3, but that it is used predominantly to direct action 
or to mark contrasts between pretend and real. In addition, “the proportion of ‘pre-
tend’ uses directing the interaction remained relatively constant across ages 2-3, but 
declined significantly by ages 4-5” (Lillard 2007b: 154).  
In contrast, pretend being used to distinguish pretend from reality increased 
from age 2 to 5. By ages 4-5 pretend was used more frequently to direct a pretend 
interaction instead. This is consistent with the view that young children start out 
with an understanding of the word pretend based on behaviour, and only later, 
around age 4, acquire a mentalistic understanding of the word pretend (Pinkham & 
Lillard 2007; Lillard 2007a,b; see Section 3.1.7). In Shatz et al.’s (1983) corpus 
study of one child, Abe, the first occurrence of pretend was at 2;10. This age was 
also the first time it was used as a mental state function. Its third occurrence was at 
age 3;1. In total, there were 32 occurrences in the corpus. Out of their list of 18 
mental words in total, it was the seventh most frequent. The results for 24 other 
children they studied in less detail were similar.  
Bunce and Harris (2008: 451) asked mothers to keep diaries and also inter-
viewed them about their children’s use of real, really, and pretend. Next to the 
interview questions, parents were also asked that they record utterances of the target 
words. As they note, “[t]his method has high ecological validity and is particularly 
useful for data on a form that is newly emerging in the child’s lexicon and is likely 
to occur infrequently” (Bunce & Harris 2008: 451). Bunce and Harris (2008) found 
that children’s pretend utterances could be sorted into the following categories: ut-
terances referring to the authenticity of entities and objects, utterances referring to 
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their reality and ontological status, and commands. In children aged 2-3 years, 81% 
of utterances focussed on authenticity, whereas only 16% focussed on ontological 
status. This pattern was different for children aged 4-7 years, where 63% of utter-
ances using pretend, real or really focussed on authenticity and 29% focussed on 
reality. However, although we see an increase in focussing on reality, utterances 
dealing with authenticity are still more frequent.  
The following examples illustrate the use of pretend utterances focussing on 
the distinction between reality and pretence. In a follow-up study, Bunce and Harris 
2013: 1495) discuss the example of one child who watched actors who were dress-
ing up and marched like soldiers and commented: They’re not really soldiers, 
they’re just pretending. Another example they mention is a child pretending to be 
a fireman who was asked to put out an imaginary fire, to which he replies: I’m only 
pretending. I’m not a real fireman! (Bunce & Harris 2013: 1495). What these ex-
amples have in common is that in “both these examples, the child was knowingly 
comparing real soldiers or firemen with people just dressing-up and pretending to 
be them” (Bunce & Harris 2013: 1495). Regarding commands, 4-7-year-old chil-
dren were found to use more commands (29%) compared to children aged 2-3 
(16%). These results are in accordance with the overall developmental trajectory 
that as they grow older, children become more active in negotiating and directing 
pretend play scenarios, using pretend as a device for scene setting and instructing 
play. We will deal with the functions of pretend in more detail in the following 
section. 
 
3.3.3 The Function of Pretend in Acquisition and Interaction 
Which functions does the word pretend serve? As Lillard and Witherington (2004: 
96) point out, “[t]he word pretend (as in ‘Pretend you hated baby fish.’) is perhaps 
the most direct way to specify pretence, and even preschoolers use it, but not 
regularly until about 5 years of age.” This is because direct statements that do not 
use the word pretend and other strategies can also initiate a pretend mode and 
specify the nature of pretend entities. One example found in Matthews (1977: 215; 
cited in Lillard & Witherington 2004: 96-97), is a 4-year-old child first asking 
Where is the oven? and then heading to a cupboard and saying This is the oven. This 
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perspective-establishing way of labelling is also a successful way to introduce and 
transform pretend entities. Indeed, this ‘in-frame’ labelling strategy can also be 
found frequently when mothers pretend with their children (Kavanaugh et al. 1983; 
Lillard & Witherington 2004: 97) for children aged 18-24 months and also for chil-
dren aged 11-15 months (Reissland 1998: 371).  
Through the use of ‘in-frame’ labelling strategies children come to realise 
that once a pretend scenario is set up and interactants have established that the ac-
tivities they engage in are pretence, they do not need to explicitly mark them with 
the lexical item pretend. As Giffin (1984: 89) notes, in these contexts, young chil-
dren “rely on an implicit pretend rule that guides all players to interpret statements 
during make-believe play as if they were prefaced with the words ‘pretend that.’” 
This enables children to organise pretend play using non-overt language; that is, 
without using the verb pretend (Giffin 1984: 89). Duveen and Lloyd (1988) also 
found that children aged 3 to 4 constructed pretend episodes by a variety of strate-
gies which did not include the use of the verb pretend but which enabled them to 
share representations of socially organised events as mutual topics of attention and 
communication. 
Overall, children use the word pretend for many different purposes, as sev-
eral studies have shown. This includes describing their own engagement in pretend 
activities, and marking both substitute and imaginary objects as pretend (Shatz et 
al. 1983; Bunce & Harris 2008). Hall and Nagy (1986) distinguish between prag-
matic and semantic uses of internal state language. Semantic uses of a mental state 
item have the purpose of communicating a mental state. Pragmatic uses of a mental 
state item, on the other hand, are used when it has some other function in the activity 
(cf. Hall et al. 1995: 251). 
 Lloyd and Goodwin (1995) argue that there must be at least some uses of 
pretend that most 4-year-old children are familiar with. They cite a study by Furrow 
et al. (1992: 624) in which it was found that pretend was used by more than half of 
the mothers in their samples. Pretend was also used by more than half of the 3-year-
old children in the study. As Lloyd and Goodwin (1995) note, however, Furrow et 
al. (1992) did not investigate the pragmatic function of the uses of pretend found in 
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mothers and children. Pretend therefore could first have the function of coordinat-
ing and commenting on an action before it is seen as a mental-cognitive word. In 
their review of previous studies, Lloyd and Goodwin (1995: 262) note that in 
basically all uses of pretend cited in the literature its function is to contrast, disclaim 
or explain children’s previous actions with reference to their pretend intention. 
They found only one exception, an overt use of pretend by a 3-year-old-child, 
whose goal it was to direct their interlocutor’s behaviour. Some cases in the more 
recent literature, however, can also be interpreted to have this meaning, as do many 
of the examples in the corpus analysis presented in Chapter 5. 
As discussed above, regarding the use of pretend, Bunce and Harris (2008) 
have found that younger children were more interested in the status of a pretend 
entity in terms of its authenticity than its reality. Bunce and Harris (2013: 10), in-
vestigating the relationship between pretend and reference to mental states, found 
that children more often used pretend to refer to external appearances and actions, 
and less to their mental state of pretending. This is consistent with the general 
observation that children start pretending at a much earlier age, following their first 
birthday, but that “they do not begin to talk about the mental realm until they are 
almost 3 years old (Shatz et al. 1983; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995)” (Woolley 2002: 
127-128).  
Lloyd and Goodwin (1995) argue that the verb pretend only plays a second-
ary role in children’s acquisition of the capacity to co-construe social pretence sce-
narios with others. Based on the fact that pretend only appeared six months into 
children’s school experience but not before, they propose that children acquire the 
verb pretend due to being exposed to it by teachers. Teachers have an educational 
agenda that emphasises metacommunication and contrasting real and pretend situ-
ations. This might lead children to use the word more frequently in their own 
pretend play encounters.  
One key difference between other studies and that of Lloyd and Goodwin’s 
(1995) is that the latter study investigated both peer play and also explicit play sce-
narios. Children’s linguistic strategies differ depending on their communicative 
partners and the situation they are engaged in (see, e.g., Roberts 2013). In addition, 
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in pretend play contexts, their use of sophisticated pretend and mental state lan-
guage mirrors that of their mothers (e.g., Osório et al. 2012: 724). This means that 
some of the differences in the frequency of pretend in different contexts are due to 
their caregivers’ use of the word.  
This contrasts with the view of Karniol (2016) on the function of pretend. 
Based on the data indicating that the use of pretend emerges around the same time 
as other contrastive mental state verbs in general, that is, around 28 months of age, 
Karniol (2016: 9) hypothesised that beginning around this age, children understand 
pretend as an epistemic operator: “Children’s understanding of pretend as an 
epistemic operator is evident when a child explains, ‘If we just tell them and don’t 
say ‘pretend’, they’ll think it’s real life’ (Curran, 1999).” 
In summary, then, the available data suggests that both children and mothers 
first prefer to talk about pretend activities in an implicit manner. As children grow 
older, however, children and mothers make more frequent use of mental verbs and 
metacommunication, as their negotiations of pretend situations become more 
complex. In the course of this development, the frequency of the lexical item 
pretend as a way to contrast pretence and reality and to express a pretend intention 
also increases. 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter summarised research on pretend play. I first described attempts to de-
scribe the features of pretend play, noting that it is a complex category that defies 
easy definition. However, among other important features, one of the central fea-
tures of pretend play is that in pretence, a situation, action, object, or event stands 
in for something else in an “as-if” relationship; this guides pretence interactions. I 
then went on to describe the cognitive development of pretend play, noting that it 
occupies a significant portion of children’s time and that children’s understanding 
of the cognitive dimension of pretence becomes increasingly complex as they grow 
older. I then outlined that pretend play is closely linked to children’s abilities of 
perspective-taking and -sharing. Next, I critically discussed proposals on possible 
functions of pretend play. While there are a number of proposals on the function of 
pretend play, there is no universal agreement on what pretend play is ‘for’ and 
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whether it has a causal role in development. However, there is evidence that it rep-
resents one important way that children can learn about the world. Moreover, pre-
tend play is clearly related to a number of important cognitive functions, such as 
social cognition and language, and can reflect and reveal children’s development in 
a number of areas, thus serving as a window on development. I also reviewed the 
role mothers play in Western culture in scaffolding and supporting pretence activi-
ties. Focussing on mothers’ role in Western culture helps to contextualise research 
on pretend play, as it is important to be aware that while pretend play may be uni-
versal, there are still important cultural differences in its expression and frequency. 
Lastly, I summarised some of the key cognitive abilities involved in pretend play, 
including symbolic understanding, psychological distancing, hypothetical thinking, 
perspective-taking, and executive functions. 
The section on pretend play and language first demonstrated that there is an 
intimate link between language development and the development of pretend play, 
with both resting on a number of the same cognitive mechanisms and showing par-
allel developments. I then looked at pretend play as a context for language acquisi-
tion. Pretend play serves as an ideal context in which children can practice negoti-
ating perspectives and using complex language to coordinate complex pretend in-
teractions. Pretend play is also related to metacommunication when activities are 
explicitly marked as pretend. However, such metacommunication occurs much 
more frequently as children grow older and their pretence becomes more complex. 
In addition, it is also used to clarify situations where it is not clear if and what a 
child is pretending, which in fact can happen quite frequently in natural interactions. 
Explicit verbalisations of pretend activities are therefore generally of high im-
portance to contextualise and negotiate pretend play.  
I then turned to linguistic features of pretend play, with the explicit lexical 
item pretend being the most significant and clearest indicator of pretence activity. 
As an overview of previous research shows, there are a number of other features 
that are likely to occur much more frequently in pretend play than in other contexts. 
These also seem to be explicitly associated with a pretend frame as one of their 
main instantiations and might also be learned especially in the context of pretend 
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play. However, pretend still seems to be the only linguistic feature to be so explic-
itly and exclusively tied to pretend activity. It therefore occupies a very special role 
in the network of constructions that are associated with pretend activities as being 
the one with the strongest association and the strongest pretence-specific conceptu-
alisation and perspectivation function, which is one of the key reasons its everyday 
use is at the centre of the current study.  
Finally, I reviewed previous research on the acquisition of the lexical item 
pretend. Overall, we still do not know much about children’s everyday use of this 
lexical item. One of the key insights, however, is that it is more frequently used by 
older children than younger children. One thing that we need to take into account 
here, though, is that there have been no extensive corpus studies to verify these 
findings, meaning that this observation rests mostly on experimental, questionnaire, 
and diary studies, many of which were limited in scope. The experimental evidence, 
however, shows that pretend represents one of the most instrumental linguistic 
methods to mark activities as pretend. In fact, CDI data shows that by 30 months, 
about half of all children already produce the word in their daily lives. Previous 
studies also found that children increasingly use pretend with a cognitive meaning 
which invokes a pretence-reality distinction as they grow older. Lastly, I discussed 
the function that pretend has in interaction, where it is at first mostly used to further 
the action and is then increasingly used to negotiate and establish complex pretend 
situations. 
The discussions of perspectivation in Chapter 3 and that of pretend play in 
this chapter have set the theoretical foundations for the corpus analysis of 
perspectivation in pretend play. In the next chapter, I will turn to the methodological 
foundations of the study.  
113 
 
4. Corpus Description and Methodology 
The current study is interested in the way pretend play and perspectivation relate to 
each other in language acquisition. In order to investigate this research question, it 
is of crucial importance to consider the language use of children and adults inter-
acting in naturalistic settings (cf. Corrigan 2012: 282). “Language acquisition re-
search thrives on data collected from spontaneous interactions in naturally occur-
ring situations” (MacWhinney 2000: 7). The CHILDES database offers access to 
this kind of data. It enables researchers to investigate a wide array of research ques-
tions using a freely available, large database, something which “has made child 
language acquisition a very democratic field” (Behrens 2008: xix). The benefit of 
CHILDES here is that for the investigation of pretend play in language acquisition, 
existing data can be used to answer this research question without the necessity to 
collect new data (Corrigan 2012: 273), an enterprise that would go beyond the scope 
of the current project.  
In this chapter, I describe the corpus used in the investigation. I first intro-
duce the CHILDES database (4.1) before describing both the Thomas corpus (4.1.1) 
and the Manchester corpus (4.1.2) in detail. Following this, I turn to methodological 
issues regarding the corpus analysis (4.2), namely to questions of the representa-
tiveness of the corpus data chosen for analysis (4.2.1), and the representativeness 
of the results obtained from it (4.2.2). In Section 4.3, I turn to the methodology 
underlying the corpus analysis. I specify the research question and elaborate on how 
the data were coded for analysis (4.3.1), before turning to the question of how the 
development of pretend in the corpus data was analysed (4.3.2). Section 4.3.3 dis-
cusses the statistical methods used for this analysis.  
 
4.1 Corpus Description: The CHILDES Database 
Two different corpora were used in the analysis of pretend play situations in lan-
guage acquisition: The Thomas corpus24 (TC; Lieven et al. 2009) and the Manches-
ter corpus25 (MC; Theakston et al. 2001), which are both part of the CHILDES 
 
24 https://childes.talkbank.org/access/Eng-UK/Thomas.html (last accessed 12/05/2019). 
25 https://childes.talkbank.org/access/Eng-UK/Manchester.html (last accessed 12/05/2019). 
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database (MacWhinney 2000).26 After a short description of the CHILDES data-
base, both corpora will be described in turn. 
CHILDES27 is an acronym of Child Language Data Exchange System and 
presents the biggest archive of child language corpora freely available on the web. 
It is the child language component of the TalkBank platform, which is “a system 
for sharing and studying conversational interactions” (MacWhinney 2000: 12) and 
the world’s largest open access database of spoken language data. The CHILDES 
project was first conceived in 1981, and began in earnest in 1984. Since then, the 
number of available corpora has vastly expanded, and new corpora are being added 
continuously, as the platform gives researchers the opportunity to freely share and 
archive the corpora they have created. As stated, CHILDES is integrated with the 
TalkBank system, a project that began in 2001 (MacWhinney 2000: 12). As of 
March 2019, there are 15 different databases on the TalkBank platform, including 
Conversation Banks (such as the conversation analysis CABank), Child Language 
Banks (such as CHILDES), Multilingualism Banks (such as the second language 
acquisition SLABank), and Clinical Banks (such as DementiaBank or 
AphasiaBank). 
Among the TalkBank databases, CHILDES is the oldest one, and also the 
one that is most widely recognised. It has been used in more than 7,000 published 
articles, 5,000 of which have been published in the last 15 years (MacWhinney 
2008: 166; MacWhinney 2019a: 6). It has almost 3,000 users and has received 4.3 
million web hits, 2.5 million of which have been from 2015-2017 (MacWhinney 
2017b: 81-82). This shows that CHILDES has become integral to “the basic re-
search methodology and publication history of the field” of language acquisition 
(MacWhinney 2019a: 6).  
The database comprises a large set of transcriptions of interactions – usually 
between adults and children – that have either been recorded in naturalistic settings 
or have been elicited and have then been transcribed in a standardised format, the 
CHAT format (Codes for the Human Analysis of Transcripts; see MacWhinney 
 
26 https://childes.talkbank.org/ (last accessed 12/05/2019). 
27 According to MacWhinney (2000: 10), “the name uses a one-syllable pronunciation.” 
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2000; Diessel 2009: 1200-1205; Corrigan 2012: 271-272). Some of the files avail-
able are also linked to audio and video recordings. The data were originally 
collected by researchers for their own projects and have later been added to the 
database. CHILDES also provides researchers with a set of computer programmes 
for the analysis of transcripts: CLAN (Computerized Language ANalysis; cf. 
Corrigan 2012: 272; see also Diessel 2009: 1200-1205).28 
At the time of writing, the CHILDES database contains 360+ corpora in 42 
languages from a wide range of different language groups. English is by far the 
most prominent language in the database, with at least half of the available data 
being English data (Xiao 2008: 427). However, the number of languages included 
in the database is growing steadily. Apart from monolingual language acquisition 
transcripts, there are also specialised corpora that collect data for children growing 
up with two or more languages, collections of elicited narratives, collections of chil-
dren with language disorders, and cross-linguistic studies. In all, CHILDES collects 
data from more than 12,000 children. More precisely, CHILDES contains 81 cor-
pora of a single child, 126 corpora with 2-10 children, 37 corpora with 11-20 chil-
dren, most of which are more detailed and more longitudinal studies, 90 corpora 
with 20-100 children, 20 corpora with 100-202 children, and 6 corpora with 258-
1,000 children, most of which offer less detailed and less longitudinal data. This 
community data sharing model has led to a database of more than 60 million 
words29 – “with 2 terabytes of media and additional 90 million words of annotation” 
(MacWhinney 2017a: 255) – making it the largest existing corpus of spoken lan-
guage after the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA)30 and the BYU 
TV and Movie Corpora31 (MacWhinney 2008; MacWhinney 2017a,b; cf. Corrigan 
2012: 273). 
Let us look at the size of the English-language CHILDES database (Eng-
UK and Eng-NA = ECD). The ECD is a collection of 61 corpora, encompassing 
 
28 See also https://talkbank.org/manuals/CHAT.pdf (last accessed 22/02/2019). 
29 In comparison, in 2008 the CHILDES database contained around 44 million words (MacWhinney 
2008).  
30 https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ (last accessed 22/02/2019). 
31 https://corpus.byu.edu/files/tv_movie_corpora.pdf (last accessed 22/02/2019). One important dis-
tinction here is that the BYU TC and Movie Corpora do contain spoken language, but unlike the 
CHILDES database, these corpora do not feature spontaneous, naturally occurring language.  
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data from 611 children. The Eng-NA data consist of data for 457 children in 49 
corpora, whereas the Eng-UK data consist of data for 154 children in 13 corpora. 
In total, the ECD consist of 17,440,578 tokens. If we look at the Eng-NA database 
on its own, we have a corpus collection of 6,996,835 tokens uttered by mothers (= 
MOT) and children (= CHI) (MOT: 4,014,195; CHI: 2,982,640). In the Eng-UK 
database, there are 7,129,524 tokens uttered by MOT and CHI (MOT: 4,872,436; 
CHI: 2,257,088). This means that out of the 17,440,578 tokens in the ECD, 
14,126,359 tokens are uttered by MOT and CHI (MOT: 8,886,631; CHI: 
5,239,728).32 
Before I describe the two corpora used for the current study, I briefly want 
to outline some of the selection criteria for these corpora. First, both the TC and the 
MC are longitudinal corpora. This means that they are “[d]ata samples that track 
the development of individuals or groups over time” (Lieven & Behrens 2012: 237). 
In addition, they also represent naturalistic corpora. This means that they can be 
said to represent naturalistic interactions, which “are meant to capture language that 
a child uses in an everyday situation, such as during dinner or while playing with 
his/her own toys” (Rowe 2012: 206). These data can therefore also be said to have 
high ecological validity.  
One additional selection criterion was that the Thomas corpus represents a 
so-called dense database (Lieven & Behrens 2012), meaning it has a much denser 
sampling rate than most other corpora. This also means that it represents a better 
approximation of children’s language experience and production and is especially 
well-suited to capture less frequent phenomena such as the usage of pretend (see 
the discussion in Section 4.2.1.1).  
Overall, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5, both corpora also have a 
relatively high frequency of pretend utterances, which makes them ideal candidates 
to study the acquisition and everyday use of this lexical item. Specifically, with 
1,392 instances of pretend word forms, the TC and MC make up for 33.8% of pre-
tend utterances in the ECD. TC and MC data capture an especially high percentage 
 
32 The remaining 3,314,219 tokens were uttered by speakers other than MOT and CHI, most often 
other caregivers such as fathers or investigators who were present during the recording. 
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of mothers’ pretend utterances, namely 41.8%. For children, the TC and MC data 
still represent 23.2% of all pretend utterances made by children in the ECD. 
In the next two sections, I describe the two corpora used for the present study 
in more detail.  
 
4.1.1 The Manchester Corpus 
The MC is a longitudinal study of 12 English-speaking children (6 w: Anne, 
Becky, Gail, Nicole, Ruth, Liz; 6 m: Aran, Carl, Dominic, Joel, John, Warren) be-
tween approximately 2 and 3 years of age. Half of the children were from Notting-
ham and half of them were from Manchester, predominantly from middle-class 
families. Recruitment of children took place through local nurseries as well as ad-
vertisements in newspapers. All children were firstborns and were growing up with 
English as their only language. Their primary caregivers were their mothers. Chil-
dren were recorded  
in their homes for an hour on two separate occasions in every 3-week period for one year. 
They engaged in normal play activities with their mothers. For the first 30 minutes of each 
hour they played with their own toys whilst for the second 30 minutes, toys provided by the 
experimenter were available to the child. For the duration of the recordings, the experi-
menter attempted as far as possible to remain in the background to allow contextual notes 
to be taken (Lieven et al. n.d.). 
 
Child Transcripts Age (FR) Age (LR) 
Tokens 
(CHI) 
Tokens 
(MOT) 
Anne 68 1;10.07 2;09.10 45,989 137,912 
Aran 66 1;11.12 2;10.28 44,907 184,852 
Becky 68 2;00.07 2;11.15 54,589 96,476 
Carl 65 1;08.22 2;08.15 64,283 84,619 
Dominic 68 1;10.25 2;10.16 45,159 126,509 
Gail 68 1;11.27 2;11.12 40,159 102,147 
Joel 68 1;11.01 2;10.11 41,534 106,062 
John 64 1;11.15 2;10.24 28,655 78,169 
Liz 68 1;11.09 2;10.18 39,555 76,303 
Nicole 68 2;00.25 3;00.10 32,071 118,054 
Ruth 66 1;11.15 2;11.21 40,479 135,642 
Warren 67 1;10.06 2;09.20 47,137 116,969 
Total 804     524,517 1,363,714 
Table 4.1: Overview of children in the MC with names, number of transcripts, age at first recording 
(FR), age at last recording (LR), and token frequency for CHI and MOT 
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All one-hour recordings are split into two half-hour transcripts. With some 
exceptions, for each child, there are about 34 recordings split into about 68 tran-
scripts.33 In total, there are 804 transcripts, representing 402 individual recordings 
of the 12 children. 
The Manchester corpus contains a total of 1,956,716 tokens. 1,888,231 
words were uttered by MOT and CHI, with 524,517 words uttered by the 12 chil-
dren (MC CHI) and 1,363,714 words uttered by the mothers (MC MOT). Table 4.1 
above gives an overview of the children, number of recordings, ages at the 
beginning and end of recording, as well as token sizes. 
 
4.1.2 The Thomas Corpus 
The TC is a naturalistic study of one English child, Thomas, over a three-year 
period, starting at age 2 and ending shortly before his fifth birthday. Thomas was 
born in 1997 and grew up in a middle-class family, with his mother being his pri-
mary caregiver.34  
 Although Thomas was recorded over a period of three years, the corpus dis-
plays significant variation in its internal composition in terms of the frequency of 
recordings. The researchers responsible for the TC therefore divide the corpus into 
three sections. In the first period of recording (Section A, age 2;00.12 to 3;02.12), 
Thomas was recorded “for one hour, five times a week, every week for the entire 
period” (Goh n.d.). With 279 transcripts, this is the most intensive period of sam-
pling. In the second period of recording (Section B, age 3;03.02 to 3;11.06), Thomas 
was recorded “for one hour, one week in every month” (Goh n.d.). This resulted in 
a total of 43 transcripts for this time period. In the final period of recording (Section 
C, age 4;00.02 to 4;11.02), Thomas was also recorded “for one hour, one week in 
every month” (Goh n.d), resulting in 57 transcripts. Overall, then, the TC consists 
of 379 transcripts, which cover a period of three years. In total, the TC contains 
2,468,931 tokens. The total number of tokens uttered by MOT and CHI in the TC 
 
33 There are some exceptions so that for some children there are only 64, 65, 66, or 67 transcripts. 
34 The corpus description this section is based on can be found here: https://childes.talkbank.org/ac-
cess/Eng-UK/Thomas.html (last accessed 18/02/2019). In some of the earlier literature on Thomas 
he is still referred to by his pseudonym “Brian.” However, “just before the corpus was deposited 
with CHILDES, the family gave permission for the use of the child’s real name” (Lieven & Behrens 
2012: 233). 
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is 2,308,033, with 1,800,266 tokens uttered by Thomas’ mother (TC MOT) in the 
timeframe from 2;00 to 4;11 and 507,767 words uttered by Thomas (TC CHI) dur-
ing that period.35 
 As mentioned above, the TC can be described as a naturalistic corpus with 
high ecological validity, as the entirety of audio recordings took place in Thomas’ 
home, where he was engaged in everyday play activities with his mother (Goh n.d.).  
Out of the 379 interactions that were transcribed, 73 were recorded on video. 
For most of the video recordings the investigator was also present and played with 
Thomas. However, as the investigator is engaged in play activities with Thomas, 
and as she speaks much less in these recordings than Thomas and his mother usually 
do as a whole, this does not detract from the naturalness and ecological validity of 
the corpus data. For all of the transcriptions where the investigator is present, the 
average frequency of tokens uttered by the investigator is 376.8, compared with an 
average of 1,339.75 for Thomas and 4,775.2 for his mother. 
Having introduced the corpus database used for analysis, we will next turn 
to issues of methodology, namely the representativeness of the corpus data and their 
problems and limitations. 
 
4.2 Methodological Issues: Representativeness, Problems, and Limitations 
Given the wealth of available corpora in the CHILDES database, it is essential that 
researchers discuss issues of corpus selection and the representativeness of their 
data. That is, they need to specify “what characteristics are relevant to their own 
research questions and select portions of the database that meet their criteria (es-
sentially designing their own corpus)” (Corrigan 2012: 275). This means that for 
research projects such as the current study, it is crucial that it is made clear why this 
particular selection of corpora was chosen (Corrigan 2012: 275).  
Moreover, the characteristics of corpus data, and that of particular corpora 
as well, such as their representativeness, influence what conclusions can be drawn 
from the analysis. This is why it is necessary to elaborate on these characteristics 
and the methodological issues surrounding them. As Hunston (2008: 160) states, 
 
35 Again, most other tokens were uttered by an investigator and were disregarded in this analysis. 
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[r]epresentativeness is the relationship between the corpus and the body of language it is 
being used to represent. A corpus is usually intended to be a microcosm of a larger phe-
nomenon, […]. As such, although some statements can be made with absolute confidence 
about the corpus itself, the value of the corpus lies in being able to make somewhat more 
tentative statements about the body of language as a whole.  
In this particular case, a corpus is assumed to enable us to make statements about 
the phenomenon of language acquisition, and the development of pretend play and 
perspectivation in particular. 
When considering issues of representativeness, three key methodological 
issues arise:  
(1) Are the corpus data representative and, if so, which population are they 
representative of?  
(2) How was a particular corpus sampled?  
(3) Are the corpus data authentic and ecologically valid?  
(Tognini-Bonelli 2001: 54-62; Rowe 2012: 206).  
As has been discussed in Section 4.1, CHILDES data in general, and the TC and 
MC data in particular, both represent authentic, spontaneous speech in natural situ-
ations, and therefore fulfil the latter two criteria.  
The other issues related to representativeness and sampling will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section (4.2.1). After that, I will discuss the 
question to what extent the results of the analysis can be judged to be representative 
(4.2.2). 
 
4.2.1 Representativeness of the Corpus 
When choosing to analyse a specific research question using corpus data, research-
ers make this decision on the basis that they think that corpus data are well-suited 
to answer the research question at hand. Their choice of a particular corpus or par-
ticular corpora for analysis is based on the same assumptions.  
Overall, as I will discuss below, the assumption that corpus data are a valid 
source for linguistic analyses are well-founded. However, there are also some prob-
lems and limitations that come with the analysis of corpus data, which will also be 
addressed. I will do the same for the specific corpus data that were chosen for this 
analysis.  
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I will first turn to the discussion of the representativeness of the corpus re-
garding issues of sampling (4.2.1.1) before discussing the representativeness of the 
selected corpora and problems of limitations of the current corpus study (4.2.1.1). 
 
4.2.1.1 Frequency and Corpus Size 
When researchers want to investigate a particular structure and its acquisition using 
corpus data, one of the most important questions they have to ask themselves is 
“How big is big enough?” (Rowland et al. 2008) in order to adequately capture the 
phenomenon at hand. As Diessel (2009: 1198) puts it, researchers have to ask them-
selves the following questions: “How much data do we need to investigate the de-
velopment of a particular phenomenon? Specifically, how much data do we need to 
determine the age of appearance, the order of acquisition, and the developmental 
pathway?”  
 Recording and transcribing child language over a long period of time is an 
extremely laborious, time-consuming, and also expensive process. This and other 
factors naturally restrict the size of any child language corpus. Most longitudinal 
child language corpora record children for about one to two hours each month. As-
suming that children are awake and communicating for about 10 hours each day, 
this only captures an estimated 1-2% of children’s speech and language experience 
(Tomasello & Stahl 2004: 102; Rowland et al. 2008: 2; Diessel 2009: 1198; Lieven 
& Behrens 2012: 226-227).  
This issue becomes even more pressing when searching for a phenomenon 
that is relatively rare in the data. In these cases, the smaller the sample, the higher 
the likelihood that there are only few relevant examples (Behrens 2008: xv). Un-
fortunately, this holds for quite many structures in corpus data: “In any corpus, a 
small set of frequent words makes up the majority of tokens, with most words oc-
curring with very low frequency” (Corrigan 2012: 273). This general relation is 
called Zipf’s law (Zipf 1949; cf. Erker & Guy 2012: 529; for the role of Zipfian 
distribution in language acquisition see, e.g., Ellis et al. 2015: 167-168). A particu-
lar structure might therefore not be found or not be represented adequately because 
it does not occur frequently enough. Pomikálek et al. (2009) even propose that the 
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study of items that occur only very rarely in corpora may require a corpus of up to 
one billion words (cf. Corrigan 2012: 273).  
As soon as we are interested in linguistic structures that a child might only 
produce one or a few times a day, corpora with a 1% sampling rate might not be 
adequate to answer such research questions (Tomasello & Stahl 2004: 118). For 
example, when a particular structure is not found in the corpus, this could be “due 
to its rarity rather than due to the fact that the child has not yet acquired that struc-
ture” (Lieven & Behrens 2012: 227). This, in turn, could lead to researchers se-
verely underestimating the developmental level of a child, as absence of evidence 
in this case would not likely also be evidence of absence. As Tomasello and Stahl 
(2004: 104) put it, “for some low frequency phenomena the majority of CHILDES-
like samples are not dense enough to support valid and reliable analyses.” The ac-
curacy of estimating the age when a particular target structure emerges in a child’s 
language is therefore closely related to the frequency of the structure and the density 
and size of the corpus data (Tomasello & Stahl 2004: 112-113). As the frequency 
analysis in Chapter 5 will show, with a relative frequency of 0.033% pretend clearly 
belongs to the more infrequent forms, so this has to inform the selection criteria for 
the corpus data. At the end of the analysis, these considerations should also inform 
the question: “Given my sample, how confident should I be in my results?”                    
(Tomasello & Stahl 2004: 104).  
More recently, there have been attempts to increase the representativeness 
of corpus data by creating so-called dense databases (DDBs, Lieven & Behrens 
2012). These databases have a much denser sampling rate, capturing an estimated 
7-15% of children’s language experience (Lieven & Behrens 2012: 226). They are 
“extremely useful for tracing the acquisition of infrequent structures” and “provide 
the data necessary for good descriptive accounts and fine-grained analyses of de-
velopmental processes” (Lieven & Behrens 2012: 228). DDBs differ in their sam-
pling rates, but their overall aim is to record children for at least 5 hours a week. 
 There are, however, also some limitations to DDBs, the most important one 
being that by using this method, “corpora can only be collected from a very small 
number of children” (Lieven & Behrens 2012: 227). It also places limitations on 
which types of children can be recorded. Given the frequency of the recordings, 
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“dense sampling is easier and timewise better if children spend more time at home 
rather than full-time nursery or school” (Lieven & Behrens 2012: 227). This of 
course matters for issues of representativeness, as the language trajectories found 
in DDBs might not be representative of children with different social environments. 
As already mentioned above, in addition, the collection of DDBs is a process that 
requires a long-term commitment from families, and so it is much more likely that 
families with an intense interest in their children’s language development will be 
part of such projects (cf. Lieven & Behrens 2012: 228). This also matters for repre-
sentativeness as data from DDBs therefore might not be representative of the lan-
guage environment of children with families with a less intense interest in their 
children’s language acquisition. This issue likely can be generalised to a significant 
degree to families who take part in long-term corpus projects such as the MC. 
In addition, families who participated in the recording of DDBs were also 
asked not to engage in noisy activities, keep background noise to a minimum and 
also not to turn on noise sources such as the radio or the TV in order to guarantee 
recording quality. One of the effects of this is that DDBs mostly cover play situa-
tions involving one or sometimes two adults interacting with the child. The inter-
actants also usually belonged to the family or to a small number of visitors who 
usually were well-known to the family. This also limits the representativeness of 
the sample as it does not cover other language and interactive environments, which 
again is also true for the CHILDES data in general.  
The question to what degree the corpora of the present study can be seen as 
representative and as suited for the analytical goals of the study will be discussed 
in the next section. Before turning to this question, there is one more important 
caveat to be made. The process of transcription reduces a richly multimodal com-
municative situation to its monomodal linguistic aspect. However, as much research 
in Cognitive Linguistics has shown,  
[i]n both expression and comprehension, conceptualizations integrate information from 
multiple sources in multiple modalities, such as bodily, auditory and visual information 
(Forceville 2009, 21; Steen & Turner 2013). These sources are then integrated into a coher-
ent and unified dynamic mental representation. Meaning construction is thus fundamentally 
and always multimodal in nature (Schneider & Pleyer 2018: 258). 
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Communication does not only consist of linguistic cues, but integrates ges-
tures, tone of voice, gaze, pauses, hesitations and information from other modalities 
in the process of dynamic, multimodal meaning construal (Pleyer & Schneider 
2014: 39; see also Forceville 2009: 21; Steen & Turner 2013; Hall et al. 2019 for 
reviews). More recent research in construction grammar has also stressed that many 
constructions are essentially multimodal, posing the question if we need a “multi-
modal construction grammar” (see Steen & Turner 2013; Ziem 2017; Zima & Bergs 
2017 for discussion). 
Transcribed corpus data, which are the basis for analysis in the current 
study, do not capture these aspects. In corpora without audio data, aspects such as 
intonation are also not captured. Transcription systems often try to address this state 
by also coding non-linguistic signals and communicative meta-data. For example, 
the CHAT format used for transcripts in the CHILDES database, which was 
mentioned in Section 4.1.1, provides researchers with guidelines of how best to 
capture the complex communicative utterances produced by children. But of 
course, any transcript in a way is still reductive and filtered through the perception 
and transcription decisions of transcribers (Behrens 2008: xxx). As the research 
question of the present study is predominantly a cognitive-semantic one, all these 
multimodal aspects are disregarded in the analysis. However, we should keep in 
mind that in instances of actual language usage, language and meaning construction 
is a fundamentally multimodal affair. 
An additional aspect relevant for language acquisition is that children’s lan-
guage often differs quite strongly in its phonetic realisation from that of adult lan-
guage users. Transcribers often have to decide whether to “transcribe forms that are 
not yet fully adult like in an orthographic fashion according to adult standards” 
(Behrens 2008: xxiii) or whether they should transcribe the perceived form in some 
other manner, e.g., phonetically. These decisions can have important consequences 
for the analysis of corpus data, especially in domains such as morphosyntactic de-
velopment (Johnson 2000). Regarding pretend, in the TC there are some instances 
where the form occurs as and is transcribed as tend@c,36 which indicates that 
 
36 @c is a special form marker for child-invented forms (MacWhinney 2019a: 42-43). 
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Thomas has a unique form of pretend in his repertoire that might however not al-
ways be coded as such, given that 
[t]he corpus was gathered over a number of years during which time CLAN was updated, 
the experience of the transcribers increased, transcribers came and went, and problems were 
identified and rectified along the way. This has inevitably led to some inconsistencies in 
transcription (Goh n.d.). 
Therefore, the form pretend might have different phonetic realisations in the corpus 
data, which, however, are all coded as pretend. 
 
4.2.1.2 Representativeness of the TC and MC 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the TC was chosen because it is a dense corpus that 
due to its composition is well-suited to analyse the kind of low-frequency structures 
this study is interested in. However, the TC consists of data from only one child, 
which again raises the issue of representativeness (cf. Demuth 2008: 204). This is 
especially the case given that children’s language acquisition trajectories can be 
quite different. On the one hand, this holds, for example, for children with different 
socioeconomic backgrounds, a point we will return to in Section 4.2.2. However, 
even within the same socioeconomic background, there is still individual variation 
in how children’s use of language develops (see Fenson et al. 1994; Shore 1995; 
Bornstein & Putnick 2012; Kidd et al. 2018 for discussion).  
With these considerations in mind, the MC was chosen to extend the dataset 
with a wider range of children and therefore increase representativeness. The MC 
is considered “to give a representative sample of speech heard by British English 
children between the ages of 2 and 3 years of age” (Matthews et al. 2005: 125) as 
well as – with qualifications – for the speech these children produce. This is why 
the MC was chosen for analysis. The MC, however, is not a dense database. At the 
beginning of the present research project, the TC was the only available English-
language DDB on CHILDES, so no other DDB could be chosen for the analysis.37 
This means that the limitations of less densely sampled corpora when analysing 
low-frequency items have to be taken into account when we ask what conclusions 
we can draw from this dataset.  
 
37 At the time of writing another DDB, the MPI-EVA-Manchester corpus (Lieven & Goh n.d.; 
Lieven et al. 2009; Theakston et al. 2015) has been released on CHILDES. As of now, the transcripts 
of two children, Eleanor and Frasier, are freely available, with the data of three more children to be 
released at a later date.  
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With recordings on two separate occasions in every three-week period, the 
MC is also more densely sampled than most other corpora in the CHILDES data-
base. This makes it one of the best-suited corpora for the current analysis, especially 
as it contains data of 12 children.  
Still, the issue of representativeness in terms of corpus size has to be kept in 
mind. One important caveat here is that it is extremely difficult to estimate how 
representative a corpus sample is of the baseline language experience a child has. 
Gilkerson et al. (2017) used the LENA (Language ENvironment Analysis) system 
for a longitudinal study of the early language environments of young children. The 
LENA system differs from corpus sampling in that it “collects day-long audio re-
cordings of children’s vocalizations and their language environments” (Naigles 
2012: 240), which are then analysed by an automated computer system. Using this 
system, Gilkerson et al. (2017) collected and analysed the language environments 
of “329 monolingual English-speaking families with typically developing children 
2-48 months of age” on a daily basis over a period of six months (Gilkerson et al. 
2017: 250). Out of these families, a further 59 families recorded their language en-
vironments for an additional 32 months. In total, “49,765 hr of data were collected 
over 3,615 daylong recording sessions” (Gilkerson et al. 2017: 254). In contrast, 
the TC and MC data taken together represent a total of 781 recorded hours. In 
Gilkerson et al.’s (2017: 255) study, adults produced an average of 12,622 words a 
day in the context of child-caregiver interaction. If we extrapolate from these data, 
this means that on average, children hear 4,607,030 words a year in child-caregiver 
interactions. Regarding the average token frequency produced by mothers in the 
MC data, taking Gilkerson et al.’s (2017) measurements as our basis, we can esti-
mate that the MC captures about 2.5% of children’s total caregiver input. For the 
TC data, we have to differentiate between Sections A, B, and C with their different 
sampling regimes (see Section 4.1.2). For Section A (2;00-3;02) with its very in-
tensive sampling period, taking Gilkerson et al.’s (2017) data as our basis, the TC 
data represent about 24% of total caregiver input. For Section B (3;03-3;11), the 
TC data represent about 7% of caregiver input. Finally, for Section C (4;00-4;11), 
they represent about 6.1% of the child’s language environment.  
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However, there is a significant problem with this analysis. If we do not take 
Gilkerson’s et al. (2017) data as the basis of our estimates, but instead extrapolate 
from the average token frequency in the MC and TC recordings, we get vastly dif-
ferent results.  
Let us start with the MC data. The average MOT token frequency for an 
hour-long recording in the MC data is 3,392 tokens. If we assume that the MC data 
are representative of the child’s general language environment, this would mean 
that on a ten-hour day, these children are not exposed to about 12,622 words but 
instead to 33,923 words. Over a year, this would add up to 12,381,980 words of 
caregiver input in a year instead of 4,607,030. Given this estimate, the percentage 
of language captured in the MC data would fall to 0.9%. 
For the TC data, extrapolating from the average token frequency in an hour-
long recording, we get the following results: For Section A (2;0-3;02), the average 
word count is 3,435, adding up to 34,350 words a day and 14,598,750 words during 
the recording period. With these numbers as our basis, the estimate for the percent-
age of caregiver input would drop to 8.9%. For Section B (3;03-3;11), the average 
token frequency for an hour-long recording is 4,989, accumulating to 49,869 words 
a day and 12,118,176 words for the whole recording period. Given this estimate, 
the percentage of caregiver input captured in the corpus data would drop to 1.8%. 
Finally, for Section C (4;00.02-4;11.02), the average token frequency for an hour-
long recording is 4,979, resulting in an estimate of 49,796 tokens a day and 
18,165,685 tokens for the whole recording period. With this estimate, the estimated 
percentage of tokens captured in the corpus data for Section C would drop to 1.6%.  
There are several possible reasons for these differences. One important 
contributing factor is related to the question to what degree one-hour-corpus 
recordings are representative and typical of children’s language experience 
throughout the day. Hart and Risley (1995, 2003), in their seminal study of 42 fam-
ilies, also arrived at much higher daily word frequencies than Gilkerson et al. 
(2017). Hart and Risley (1995, 2003) recorded 42 families for one hour each month 
from 7-9 months until 3 years of age. They then extrapolated from the averages of 
the observational data, assuming a 14-hour-waking day. Extrapolating from their 
measurements, children from professional families with academic backgrounds 
128 
 
hear an average of 30,142 adult words each day, resulting in 11,001,830 words in a 
year. This average is much closer to the estimates for the MC and TC Section A 
data than to the ones by Gilkerson et al. (2017). However, these data are based on 
families with a high socioeconomic status (SES). For middle-SES families, Hart 
and Risley’s (1995, 2003) data suggest a daily adult word count of 17,514 and a 
yearly word count of 6,392,610. However, Hart and Risley (2003: 7-8) also some-
times refer to middle-SES families as “working class,” so they are probably differ-
ent in composition than the predominantly middle-class TC and MC families.  
It is important to note that Hart and Risley (1995, 2003) usually recorded 
during the early evening hours. This is relevant because talk and interaction are 
highest “in the early morning beginning at 7 and in the late afternoon–early even-
ing” (Greenwood et al. 2011: 86). Gilkerson et al. (2017: 261) argue that this fact 
probably inflated Hart and Risley’s (1995, 2003) daily estimates.  
Another possible reason is that the MC and TC data simply represent outli-
ers to the median arrived at by Gilkerson et al. (2017). Indeed, the standard devia-
tion in the Gilkerson et al. (2017: 255) data set is 4,281, meaning that in many 
families, the adult word count was actually much higher or lower than the mean. In 
fact, 1% of the recordings in the Gilkerson et al. (2017) study range as high as 
30,000-40;000 adult words in a day (Jill Gilkerson, personal communication).  
As noted in Section 4.2.1.1, families participating in longitudinal corpus 
projects, especially in those that establish DDBs, likely display a particularly pro-
nounced interest in their children’s language acquisition. They might therefore gen-
erally talk to their children much more than other families. This means that it is 
definitely possible that extrapolating from the corpus data does, in fact, give an 
accurate representation of the amount of language the children in the corpora are 
exposed to on a daily basis.  
On the other hand, it is quite likely that recording sessions as part of a project 
to document language acquisition will be more talk-intensive than other parts of the 
day, almost by definition. There is, therefore, a high probability that during the re-
cording sessions, adults actually engage with their children at a higher frequency 
and more intensively than at certain other times of the day. The estimated daily 
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adult word counts based on extrapolating from the token frequency in the record-
ings are therefore likely also inflated. It is, of course, an important question what 
this means for issues of representativeness, authenticity and ecological validity. At 
the moment, though, no definite and satisfying answer can be given. Nevertheless, 
when doing corpus research, either in general or using specific corpora, we should 
acknowledge that representativeness is a problematic issue and reflect this in how 
confident we can be in our results (see Biber 1993; Leech 2007; Hunston 2008: 
160-165 for discussion). 
However, from a methodological perspective, using the TC and MC for 
analyses of pretend play behaviour and the lexical item pretend is actually quite 
well-motivated. Almost by definition, usage of pretend will be much more likely to 
occur in play contexts than in other everyday contexts. Indeed, evidence suggests 
that “the setting of interaction influences the nature of the talk produced” (Hoff 
2006: 70). For instance, several studies have found differences in mother-child in-
teractions when comparing toy play and book reading (e.g., Choi 2000; Yont et al. 
2003; Hoff 2006: 70). Therefore, in the context of the issue of representativeness, 
the question is not necessarily if corpus recordings are representative of children’s 
daily interactions as a whole, but if the data are representative of children’s play 
behaviour in general, which they in fact seem to be. 
When we consider the corpus descriptions of the MC and TC, we do indeed 
find that the recordings predominantly capture play situations. As discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1.1, for the TC “all of the audio recordings took place in Thomas’s home 
where he was engaged in normal play activities with his mother” (Goh n.d.). For 
the MC, it is also noted that during the recordings, children “engaged in normal 
play activities with their mothers” (Lieven et al. n.d.).  
For the MC and TC data, we can glean some more information from looking 
at the @Situation header at the beginning of the transcript, which “describes the 
general setting of the interaction” (MacWhinney 2019a: 40). In the MC data, 175 
(21.8%) transcripts are tagged with the situational description “Free Play,” 163 are 
tagged as “Structured Play” (20.3%), and 366 are tagged as “playing with toys” 
(45.5%). The 100 remaining transcripts (12.4%) do not include an explicit situa-
tional description.  
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For the TC data, 175 (46.2%) transcripts are tagged with the @Situation tier 
“playing with toys,” and 73 (19.3%) are tagged as other kinds of play activities such 
as “playing at home,” “role playing,” or specifying exactly what Thomas is playing 
with, such as “playing with train set,” “mending and cleaning vehicles,” and “play-
ing with cheese.” 82 (21.4%) transcripts include a situational description that is not 
related to play, such as “talking about their day,” “having breakfast,” or “getting up 
in the morning.” 49 (12.9%) transcripts do not include an @Situation tier.  
Divided into the three sampling sections, we get the distribution found in 
Table 4.2. Section A contains 132 (47.3%) “playing with toys” @Situation descrip-
tions, 35 (12.5%) other play activities, and 62 (22.6%) other situation types. 49 
(17.6%) transcripts do not feature a situational description. Section B contains 24 
(55.8%) instances of “playing with toys,” 6 (14%) other types of play activity and 
13 (30.2%) non-play activities. Finally, in Section C there are 19 (33.3%) tran-
scripts tagged as “playing with toys,” 32 (56.1%) transcripts feature other descrip-
tions of play activities and 6 (10.5%) transcripts are tagged with some other type of 
activity. As we have seen, in Section A there are quite a number of transcripts 
without an @Situation tag. Moreover, in Section B and C the @Situations tags are 
often more specific. This is likely due to the inconsistencies in the transcriptions 
mentioned in Section 4.2.1.1.  
Situation  MC  TC  
TC Sec-
tion A 
TC Sec-
tion B 
TC Sec-
tion C 
Total 
 
Free Play 
175 
(21.8%) / / / / 
175 
(14.6%) 
Structured 
Play 
163 
(20.3%) / / / / 
163 
(13.6%) 
Playing 
with Toys 
366 
(45.5%) 
175 
(46.2%) 
132 
(47.3%) 
24 
(55.8%) 
19 
(33.3%) 
541 
(45.1%) 
Other Play 
Activities / 
73 
(19.3%) 
35  
(12.5%) 
6  
(14%) 
32% 
(56.1%) 
73 
(6.1%) 
Other Ac-
tivities / 
82 
(21.4%) 
63  
(22.6%) 
13 
(30.2%) 
6  
(10.5%) 
82 
(6.8%) 
No @Situ-
ation Tier 
100 
(12.4%) 
49 
(12.9%) 
49  
(17.6%) / / 
149 
(12.4%) 
Table 4.2: Number and percentages of types of play @Situation tiers, other activities and no @Sit-
uation tiers in the MC and TC 
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Overall, then, the vast majority of TC and MC transcripts is of play situa-
tions. Out of all transcripts, 952 (80.5%) refer to some type of play activity in their 
@Situation tier, 82 (6.9%) refer to non-play activities, and 149 (12.6%) do not fea-
ture an @Situation tier.  
The issues and problems that were discussed regarding sampling density 
therefore might not apply to the corpus data used in this study, as they can be 
regarded as specialised play corpora. Regardless of the issues of sampling density 
and representativeness, then, they are clearly well-suited for the analysis at hand as 
they are more likely to yield pretend utterances than corpus data which truly repre-
sent a random sample where “any given target structure of interest occurs at random 
intervals in the child’s speech” (Rowland et al. 2008: 4). This presents a strong 
argument why the MC is suited for the current analysis. It is true that the MC is not 
a densely sampled corpus and therefore in principle might not be suited to investi-
gate low-frequency structures. However, on the basis of the discussion above, we 
can indeed make the argument that we will find more pretend items for analysis in 
these corpus data. This is the case because the MC can be treated as a representative 
play corpus.  
However, as briefly discussed in Section 3.3.1, we need to take into account 
that in these play situations, especially situations where children play with toys, a 
play frame has already been established. Therefore, the need for children to explic-
itly announce actions and objects as pretend might be reduced (cf. Bunce & Harris 
2008: 453). This means that in the corpus data, we can expect more implicit refer-
ences to pretence vs. reality status than explicit ones such as let’s pretend that…. 
This conclusion can be drawn when comparing Bunce and Harris’ (2008) and 
Woolley and Wellman’s (1990) results on the use of fantasy-reality metalanguage 
in young children. Both studies found a higher frequency of implicit references than 
explicit ones, but in Bunce and Harris’ (2008) data, in contrast to the findings of 
Woolley and Wellman (1990), young children used more explicit references to fan-
tasy and reality status than did older children (cf. Bunce & Harris 2008: 453). The 
researchers explain this finding in light of the different contexts in which the data 
were gathered. Woolley and Wellman (1990) used data from the CHILDES data-
base, much of which had been collected in the context of toy play. Bunce and Harris 
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(2008: 453), on the other hand, sampled children’s uses of pretend metalanguage 
over a wider range of contexts using diary records and interviews.  
In addition, as seen above, free play and other types of non-toy related play 
activities also make up for a significant proportion of the corpus data. As Hall et al. 
(1995: 248) note, children use pretend more frequently than mental verbs such as 
know or think in free play than in other types of situations. This, then, serves as 
another indication for the well-suitedness of the corpus data. 
A further issue is that analyses of corpus data that only contain information 
on few children clearly have limitations in what they can tell us about how linguistic 
constructions develop (Demuth 2008: 204). As mentioned above, in order to in-
crease representativeness, the MC was chosen and combined with the TC data for 
analysis. However, this leads to a number of characteristics influencing the analysis 
that have to be addressed. Regarding the CHI data, for the age group of 3;00-4;11 
all corpus data only stem from the TC, so that for this time span, we have to 
acknowledge that the representativeness of the data is limited by the fact that they 
are only of a single child. The same holds for the MOT data for the 3;0-4;11 period.  
In addition, since the two corpora do not have the same sampling frequency, 
this means that the frequency in the corpora is skewed towards the TC. Simply put, 
for the age period of 2;0-3;0 the TC data are overrepresented and contain more 
transcripts, and consequently more tokens than the MC data. So for the Anne dataset 
of the MC, for example, there are 68 transcripts for the 2;0-3;0 period, representing 
34 one-hour recordings. In comparison, in the TC, for the same period, there are 
233 transcribed recordings. For the CHI data this does not constitute a problem as 
in the TC CHI the lexical item pretend does not occur in Thomas’s speech before 
age 3;0 at all. So analyses of CHI utterances of pretend before age 3;0 only repre-
sent the MC data. In the TC MOT data, however, pretend does occur in the 
timeframe of 2;0-3;0, which means that when analysing the corpus data for that 
timeframe, the TC MOT data are overrepresented.  
This is especially relevant given the discussion of searching for low-fre-
quency items in DDBs. Due to its higher sampling density, we would therefore 
expect pretend to be found more frequently in the TC MOT data. However, because 
the MC contains data for 12 children, the overall number of one-hour recordings is 
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much more similar to each other (TC: 379 vs. MC: 402). If we just consider the age 
span of 2;0-3;0, the TC 2;0-3;0: data has 279 recordings. However, the sampling 
density is of course still very different, and this needs to be taken into account. This 
is also one of the reasons why in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 we will often compare to what 
extent the TC MOT and MC MOT data differ. If we find differences, however, it 
has to be kept in mind that these could be due to differences in sampling, or due to 
individual variation.  
Even if we are not able to answer the question to what extent the factors of 
sampling differences and individual differences play a role in the structure of the 
data, they are still interesting in themselves. This is especially so given that the 
current study is also interested in the cognitive and semantic properties of pretend 
utterances. The utterances featuring pretend that we find in the corpora will still 
“provide a revealing window onto the everyday but often opaque world of early 
childhood, and into young children’s understanding of persons and minds” (Bartsch 
& Wellman 1995: 11), as well as of their understanding of pretence and other peo-
ple’s perspectives. So the data we do find are still highly relevant and can shed light 
on how perspectivation in pretend utterances works and develops. However, be-
cause of the lower sampling rate, especially of the MC CHI data, the representa-
tiveness of the data as markers for age of emergence have to be seen critically. 
Overall, we can conclude that the TC and MC data provide us with interest-
ing data on perspectivation, pretend play, and the acquisition of the lexical item 
pretend, even though we have to acknowledge a number of limitations in what the 
data can tell us. In general, then, the combination of a dense corpus of a single child 
and a representative, less densely sampled corpus of 12 children can provide valu-
able insights on the linguistic realisation of pretend play. However, we have to ex-
plicate precisely to what extent and for which population these results can be seen 
as representative. We will turn to this issue next. 
 
4.2.2 Representativeness of the Results 
This study is interested in the question how children and their caregivers use per-
spectivation in pretend play, how it develops over time, and how children’s and 
mothers’ pretence behaviours are related and differ from each other. By using a 
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corpus of 13 child-caregiver dyads to investigate this question, the assumption is 
made that these data can tell us something about English-speaking children’s and 
mothers’ use of perspectivation and pretend play in general. That is, it is assumed 
that these data are in some way representative. However, these assumptions need to 
be explicated. It also needs to be made clear which population these data are thought 
to be representative of. In this section, it will be discussed what kind of subjects and 
what kind of population we can draw conclusions for. 
Two qualifications have already been introduced in the section above. First, 
as mentioned, the corpus analysis investigates English-speaking children. This 
means that all conclusions drawn in the analysis might not reflect how pretend play 
and its linguistic realisations develop in languages other than English. Of course, as 
discussed in Section 3.1.6, pretend play seems to be a cultural and cognitive uni-
versal. Indeed, for a number of cognitive and sociocognitive capacities, research 
suggests that they develop following a relatively universal timeline (Callaghan et 
al. 2011). However, as we have also seen in Section 3.1.6, despite its universal na-
ture, there are significant cultural differences in the realisations of pretend play.  
In addition, whereas WEIRD cultures show many similarities in terms of 
their cognitive-behavioural tendencies and their development, much cross-cultural 
research has indicated that these cultures are not representative of humans as a spe-
cies. As Henrich et al. (2010) have shown, in domains such as categorisation, infer-
ence, spatial reasoning, cooperation, fairness, and visual perception, people from 
WEIRD cultures are actually unusual and differ quite strongly from those of non-
WEIRD cultures. This not only holds for cognition in general (e.g., Cole & Cagigas 
2010), but also for language. In fact, research indicates that languages differ quite 
remarkably in their structure as well as their acquisition (Evans & Levinson 2009; 
Lieven & Stoll 2010). Furthermore, this research also suggests that “English is not 
a very good basis for understanding how children learn this wide range of languages 
because it has a number of characteristics that make it a poor exemplar” (Lieven & 
Stoll 2010: 157). So while it is assumed that the analysis presented here is relevant 
for the question of how pretend play and perspectivation develop, and that the data 
might be indicative of more general trends that are true for the human population 
in general, this assumption is also problematic to a certain degree.  
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We also need to further qualify the statement “English-speaking.” For one, 
the corpus data only represent English children, as the MC and TC are both drawn 
from the Eng-UK data and no Eng-NA data were sampled. So this means that our 
conclusions are narrowed further to only applying to British English-speaking chil-
dren. The Eng-UK and Eng-NA data (see Section 5.1), as well as the CDI data for 
the UK, North America and Australia (see Section 3.3.2), are quite similar in their 
distribution of pretend, but we should be aware that in a narrow sense, the analysis 
only applies to children who grew up in England.  
A further important qualification is that the corpus consists of data of pre-
dominantly middle-class children. As Hart and Risley’s (1995) study, which was 
already discussed in Section 4.2.1.2, and many studies after them have shown, SES 
plays a vital role in how much language children are exposed to and this has con-
sequences for their linguistic development. English-speaking children in low-SES 
families hear fewer words than mid-SES children and especially high-SES children 
(e.g., Hart & Risley 1995; Hoff 2003; Rowe 2008; Gilkerson et al. 2017). The same 
holds for children from families speaking a minority language (Erika Hoff 2013). 
As a result of the different communicative environments they grow up in, these 
children also “have different language trajectories than children from middle class, 
monolingual English-speaking homes” (Erika Hoff 2013: 4). It therefore needs to 
be stated that the results of the present study might not be transferrable to the de-
velopment of perspectivation in pretend play in other SES groups. Some studies 
stress the substantial variability of how many words children hear within a particu-
lar SES stratum (e.g., Gilkerson et al. 2017; Sperry et al. 2018), which indicates that 
because of this variation, data obtained from a small number of middle-class fami-
lies might not be representative of the language environment of mid-SES families 
as a whole. However, as on average mid-SES families are more similar to each other 
in their language environment than they are to low-SES and high-SES families 
(Hart & Risley 1995; Gilkerson et al. 2017), we can nevertheless be relatively con-
fident that the data analysed here are on average representative of the linguistic 
trajectories and communicative context of English middle-class children.  
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There are also some factors pertaining to family structure that need to be 
mentioned in order to specify to what degree the present corpus analysis can be seen 
as representative. Most importantly, as mentioned, all 13 children in the corpus 
were cared for primarily by their mother. The analysis therefore does not represent 
the language environment of children who are cared for by a caregiver other than 
their mother. Indeed, as we have seen in Section 3.1.5, mothers and fathers differ 
in their pretend play with their children, which indicates that the present analysis of 
mother-child data are not necessarily transferrable to father-child dyads. The data 
also cannot be automatically transferred to families where there is no primary care-
giver but where caregiving duties are distributed more equally among more than 
one person. The children in the study also did not have any siblings and were mon-
olingual. Therefore, the analysis does not shed light on the linguistic and cognitive 
development of children growing up in bi- or multilingual settings, nor on the in-
fluence of sibling interactions on language acquisition. In the MC, gender is bal-
anced (6w, 6m), but it has to be kept in mind that for the age group of 3;00-4;11 all 
corpus data only come from one child-mother-dyad, with the child, Thomas, being 
a boy. So for this dataset, it can be asked to what extent it is representative of the 
linguistic development of girls as well, as there is some evidence of gender differ-
ences in the way that language is acquired (Karrass et al. 2002; Diessel 2009: 1198; 
Eriksson et al. 2012). 
 Taking all of these considerations into account, this means that the analysis 
of the corpus data is assumed to be representative of monolingual English children 
from middle-class families without siblings and their mother as their primary care-
giver. The extent to which these data can also be argued to be representative for a 
wider population is, as we have seen, a matter of debate.  
 With these considerations in mind, I will now turn to the methodology of 
the corpus analysis and describe how the research questions of this study were in-
vestigated. 
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4.3 Methodology: Corpus Analysis of Perspectivation and Pretend Play 
When performing a corpus analysis, researchers need to make transparent in what 
way the corpus data were handled and analysed in order to investigate the research 
question at hand. How were the data coded? How and by which criteria were they 
grouped? Which methods were used to then analyse these data and draw conclu-
sions from them?  
In this section, we will turn to questions of how the corpus data were coded, 
grouped, and analysed for the present study in order to gain insight into the use of 
perspectivation in pretend play in language acquisition. Section 4.3.1 will spell out 
the research questions in more detail and describe the process of data annotation. 
Section 4.3.2 will explain the concept of mean length of utterance (MLU), which is 
one of the ways linguistic development is measured in this study. Section 4.3.3 will 
briefly introduce the statistical methods employed in the study.  
 
4.3.1 Research Questions and Coding 
As the discussion in Section 3.3 has shown, pretend is only one node in the complex 
network of constructions children and caregivers use to talk about, negotiate and 
coordinate pretend play. In addition, children very often do not make the fact that 
they are pretending explicit via metacommunication (see Section 3.2.3). So just 
looking at one lexical item in the corpus data will not capture all pretence activities 
a child is engaged in. However, given that pretend as a lexical item is of high im-
portance in children’s play activities (see Sections 3.2.5 and 3.3.3), we can still 
expect that searching for it in the corpus data will yield insightful results. Moreover, 
the lexical item pretend clearly is the word most strongly associated with pretend 
play situations both when caregivers produce it and when children start using the 
word themselves. Studying what happens when pretence behaviour is explicitly 
marked and commented on can tell us much about how children and their caregivers 
conceptualise pretence in general. Overall, it represents a very useful starting point 
for investigating children’s pretend play interactions.  
Moreover, it is not only interesting to investigate children’s use of pretend 
but also how their caregivers use it. One reason for this is the importance of child-
directed speech for language acquisition, as discussed in Section 2.2.3. Another 
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reason follows from the cognitive orientation of the current study. If we are inter-
ested in the structure of pretend play interactions between children and caregivers, 
we should just as much look at caregiver speech as we do at children’s speech. 
Pretend play situations are co-constructed and negotiated by children and caregiv-
ers. If we are interested in this process and the kinds of pretence behaviours mother-
child dyads engage in, we have to analyse both groups of speakers. In line with the 
usage-based approach adopted here, the goal of this study therefore is a careful 
analysis of how the lexical item pretend is employed in discourse by children and 
caregivers. More specifically, this study investigates the question of how pretend is 
used in the context of pretend play “for the purpose of making meaning” (Tyler & 
Huang 2018: 28). 
To find instances of pretend in the corpus data, I performed an analysis by 
lexical tracking (MacWhinney 2008: 168). Using the CLAN programme (Diessel 
2009: 1203-1205; MacWhinney 2019b), occurrences of pretend and its word forms 
were tracked in the TC and MC data. The programme then sorted these results into 
a concordance of utterances featuring pretend word forms (cf. Wynne 2008: 706). 
These data were then coded for further analysis according to a number of catego-
ries.38 The categories are discussed in more detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, so here I 
will just give a brief overview along with some methodological considerations.  
For the analysis in Chapter 5, the different surface forms of pretend and their 
frequency were analysed to investigate their overall distribution and development. 
Many studies in a usage-based approach focus on surface forms so as not to make 
too many assumptions about their underlying constructional composition (Erker & 
Guy 2012: 530). This usage-based commitment is reflected in the analysis of dif-
ferent forms of pretend in Chapter 5. However, Chapter 5 also looks at pretend and 
its different morphological constructions using the morphological coding in the 
transcripts (see Section 5.2). In addition, utterances containing the lexical item pre-
tend were coded for utterance type/speech act type: declarative, imperative, ques-
tion, question tag, repetition. 
 
38 Coding refers to the “process of categorizing transcribed speech […] for analysis. The type of 
coding system used depends upon the intended goal of the analysis” (Rowe 2012: 206). The coding 
of data represents “the researcher’s conceptual description of the data collected” (Blume & Lust 
2017: 217) and the coding system reflects the research questions that are investigated. 
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The aim of Chapter 6 is to investigate questions tightly connected to the 
relation between cognitive development and children’s pretence behaviour: Which 
pretend target domains occur in children’s naturalistic interactions? How do these 
develop over time and with increasing linguistic complexity in language acquisi-
tion? For this analysis, the data were coded for the semantic target domains evoked 
or involved in pretend play situations in a bottom-up manner. Utterances were first 
coded for individual targets of a pretend play situation (e.g., something being an 
elephant, seeing something, knowing something, being on a boat, something being 
broken). In the following step, based on the types of individual targets in the utter-
ances, higher-order, more abstract and schematic categories were inferred that the 
individual target structures can be seen as instantiations of. For example, the utter-
ance you’re pretending to eat him (MOT, aran27b.cha) is treated as an instantiation 
of the action schema. These schematic categories were inferred on the basis of a 
qualitative analysis of the interactional sequences in which pretend utterances were 
produced, and with the goal that they should a) be cognitively realistic and b) be 
motivated by what we know about cognitive development and categorisation. In 
short, the pretend target categories were inferred using Cognitive-Linguistic con-
siderations, which will be outlined in more detail in Chapter 6.  
For the analysis in Chapter 7, pretend utterances were coded following the 
event schema typology of Radden and Dirven (2007: 269-299), which will be 
discussed in more detail in the chapter. 
One caveat that needs to be addressed here is that, especially for children’s 
language use, coding is not an objective process but in essence a subjective one 
based on the researcher’s analysis and coding decisions. This also means that an-
other coder might make different coding decisions. Due to the nature of this project, 
all data were analysed and coded by only one person (the author), so that no inter-
rater reliability information (cf. Corrigan 2012: 277-278) is available.  
Coding children’s linguistic utterances generally is a problematic endeav-
our. As Blume and Lust (2017: 215) summarise, 
interpreting what a given child utterance was “intended” to mean can be difficult. Although 
methods such as “rich interpretation” have been developed, wherein the context of natural 
speech is carefully considered to determine what a child’s utterance means and what its 
structure likely is (e.g., Bloom, 1970), this process remains subjective, and inferences must 
be qualified appropriately. 
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This also has to be kept in mind for the current study. Pretend utterances 
were coded using as many contextual cues as possible, also taking into account the 
preceding and following utterances of an interaction. This was especially important 
when the utterance itself did not make explicit the pretend situation children and 
caregivers were involved in. This happened frequently with children’s utterances, 
which are often one- or two-word utterances such as pretend (e.g., CHI, 
becky12b.cha, talking about eating a sandwich) or just pretend (e.g., CHI, 
gail12a.cha, talking about a toy boat capsizing), but also with mothers’ utterances, 
e.g., when pronouns are used to refer to a pretend situation or entity, as in it’s only 
pretend (MOT, carl10b.cha, talking about a pretend doughnut). 
 
4.3.2 Analysing Development  
To investigate the development of pretend, after coding the data were grouped by 
two different measures: by age and by linguistic development. For pretend utter-
ances and the analysis of the targets and event schemas these are associated with, 
these two different groupings relate to two different questions. On the one hand, we 
can ask if the distribution and development of pretend categories changes with age. 
This question is relevant if we want to assess which role cognitive development 
plays when it comes to which kinds of pretend play situations children partake in 
and how these are being talked about. If we are interested in the relation between 
pretend play and linguistic complexity, this question is relevant in order to investi-
gate whether a given change is simply a result of cognitive development, or if it 
reflects the acquisition and mastering of a more complex repertoire of constructions 
used to initiate, negotiate, and coordinate pretend play. It is also important to note 
that the key focus of Chapters 6 and 7 lies on the conceptual representations, target 
domains, and event schemas associated with any surface form of pretend. There-
fore, in the analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 different surface realisations of pretend are 
pooled for analysis. 
Grouping by age is relatively straightforward, but sorting pretend utterances 
into groups by language level is a more complicated matter, which is why I will 
discuss it in more detail. The “most commonly used measure of language profi-
ciency in child language research” (Corrigan 2012: 275) is that of mean length of 
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utterance (MLU): “MLU consists of counting the length of each of the subject’s 
utterances and dividing the total unit count by the total number of the subject’s 
utterances” (Blume & Lust 2017: 192). In the following, we will present MLU 
counted by words (MLUw). 
For example, we can calculate the MLUw of the first seven CHI utterances 
in one randomly chosen transcript of the MC:  
 
(1)  First 7 utterances for Nicole, age 2;06.11 (nic16a.cha): 
my purse 
purse gone 
put in there 
no 
get Nicole purse in there 
done it all 
Nicole done it all 
 
To calculate MLUw here, we add the unit count of each utterance (my purse = 2; 
purse gone = 2; put in there = 3; no = 1; get Nicole purse in there = 5; done it all = 
3; Nicole done it all = 4; total = 20) and divide it by the total number of utterances, 
in this case, seven. The resulting MLUw for these seven utterances is therefore 2.9 
(cf. Blume & Lust 2017: 193). If we follow the same procedure for the whole tran-
script, we arrive at a relatively reliable average of utterance length for that particular 
child at that particular time; the MLUw for this transcript is 1.9. If we calculate 
MLU for children at different ages, we can get a measurement of their language 
level that is independent of age. For example, if we take the TC data at age 03;07.01, 
Thomas’ first seven utterances are the following:  
 
(2)  First 7 utterances for Thomas, age 3;07.01 (030701.cha): 
Mummy (1) 
yes it is (3) 
Mummy (1) 
my numbers <are still> [//] is [*] still on the telly (9)39 
can I switch them off? (5) 
oh (1) 
Mummy, I like you (4) 
 
 
39 The symbol [//] indicates retracings “when a speaker starts to say something, stops, repeats the 
basic phrase, changes the syntax but maintains the same idea” (MacWhinney 2019b: 75). 
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For these utterances, the MLUw is 3.4 (for the whole transcript the MLUw 
is 3.6). Based on these calculations of MLUw, we can state that Thomas’ utterances 
exhibit a higher linguistic complexity than those of Nicole. We can therefore com-
pare different levels of linguistic development independent of age. 
Following Brown (1973), for many types of research question researchers 
prefer to classify children by MLU instead of age because children at the same age 
may vary strongly in their MLU and therefore their language level (Corrigan 2012: 
275; Owens 2012: 272; Blume & Lust 2017: 192). For example, Fig. 4.1 contains 
the MLUw measured at two separate ages for the children in the MC and TC data. 
MLUw was measured first around 2 years of age, that is, roughly at the beginning 
of the recording period, and then around 2;6, based on the MLUw analysis of one 
transcript for each child for each age group. 
Fig. 4.1 below shows that children in the TC and MC differ quite strongly 
in their MLU at a given age. However, what we can also see is that MLU increases 
uniformly with age, although it does so at different rates (cf. Miller & Chapman 
1981; Rice et al. 2010).  
Following Brown (1973: 53-59), most researchers measure MLU in mor-
phemes (MLUm), but it can be argued that this is not very much in line with a 
usage-based, constructionist approach. In such an approach it is not necessarily as-
sumed that children’s use of constructions is based on knowledge of morphemes 
but instead proceeds via item-based learning and progressive schematization (see 
Tomasello 2003: 94-143; Booij 2010: 15; Ambridge & Lieven 2011: 137-190 for 
discussion). I therefore follow Lieven et al. (2009: 485) in preferring to measure 
MLU in words (MLUw) “rather than to make assumptions about the productivity 
of morphemes.” However, measures of MLU by morphemes and by words correlate 
very strongly, suggesting that both types of measurements effectively capture chil-
dren’s general language development (Parker & Brorson 2005; see MacWhinney 
2008: 169-170; Norris & Ortega 2009; Corrigan 2012: 275 for discussions of other 
types of measurements of the development of linguistic complexity in language ac-
quisition). It also has to be noted that whereas there are good theoretical grounds to 
measure MLU in words for English, this might be less appropriate for other lan-
guages (Owens 2012: 272; Ezeizabarrena & Garcia Fernandez 2018; though see 
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Parker & Brorson 2005: 368). In addition, there are some languages, such as He-
brew, where an increase in grammatical complexity “does not necessarily result in 
longer utterances” (Owens 2012: 272; cf. Dromi & Berman 1982). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: MLUw around age 2;00 and 2;06 based on the available transcripts for that particular 
month 
Of course, especially when it comes to language acquisition, word boundaries can-
not always be clearly defined. For example, just pretend is written as two words in 
the CHILDES transcripts, but it is possible that children represent this construction 
as a unitary chunk just_pretend.40 While the concept of ‘word’ does not necessarily 
capture the basic units of language that children acquire when learning a language, 
it is arguably subject to interpretation to a lesser degree than morphemes.  
Moreover, the question if MLU really measures grammatical development 
is controversial. Brown (1973: 53-54; cf. Ezeizabarrena & Garcia Fernandez 2018) 
argued that 
 
40 In the CHAT transcription format, linkages are marked by an underscore, such as Santa_Claus, 
Fireman_Sam, got_to, or thank_you (MacWhinney 2019a: 49). 
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[t]he MLU is an excellent simple index of grammatical development because almost every 
new kind of knowledge increases length: the number of semantic roles expressed in a sen-
tence, the addition of obligatory morphemes, coding modulation of meaning, the addition 
of negative forms and auxiliaries used in interrogative and negative modalities, and, of 
course, embedding and coordinating. All alike have the common effect on the surface form 
of the sentence of increasing length. 
However, Dethorne et al. (2005) argue that “MLU is better viewed as a global meas-
ure of expressive language ability” as it is not only related to grammatical complex-
ity but also to semantic complexity and the number of different words children use 
(cf. Douglas 2012: 88). Blake et al. (1993: 193), on the other hand, maintain that 
MLU “is a valid measure of clausal complexity up to 4.5” (cf. Blume & Lust 2017: 
192-193), although others find this measure to be less predictive as a measure of 
grammatical complexity beyond an MLU of 3.0 (Rondal et al. 1987; Hoff 2014: 
186). Even though there are debates as to what exactly MLU measures, it is gener-
ally found to be a valid and reliable index of language development as well as lan-
guage impairment (Rice et al. 2010: 333). Overall, MLU is generally found useful 
in conceptualising development as it correlates positively with age and in that MLU 
generally increases with age, even though children’s linguistic trajectories can be 
quite different (Owens 2012: 272; Hoff 2014: 186).  
We have established that MLU can be seen as an index of language devel-
opment; it therefore represents a metric other than age that we can relate the devel-
opment of pretend utterances to. However, for purposes of analysis it makes sense 
not to simply relate the development of pretend utterances to MLU per se, but to 
also group MLU by some higher-order system. The grouping system I am using for 
the current study is that of Brown’s (1973) five stages of grammatical development, 
a system that is used quite frequently to categorise children’s MLU development 
(e.g., Lieven et al. 2009; Wieczorek 2010; Ninio 2011). Following Brown (1973: 
56), researchers have found it useful to divide the MLU continuum into the follow-
ing and associated MLU ranges: Early I (MLU 1.01-1.49), Late I (1.50-1.99), II 
(2.00-2.49), III (2.50-2.99), Early IV (3.00-3.49), Late IV/Early V (3.50-3.99), Late 
V (4.00-4.49), Post V (4.5+) (Miller & Chapman 1981: 160; Ingram 1989: 50; 
Singleton & Ryan 2004: 26; Hoff 2009: 244; see Table 4.3). Brown (1973: 32) 
described these stages as constituting “the core of English sentence construction, 
and with some allowance for variation in syntax and meaning, of language gener-
ally.”  
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Brown (1973) also used these stages to summarise some of the most im-
portant developments in language acquisition. Stage I captures children’s first 
combinations of words and first inflections. Stage II captures the addition of 
grammatical morphemes to word combinations and a productive use of grammar. 
In Stage III, different sentence modalities such as negatives and questions begin to 
be used. Stage IV marks the beginning of the use of complex sentences, including 
embedding of sentences. Stage V is thought to mark the emergence of new forms 
of complex sentences and the coordination of sentences (Hoff 2014: 186). Clear-
cut stages associated with particular abilities are generally treated with more scep-
ticism both in linguistic and cognitive development more generally, as cognitive 
development does not proceed in an additive, stage-like, linear progress of struc-
tural changes. Instead, the emergence of system novelty should be modelled in 
terms of organisational transformation and increasing complexity in a dynamically 
developing system, with changes often being non-linear and variable, forming a 
multidimensional developmental web of task-dependent skills (cf. Mascolo & 
Fischer 2015; Overton 2015; see also Section 2.3.2).41 Owens (2012: 272) goes so 
far as to claim that “much of the work on MLU, suggesting stages of development, 
has been discredited.” This is especially the case from a usage-based, construction-
ist point of view, where early rote-learned items might become more abstracted and 
schematic over time. This might also mean that inflections might disappear and 
language production in general might change as children construct their language 
(e.g., Tomasello 2003, 2006). But Owens (2012: 272), too, recognises the role of 
MLU in conceptualising development. 
In general, Brown’s stages can be argued to divide linguistic development 
“somewhat arbitrarily” (Hoff 2014: 186). However, as Ingram (1989: 50-51) points 
out, Brown’s stages should be seen as intervals on a continuum, without reference 
to categorical distinctions of what a child can and cannot do at a particular stage. 
Instead, Brown’s argument was that samples from children within these MLU 
ranges “would be typical of the kinds of linguistic behaviours shown for that range 
 
41 It has to be noted though that contrary to the received view of Piaget’s model of stages of devel-
opment, his actual views were much more complex and allowed for degrees and décalages in terms 
of the variability and consistency of children’s cognitive performance (Carpendale et al. 2018: 52-
58; cf. Overton 2015: 14-16).  
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of MLUs” (Ingram 1989: 51). Brown (1973: 59) stresses that “the whole develop-
ment of any one of the major constructional processes is not contained within a 
given stage interval.” He explicitly differentiates his conception of linguistic stages 
from his understanding of stages in Piaget’s (e.g., 1962) sense as marking a quali-
tative developmental change (Brown 1973: 58; cf. Ingram 1989: 51). He also 
stresses that “as utterances get longer and MLU increases, some sort of increase in 
complexity is bound to occur, but there is no a priori reason why the increase should 
take only the forms it does, and, in particular, that these forms should be the same 
for all children studied” (Brown 1973: 64-65; cf. Shore 1995; Owens 2012: 272; 
Hoff 2014: 186; Ezeizabarrena & Garcia Fernandez 2018). Understood as useful 
groupings to investigate some measure of linguistic proficiency, however, 
“Brown’s stages are descriptively accurate and have stood the test of time” (Hadley 
2014: 110).  
In the current study, Brown’s stages are also understood as useful groupings 
broadly representative of typical linguistic behaviours and abilities in a given MLU 
range. That is, in this study, Brown’s stages are mostly used as groupings for com-
parison in the same way that age is grouped into three-month-intervals for compar-
ison.  
There is one more very important aspect in which use of Brown’s (1973) 
stages is different from the way it is used in this study and should not be interpreted 
in the same ways. Brown’s (1973) original conception of stages and the one most 
often used in the literature is based on MLU measured by morphemes (MLUm), 
whereas this study, as outlined above, opts for measuring MLU in words (MLUw). 
Given the strong correlation of MLUw and MLUm discussed above, however, stud-
ies adopting MLUw also often refer to Brown’s stages (e.g., Lieven et al. 2009: 
485). However, some have argued that MLUw and MLUm do in fact measure dif-
ferent aspects of linguistic development (e.g., Wieczorek 2010: 68). In addition, 
although both values are almost perfectly correlated, MLUm counts in general tend 
to be higher than corresponding MLUw counts (e.g., Rice et al. 2010: 344; 
Wieczorek 2010: 65) by a coefficient of 1.108 (Parker & Brorson 2005: 372-373). 
This means that an MLUw of 2.99 can be converted, or correlates, to an MLUm of 
3.3. This is of course of importance for our conceptualisation of stages grouped by 
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MLU, and another reason to treat the grouping into Brown’s stages in the current 
study mainly as a heuristic measure. Table 4.3 below summarises Brown’s stages 
and associated MLU ranges, as well as the age ranges these occur in that are found 
in the literature.  
In the current study, the usage of pretend will be correlated with age on the 
one hand, and Brown’s stages on the other. In this way we will gain insight into the 
question to what degree the use of pretend, the target domains and the event sche-
mas associated with it change a) over time, and b) with linguistic development.  
As mentioned above, however, we have to be careful about which conclu-
sions we can draw if we find such correlations. Generally speaking, changes in the 
distribution of pretend usage with age might speak for a correlation with general 
cognitive and sociocognitive development, but it could of course also be related to 
maturation or changes that are specific to the lexical item pretend. Changes in the 
distribution of pretend usage by Brown’s stages might indicate a correlation with 
linguistic development. However, as we have seen, whether this is a correlation 
with grammatical development, global expressive language ability, general lan-
guage level or general language proficiency is a point of contention. This needs to 
be reflected in the conclusions drawn from these correlations. 
 
Stage MLU Age range 
Early I 1.01-1.49 16-26 months 
Late I 1.50-1.99 18-31 months 
II 2.00-2.49 21-35 months 
III 2.50-2.99 24-41 months 
Early IV 3.00-3.49 28-45 months 
Late IV/Early V 3.50-3.99 31-50 months 
Late V 4.00-4.49 37-52 months 
Post V 4.5+ 41- 
Table 4.3: Brown’s stages of grammatical development with associated MLU ranges and normative 
age ranges. Adapted from Miller and Chapman (1981: 160; see also Ingram 1989: 50; Singleton & 
Ryan 2004: 26; Hoff 2009: 244; Rice et al. 2010: 344; Ezeizabarrena & Garcia Fernandez 2018) 
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However, before we can discuss what conclusions we can draw from any 
attested correlations, it needs to be addressed how correlations between variables 
are established in the dataset in the first place. That is, which statistical measure-
ments are used to investigate possible correlations? This is the question the next 
section will turn to. 
 
4.3.3 Statistical Methods 
In the current study, I also want to investigate possible relationships between the 
distribution of various aspects relating to the use of pretend, for example in terms 
of target domains and event schemas on the one hand, and other measures, mostly 
age and Brown’s stages, on the other. That is, the research question to be investi-
gated is whether there is a correlation between changes in a particular variable re-
lated to pretend and changes in age or MLU.  
If there is a linear relationship between two variables, this means that as one 
variable changes, the other also changes. For example, in children, there is a rela-
tionship between age and height. As children grow older, they also become taller. 
In such a case, we speak of a positive correlation, because we can phrase the result 
in terms of “the higher the value of x, the higher the value of y” or “the lower the 
value of x, the lower the value of y” (Gries 2013: 147), meaning that both changes 
are changes in the same direction. 
However, for adults there is no such relationship. Whereas a child at age 12 
will, as a rule, be taller than a child at age 6, an adult at age 50 will not necessarily 
and automatically be taller than an adult at age 25. In this case, we would say that 
there is no correlation between adult height and adult age.  
The third type of possible correlation is a negative one. If there is a negative 
correlation between two variables, we expect that if one variable changes, the other 
variable will also to change, but in the opposite direction. For instance, there is a 
negative correlation between the corruption level of a country and the effectiveness 
of its legislature. So the higher a nation’s corruption index is, the lower its level of 
government effectiveness will be (Klomp & De Haan 2008; cf. Warne 2018: 337). 
Such a negative correlation can be phrased in terms of “the higher the value of x, 
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the lower the value of y” or “the lower the value of x, the higher the value of y” 
(Gries 2013: 147). 
Positive and negative correlations can also be found in language. In their 
research on the “30 Million Word Gap,” Hart and Risley’s (1995, 2003; see also 
Section 4.2.2) finding that children growing up in higher-SES families on average 
hear more words than children in lower-SES families would qualify as a positive 
correlation between the two factors. Their finding that the more words parents 
spoke to their children, the more words children knew at a later point in time also 
counts a s a positive correlation between parental word frequency and children’s 
vocabulary size. As an example of a negative correlation, consider the following 
two examples from research on population structure and linguistic structure. 
Lupyan and Dale (2010) have found a negative correlation between population size 
and morphological complexity. That is, they found that the bigger a particular lin-
guistic community is, the simpler their inflectional morphology. Similarly, Bentz et 
al. (2015) found a negative correlation between the number of non-native speakers 
and the number of word forms of a language: the more non-native speakers a lan-
guage has, the fewer word forms it will have.  
After having established how to talk about the direction of a correlation we 
can find between two variables, the next question we will turn to is how the strength 
of such a correlation can be measured. As Cohen (1988: 75) states, “[b]y far the 
most frequently used statistical method of expression of the relationship between 
two variables is the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, r.” Using 
Pearson’s product moment correlation allows us to evaluate the degree to which 
there is a linear relationship between two variables, meaning it allows us to assess 
to which degree one variable changes if the other one also changes (Sheskin 2004: 
957). The current study will follow this approach and mostly measure the relation-
ship between two variables using Pearson’s product moment correlation.42 
  
 
42 Hilpert and Gries (2009: 389-390) suggest that in language acquisition research, Kendall’s Tau 
would be a better statistical measure. However, they also note that most scholars in language acqui-
sition research use Pearson’s r (Hilpert & Gries 2009: 396), and I follow this common practice here, 
with the exception of a number of cases where Kendall’s Tau is seen as more appropriate. 
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Computing Pearson’s product moment correlation yields the correlation co-
efficient, r. In a second step, we can derive a measure of its statistical significance 
from the correlation coefficient, p. We can interpret the p-value as telling us how 
confident we can be that a distribution like the one we observe did not occur by 
chance. The lower the p-value, the higher the confidence that an effect that we ob-
serve is not random. Generally, a p-value of <0.05 is treated as being statistically 
significant (Miles & Banyard 2007: 87; Albert & Marx 2016: 130-132); this means 
that there is only a 5% probability that the effect we observe is due to chance and 
that there is, in fact, no relationship between the two variables we are measuring. A 
p-value of <0.001 is treated as being statistically highly significant, and I will follow 
these conventions here. However, it has to be noted that the cut-off points for sta-
tistical significance are essentially arbitrary and based on convention (see Miles & 
Banyard 2007: 300-305; Field et al. 2012: 52 for discussion). Therefore, it has been 
suggested that instead of simply stating that a given effect is statistically significant, 
the exact probability level always be reported as well (Dancey & Reidy 2017: 145). 
I will follow this practice here.  
The value of the correlation coefficient r can lie between 1 (positive corre-
lation) and -1 (negative correlation). This is referred to as the strength of a correla-
tion. When r is 0 there is no linear relationship between the two variables. When r 
is 1 (or -1) both variables are perfectly correlated. For instance, measuring weight 
in pounds or kilograms is perfectly correlated, in that the higher a measurement is 
in pounds, the higher it will also be in kilograms to exactly the same degree (Warne 
2018: 336). However, most real-life correlations are essentially never this perfect. 
Instead, they generally lie somewhere between 0 and 1. This, of course, makes the 
assessment of the strength of a correlation more complicated. In general, we can 
state that the closer a correlation coefficient is to 1 (or -1), the stronger the relation-
ship between the two variables is, and the closer it is to 0, the weaker the relation-
ship.  
Beyond that, verbally describing the effect size or strength of a correlation 
is much more problematic. In fact, in the research literature, there are many differ-
ent suggested cut-off points regarding when a correlation should be labelled as high 
(or strong), moderate (or intermediate), or low (or weak). As we can see, even the 
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terminology itself is already contentious, i.e. whether we should speak of high vs. 
low (e.g., Gries 2013: 147; Hinkle et al. 2003), strong vs. weak (e.g., Evans 1996; 
Dancey & Reidy 2017: 182; Schober et al. 2018: 1765), large vs. small (Cohen 
1988: 82; Brezina 2018: 144) or even high vs. weak (Albert & Marx 2016: 130-
131). In the current study, these verbal labels will be used interchangeably.  
One of the most influential guidelines for interpreting the size of a correla-
tion coefficient is Cohen’s (1988: 82) suggestion of r = .10 for a small effect, r = 
.30 for a medium effect, and r = .50 for a large effect (cf. Brezina 2018: 144). Most 
researchers have subdivided this classification further, adding a distinction between 
.50 to .70 for a high correlation, and .70 to 1 for a very high correlation (see, e.g., 
Gries 2013: 147). However, many researchers have not only introduced this subdi-
vision, but also assume an even higher cut-off point for labelling a correlation as 
moderate, or high/strong (Hinkle et al. 2003; Albert and Marx 2016: 130-131; 
Dancey & Reidy 2017: 182; Schober et al. 2018: 1765). I will follow these research-
ers when discussing the strength of the correlation coefficient r. Therefore, in this 
study, a correlation coefficient .00 to .30 will be labelled as very weak/low, .30-.50 
as weak/low, .50-.70 as moderate, .70-.90 as high/strong and .90 to 1.00 as very 
high/strong. Table 4.4. summarises the guidelines for interpreting and labelling the 
correlation coefficient r used in this study. 
 
Correlation coefficient r Interpretation 
.90 to 1.00 (-.90 to -1.00) very strong/high positive (negative) correlation 
.70 to .90 (-.70 to .-90) strong/high positive (negative) correlation 
.50 to .70 (-.50 to -.70) moderate positive (negative) correlation 
.30 to .50 (-.30 to -.50) weak/low positive (negative) correlation 
.00 to .30 (-.00 to -.30) very weak/very low/negligible positive (negative) 
correlation 
Table 4.4: General guidelines for the interpretation of Pearson’s product moment correlation coef-
ficient r, following Hinkle et al. 2003; Albert & Marx 2016: 130-131; Dancey & Reidy 2017: 182; 
Schober et al. 2018 
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It has to be noted, of course, that just as with the p-value, the cut-off points 
and suggested labels for the correlation coefficient are arbitrary and inconsistent 
and should be seen more as a general guide given the research question at hand 
(Cohen 1988: 13; Brezina 2018: 144; Schober et al. 2018: 1765).  
 A further important caveat has to be noted here. It is often tempting to see 
correlation as causation, but observing a correlation does not give us grounds to 
assume that the change in one variable causes the change in the other variable. For 
example, following earlier work by Sies (1988), Matthews (2000) shows that there 
is a statistically highly significant correlation between human birth rates across 
Europe and stork populations. This is, of course, an “association which is clearly 
ludicrous” (Matthews 2000: 36). In this case people would not actually infer cau-
sality. However, this example still points to a genuine problem in statistics. For one, 
as the example shows, there is the danger of “spurious correlations” (Roberts & 
Winters 2013) where there is, in fact, no direct relationship between the two varia-
bles. Roberts and Winters (2013), for example, discuss statistical links such as those 
found between linguistic diversity and traffic accidents, the occurrence of siestas 
and morphological complexity, phoneme inventories and levels of extramarital sex, 
or chocolate consumption and numbers of serial killers in a country. As they 
caution, if studies do not control for factors such as whether variables are linked by 
common descent, or are linked by another underlying cause, and if studies are not 
grounded in an adequate theory, they might actually have little explanatory power. 
Even for correlations that appear to be meaningful, we are left with the prob-
lem of how to conceptualise the causal links underlying them. There are three dis-
tinct possibilities for why we might observe a relationship: a) variable x might cause 
changes in variable y; b) variable y might cause changes in variable x; c) a third, 
unknown variable, z, causes changes in both x and y. Clarifying which of these 
three possibilities is the one that is most likely can be quite problematic. Warne 
(2018: 350-351) uses the Hart and Risley (1995, 2003) study cited above as an ex-
ample of this problem. According to Warne (2018: 350-351), Hart and Risley 
(1995, 2003) did not consider other possibilities in their claim that children’s vo-
cabulary size is caused by the number of words spoken to them by their parents:  
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For example, it is possible that children with larger vocabularies talk more to their parents, 
who respond by speaking more words than they would to a child with a smaller vocabulary 
[…]. Another interpretive model for their data is that some unknown third variable – such 
as the family's income level, or genetic factors – causes the correlation (Warne 2018: 350-
351). 
Applied to the current study, this means that we need to be careful what conclusions 
to draw from any given correlation between pretend uses on the one hand and age 
and MLU on the other.  
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have described the corpora to be analysed and discussed the meth-
odology of this study in more detail. First, I described the CHILDES database, 
which is a freely available archive of child language corpora that enables research-
ers to analyse naturalistic data. I then described the structure of the two corpora that 
were selected for analysis: the Manchester corpus, which contains data on 12 Eng-
lish-speaking children from 2 to 3 years of age, and the Thomas corpus, which con-
tains data on one English-speaking child from 2 to 5 years. 
For all corpora, we have to critically assess how representative they are. 
Here I critically note that transcribed data cannot capture multimodal phenomena 
and differences in phonetic realisation. We also have to ask how much of children’s 
language experience a particular corpus actually captures, especially when looking 
for rare structures. To take this into account, a so-called dense database corpus was 
chosen in the Thomas corpus, and the Manchester corpus was chosen to increase 
the number of children who could be analysed. Moreover, both corpora are partic-
ularly well-suited to analyse occurrences of the lexical item pretend as they feature 
quite a high number of play situations. Regarding the representativeness of the over-
all results, we have to keep in mind that the analysis focusses on middle-class, Brit-
ish English-speaking children without siblings, cared for primarily by their mother, 
in an environment where caretakers and family have an especially high interest in 
their children’s language development, and might also talk more often to their chil-
dren. This means that findings might not be transferrable to other contexts, SES and 
family backgrounds, languages and cultures, especially non-WEIRD cultures.  
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I then turned to questions of the methodology of this study, whose main goal 
it is to investigate perspectivation and pretend play in language acquisition by ana-
lysing the lexical item pretend in the TC and MC. In order to do this, I lexically 
tracked pretend word forms in children’s and mothers’ utterances and annotated 
these utterances for a number of criteria. The data were sorted both by age, and by 
MLU, taking Brown’s stages of development as a framework to sort utterances into 
different stages of linguistic complexity. Finally, I outlined the statistical methods 
employed in the analysis, along with a critical discussion of what conclusions we 
can draw from statistical measurements. 
After laying the theoretical and methodological groundwork in this and the 
previous chapters, the following three chapters focus on the empirical analysis of 
pretend utterances using language acquisition and corpus data.  
Chapter 5 presents a corpus analysis of pretend with a focus on the fre-
quency and distribution of pretend tokens in the corpus data. It also analyses the 
morphological constructions that pretend is part of as well as speech act types to 
elucidate the pragmatic functions of pretend utterances.  
Chapter 6 adopts a cognitive-semantic perspective and investigates the tar-
gets of pretend utterances, i.e. the kinds of entities, situations and events children 
and caregivers talk about when they pretend. This will be done both from a quanti-
tative perspective, i.e. by examining the absolute and relative frequencies of the 
occurrences of pretend targets, as well as from a qualitative perspective which ex-
plores the conceptual and cognitive dimension of the targets of pretend utterances. 
Importantly, in Chapter 5 I will discuss the distribution of the frequency of pretend 
in my dataset in total. In Chapter 6, I will adopt a developmental perspective as well 
and not only discuss the overall frequency of pretend targets in my dataset but also 
their development in terms of age and linguistic complexity.  
Chapter 7 analyses pretend utterances using the Cognitive-Linguistic con-
cept of event schemas (e.g., Radden & Dirven 2007), which refers to the conceptual 
patterns into which we sort types of events and situations. Specifically, the chapter 
investigates a) the question which event schemas children and caregivers evoke in 
their pretend play and b) how the distribution of event schemas in pretend activities 
changes with age and the growing complexity of children’s utterances.  
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5. Corpus Analysis of Pretend: Frequency, Distribution, Morpho-
logical Structure, Speech Act Types, and Development  
This chapter will be structured as follows: Section 5.1 presents analyses of the fre-
quency and distribution of pretend word forms in the corpus data using a number 
of different measures and points of comparison. The following Section, 5.2, pre-
sents an analysis of pretend morphological constructions. The next two sections 
will be the first that adopt a temporal and developmental perspective on the lexical 
item pretend. Section 5.3 describes the timeframes of the first occurrence of pretend 
for the various speakers. Section 5.4 then gives a brief overview of the development 
of the frequency of pretend and which factors might influence it. 
 
5.1 Analysis of Number of Pretend Word Forms 
As mentioned above, to first get an overall impression of the frequency of pretend 
in the data, let us review the total number of pretend word forms found in the cor-
pus. 
If we go by the number of words contained in all utterances in the MOT and 
CHI tier in the TC and MC, there are 4,189,147 tokens in total that were searched 
for occurrences of pretend. In total, 1,392 pretend tokens were found in the corpora 
(= 0.033%). In comparison, there are 211 pretend*43 word forms in the 10,409,851- 
item spoken word part of the British National Corpus (BNC), which amounts to a 
frequency of 0.002%. In the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), 
there are 2,416 occurrences of pretend word forms in the 118,167,133-item spoken 
word part of the corpus, also amounting to a frequency of 0.002%.  
Out of the 1,392 utterances found in the CHILDES data, 394 (relative fre-
quency = 0.038%) were uttered by the children in the corpora (TC: 300 = 0,018%; 
MC: 94 = 0,059%), and 998 (= 0,032%) were uttered by the mothers (TC: 508 = 
0,037%; MC: 490= 0,027%).  
  
 
43 The *-asterisk is a wildcard character in the corpus search syntax yielding all word forms that 
feature words beginning with pretend*. This search the yields results for word forms such as pre-
tend, pretends, pretended, pretender, or compound nounds such as pretend-mistress. 
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However, regardless of the differences between MOT and CHI measure-
ments, in all of the sub-corpora the relative frequency of pretend word forms is 
much higher than in the spoken BNC and COCA data. In fact, the relative frequency 
of pretend word forms in the English CHI data in CHILDES is 19 times higher than 
in the COCA and the BNC. For the MOT data in CHILDES, the occurrence of 
pretend word forms is 16 times higher than it is in the spoken BNC and COCA data. 
This is clear evidence that the lexical item pretend plays a bigger role in the inter-
action of young children and their mothers than it does in the types of more balanced 
spoken data found in the BNC and COCA (Aston & Burnard 1998: 28; McEnery et 
al. 2006: 16-19). 
Let us compare the data from the MC and TC to the frequency of pretend in 
the English-language CHILDES corpus data database (Eng-UK and Eng-NA = 
ECD) as a whole. In the ECD, there are 4,118 instances of pretend in total. Out of 
these, 1,692 were uttered by children in the corpora (Eng-NA: 1,060; Eng-UK: 
632), and 2,426 were uttered by mothers in the corpora (Eng-NA: 1,037; Eng-UK: 
1,389). If we subtract the TC and MC data, this leaves 1,298 pretend word forms 
spoken by the other children in the ECD (Eng-NA: 1,060; Eng-UK: 238), and 1,428 
pretend word forms spoken by mothers (Eng-NA: 1,037; Eng-UK: 391), for a total 
of 2,726 pretend word forms in the ECD excluding TC and MC data. Overall, then, 
as already mentioned in Section 4.1, the TC and MC data make up for 33.8% of 
pretend utterances in the ECD (TC and MC CHI: 23.2%; TC and MC MOT: 
41.8%).  
Looking at the total distribution of pretend in percentages, this means that 
pretend word forms make up 0.029% of the ECD data (Eng-NA: 0.030%; Eng-UK: 
0.028%). If we exclude the TC and MC data, the percentage drops slightly, to 
0.027% (Eng-NA: 0.30%; Eng-UK: 0021%). For the CHI data, the percentage of 
pretend word forms in the ECD is 0.032%, (Eng-NA: 0.036%; Eng-UK: 0.028%), 
and for the MOT data it is 0.027% (Eng-NA: 0.026%; Eng-UK: 0.029%). Exclud-
ing the TC and MC data, the ECD percentage drops to 0.031% for the CHI data 
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(Eng-UK without TC and MC CHI: 0.019%) and to 0.25% for the MOT data (Eng-
UK without TC and MC MOT: 0.022%).44 
Overall, the MC CHI data exhibit a lower frequency of pretend than the 
North American data in the same timeframe, but a higher frequency of pretend than 
the British data in this timeframe. The TC CHI data exhibit a higher frequency than 
the other British data around this timeframe, and a much higher frequency than the 
North American data for this timeframe. 
 
TYPE TO-
KENS: 
MOT 
EXAMPLE TO-
KENS: 
CHI 
EXAMPLE 
Total 508  300  
pretending 313 are you pretending 
to cough like 
Daddy? (2-01-
15.cha) 
50 just pretending I’m 
eating it (3-10-
01.cha) 
pretend 184 a pretend fly? 
(4-10-10.cha) 
245 just pretend you’ve 
got no dustbin (3-06-
01.cha) 
pretends 2 play that game 
where Daddy pre-
tends he’s a gate 
(03-01-03.cha) 
0  
pretended 9 you pretended to 
blow out the candle 
and then you went 
hooray (02-05-
20.cha) 
1 I just pretended I 
was one of those xxx 
[+ PI] (04-03-
00.cha) 
tending@c 0  1 (be)cause I'm tend-
ing@c (04-00-
07.cha) 
tend@c 0  3 just tend@c you 
were <getting the 
train> [>] (04-11-
20.cha) 
Table 5.1: Pretend tokens in the TC by number of occurrences 
 
44 These data are for the whole time span of the corpus collections. In Section 5.1.1 we will be 
looking at the timeframe of 1;6-5;0, which is the time span of the TC and MC. 
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If we consider these overall frequencies, we can state that pretend and its 
word forms can be counted among the infrequent linguistic forms. Erker and Guy 
(2012: 536) define infrequent forms as those that constitute less than 1% of a cor-
pus. In all of the corpora studied here, pretend clearly falls within this category. For 
the TC, MC and ECD overall, then, the distribution of pretend is in accordance with 
Zipf’s law (Zipf 1949) in that it belongs to the majority of words with very low 
frequencies (cf. Erker & Guy 2012: 529; see also Section 4.2.1.1). 
I will now turn to the distribution of pretend tokens in the TC and MC. First 
the data for the TC will be presented, divided in the data for the CHI tier and MOT 
tier, respectively. The same will be done for the MC data. I will then compare these 
distributions to the ECD. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Pretend tokens in the TC  
In the TC, the following distribution of pretend word forms can be found: Out of 
the 508 MOT pretend tokens, 313 (61.7%) belong to the pretending category, 184 
(36.2%) to the pretend category, 9 (1.8%) to the pretended category, and 2 (0.4%) 
to the pretends category. Out of the 300 CHI pretend tokens, 245 belong to the 
pretend category (81.7%), 50 to the pretending category (16.7%), and 1 (0.33%) to 
the category pretended. There also were 3 instances (1%) of the reduced child-in-
vented form tend and 1 (0.33%) instance of tending. The most striking difference 
here is that Thomas’ mother uses the progressive pretending much more often than 
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Thomas, whereas for Thomas himself, the token pretend is the most frequent (see 
the discussion in Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.1). Table 5.1 above summarises these re-
sults, which are also represented in graph form in Fig. 5.1. 
The number of pretend tokens is of course quite different for the MOT tier 
and the CHI tier. If we analyse the overall relative distribution of pretend types in 
both tiers separately, we find the pattern in Fig. 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Comparison of the relative distribution of pretend types in the TC for MOT and CHI 
In the MC, we find the following distribution: Out of the 492 MOT utterances, 428 
(87.3%) belong to the pretend category, 58 (11.8%) belong to the pretending cate-
gory, 4 (1%) are in the pretended category, and 1 (0.2%) is in the pretends category. 
Out of the 94 CHI pretend tokens, 83 (88.3%) belong to the pretend category and 
11 (11.7%) are in the pretending category. In contrast to the TC data, the MC MOT 
and MC CHI data are therefore much more similar in their distribution. Table 5.2 
summarises these results; the distribution in graph form can be found in Fig. 5.3 
below.  
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TYPE TO-
KENS: 
MOT 
EXAMPLE TO-
KENS: 
CHI 
EXAMPLE 
Total 490  94  
pretending 58 you’re only pretend-
ing, are you? 
(becky19a.cha) 
11 it’s for pretending 
(becky27a.cha) 
pretend 428 just pretend that the 
babas can have it 
(ruth01a.cha) 
83 I pretend to be a 
prince (ruth31b.cha) 
 
pretends 1 well he pretends 
that he’s good at 
juggling, doesn’t 
he? 
(john33a.cha) 
0  
pretended 3 you pretended for a 
long time then  
(gail25b.cha) 
0  
Table 5.2: Pretend tokens in the MC by number of occurrences 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Pretend tokens in the MC 
As the total number of pretend tokens again differs quite strongly between the MOT 
and CHI tier, this makes it difficult to compare the two datasets. Therefore, it can 
be insightful to analyse relative frequencies instead. Here we see that the relative 
frequency of pretend in MOT (87.3%) and CHI (88.3%) is very similar, as is the 
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relative frequency of pretending (MOT: 11.8%; CHI: 11.7%). This is shown in Fig. 
5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Comparison of the relative distribution of pretend tokens in the MC for MOT and CHI 
In the ECD, with the TC and MC data subtracted, we find the following distribution: 
Out of 1,436 utterances in the MOT tier, 1,153 (80.3%) belong to the pretend cate-
gory, 246 (17.1%) belong to the pretending category, 22 (1.5%) are in the pretended 
category, and 13 (0.9%) are in the pretends category. Out of the 1,302 CHI pretend 
tokens, 1,074 (82.5%) belong to the pretend category and 200 (15.4%) are in the 
pretending category. There are 6 instances of pretends (0.5%) and 24 (1.8%) in-
stances of pretended. Table 5.3 summarises these results; again, the distribution in 
graph form can be found in Fig. 5.5 below. 
 
TYPE TOKENS: MOT TOKENS: CHI 
Total 1,436 1,302 
pretending 246 200 
pretend 1,153 1,074 
pretends 13 6 
pretended 22 24 
Table 5.3: Pretend tokens in the ECD by number of occurrences (MC and TC data have been 
subtracted) 
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Figure 5.5: Pretend tokens in the ECD with MC and TC subtracted 
As can be seen in Fig. 5.6 below, if we compare MOT and CHI data in the ECD, 
their distributions are quite similar.  
 
  
Figure 5.6: Comparison of the relative distribution of pretend tokens in the ECD MOT and CHI 
(MC and TC data have been subtracted) 
If we compare the data we find that, overall, the distributions of pretend tokens are 
quite similar across corpora, with the exception of the TC MOT data, which display 
a much higher frequency of pretending, to the extent that in this dataset, it is by far 
the most frequent category. In addition, the MC CHI and MC MOT data have the 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Total pretending pretend pretends pretended
Pretend Tokens, ECD without MC and TC
TOKENS: MOT TOKENS: CHI
17%
15%
80%
82%
1%
1%
2%
2%
M O T
C H I
pretend distribution, ECD 
pretending pretend pretends pretended
163 
 
highest frequency of pretend as compared to the TC CHI, ECD CHI and ECD MOT 
data. Table 5.4 summarises the data for all corpora: 
 
TYPE TC 
CHI 
MC  
CHI 
ECD 
CHI 
TC 
MOT 
MC 
MOT 
ECD 
MOT 
Total 300 94 1,302 508 490 1,436 
pretending 50 
(16.7%) 
11 
(11.7%) 
200 
(15.4%) 
313 
(61.7%) 
58 
(11.8%) 
246 
(17.1%) 
pretend 245 
(81.7%) 
83 
(88.3%) 
1,074 
(82.5%) 
184 
(36.2%) 
428 
(87.3%) 
1,153 
(80.3%) 
pretends 0  0 6 
(0.5%) 
2  
(0.4%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
13 
(0.9%) 
pretended 1  
(0.3%) 
0 24 
(1.8%) 
9 
(1.8%) 
3 
(0.6%) 
22 
(1.5%) 
tending@c 1 
(0.3%) 
0 0 0 0 0 
tend@c 3 (1%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5.4: Number of pretend tokens and percentages in the TC, MC, and ECD (without TC and 
MC) data for MOT and CHI 
In this section, we have investigated word forms, meaning that we analysed surface-
level realisations of the lexical item pretend. However, only discussing surface re-
alisations masks the different uses of the same word form. Importantly, the same 
word form can represent different morphological constructions. As a case in point, 
the discussion above does not shed light on the question of when pretend is used 
with an adjectival meaning, as in pretend bricks (John20a.cha), and when it is used 
as a verb, as in me [*] pretend a be a workman (Ruth27b.cha). Therefore, in the 
next sections we will analyse pretend and its instantiations on a morphological 
level.  
 
5.2 Analysis of Pretend Morphological Constructions 
In the previous sections, I have discussed the overall frequency and distribution of 
the lexical item pretend and its associated word forms. In this section, I will take a 
closer look at the different morphological constructions that pretend occurs in, as 
well as at their frequency and distribution. The analytical categories in this section 
are based on the tagging of pretend word forms in the %mor (i.e. morphosyntactic 
structure) tier of the TC and MC. The morphological tier is a feature of the CHAT 
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format (see Section 4.1).45 It codes “morphemic segments by type and part of 
speech” (MacWhinney 2019a: 83). These codings/taggings are automatically 
created by the MOR programme (MacWhinney 2000, 2008; Sagae et al. 2010).46 
The coding scheme in the case of pretend morphological constructions has the fol-
lowing structure: part-of-speech|stem-SUFFIX. Using an instance of pretending as 
an example, morphosyntactic tagging in CHAT files looks like this:  
 
(1)  CHI:  I’m pretending that I’m making green sausage . 
%mor: pro:sub|I~aux|be&1S part|pretend-PRESP 
rel|that pro:sub|I~aux|be&1S part|make-PRESP adj|green 
n|sausage . 
(4-11-06.cha, emphasise mine, MP) 
 
Here, as we can see, pretending is coded as part|pretend-PRESP. This means that 
the code for pretending consists of three parts: a part-of-speech tag indicating that 
it is a participle/compound verb form (part|), a tag indicating the stem of the mor-
phological construction (pretend), and a tag specifying that the suffix is the present 
participle suffix (-PRESP), yielding part|pretend-PRESP. Table 5.5 below lists the 
types of pretend codings found in the TC and MC and their meanings as well as the 
corresponding word forms tagged in the corpus (cf. MacWhinney 2000).  
 
TYPE EXPLANATION WORD FORMS 
part|pretend-PRESP verb, present participle Pretending 
v|pretend verb, base form pretend 
adj|pretend adjective pretend 
v|pretend-PAST verb, past tense pretended 
part|pretend-PASTP verb, past participle pretended 
v|pretend-3S verb, 3rd singular present  pretends 
Table 5.5: Codings of pretend morphological constructions in the %mor tier of the TC and MC 
 
45 The most recent version of the manual detailing the structure and features of the CHAT format 
can be found here: https://talkbank.org/manuals/CHAT.pdf (last accessed 10/11/2018). 
46 The most recent version of the manual detailing the MOR programme and other programmes that 
automatically tag parts of speech for CHAT transcripts, as well as the morphosyntactic coding 
scheme used for taggings of parts of speech, can be found here: https://talkbank.org/manu-
als/MOR.pdf (last accessed 17/04/2019). 
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As we can see, examining the distribution of pretend morphological con-
structions gives us more detailed distributional linguistic information than the anal-
ysis of pretend word forms only. This is the case because the same word form can 
be an instantiation of different morphological constructions, depending on the sen-
tential context and the meaning of the utterance as a whole. In the case of pretend 
word forms, the word form pretend without context could be either coded as an 
adjective (adj|pretend) or a verb (v|pretend), and the word form pretended could be 
coded as either v|pretend-PASTP or part|pretend-PASTP. Unfortunately, this is also 
where the automatic tagging of the MOR programme can run into trouble, as it 
sometimes tags morphological constructions incorrectly. This happens when the 
word form itself can be tagged in more than one way when context and utterance 
meaning are not taken into account. As Corrigan (2012: 278) states, “[a]ny auto-
matic tagging program generates a certain percentage of errors.” Given the often 
fragmentary nature of children’s utterances and the frequent difficulty of assigning 
exact meanings to them, the MOR programme encounters this problem of 
mistagging quite frequently for some word forms. For automatic tagging of the 
CHILDES data, the error rate is an estimated 6% (Corrigan 2012: 278). For pre-
tended, this problem did not arise very often, as the programme could correctly take 
the co-occurrence of the word form with auxiliary verbs into account (I pretended 
vs. I’ve pretended). The problem was significantly more pronounced for the word 
form pretend, however. Take, for example, the two following utterances: 
 
(2) MOT:   they’re pretend though . 
%mor:  pro:sub|they~cop|be&PRES adj|pretend adv|though . 
(Anne03b.cha, emphasis mine, MP) 
 
(3) CHI:   I just pretend .  
%mor:  pro:sub|I adv|just adj|pretend . 
(4-11-08.cha, emphasis mine, MP) 
 
As we can see, in example (2) the MOR programme has coded the pretend mor-
phological construction correctly as an adjective. In example (3), however, the au-
tomatic tag adj|pretend is incorrect, as taking utterance meaning into account clearly 
shows that it should correctly be v|pretend. Because of this inconsistency in tagging, 
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for the analysis in question, all pretend %mor codings in the TC and MC were 
manually checked and corrected.  
Section 5.2.1 will present the distribution and frequency of pretend morpho-
logical constructions in the TC, whereas Section 5.2.2 will do the same for the MC. 
In the next two sections, I will compare both datasets. Section 5.2.3 will compare 
the data for the MOT tier, and Section 5.2.4 will do the same for the CHI tier. Sec-
tion 5.2.5 will adopt an explicitly pragmatic perspective and show which speech act 
types are tied to which pretend constructions. 
 
5.2.1 Pretend Morphological Constructions in the TC 
As Table 5.6 and Fig. 5.7 show, the use of pretend as a verb (v|pretend) is by far 
the most frequent in the CHI tier, followed by the progressive form (part|pretend-
PRESP). For the MOT data, the progressive morphological construction pretending 
(part|pretend-PRESP) dominates, followed by pretend used as a non-progressive 
verb (v|pretend).  
 
TYPE TO-
KENS: 
MOT 
EXAMPLE TO-
KENS: 
CHI 
EXAMPLE 
Total 508  296  
part|pretend-
PRESP 
313 
(61.6%) 
You’re pretending 
to drive, aren’t 
you? (2-00-23.cha) 
50 
(17%) 
just pretending 
there’s a fire (03-
02-06.cha) 
v|pretend 164 
(32.3%) 
are you going to 
pretend someone’s 
ringing up? (2-03-
17.cha) 
234 
(79%) 
(pre)tend this is the 
oven (03-04-
02.cha) 
adj|pretend 20 
(3.9%) 
they’re two pretend 
Smarties, aren’t 
they? (2-04-
08.cha) 
11 
(3.7%) 
they’re pretend 
sandwiches (4-00-
07.cha) 
v|pretend-
PAST 
7 (1.4%) you pretended to 
blow out the candle 
and then you went 
hooray (2-05-
20.cha) 
1 
(0.3%) 
I just pretended I 
was one of those 
xxx . [+ PI]47 (4-03-
00.cha) 
Table 5.6a: Frequency of pretend morphological constructions in the Thomas corpus (cf. Pleyer 
2017b: 180-181) 
 
47 xxx stands for unintelligible speech and [+PI] indicates a partially intelligible utterance. 
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TYPE TO-
KENS: 
MOT 
EXAMPLE TO-
KENS: 
CHI 
EXAMPLE 
part|pretend-
PASTP 
2 (0.4%) you could have pre-
tended you were 
making some nice 
curry or some bis-
cuits (4-09-06.cha) 
0   
v|pretend-3S 2 (0.4%) play that game 
where Daddy pre-
tends he’s a gate 
(3-01-03.cha) 
0  
Table 5.6b: Frequency of pretend morphological constructions in the Thomas corpus (cf. Pleyer 
2017b: 180-181) 
 
  
Figure 5.7: %mor pretend tokens in the TC  
Fig. 5.8 below displays the relative frequencies of these two datasets, which brings 
out the differences in distribution more clearly (cf. Pleyer 2017b). 
From a Cognitive-Linguistic and constructionist point of view, different 
morphological constructions also differ in terms of the construals and pragmatic 
functions they are associated with. Regarding pretend morphological constructions, 
the part|pretend-PRESP progressive construction pretending is a good example, 
which is why I will analyse this construction in more detail in the next two sections. 
First, I will deal with its occurrence in terms of construal (5.2.1.1) and then look at 
its distribution in different utterance types (5.2.1.2). 
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Figure 5.8: Relative distribution of %mor pretend types in the TC for MOT and CHI (cf. Pleyer 
2017b: 181) 
 
5.2.1.1 The Progressive Construction and Pretend: Construal 
As we can see from these data, the most frequent morphological construction used 
in the MOT CDS in the Thomas corpus is the part|pretend-PRESP progressive form. 
In terms of construal mechanisms, this can give us information on the use of view-
ing frames in MOT utterances. In 62% of cases, Thomas’ mother uses a restricted 
viewing frame that focusses on the dynamic, processual nature of an event or action. 
That is, this viewing frame presents an internal, involved viewpoint of a situation 
(Radden & Dirven 2007: 176-179). This is consistent with the findings discussed 
earlier by Ibbotson et al. (2014) that caregivers often tend to narrate “their children’s 
actions as they perform them, in the here-and-now” (Ibbotson et al. 2014: 708; see 
also Section 5.2.5). Ibbotson et al. (2014) also found this feature in the Thomas 
corpus along with a significant use of the progressive aspect in CDS. This also holds 
for pretend utterances as in, e.g., you sit behind Daddy pretending to steer the wheel 
(2-01-11.cha) or you’re pretending to blow out the candles (2-03-24.cha). The re-
stricted viewing frame expressed by part|pretend-PRESP constructions is not only 
used for this narrative commenting function, however. We also find cases where 
Thomas’ mother uses this involved, internal viewing frame in order to negotiate or 
clarify a shared perspective on a pretend play situation. This happens most often 
with questions (e.g., are you pretending to throw a bin bag? 2-03-23.cha; are you 
61.6%
17%
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79%
3,9%
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M O T
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pretending you’re a boy and I’m a girl? 2-10-05.cha) or tag questions (e.g., so 
you’re pretending to read a letter, aren’t you? 3-00-10.cha; oh you’re pretending 
to be a ginger cat, are you? 2-07-15.cha).  
 
5.2.1.2 The Progressive Constructions and Pretend: Utterance Types 
Analysing the frequency of declarative utterances, interrogative utterances, and tag 
questions in the MOT tier, we find the following distribution: 44.4% of utterances 
are declarative utterances, whereas 55.6% are questions (33.6% questions, 22% tag 
questions; see Fig. 5.9). To a significant degree, then, mother-child interactions re-
garding pretend play involve the negotiation and clarification of a shared perspec-
tive on the situation by the mother.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Relative frequency of declarative utterances (Others), questions, and question tags of 
part|pretend-PRESP utterances in the MOT tier of the TC 
Questions are one particular area where the TC MOT data differ quite strongly from 
the TC CHI data. But there are also distinguishing features of the TC CHI data. For 
instance, as seen in Fig. 5.8, child utterances exhibit a much higher degree of v|pre-
tend constructions (79%) than MOT utterances (32%). From a construal point of 
view, we can interpret this result as follows: Thomas’ mother mostly expresses a 
dynamic, internal perspective on a pretend play situation, using a restricted viewing 
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frame. Thomas, on the other hand, often evokes conceptualisations of pretend play 
situations and actions with a maximal viewing frame that puts the whole situation 
or action into focus.  
In order to examine the internal structure of v|pretend utterances, instances 
were manually coded for the following categories, question: question tag, declara-
tive, and imperative. The codings took into account contextual cues in the ongoing 
interactional exchange (cf. Cameron-Faulkner 2014: 43-44). Of the 234 v|pretend 
TC CHI utterances in the corpus, most (160 or 68%) are imperative constructions 
with the constructional pattern just pretend (e.g., just pretend you’ve got no dustbin 
3-06-02.cha; Mummy, just pretend that’s my cup of tea 3-07-02.cha). Overall, then, 
we can conclude that Thomas’ mother mostly uses the restricted viewing frame 
construal operation and questions and question tags to negotiate pretend play situ-
ations. Thomas, on the other hand, most often employs a maximal viewing frame 
and often uses the just pretend imperative construction to instruct and negotiate 
pretend play (cf. Pleyer & Lindner 2014: 249; Pleyer 2017b: 180-184). 
In the next section, we will take a look at the distribution of pretend mor-
phological constructions in the MC data. 
 
5.2.2 Pretend Morphological Constructions in the MC data 
Comparing the TC and MC data shows some interesting differences. Table 5.7 and 
Fig. 5.10 give an overview of the data. 
The absolute frequencies of tokens, of course, differ quite strongly when we com-
pare morphological constructions in the MC MOT and MC CHI data, respectively. 
What is interesting is that when we consider the relative distribution of morpholog-
ical constructions, the results are much more homogenous and similar to each other 
than in the case of the TC MOT and TC CHI data (see Fig. 5.11). 
In both MC CHI and MC MOT, the part|pretend-PRESP is the third most 
frequent construction (12%). In the MOT tier, the v|pretend-construction is most 
frequent (45%), followed closely by the adj|pretend-construction (43%). In the CHI 
tier, it is the other way around. The adj|pretend-construction is the most frequent 
one (48%), followed by the v|pretend construction (40%). This also means that 
judging by the frequencies of morphological pretend constructions alone, there 
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seem not to be significant differences in conceptualisations of viewing frames be-
tween children and mothers in the MC.  
 
TYPE TO-
KENS: 
MOT 
EXAMPLE TO-
KENS: 
CHI 
EXAMPLE 
Total 490  94  
part|pretend-
PRESP 
58 Are you pretend-
ing to be a 
fire+engine then? 
(aran08b.cha)48 
11 I pretending to eat 
him (aran27b.cha) 
v|pretend 219 pretend this is the 
car (anne02b.cha) 
38 me pretend be a 
workman 
(nic32a.cha) 
adj|pretend 209 you want a pre-
tend bath 
(nic10b.cha) 
45 a pretend castle 
(ruth34b.cha) 
v|pretend-
PAST 
3 I pretended to eat 
my biscuit 
(becky28.cha) 
0  
v|pretend-3S 1 well he pretends 
that he’s good at 
juggling, doesn’t 
he? (John33a.cha) 
0  
Table 5.7: Frequency of pretend morphological constructions in the Manchester corpus 
However, this picture changes slightly when we look at the distribution of 
questions and question tags in the MC MOT data (Fig. 5.12). Although the fre-
quency of part|pretend-PRESP is lower in the MC MOT tier than in the TC MOT 
tier, it is still interesting to examine the frequency of different utterance types in 
MC MOT utterances. Out of the 58 part|pretend-PRESP utterances, 41.4% are de-
clarative utterances, and 58.6% are questions (43.1% questions, 15.5% question 
tags). As can be seen, in terms category frequency, the MC MOT data and TC MOT 
have the same ordering. However, the MC MOT data have a higher frequency of 
questions and a lower frequency of question tags compared to the TC MOT data. 
 
48 In the CHAT format, compounds such as fire engine or birdhouse are sometimes written as 
fire+engine or bird+house because this helped earlier versions of the morphological tagging pro-
gramme MOR to identify compound nouns (MacWhinney 2019a: 49). 
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Figure 5.10: %mor pretend tokens in the MC 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5.11: Comparison of the relative distribution of %mor pretend types in the MC for MOT and 
CHI 
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of the relative frequency of declarative utterances (Others), questions, and 
question tags of part|pretend-PRESP utterances in the MOT tier of the MC 
To investigate the differences between the two corpora, we will now compare the 
MC and TC data in more detail, first for the MOT tier (5.2.3) and then for the CHI 
tier (5.2.4). 
 
5.2.3 Comparing MC and TC Data for the MOT Tier 
As Fig. 5.13 below shows, although the relative frequencies of questions and ques-
tion tags are somewhat different in the MC and the TC, the overall ratio of declar-
ative utterances to interrogative utterances in the MOT tiers is very similar in both 
corpora (MC MOT: 41.4% to 58.6%; TC MOT: 44.4% to 55.6%). 
This means that just like in the TC, mothers in the MC often use the con-
strual operation of expressing a restricted viewing frame in combination with 
question and question tags that serve to clarify and negotiate pretend play situations, 
but they seem to do so to a different degree. As an illustration, here is an example 
from the MC for a progressive form evoking a restricted viewing frame to clarify a 
shared perspective on a situation.  
 
(4) CHI:  I crying . 
MOT:  are you crying ? 
MOT:  oh there_there . 
MOT:  oh . 
MOT:  are you pretending ? 
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MOT:  are you pretending ? 
CHI:  no . 
MOT:  no ? 
MOT:  are you really crying ? 
MOT:  why ? 
MOT:  are you sad ? 
MOT:  are you sad ? 
CHI:  yeah . 
MOT:  why ? 
MOT:  what's happened ? 
MOT:  what happened to make you sad ? 
CHI:  xxx . 
MOT:  &eh ? 
MOT:  you [/] you’re kidding me, aren't you ? 
MOT:  you’re tricking . 
MOT:  are you tricking ? 
(Joel09a.cha)49 
In this case here, Joel’s mother tries to establish if the situation currently unfolding 
is, in fact, a pretend situation. As noted in Section 3.2.4, it is often not exactly clear 
what children are pretending, and sometimes, it is not even clear if they are pre-
tending at all. Such interpretative perspective statements by caregivers – interpret-
ing not only what is being pretended, but commenting on whether pretend is taking 
place at all – therefore occur relatively frequently. In addition to example (4) above, 
for instance, there are 11 other references in the MC and TC (TC: 10, MC: 1) to 
pretending to cry where part of the MOT perspective statement is trying to clarify 
if the crying is ‘real’ or ‘pretend.’ However, as can be seen, this pattern is much 
more pronounced for the TC MOT data, which, as noted in Section 5.2.1.1, also 
have a much higher frequency of questions with the progressive form pretending 
(See also Section 5.2.3.2 below). In general, as we will see below, questions and 
question tags do indeed make up for a significant amount of MOT pretend utter-
ances, both in the TC and the MC. But, as we can see, there are also differences in 
how pretend activity is being talked about. 
 
 
49 Unintelligible words and utterances are coded as xxx; the symbol & indicates phonological frag-
ments and fillers such as &eh and &um; (MacWhinney 2019a: 46-47). The symbol [/] indicates 
repetitions (MacWhinney 2019a: 74-75). 
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5.2.3.1 Comparing Different Age Spans in the TC MOT and MC MOT Data 
for the part|pretend-PRESP Construction 
One source of the differences could, of course, be the fact that the MC covers the 
age range of 2-3 whereas the TC covers a wider age range, namely 2-4;11. To see 
if the differences between MC and TC are due to this factor, we can split the data 
for the TC into the age range 2-3 and 3-4;11, respectively. Splitting the TC MOT 
data in these two age ranges, we get the distribution in Fig. 5.13 below. 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Relative distribution of part|pretend-PRESP utterance types for MOT in the MC, the 
TC and the TC for the age spans 3-4,11 and 2-3 
As can be seen in Fig. 5.13, the TC MOT 2-3 data are most similar to the MC MOT 
data. They show less similarity to the TC MOT 3-4;11 data. In the TC MOT 2-3 
data, 60% of part|pretend-PRESP data are questions (37% questions, 23% question 
tags), and 40% are declarative utterances, compared to 57% questions (41% ques-
tions, 16% question tags) and 43% declarative utterances in the MC MOT data. 
What this shows is that across the corpora, mothers seem to use more questions and 
question tags in the negotiation of pretend play situations in the age range from 2-
3 than Thomas’ mother does in the later age range. In the 2-3 age range, then, moth-
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ers seem to exhibit a higher degree of linguistic scaffolding of pretend play situa-
tions. In the TC MOT 3-4;11 age range, we find a lower relative frequency of ques-
tions (49% with 29% questions and 20% question tags). This can be seen in the 
context of Vygotsky’s (e.g., 1978: 84-91) concept of the zone of proximal develop-
ment (cf. Sections 3.1.3 to 3.1.5). In line with this, we can state that the emerging 
cognitive and interactional capacity for pretend play in this age range is supported 
by mothers asking questions and using question tags to enable a shared perspective 
and intersubjectively classify a situation as pretend. 
This change is not only apparent when we look at relative frequency, but 
also at overall frequency. In the TC MOT 2-3 dataset, there is a total of 192 part|pre-
tend-PRESP utterances. In the TC MOT 3-4;11 dataset, on the other hand, there are 
only 121 instances, although the age range is almost twice as long as in the 2-3 set. 
What we have to keep in mind here, however, is that overall the 2-3 age range has 
a much denser sampling range than the 3-4;11 set. The TC 2-3 subcorpus consists 
of 234 transcripts, whereas the TC 3-4;11 subcorpus consists of only 145 tran-
scripts, and this might explain the lower overall frequency of part|pretend-PRESP.50 
For the TC CHI data, however, this is not really the case, as Thomas utters 251,808 
tokens in the TC CHI 2-3 timeframe, and 255,692 tokens in the TC 3-4;11 
timeframe. For the TC 2-3 data, this amounts to an average ratio of 1,076.1 tokens 
per transcript. For the TC 3-4;11 data, on the other hand, the average token/tran-
script ratio is 1,777.5 This is correlated with and likely due to an increase in utter-
ance length. In the TC 2-3 data, the average MLU is 2.2, but in the TC CHI 3-4;11 
data Thomas on average produces much longer utterances, with an average MLU 
of 3.4. As Thomas does not use pretend tokens before age 3, these data, of course, 
do not impact the distribution of pretend utterances. The situation is different for 
MOT utterances. In the TC MOT 2-3 timeframe, Thomas’ mother utters 1,070,149 
tokens. This amounts to a token/transcript ratio of 4,573. In this timeframe, the av-
erage MLU of Thomas’ mother is 6.34. In the TC MOT 3-4;11 timeframe, Thomas’ 
mother utters 730,133 tokens, amounting to a token/transcript ratio of 5,035.4. The 
average MLU in this timeframe for the MOT tier is 6.39, which means that the TC 
 
50 For the TC MOT 2-3 data, there are only 232 transcripts, as there are two transcripts in which 
Thomas is talking to an investigator (INV). 
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MOT utterance length stays relatively constant. Given these data, it is indeed 
possible that the lower number of part|pretend-PRESP utterances in the TC MOT 
3-4;11 data is due to the fact that the TC MOT 2-3 subcorpus has a denser sampling 
rate. However, Thomas’ on average utters more tokens per transcript in the TC CHI 
3,-4;11 dataset, which is likely due to Thomas himself becoming a more active 
contributor to their interactions, taking longer turns and using longer utterances. In 
addition, the average token frequency of Thomas’ mother also rises in the TC MOT 
3-4;11 data, indicating that Thomas and his mother in fact have longer 
conversations than when Thomas is younger, although his mother’s MLU does not 
seem to change much. 
Still, the results regarding relative frequency at different age ranges are quite 
interesting. This holds especially if we take into account that in the CHI tier of the 
TC, the first pretend utterance does not appear before 3;00;25 (I pretend this be 
one; 3-00-25.cha). It makes sense, therefore, that since Thomas himself is not lin-
guistically negotiating pretend play situations before age 3, we have a higher fre-
quency of questions and question tags for clarifying and establishing pretend play 
situations in the TC MOT 2-3 dataset.  
 
5.2.3.2 Comparing Other Pretend Construction Types in the TC MOT and MC 
MOT Data 
So far, we have only discussed the relative frequency of questions vs. declarative 
utterances in the part|pretend-PRESP dataset. But what about the overall relative 
frequency of questions in pretend utterances? To answer this question, let us com-
pare the frequency of questions in the part|pretend-PRESP data vs. other types of 
pretend morphological constructions (Fig. 5.14).  
In the TC MOT data without part|pretend-PRESP, 33.5% of utterances are 
questions (questions: 22.7%; question tags 10.8%) and 66.5% of utterances are de-
clarative utterances. This means that the relative frequency of questions in the 
part|pretend-PRESP data is much higher than in the rest of the data (58.6% for TC 
MOT part|pretend-PRESP vs. 33.5% for TC MOT pretend without -ing.).  
In the MC MOT data, the difference to the part|pretend-PRESP utterances 
is even more pronounced. Here, the non-part|pretend-PRESP data show a relative 
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distribution of 22% questions (14% questions, 12% question tags) and 78% declar-
ative utterances. The part|pretend-PRESP MC MOT data therefore have a much 
higher relative frequency of questions than the rest of the data (55.6% for MC MOT 
part|pretend-PRESP vs. 22% for MC MOT pretend without -ing). Of course, inter-
rogative constructions not using the progressive construction are still used in the 
MC MOT data, and with 22% they do still play an important role in how mothers 
negotiate pretend play situations. Overall, however, the data for TC MOT and MC 
MOT lend further support to the argument that questions and question tags in com-
bination with a progressive, internal, restricted viewing frame serve as a key con-
structional pattern to establish and negotiate a perspective on a pretend play situa-
tion as it is happening at the moment.  
 
 
Figure 5.14: relative frequency of pretend morphological constructions (v|pretend, adj|pretend, 
v|pretend-PAST, v|pretend-3S) without part|pretend-PRESP for TC MOT and MC MOT 
In the MC MOT data, the difference to the part|pretend-PRESP utterances 
is even more pronounced. Here, the non-part|pretend-PRESP data show a relative 
distribution of 22% questions (14% questions, 12% question tags) and 78% declar-
ative utterances. The part|pretend-PRESP MC MOT data therefore have a much 
higher relative frequency of questions than the rest of the data (55.6% for MC MOT 
part|pretend-PRESP vs. 22% for MC MOT pretend without -ing). Of course, inter-
rogative constructions not using the progressive construction are still used in the 
MC MOT data, and with 22% they do still play an important role in how mothers 
negotiate pretend play situations. Overall, however, the data for TC MOT and MC 
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MOT lend further support to the argument that questions and question tags in com-
bination with a progressive, internal, restricted viewing frame serve as a key con-
structional pattern to establish and negotiate a perspective on a pretend play situa-
tion as it is happening at the moment.  
Are there any other frequent constructional patterns we can find in the data 
that are part of the constructional repertoire used by mothers to establish a pretend 
play perspective on a situation? If we analyse the constructions that occur fre-
quently in the MC MOT dataset, we find that there are a one-word constructional 
pattern and a two-word constructional pattern that occur even more often than in-
terrogative constructions: pretend and just pretend. Overall, these two constructions 
make up for 36.3% of the utterances in the non-progressive-pretend data (just pre-
tend: 18.8%, pretend: 17.5%; see Fig. 5.15). In comparison, 42% of the MC MOT 
data are other types of constructions, that is, multiword declarative constructions 
featuring the lexical item pretend, such as let’s pretend NP BE NP (e.g. let’s pretend 
the goat’s a rabbit then, Aran24b.cha) and it’s only pretend (gail01b.cha) 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Constructional patterns in the MC MOT dataset for pretend forms without part|pretend 
A significant amount of MOT utterances in the MC are therefore imperative con-
structions initiating and instructing pretend play. This is in line with the observa-
tions and argument made in Section 5.2.3.1 that mothers play an essential role in 
scaffolding pretend play situations.  
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Interestingly, we do not find a similar pattern in the TC MOT data. Here, 
just pretend as a two-word utterance only occurs in the context of commenting on 
Thomas’ language use: 
 
(5) MOT:  well do you know what I think your favorite saying is ?  
CHI:  no .  
MOT:  <just pretend> [/] <just pretend> [/] just pretend .  
MOT:  just pretend . 
 (4-04-05.cha) 
 
Other multi-word constructions with pretend occur more frequently, but nowhere 
as frequently as pretend and just pretend do in the MC MOT data: let’s pretend [X] 
(5 times), shall we pretend [X] (12 times). 
 
5.2.4 Comparing MC and TC Data for the CHI Tier 
To what degree are the respective TC MOT and MC MOT data similar to the data 
in the CHI tier? In the TC MOT data, we do not find a single occurrence of the 
single-word utterance pretend. As mentioned in the previous section, the two-word 
utterance just pretend only occurs when commenting on Thomas’ language use. For 
Thomas, on the other hand, more than half of his non-progressive pretend utter-
ances include the constructional pattern just pretend (134 instances or 54.5%).  
In the MC CHI data, there are no instances of questions and only one in-
stance of a question tag (&um must pretend, don’t we? nic34a.cha). In the TC CHI 
data, there are 6 (2%) instances of questions and 5 (2%) instances of question tags. 
Overall, though, although they occur more often in the TC CHI data than the MC 
CHI data, interrogative constructions still only make up for 4% of Thomas’ utter-
ances. Moreover, the first question tag only appears at age 3;04.02 (you (pre)tend 
that’s money, can’t you? 3-04-02.cha) and the first question at age 4;00.07 (can I 
pretend to tread on it? 4-00-07.cha). This is a very stark contrast to the high fre-
quency of interrogative statements found in the MOT tiers. This difference in dis-
course strategies becomes especially apparent given that in other contexts questions 
are relatively frequent in child language, with every single child in both datasets 
already using questions in their very first recordings at the beginning of their third 
year of life. Of course, it takes longer for children to acquire more complex question 
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constructions (Dąbrowska & Lieven 2005; Dąbrowska et al. 2009). Nevertheless, 
the fact that even simple question constructions with pretend are very infrequent 
points to different discourse strategies when it comes to talking about pretend play 
situations.  
Regarding different discourse strategies, it can also be insightful to explore 
the different utterance types in children’s utterances in more detail. That is, after 
we have looked at the frequency of questions and frequently occurring construc-
tional patterns like pretend and just pretend, what other utterance types, or more 
precisely, which speech act types can we find in the corpus data?  
 
5.2.5 Speech Act Types and Pretend Constructions 
To investigate the relationship between pretend constructions and speech act types, 
the CHI data have been annotated for the following structural types of speech acts: 
Declaratives – which serve as a comment on or explanation of an ongoing pretend 
play situation –, imperatives – which serve as instructions to initiate, assume or 
perform specific pretend play acts or situations –, questions, question tags, and rep-
etitions.  
 
 
Figure 5.16: Relative frequency of speech act types in the MC CHI and TC CHI data 
As has been established, questions and question tags only play a minor role or no 
role at all in children’s pretend utterances. But if we look at the other categories, 
we find that the MC CHI and TC CHI data are very different from each other (Fig. 
5.16). That is, Thomas and the MC children seem to use very different speech acts 
and discourse strategies in pretend play situations. In the TC CHI data, the most 
frequent speech acts are imperative speech acts (74.8%), followed by declarative 
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speech acts as the second most frequent category with 18.7%. In the MC data, on 
the other hand, we hardly find any imperative speech acts (3.6%, only 3 in total), 
with by far the most frequent speech act type being declarative speech acts (66.3%). 
This coincides with the high frequency of the constructions pretend and just pre-
tend, which are most often used declaratively to comment on or explain an ongoing 
pretend play situation that the child is performing in. The second most frequent 
category in the MC CHI data are repetitions (REP). This means that in 28.9% of 
non-progressive pretend utterances the children in this corpus directly repeat their 
mother’s utterance, as in (6), where Anne is pretending to eat strawberries, and (7), 
where Becky pretends to eat a sandwich: 
 
(6) MOT:  please don’t put them in your mouth , Anne . 
CHI:  strawberry xxx . 
MOT:  yeah . 
MOT:  pretend . 
MOT:  just pretend . 
MOT:  pretend . 
MOT:  that's it . 
CHI:  pretend . 
MOT:  pretend . 
CHI:  pretend , Mummy . 
CHI:  pretend , Mummy . 
(Anne03b.cha) 
 
(7) CHI:  alright . 
CHI:  I bite it . 
MOT:  just pretend . 
CHI:  just pretend . 
(Becky12b.cha) 
 
What this shows is that Thomas has a much more interactive, cooperative and di-
rective role in establishing and coordinating pretend play. He has a much higher 
rate of imperative speech acts instructing his mother on what to do and pretend in a 
pretend situation and coordinating a shared perspective on the developing pretence. 
Children in the MC, on the other hand, are much more often explaining their be-
haviour or commenting on it and expect their mothers to enter into their pretence or 
perform it on their own.  
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We have already established the importance of questions and question tags 
in child-directed-speech. As illustrated in Fig. 5.17 below, in the TC and MC MOT 
data (excluding the progressive form pretending) we also find that questions and 
question tags form a significant part in both corpora with 35.5% in the TC MOT 
data (24.7% questions and 10.8% question tags) and 25% in the MC MOT data 
(12.3% questions and 12.7% question tags). 
 
Figure 5.17: Relative frequency of speech act types in the MC MOT and TC MOT data (D = declar-
ative, I = imperative, Q = question, QT = question tags, REP = repetition) 
As already stated, questions play a more significant role in the TC MOT data than 
in the MC MOT data. In the TC MOT data, declarative utterances are most frequent 
with 48.5%. This fits with the pattern established above regarding the high fre-
quency of part|pretend-PRESP constructions. So generally, both in terms of the fre-
quency of part|pretend-PRESP and declarative speech acts, we find many instances 
of clarifying and commenting on pretend play situations in the TC MOT data. Im-
peratives are least frequent with 16%. That is, Thomas’ mother uses fewer instruc-
tions and directions to initiate and coordinate pretend play. This fits well with the 
much higher frequency of imperative speech acts in the TC CHI data, indicating 
that Thomas takes a much more active role in the coordination and initiation of 
pretend play. It is also in line with the higher frequency of questions in the TC MOT 
data.  
In the MC MOT data, declarative and imperative speech acts are roughly 
similar in their relative frequency (declarative: 33.1%, imperative: 32.2%). This 
shows that here we can find a relative balance of commenting on pretend play on 
the one hand and initiating and coordinating pretend play on the other. One category 
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that only appears in the MC MOT data are repetitions of previous utterances, with 
a relative frequency of 9.7%. Repetitions can be seen as another way of clarifying 
utterances and securing understanding, together with declarative utterances.  
Overall, we can see that discourse strategies for mothers and children in the 
TC and MC are complementary. In the TC CHI speech act data, we have a very 
high degree of imperatives. In comparison, in the TC MOT speech act data there is 
a high frequency of declaratives and questions that serve to clarify Thomas’ imper-
atives. In the MC MOT speech act data, we have both a high degree of questions 
and imperatives, whereas in the MC CHI data, we have a high degree of declarative 
utterances and repetitions. This is probably due to the high frequency of pretend 
and just pretend in the dataset. In addition, we also have to keep in mind that 
part|pretend-PRESP plays a much more critical role in the TC MOT data, which is 
why in this dataset there are only 195 non-progressive occurrences of pretend. In 
the MC MOT data, on the other hand, there are 432 non-progressive occurrences of 
pretend. We can therefore say that the progressive plays a much weaker role as a 
discourse strategy between mothers and children in the MC than it does in the TC. 
 
5.3 First Occurrences of Pretend 
One of the reasons for the patterns described above could be the difference in age 
in the samples as well as the syntactic complexity and utterance length in both cor-
pora. Whereas the MC stops at age 3, Thomas does not start using the word pretend 
before age 3 at all. If we compare the MLU of Thomas and the children in the MC, 
we find that there are both similarities and significant variation in when they start 
using pretend, as shown in Fig. 5.18 below. 
For most children (5: Anne, Aran, Becky, Liz, Nic), their first use of pretend 
occurs somewhere between MLUs 1.317 and 1.72. However, there are three chil-
dren (Gail, John, Ruth) who only start using it later, between MLUs 2.176 and 
2.538, and two children who start using pretend even later at MLU 3.053 (Joel) and 
MLU 3.311 (Thomas). We can therefore see some general patterns when children 
start using pretend, but these are only slight tendencies with significant variations.  
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Figure 5.18: Mean length of utterance (MLU) at first occurrence of pretend for children Thomas and 
in the MC  
Looking at Thomas’ use of pretend in terms of morphological complexity, 
his first use of the word pretend is in the Early IV stage of linguistic development, 
with an MLU of 3.31. Thomas’ subsequent pretend utterances in the next 23 months 
from 3 years onwards are in the range of III (MLU 2.50-2.99), Early IV (3.00-3.49), 
Late IV/Early IV (3.50-3.99), and Late V (4.00-4.49) to Post V (MLU 4.5+). As we 
have seen, the relationship between MLU and the occurrence of pretend utterances 
looks entirely different for the children in the MC. This becomes evident, for ex-
ample, when comparing MLU at the first and last occurrence for children in the 
MC. An overview of MLU, stage of development and age at first occurrence as well 
as last occurrence can be found in Table 5.8 below. 
As we can see, most children in the MC start to use the word pretend at the 
stages Early I (two: Aran, Becky), Late I (three: Anne, Liz, Nic) and II (two: Gail, 
John). The average MLU for the first occurrence of pretend in the MC is 1.97, 
which is at the end stage of linguistic stage Late I and close to Stage II (with Joel 
and Ruth being outliers somewhat; without these two the average MLU would be 
1.73). As discussed, this is much earlier than the first occurrence of pretend in the 
TC CHI dataset (Early IV, 3.31). The stage of linguistic development at the first 
occurrence of pretend for the different children in the MC and TC is shown in Fig. 
5.19. 
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Table 5.8: Number of occurrences (NoO), mean length of utterance at first occurrence of pretend 
(MLU/FO), stage of linguistic development at first occurrence of pretend (SLD/FO), age at first 
occurrence of pretend (Age/FO) as well as the corresponding data for the last occurrence of pretend 
in the dataset 
 
 
Figure 5.19: Stage of linguistic development at the first occurrence of pretend for Thomas and the 
MC CHI data  
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Child NoO MLU/ 
FO 
SLD/ 
FO 
Age/ 
FO 
MLU/ 
 LO 
SLD/ 
LO 
Age/ 
LO 
Anne 8 1.69 Late I 1;11.04 2.795 III 2;5.25 
Aran 8 1.317 Early I 1;11.12 3.231 Early IV 2;10.21 
Becky 20 1.419 Early I 2;1.30 3.119 Early IV 2;11.15 
Gail 4 2.176 II 2;0.25 3.1 Early IV 2;3.17 
Joel 2 3.053 Early IV 2;8.23 3.319 Early IV 2;10.11 
John 1 2.249 II 2;5.27 2.249 II 2;5.27 
Liz 7 1.72 Late I 2;0.07 2.335 II 2;7.17 
Nic 16 1.549 Late I 2;4.00 3.044 Early IV 3;0.10 
Ruth 17 2.538 III 2;8.21 3.173 Early IV 2;11.21 
Thomas 246 3.311 Early IV 3;0.25 4.15 Late V 4;11.20 
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5.3.1 Comparing First Occurrences of Pretend in the CHI and MOT data 
Is there any relationship between when pretend is first used by children and when 
their mothers use it? To answer this question, let us compare the age at first occur-
rence for all children in the MC and TC and their mothers. If we go by age at first 
occurrence, we get the distribution in Fig. 5.20. As we can see, for many children, 
their first occurrence of pretend closely follows that of their mothers, sometimes 
even within only a few days (Anne, Aran) or a month (Becky, Gail, Liz). For some 
pairs, the delay is some months longer (John, Nic), and in the cases of Joel and 
Ruth, they only start using pretend about 8 months later. Thomas even uses pretend 
about a year after his mother’s first use. In three cases, the children do not use the 
term at all, although their mothers use it from very early on (Domin, Carl, Warren). 
As seen in the discussion of the CDI and Wordbank data in Section 3.3.2, only 
about half of all children use pretend around 30 months of age, and in the British 
Wordbank, at 35 months of age, this result has not changed very much (cf. Frank et 
al. 2017). The TC and MC data are consistent with this finding. Another interesting 
observation is that all mothers use pretend roughly around the same time (with the 
exception of Domin and Carl). However, this does not necessarily imply a devel-
opmental sequence. Instead, it is important to note at what age these corpora 
actually begin. When we compare age of first occurrence of pretend and age of first 
recording, we find that for most mothers (apart from Domin, Carl) and some of the 
children (Anne, Aran, Becky, Gail and Liz), the very first occurrence of pretend 
coincides with or follows very closely the time of the first transcript. This means 
that it is possible, and perhaps even likely, that many mothers commented on their 
children’s pretend play behaviour using the word pretend prior to the time span of 
the corpus. The same goes for the children in the corpora, so that it is possible that 
the children who use pretend close to the beginning of the corpus recording have 
already been using this form earlier. As discussed above, it is of course also possible 
that the children have used pretend at a time they simply were not being recorded. 
As pretend play generally starts around 18 months of age (Weisberg 2015; see also 
Section 3.1.2), it is indeed possible that the first instances of pretend both by moth-
ers and children took place before the time the corpora start. 
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Figure 5.20: Age at first occurrence of pretend for the CHI tiers and the MOT tiers in the MC and TC data and age at the time of the first corpus recording
1;10.21 1;11.12
2;1.30
2;0.25
2;8.23
2;5.27
2;0.07
2;4.
2;8.21
3;0.25
1;11.04 1;11.12
2;0.14
1;11.27
2;0.26
1;11.15 1;11.09
2;1.01
1;11.15
2;0.12
2;4.04
2;2.22
1;10.15
A N N E A R A N B E C K Y G A I L J O E L J O H N L I Z N I C R U T H T H O M A S D O M I N C A R L W A R R E N
AGE AT FIRST OCCURENCE OF PRETEND 
CHI VS. MOT
CHI: Age at first occurence MOT: Age at first occurence
189 
 
5.3.2 First Occurrences of Pretend in Other Corpus Data 
Concerning maternal behaviour in pretend play situations, we do find the use of 
pretend in other corpora that start at an earlier age. Indeed, the CDI and Wordbank 
data discussed in Section 3.3.2 show that there are children who use pretend before 
age 2. In the Forrester corpus (Howe 1981) we can also find an example of a mother 
coordinating a pretend play situation with her 1;7-year-old son Kevin using the lex-
ical item pretend. In this section of the transcript, mother and child are engaged in 
a play session involving a teddy bear and a tea set. They are pretending to pour tea 
and coffee for the teddy when Kevin utters the name of a person. This leads to his 
mother following up on his utterance first with a question involving pretend (shall 
we pretend Joanna’s here?), and later on, a clarifying statement using pretend (pre-
tend Joanna’s there). In this way, Kevin’s mother construes a new target and state 
of affairs – and with it, affordances for new pretend actions with the overall pretend 
frame of drinking tea. 
 
(8)  CHI:  Joanna . 
MOT:  is that for Joanna ? 
MOT:  she’s not here is she ? 
MOT:  shall we pretend Joanna’s here ? 
MOT:  give it to Joanna here . 
MOT:  there’s Joanna . 
MOT:  pretend Joanna’s there . 
CHI:  0 . 
%act:  looks at pretend Joanna 
MOT:  Joanna’s gone to Nanny’s (.) hasn’t she ? 
%act:  <bef> passes tea to pretend Joanna 
%par:  <dur> laughs 
CHI:  coffee . 
%act:  <bef> passes cup to mother 
MOT:  coffee for me (.) thank_you . 
(Kevin1.cha; Howe 1981)51 
 
As outlined above, pretend also occurs frequently in the other English-language 
corpora. In the following I will give an overview of some of the data of first occur-
rences of pretend in a selection of other CHILDES corpora (see Table 5.9 and Fig. 
 
51 “0” indicates an action without speech; “(.)” indicates a pause; “%act” represents the action tier; 
“%par” represents the paralinguistic tier indicating behaviours such as laughing and crying; <bef> 
indicates an occurrence before; <dur> indicates an occurrence during an action. 
190 
 
5.21). What has to be kept in mind, however, is that most of these corpora are less 
densely sampled than the MC and the TC. However, these examples can still give 
us an indication of when the first instances of pretend can be found in the various 
corpora and represent further evidence that many children in corpora use pretend 
from quite early on. This can be seen in Table 5.9. 
 
Corpus Age 
Range 
N Child  Age/FO 
Bates corpus  
(Bates et al. 1988) 
1;8-2;4 27 Nan 2;4. 
Bates corpus 
(Bates et al. 1988) 
1;8-2;4 27 Olivia 
 
2;4. 
Bates corpus  
(Bates et al. 1988) 
1;8-2;4 27 Ruth 2;4. 
Bloom70 corpus  
(Bloom et al. 1974, 
1975) 
1;9-3;2 
 
3 Peter 2;05.22 
Braunwald corpus 
(Braunwald 1978) 
1;0-6;0, 1 Laura 2;00.11 
Brown corpus  
(Brown 1973) 
1;6-5;1 2 Eve 2;02.00 
Brown corpus  
(Brown 1973) 
1;6-5;1 2 Adam 2;05.12 
Clark corpus  
(Clark 1978) 
2;2-3;2 1 Shem 2;07.18 
Lara corpus  
(Rowland & Fletcher 
2006) 
1;9-3;0 1 Lara 2;01.11 
McCune corpus  
(McCune 1995) 
1;0-3;0 9 Alice 1;10.00 
Nelson corpus  
(Nelson 1989) 
1;9-3;0 1 Emily 2;00.13. 
 
MacWhinney corpus 
(MacWhinney 1991) 
0;7-8;0 2 Mark 3;00.02 
MacWhinney corpus 
(MacWhinney 1991) 
0;7-8;0 2 Ross 3;04.03 
Table 5.9: Corpus, age range, number of children (N), name of the child using pretend, and age of 
child at first occurrence of pretend (Age/FO) in selected ECD corpora 
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There are, of course, also other corpora where pretend occurs at a later date, 
suggesting that the later first instance of pretend in the Thomas corpus is not an 
unusual outlier. For example, in the MacWhinney corpus (age range, 0;7 to 8;0, 
MacWhinney 1991), a corpus of two brothers in natural situations, Mark’s first doc-
umented usage of pretend is 3;00.02 and that of his older brother Ross at age 
3;04.03. As discussed above, for most children in the MC the first use of pretend 
occurs earlier than in these other corpora. Whereas the average MLU at first occur-
rence in the MC was 1.97, in the selected ECD corpora it is 3.61. But, as also dis-
cussed above, the higher MLUs at first occurrence of pretend in the corpora dis-
cussed in this section are also likely influenced by sampling density. MLU at first 
occurrence of pretend is represented in Fig. 5.21. 
 
 
Figure 5.21: Mean length of utterance (MLU) at first occurrence of pretend for selected children in 
the ECD: the McCune corpus (Alice), the Braunwald corpus (Laura), the Nelson corpus (Emily), 
the Lara corpus (Lara), the Brown corpus (Adam, Eve), the Clark corpus (Shem), the MacWhinney 
corpus (Mark, Ross), and the Bates corpus (Nan, Olivia, Ruth) 
When we look at Brown’s stages of linguistic development, the later occurrence of 
pretend compared to the MC is also evident. In the MC, stages Early I, Late I, and 
II were the most frequent stages where pretend is first found. In the selected ECD 
corpora, the most frequent stage where pretend first occurs is Post V (Shem, Mark, 
Ross, Emily). But after that, Late IV/Early V (Laura, Adam), Late I (Nan, Ruth), 
and II (Lara, Eve) are represented with two children each. The data are summarised 
in Fig. 5.22 below. 
3.249
3.686
4.52
2.355
3.713
2.464
6.844
4.928
5.206
1.875
2.667
1.833
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
A L I C E L A U R A E M I L Y L A R A A D A M E V E S H E M M A R K R O S S N A N O L I V I A R U T H
MLU AT FIRST OCCURRENCE
192 
 
 
 
Figure 5.22: Stage of linguistic development at the first occurrence of pretend for selected children 
in the ECD: the McCune corpus (Alice), the Braunwald corpus (Laura), the Nelson corpus (Emily), 
the Lara corpus (Lara), the Brown corpus (Adam, Eve), the Clark corpus (Shem), the MacWhinney 
corpus (Mark, Ross), and the Bates corpus (Nan, Olivia, Ruth) 
 
5.4. Development of Pretend Frequency 
So far, we have investigated the overall distribution as well as at the first occur-
rences of pretend in the corpus data. This section will present a first brief look at 
the distribution of pretend by age. The question if there are any specific develop-
mental patterns when it comes to the usage of pretend will be investigated in more 
detail in Chapters 6 and 7. For a first overall impression, the distribution of pretend 
frequencies can be found in Fig. 5.23.  
The key question that is discussed in this section is whether the changes in 
the distribution of pretend frequencies that we see in Fig. 5.23 are related to other 
measures that might predict this distribution. Essentially, the question that is ad-
dressed here is if pretend shows its own independent developmental trajectory. This 
question is important because it is possible that the trajectory we observe is simply 
due to other factors, such as corpus size (5.4.1) or overall lexical development 
(5.4.2). We will discuss each of these possibilities in turn. 
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Figure 5.23: Overall distribution of pretend frequencies by age for the CHI data
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5.4.1 Pretend Frequency vs. Corpus Size 
To investigate this question further, we have to go beyond measuring the absolute 
frequency of pretend in isolation. For example, it might be possible that the varia-
tions in absolute frequency are simply due to the fact that there are more corpus 
transcripts, and therefore more tokens in general, for a given time span or stage of 
linguistic complexity. If that were the case, changes in the frequency of pretend 
could not be seen as being due to linguistic or cognitive development. Instead, any 
observed changes simply would be a matter of variation in corpus size/availability. 
If this was the reason for the pattern we see, we would expect the frequency of 
pretend to correspond very closely to corpus size, either measured in number of 
transcripts or token frequency. So, for example, if the pretend frequency at a certain 
stage is higher than for other stages, we would expect that the corpus size for this 
stage is also bigger than for other stages. If, on the other hand, there is no strong 
relationship between the number of transcripts and pretend frequency, a bigger cor-
pus size for a given interval would not necessarily correlate with a higher number 
of pretend tokens.  
According to Pearson’s product moment correlation test, there is only a neg-
ligible negative correlation between pretend frequency and number of transcripts, 
and the results are not statistically significant (r = -0.40; p = 0.17). So the number 
of transcripts available does not predict the frequency of pretend. This, therefore, 
points to a different explanation for the changes in pretend frequency. We get sim-
ilar results for the data divided by Brown’s stages as for the data divided by age. 
According to Pearson’s test, there is a negligible negative correlation between the 
two values and the result is not statistically significant (r = -0.048, p = 0.91). In 
terms of token frequency, there is only a negligible negative correlation between 
token frequency and frequency of pretend divided by age, which is not statistically 
significant (r = -0.38; p = 0.26).  
The same holds for the relationship between token frequency and frequency 
of pretend sorted by Brown’s stages, which is also a negative negligible one and 
not statistically significant (r = 0.25; p = 0.54). This result is not surprising as num-
ber of transcripts and token frequency are strongly correlated, both when we look 
at its development by age and by Brown’s stages. Pearson’s test shows that for the 
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data sorted by age there is a very high positive correlation that is statistically highly 
significant (r = 0.96; p = 0.000000031). MLU and token frequency also have a very 
high positive relationship that is statistically highly significant (r = 0.93; p = 
0.00095). This means that both when considering age and Brown’s stages, there are 
more tokens the more transcripts there are. Overall, then, pretend seems to follow 
its own trajectory regardless of the number of transcripts or token frequency.  
Two candidates for the developmental pattern we see are linguistic and cog-
nitive development. To investigate the influence of these factors, we can perform 
Pearson’s product moment correlation to see if there is a relationship between the 
development of the frequency of pretend with increasing MLU and age, respec-
tively. If we compare the development of relative frequency of pretend with the 
increase in MLU according to Brown’s stages in the CHI data, we find that there is 
a high positive correlation between the two values and the result is statistically sig-
nificant (r = 0.86; p = 0.006). This means that as MLU rises, the relative frequency 
of pretend also rises. If we apply Pearson’s test to the data sorted by age, we find a 
moderate positive relationship between the values that is also statistically signifi-
cant (r = 0.64; p = 0.017). So as children grow older, the relative frequency of 
pretend increases, but the pattern is less pronounced for age as it is for development 
in terms of Brown’s stages. However, it has to be kept in mind that this difference 
is very likely due to the fact that the development in terms of Brown’s stages is a 
much more coarse-grained measure. This means that more data are aggregated for 
a given stage of measurement, which masks some of the underlying variation in the 
data. This in turn results in a more monotonous distribution and a stronger 
correlation.  
Interestingly, for the MOT data the relationship between corpus size and 
pretend frequency looks quite different. In terms of absolute frequencies, for the 
MOT data, we find that the more transcripts there are, the more instances of pretend 
there are. Pearson’s test shows that there is a high positive correlation between the 
two values that is highly statistically significant both when we look at the relation-
ship in terms of age (r = 0.89; p = 0.000045) as well as Brown’s stages (r = 0.99; p 
= 0.0000056). This is quite the opposite from the CHI data, where no such correla-
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tion is apparent. The same holds for the relationship of token frequencies and pre-
tend, which for the MOT data are highly correlated with pretend frequencies both 
sorted by MLU (r = 0.98; p = 0.000013) and age (r = 0.92; p = 0.0000099); in both 
cases the results are highly statistically significant. So the more tokens there are, 
the more instances of pretend we find in the MOT data. This implies that the fre-
quency with which mothers use the lexical item pretend is fairly consistent across 
the age range covered by the corpus data. Indeed, for the MOT data, both pretend 
frequency and token frequency stay relatively constant across age. This is consistent 
with the result of Gilkerson et al.’s (2017) study of children between 2 to 48 months 
of age, in which they found that whereas the frequency of child vocalisations in-
creased with age, the number of words adults produced when interacting with their 
children was independent of age after early infancy. Overall, then, pretend does not 
seem to have a special developmental status in the MOT data in terms of absolute 
frequencies, whereas it seems to do so for the CHI data.  
Regarding relative frequencies, as in the CHI data, for the MOT data sorted 
by age, there is no relationship between changes in average frequency for all tokens 
and the relative frequency of pretend. However, if we divide the data by Brown’s 
stages of development, Pearson’s test shows a high negative correlation between 
relative frequency of pretend and MLU. The results are statistically significant (r = 
-0.72; p = 0.043). This means that as children’s utterances become more linguisti-
cally complex, mothers tend to use pretend less often relative to other lexical items. 
This result is interesting if we see it in the context of children becoming more active 
linguistic negotiators of pretend situations as their language skills grow (see also 
Sections 2.2.3 and 3.3). 
 
5.4.2 Development of Pretend vs. Development of Other Lexical Items 
But how does the development of the relative frequency of pretend compare to the 
development of other lexical items? To illustrate this, Fig. 5.24 shows the develop-
ment of the relative frequency of lexical items that have a similar overall distribu-
tion as pretend. Represented here are words with an overall frequency of 200 to 500 
(frequency of pretend in the TC+MC CHI data: 393) and their distribution across 
Brown’s stages. 
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Figure 5.24: Comparison of the development of the relative frequency of pretend compared to the 
development of lexical items with a similar overall frequency sorted by Brown’s stages of develop-
ment 
What is interesting here is that most other lexical items with a similar overall fre-
quency start out with a higher frequency than pretend, but pretend shows a signifi-
cant increase at later stages. This can also be shown statistically. As we have already 
seen, Pearson’s test showed that the development of pretend across Brown’s stages 
has a statistically significant high positive correlation with MLU. Here, we perform 
Kendall’s rank correlation tau to investigate whether the lexical item pretend also 
shows an increase along the stages. The difference here between Pearson’s and 
Kendall’s test is that in Pearson’s test, we compared the correlation between relative 
frequency and ordinal MLU stages. In Kendall’s test, we compare the development 
of relative frequency with a nominal value, namely, Brown’s stages of linguistic 
development. Kendall’s rank correlation tau shows that there is a statistically sig-
nificant unidirectional increase in relative frequency (t = 0.71; p = 0.014). The rel-
ative frequency of pretend therefore increases with linguistic development.  
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Figure 5.25: Comparison of the development of the relative frequency of pretend compared to the 
development of lexical items with a similar overall frequency sorted by age 
Fig. 5.25 displays the distribution sorted by age. Here we also see that pretend starts 
out with a much lower frequency than many other lexical items but then increases, 
especially when it comes to the TC CHI dataset starting at age 3. Kendall’s rank 
correlation tau shows a statistically highly significant unidirectional increase, 
meaning that the relative frequency of pretend rises with age (t = 0.74; p = 
0.000077).  
 
5.4.3 Overall Results 
In conclusion, we can state that the frequency of pretend indeed increases as 
children grow older and as they become more sophisticated language users. This is 
an interesting observation regarding the role of pretend play in both cognitive de-
velopment and language acquisition, and it is in line with the research on pretend 
play described in Chapter 3. For mothers, on the other hand, the use of pretend stays 
relatively constant, and the only pattern we observe is that with growing linguistic 
complexity of children’s utterances, the relative frequency of mothers’ pretend ut-
terances decreases, which we can interpret in terms of children becoming more ac-
tive contributors in pretend play situations. 
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5.5 Summary 
Overall, in this chapter we have seen that the lexical item pretend plays a more 
important role in the interactions of young children and their mothers than it does 
in other types of discourse. We have also seen that there are both similarities as well 
as differences in the frequency of pretend, both in terms of its surface forms as well 
as in terms of its morphological constructions.  
In terms of distributions of different pretend categories, Thomas’ mother 
proved to be somewhat of an outlier, with the TC CHI, MC CHI and MC MOT data 
being much more similar to each other. Specifically, the TC MOT data feature a 
much higher frequency of progressive pretend constructions, which was linked to 
the following two functions: On the one hand, Thomas’ mother uses pretending for 
narrative commenting on pretend activities, and on the other she adopts a restricted 
viewing frame to clarify and negotiate perspectives on an ongoing pretend activity. 
This view is also supported by the high frequency of questions and question tags in 
TC MOT utterances. Thomas, on the other hand, more frequently uses a maximal 
viewing frame as well as imperative speech acts and imperative constructions such 
as just pretend to instruct and negotiate pretend activities.  
Whereas questions are an important discourse strategy for the negotiation of 
pretend activities for both MC MOT and TC MOT, we found that mothers in the 
MC data also use a significant amount of declarative and imperative constructions 
to coordinate and scaffold pretend activities. This in turn corresponds to a lower 
degree of imperatives in the MC CHI data, who more often explain or comment on 
their behaviour as compared to Thomas, who takes a more active role in negotia-
tions of pretend play behaviours once he starts using the lexical item pretend. This 
is also evident in the fact that Thomas’ mother uses less questions in the 3-5 age 
range, the age range in which Thomas starts developing a more active role in di-
recting and negotiating pretence behaviour. However, questions in general play a 
very limited role in the CHI data overall, showing that this discourse strategy is 
rarely used as a scaffolding mechanism in pretend activities. 
Regarding the developmental progression of using the lexical item pretend 
it was shown that there are some small trends as to when children start using the 
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lexical item, but also significant variation. Interestingly, there was no clear relation-
ship between children’s first documented use of pretend and their mothers’ first 
documented use of it. In addition, in contrast to children’s usages, mothers fairly 
consistently used pretend from very early on. Mothers’ frequency of using pretend 
was also quite consistent across age ranges, whereas in children the frequency of 
pretend rose both with age and the linguistic complexity of their utterances. So for 
the CHI data, there is a clear increase in the frequency of pretend as they grow 
older. One pattern that could be observed was that the relative frequency of pretend 
in MOT utterances decreased as the relative frequency in CHI utterances increased 
along with the linguistic complexity of children’s utterances. One interpretation of 
this relationship is that mothers use less linguistic scaffolding strategies of pretence 
scenarios as their children grow older and become more active directors and nego-
tiators of pretend play. 
After investigating the general frequencies and development of the lexical 
item pretend, I will now return to the question if the targets of what is pretended 
also change during development. To do so, the changes in relative frequencies of 
pretend targets will be investigated. In the next chapter, I will therefore turn to the 
analysis of the targets of pretend utterances. 
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6. Analysis of Targets of Pretend Utterances 
After examining the distribution of pretend word forms, morphological construc-
tions, and speech act types, the next section will present a semantic analysis of pre-
tend in the corpora. Specifically, this analysis will deal with the targets of pretend 
utterances, or put more simply, with the question of what kinds of entities, events 
and situations children and their caregivers evoke and refer to when pretending.  
The chapter is divided into four main sections. In Section 6.1 and its sub-
sections, I will present the distribution of pretend targets in the CHI dataset. In Sec-
tion 6.2, I will turn to the MOT dataset. Section 6.3 will then analyse the absolute 
and relative frequencies of pretend targets for both the CHI and MOT data and 
compare them. Section 6.4, on the other hand, will offer a qualitative analysis of 
the targets of children’s pretend utterances. First, however, I will turn to the meth-
odology of this chapter’s analysis. 
As stated in Section 5.1, in total, 1,392 utterances with a lexical form of 
pretend were found. Out of these, 76 utterances were eliminated from the analysis. 
On the one hand, these were utterances that were coded as incomplete or incompre-
hensible. It is standard practice when coding utterances that only complete utter-
ances be coded “for which the meaning is fairly clear” (Blume & Lust 2017: 188). 
Also eliminated from the analysis were direct repetitions of a previous utterance or 
retracings. Retracings, marked in the CHAT format by the symbol [//], indicate that 
a speaker starts to say something but then stops and changes the syntax of the utter-
ance, while maintaining the same idea (MacWhinney 2019a: 74), as in (1). 
 
(1) MOT:   <we could pretend this> [//] is this the horse’s field today? 
(john23b.cha) 
 
This left 1,316 pretend utterances to be analysed. This means that for analysis, in 
the TC, there were 741 pretend utterances, and in the MC, there were 575. In the 
TC, 265 pretend utterances belonged to the CHI tier, and 476 belonged to the MOT 
tier. In the MC, 88 pretend utterances belonged to the CHI tier, and 487 utterances 
belonged to the MOT tier. 
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The utterances were first annotated for the individual targets of a pretend 
play situation. In a second step, they were sorted into the following abstract cate-
gories that individual pretend play targets were instantiations of: pretending an ac-
tion (ACTION), pretending to be an entity, either animate or inanimate (BEING 
ENTITY), pretending the existence of an entity (ENTITY), pretending that an ob-
ject or entity has some property (PROPERTY/OBJECT PROPERTY), pretending 
to possess an object (POSSESSING OBJECT/POSSESSION), pretending that 
something is the case and that a certain state of affairs pertains (STATE OF AF-
FAIRS), making a metacomment about a pretend situation (METACOMMENT), 
explaining a pretend play situation that is ongoing (EXPLANATION), pretending 
to have an experience (EXPERIENCE), and pretending to be in or to experience a 
particular mental state (MENTAL STATE). Table 6.1 lists all pretend target cate-
gories together with an illustrative example. 
 
Pretend Targets Example 
ACTION and I 0am [*] walking down (.) just (pre)tend I’m 
walking on a street (CHI; 03-06-03.cha) 
BEING ENTITY I’m [/] I’m [//] I (pre)tending be big &uh big ele-
phant (CHI; 03-01-02.cha) 
ENTITY well let’s pretend this is a horse (MOT; john01a.cha) 
 
PROPERTY/OBJECT 
PROPERTY 
pretend the cars are broken (MOT; 3-06-04.cha) 
POSSESSING OB-
JECT/ 
POSSESSION 
are you going to pretend it’s your shoe? (MOT; 04-
05-04.cha) 
STATE OF AFFAIRS pretend you’re in a boat (MOT, nic09b.cha) 
METACOMMENT We’re doing an awful lot of just pretending aren’t 
we? (MOT; 4-10-10.cha) 
EXPLANATION just pretend. (comment that a story is not real but 
pretend; CHI; 4-11-08.cha) 
EXPERIENCE just pretend you saw (CHI; 4-01-05.cha) 
MENTAL STATE just pretend you didn’t know (CHI; 4-04-06.cha) 
Table 6.1: Pretend targets in the analysed corpora 
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In the next sections I will give a general overview of the development of 
pretend targets in the TC CHI and MC CHI by age and Brown’s stages, before 
discussing these distributions in more detail. I will first present an overview of the 
absolute and relative frequencies of pretend targets and their development in the 
CHI dataset (6.1) and then turn to the MOT dataset (6.2). Section 6.3 then compares 
the CHI and MOT datasets and their various subcorpora. 
 
6.1 Distribution of Pretend Targets in the CHI Dataset 
To get a first overview, Fig. 6.1 shows the distribution of pretend targets for all 
children in the TC and MC corpora. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Absolute frequency of pretend targets for all children in the MC and TC data by age 
What we have to keep in mind here is that this graph collapses the data for the MC 
for pretend targets (1;9 to 2;11) and the data for Thomas (3;0-4;11). In terms of 
absolute frequency, we can observe a clear pattern of increase for the MC data. 
Pretend targets are very infrequent in the 1;9 to 1;11 age range, but rise continuously 
in the 2;0-2;2 age section and the 2;3 to 2;5 section. There is a slight but not very 
significant drop in the 2;6 to 2;8 data, but it still rates higher than the 2;0-2;2 data. 
So we do see a slight developmental progression here. The frequency rises quite 
sharply in the 2;9-2;11 age span. We can, therefore, see a definite increase in the 
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absolute frequency of pretend targets especially at the end of the age range covered 
by the MC. The data for the MC CHI subcorpus alone can be found in Fig. 6.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Absolute frequency of MC CHI pretend targets sorted by age 
For Thomas, we see an increase in pretend targets from 3;0-3;2 to 3;3-3;5 and then 
a sharp increase in 3;6-3;8. But after that it drops and then fluctuates, with two 
spikes in absolute frequency in the 4;0-4;2 and the 4;9-4;11 age range. In addition, 
it is interesting to observe that by far the highest absolute frequency of pretend tar-
gets occurs in the last cross-section in the TC, 4;9-4;11.  
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, we can sort the data not only by age but also 
by measures of linguistic complexity such as mean length of utterance. In the fol-
lowing chapters, the data will be sorted into the stages of development proposed by 
Brown (1973) (cf. Section 4.3.2). The division of the data by Brown’s stages is 
displayed in Fig. 6.3 below. 
As we can see, there are only some general patterns of development in terms 
of Brown’s stages when it comes to the absolute frequency of pretend targets. Stage 
Early I has a very low level of pretend targets, which then rises sharply at Late I. 
For Stage II, the absolute frequency of pretend targets decreases slightly, and then 
rises above Stage Late I for Stage III. There is a significant increase for stage Early 
IV, and an even higher rise in absolute frequency for Late IV//Early V. But after 
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that, it fluctuates again, with the frequency in Late V being significantly lower than 
before, but still higher than Stage III. Post V is very low. So from the outset, we 
cannot clearly state that the pretend targets occur more often in later stages of lin-
guistic development.  
 
 
Figure 6.3: Absolute frequency of pretend targets for all children in the MC and TC data by Brown’s 
stages of development. 
 
6.1.1 Frequencies of Pretend Targets in the CHI Dataset 
A general overview of the development of all pretend targets in the CHI dataset can 
be found in Fig. 6.4 below. At first glance, we can see that the number of pretend 
targets becomes more diverse with age, both in the MC data but especially in the 
TC data. At the beginning of the corpus data, in the age span of 1;9-1;11 there are 
only two pretend target categories, ACTION and OBJECT. One year later, in the 
last MC CHI age range, 2;9-2;11, there are 5 different pretend targets in the dataset: 
ACTION, OBJECT, BEING ENTITY, ENTITY, and STATE OF AFFAIRS. Pear-
son’s test shows that for the MC data, there is a statistically significant very high 
positive correlation between number of different pretend targets and age (r = 0.97; 
p = 0.006; see Fig. 6.5). As with the MC data, there is also statistical evidence that 
the number of different pretend targets becomes more diverse as Thomas gets older. 
In the first age range in which Thomas starts using pretend, he uses it to refer to 4 
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different pretend target types: ACTION, BEING ENTITY, OBJECT and STATE 
OF AFFAIRS. Almost two years later, in the age range of 4;9-4;11 the number of 
pretend target types Thomas refers to has doubled to 8: ACTION, BEING ENTITY, 
EXPERIENCE, EXPLANATION, MENTAL STATE, OBJECT, OBJECT PROP-
ERTY and STATE OF AFFAIRS. Pearson’s test shows that there is a statistically 
significant high positive correlation between number of pretend targets and age (r 
= 0.87; p = 0.0051). 
 
Figure 6.4: Relative frequency of pretend targets for all children in the MC and TC data by age 
Overall, then, studying the distribution of pretend targets, we can state that the num-
ber of targets becomes more diverse with age. If we look at the TC and MC data 
together, we also get a statistically highly significant positive correlation between 
number of pretend targets and age (r = 0.86; p = 0.00019).  
So as children grow older, they talk about more different types of pretend 
targets. In addition, in the MC data, ACTION and OBJECT seem to be the most 
frequent target categories, whereas the TC data display a much higher rate of 
STATE OF AFFAIRS pretend targets.  
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Figure 6.5: Change in the number of different pretend targets by age for the MC CHI (red) and TC 
CHI (blue) 
Does this pattern change when we look at target frequencies sorted by 
Brown’s stages of development? First of all, analysing the relative frequency of 
pretend targets according to Brown’s stages of development only gives us some 
very general patterns (Fig. 6.6). 
What we can see at first glance is that, just as for the data sorted by age, with 
increasing linguistic complexity of utterances, the range of pretend targets becomes 
more diverse. In addition, whereas the relative frequency of ACTION decreases, 
references to OBJECTS seem to increase. Other target categories only have a very 
low occurrence rate so that we only have a very limited dataset. This holds for 
PROPERTY, POSSESSION and EXPLANATION (only one data point), EXPE-
RIENCE and MENTAL STATE (only two data points), and ENTITY (only three 
data points). There are, however, two categories where there seems to be an increase 
in relative frequency. First, as children’s language skills develop and their utter-
ances become more complex, they use BEING ENTITY more frequently. The pat-
tern is even more pronounced when we analyse the development of STATE OF 
AFFAIRS targets in the CHI corpus. So the higher a child’s MLU, the more STATE 
OF AFFAIRS targets she will use.  
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Figure 6.6: Frequencies of pretend targets for all children in the MC and TC data by Brown’s stages 
of linguistic development 
At first glance, the change in the number of different pretend targets seems not to 
be as clear-cut than when we look at age. Indeed, if we examine the changes in 
number and diversity in more detail, it becomes clear that there is no unidirectional 
increase, as shown in Fig. 6.7. 
 
Figure 6.7: Change in the number of different pretend targets by MLU for the CHI dataset 
What we can observe is a clear increase from Stage Early I to Stage Early IV. For 
the subsequent Brown’s stages, we observe a decrease in number of different tar-
gets, but these also represent the stages for which we have the least data. What we 
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have to keep in mind here, however, is that the MLU data conflate the MC CHI and 
the TC CHI data, and these might differ internally from each other to varying de-
grees. To investigate this possibility, let us explore the relative frequency of pretend 
targets in the MC and TC corpora as a whole.  
 
6.1.2 Comparing the Overall Distributions of Pretend Targets in the TC CHI 
and MC CHI 
Fig. 6.8 below illustrates the distribution of pretend targets in the MC CHI vs. TC 
CHI data. First of all, we see that there are differences in which pretend target cat-
egories are most frequent. In the MC, OBJECT is the most frequent pretend target 
with 42.9%, followed by ACTION with 41.7%. References to non-object ENTI-
TIES (7.1%) are the third most frequent, followed by references to BEING EN-
TITY (4.8%) and STATE OF AFFAIRS (3.6%) as the fourth and fifth most fre-
quent category.  
The distribution in the TC is quite different. There, references to a STATE 
OF AFFAIRS are most frequent (33.6%). ACTION is the second most frequent 
category, although with a much lower frequency than in the MC (26% vs. 41.7% in 
the MC). OBJECT comes third with 23.8%, and BEING ENTITY fourth with 9.4%. 
The TC pretend targets are also more diverse than the targets in the MC. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Distribution of pretend targets for the children in the MC CHI and TC CHI data 
With this in mind, it is interesting that there are some pretend targets that we do not 
find in the MC but only in the TC. Interestingly, these categories are all related to 
expressing a perspective on an entity or event. First, these are references to EXPE-
RIENCES and MENTAL STATES. These relate to expressing a perspective in the 
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cognitive domain of the psychological world (see Section 7.3). This can likely be 
seen in the context of the development of theory of mind, mentalising and perspec-
tive-taking. And indeed, we do not find references to pretending experiences in the 
TC before Age 4;0, and references to pretending mental states before age 4;3. This 
is also the age span in which most children pass theory of mind tasks and are seen 
as having developed a complex understanding of others’ perspectives (Wellman et 
al. 2001; see Section 2.3.2). Secondly, talking about OBJECT PROPERTIES and 
POSSESSING OBJECTS (although the latter only has 1 instance in the TC), as 
well as EXPLANATIONS also add a perspective on an entity or event in terms of 
its properties and attributes in the cognitive domain of the material world (cf. Rad-
den & Dirven 2007; see Section 7.2).  
These targets still occur very infrequently in the TC, making up only 1.9% 
(EXPERIENCE) and 3.4% (MENTAL STATES) of all pretend targets, respec-
tively. If we analyse the distribution from their first occurrence onwards, however, 
their relative frequency rises. If we just consider the relative distributions of pretend 
targets from age 4;0 to age 4;11, we find that the frequency is slightly higher, with 
5.3% for MENTAL STATES and 2.9% for EXPERIENCE, but they still do not 
make up for a large part of pretend targets.  
We also see that the BEING ENTITY category is generally more frequent 
in the TC than in the MC (MC: 4.8%; TC: 9.74%). As with the MENTAL STATES 
and EXPERIENCE categories, BEING ENTITY rises in frequency in the TC after 
age 4. So if we look at its distribution in the age span from 4;0 to 4;11 we find a 
relative frequency of 10.5%, compared to a frequency of 6.25% for the age span of 
3;00 to 3;11. This is interesting as it can be argued that pretending to be somebody 
or something else also requires more sophisticated theory of mind and perspective-
taking skills than other forms of pretending. To pretend to be somebody/something 
else you metaphorically have to put yourself in somebody else’s shoes and take the 
perspective of the entity that you pretend to be (see also Sections 2.3 and 6.4.2). 
Following this line of reasoning, it makes sense that, just like the frequency of 
MENTAL STATES and EXPERIENCE, the frequency of the BEING ENTITY 
pretend category increases after 4 years of age, as children’s theory of mind and 
perspective-taking capacities have become more sophisticated and complex. 
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As mentioned above, another type of category that is missing in the MC data 
are attributions of properties to objects in the context of pretend play. These cate-
gories also hardly occur at all in the TC. OBJECT PROPERTY only has two in-
stances in the TC, amounting to a relative frequency of 0.8%, and POSSESSING 
OBJECT only has one instance, amounting to a relative frequency of 0.4%. Regard-
less of this very low frequency, it is still noteworthy that they occur at all in the TC 
and not in the MC. This is especially so given that pretend play involving objects 
occurs much more often in the MC (41.7%) as compared to the TC (23.8%), with 
OBJECT being the most frequent pretend category in the MC and only the third 
most frequent category in the TC. In the context of the development of theory of 
mind and perspective-taking, this pattern is also quite interesting, as the two in-
stances of OBJECT PROPERTY occur in the age span of 4;9-4;11 and the one 
instance of POSSESSING OBJECT occurs in the age span of 4;3-4;5. This means 
that the attribution of properties to objects – or perspectives on objects – also only 
appears after the emergence of theory of mind and sophisticated perspective-taking 
capacities. In the next section, we will turn to the MOT data. 
 
6.2 Distribution of Pretend Targets in the MOT Dataset 
How do the results in the CHI tier compare to those in the MOT tier? The absolute 
frequency of pretend targets for all mothers in the MC and TC data sorted by age 
can be found in Fig. 6.9 below. 
Again, Fig. 6.9 collapses the data for the MC for pretend (1;9 to 2;11) and 
the data for the TC. Unlike in the CHI data, pretend can be found much earlier in 
the TC MOT tier, so that the TC MOT pretend data cover an age span of 2;0 to 
4;11. This also explains the drop in frequency starting with age 3;0 because the data 
from 3;0 – 4;11 only stem from the TC. As with the CHI data, we do not see a clear 
pattern regarding the overall absolute frequency of pretend data. However, in the 
age span between 1;9 to 1;11 we see a relatively low frequency of pretend, with a 
sharp rise in the age span of 2;0-2;2, just like in the CHI data. In the age span of 
2;3-2;8, we see another slight increase in frequency. It then decreases again and 
slightly increases in the time span of 2;9-2;11. Starting at 3;0-3;2 we have a lower 
frequency again, as this is the timeframe where we start to only have data for the 
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TC. In the TC+MC data we therefore first see an increase and some slight fluctua-
tion. However, this pattern does not hold up if we only examine the MC data alone, 
as can be seen in Fig. 6.10. 
 
Figure 6.9: Absolute frequency of pretend targets for all mothers in the MC and TC data by age 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Absolute frequency of pretend targets for all mothers in the MC data by age 
Therefore, this pattern of only slight fluctuations in pretend targets does not 
hold for the MC MOT data. In the TC MOT 2-3 data, there is some slight variation 
(Fig. 6.11). 
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Figure 6.11: Frequency of pretend for the TC MOT 2-3 data 
As we have seen in Fig. 6.9, the pattern does not change much after age 3;0 in that 
there are slight fluctuations but no clear progression or increase with age.  
Dividing the data by Brown’s stages of linguistic development for the MOT 
tier, the absolute frequencies can be found in Fig. 6.12.  
 
 
Figure 6.12: Absolute frequency of pretend targets for all mothers in the MC and TC data by 
Brown’s stages of development 
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To investigate the question of how the relative distribution of pretend targets 
changes in the corpus, let us have a look at the relative frequency of pretend targets 
in the MOT data. This analysis will closely follow the one done for the CHI tier in 
Section 6.1. The distributions sorted by age are displayed in Fig. 6.13. 
 
Figure 6.13: Relative frequency of pretend targets for all mothers in the MC and TC data by age 
For many of the target categories, there are no clear developmental patterns. 
However, there are categories for which we can indeed observe statistically signif-
icant changes as children grow older. For ACTION, Pearson’s test shows a moder-
ate negative correlation that is statistically significant (r = -0.64 p = 0.018). This 
means that as children grow older, mothers use relatively fewer ACTION targets. 
This fits in with the data discussed in Section 6.1, which showed that children show 
tendencies to increasingly talk about pretend objects (especially in the MC CHI 
data) and pretend state of affairs (especially in the TC CHI data) as they grow older. 
It also fits in with the argument that with age children become more active in in-
structing and negotiating more complex pretend play scenarios that go beyond sim-
ple actions. Indeed, for the MOT data, the STATE OF AFFAIRS target category 
displays a high positive correlation with age that is statistically highly significant (r 
= 0.89; p = 0.000054). As children grow older, their mothers use more and more 
STATE OF AFFAIRS targets relative to other pretend target categories, just as their 
children do. 
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We have to keep in mind here, though, that these data conflate the TC MOT 
and the MC MOT tiers. Moreover, as Thomas’ pretend trajectory is quite different 
from those in the MC data, we might expect that Thomas’ mother and the mothers 
in the MC data also differ in their use of pretend. The 3;0-4;11 data also only cover 
the TC MOT data. If we compare the data for 1;9-2;11 and 3;0-4;11, respectively, 
we find that for some pretend targets developmental patterns with age actually dif-
fer quite strongly. For example, the pattern observed for the ACTION target cate-
gory only holds if we compare the data for the whole age span covered by both 
corpora. For BEING ENTITY, if we examine the 1;9-2;11 data, mothers’ references 
to BEING ENTITY pretend events rise in relative frequency as children become 
older. For the 3;0-4;11 TC MOT-only data, on the other hand, we do not find a 
similar pattern. Because the data for the time span from 3;0-4;11 are only for 
Thomas’ mother, we of course cannot really speak of a general developmental pat-
tern. However, if we look at the MOT data in the age span from 1;9-2;11, we ob-
serve that BEING ENTITY starts to rise in relative frequency, but then stagnates in 
the 3;0-4;11 TC MOT dataset. 
Regarding the MOT data, another interesting question is to what extent the 
diversity of pretend targets changes more generally with age. The distribution can 
be found in Fig. 6.14. 
 
Figure 6.14: Change in the number of different pretend targets by age for the MOT dataset for MOT 
1;9-2;11 (red) and TC 3;0-4;11 (blue) 
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As we can see, in contrast to the CHI data, for the MOT dataset there are no signif-
icant changes in the number of different pretend targets evoked with age. Apart 
from some slight fluctuations, mothers’ number of different pretend targets stays 
quite constant and high.  
If we turn to the data sorted by Brown’s stages, we also cannot observe many 
clear-cut changes in the distribution of the data, as shown in Fig. 6.15. 
 
Figure 6.15: Relative frequency of pretend targets for all mothers in the MC and TC data by Brown’s 
stages of development  
The only category that has a statistically significant correlation to MLU is 
that of ACTION (r = -0.77, p = 0.026). To be precise, it has a high negative corre-
lation. This means that, as also observed above, with children’s utterances growing 
in complexity, mothers use less ACTION target utterances. 
When we analyse the diversity of pretend targets by MLU, we get the dis-
tribution with Brown’s stages in Fig. 6.16 below. As we can see, there is no apparent 
change in the number of pretend targets correlated with the progression of Brown’s 
stages. The only fundamental difference seems to be that for stages Early I to III 
(median = 5.25) the number of different pretend targets seems to be generally lower 
than for stages Early IV to Late V (median = 8.33). For Post V, there again are not 
enough data points because there are only two transcripts. 
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Figure 6.16: Change in the number of different pretend targets by Brown’s stages for the MOT data 
 
6.3 Comparing MOT and CHI and their Subcorpora 
In the previous sections, we have surveyed the distribution of pretend targets in the 
CHI and MOT data. This section will compare these data with each other. However, 
it is important to note that there are also differences in the distribution of pretend 
targets within a given corpus for different time spans. This is why we will also 
investigate differences in some of the subcorpora of the TC and MC data. We will 
first turn to the comparison of different age spans in the MOT data (6.3.1). After 
that, different age spans in the MOT and CHI data will be compared to each other 
(6.3.2). Section 6.3.3 will compare the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 to the MC MOT data. 
Finally, Section 6.3.4 will compare the TC CHI and the TC MOT 3-4;11 data. Spe-
cifically, this section will present an overview of differences in the overall distribu-
tion of relative frequencies of pretend targets (6.3.4.1) with special attention being 
paid to the categories of ACTION (6.3.4.2), OBJECT, (6.3.4.3) and STATE OF 
AFFAIRS (6.3.4.4). 
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6.3.1 Comparing Different Age Spans in the MOT Data 
As we have seen, the age spans of 1;9-2;11 and 3;0-4;11 can differ in their devel-
opment of the distribution of pretend targets. For this reason, it also makes sense to 
analyse the overall relative frequency of pretend targets for these two age groups, 
respectively. 
Fig. 6.17 divides the pretend target data into the two age groups to compare 
the relative frequency for the younger age group (TC MOT + MC MOT, age span 
1;9-2;11) and the older age group (only TC MOT, 3;0-4;11).  
 
 
Figure 6.17: Relative frequency of pretend targets for the MOT tier for the age spans 1;9-2;11 
(MC+TC) and 3;0-4;11 (TC only) 
Two things stand out when comparing these two samples. First of all, there are some 
significant changes in the relative frequency of pretend targets. Secondly, the TC-
only, 3;0-4;11 age span has a much more diverse and varied set of pretend targets. 
Regarding the first point, the most frequent pretend target category in the age span 
1;9-2;11 is ACTION (36.2%), followed closely by OBJECT (35%). The third most 
frequent category is BEING ENTITY (18.4%), followed by STATE OF AFFAIRS 
(7.4%) and lastly by ENTITY (3%).  
In the age span of 3;0-4;11, OBJECT (31.7%) is the most frequent category, 
followed by STATE OF AFFAIRS (23.6%), BEING ENTITY (17.8%), ACTION 
(13.9%) and lastly by METACOMMENT (6.3%). The remaining 6.7% are divided 
across the categories POSSESSION (3.4%), ENTITY (<1%), MENTAL STATE 
(<1%) and OBJECT PROPERTY (<1%).  
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There are some additional conclusions that can be drawn from these obser-
vations, apart from the observation of an overall increase in the complexity of pre-
tend play target categories. In the MOT 3;0-4;11 data, there seem to be more nego-
tiations of the elements and actors within a pretend play scene and what they stand 
for. This holds especially for negotiations about the perspectives and mental stances 
towards these pretend elements and actions. There also seem to be more instances 
of broader situational perspectives of pretend play scenes. In the MOT 1;9-2;11 
data, on the other hand, mothers still predominantly comment on pretend activities 
as a whole and the actions and key objects involved in them.  
 
6.3.2 Comparing Different Age Spans in the MOT Data and the CHI Data 
In some regards, there are clear similarities between the MOT and CHI data and the 
two age spans. However, there are also differences, as we can see in Table 6.2. 
Pretend Target MC CHI MOT 1;9-2;11 TC CHI MOT 3;0-4;11 
ACTION 41.7% (2) 35.8% (2) 25.7% (2) 13.5% (4) 
BEING ENTITY 4.8% (4) 12.8% (3) 9.3% (4) 17.9% (3) 
ENTITY 7.1% (3) 2.7% (5) <1% <1% 
EXPERIENCE   1.9% (6)  
MENTAL STATE  <1% 3.3% (5) <1% 
OBJECT 42.9% (1) 39.6% (1) 23.4% (3) 36.2% (1) 
OBJECT PROP-
ERTY 
  <1% 1.9% 
STATE OF AF-
FAIRS 
3.6% (5) 8.7% (4) 33.1% (1) 23.7% (2) 
POSSESSING OB-
JECT 
  <1% 3.4% (5) 
METACOMMENT    1.9%  
EXPLANATION   <1%  
Table 6.2: Relative frequencies and rankings of pretend targets for MC CHI, 1;9-2;11 MOT, TC 
CHI, and 3;0 – 4;11 (TC MOT only). The numbers in brackets list the rank in frequency (1-6) 
Regarding frequency rankings, we already see some differences between the cor-
pora. If we compare the MC CHI and the MOT 1;9-2;11 data, we find that OBJECT 
references both occur quite frequently. In fact, they are the most frequent category 
in both datasets, although the frequency is higher in the MC CHI data (MC CHI: 
42.9% vs. MOT 1;9-2;11: 39.6%). ACTION occurs at higher frequency in the MC 
CHI data than in the MOT 1;9-2;11 data (MC CHI: 41.7% vs. MOT 1;9-2;11: 
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35.8%). It is the second most frequent pretend target in both datasets. BEING EN-
TITY is ranked third in terms of frequency in the MOT 1;9-2;11 data with 12.8%, 
but only fourth in the MC CHI data with 4.8%. Although its overall percentage is 
not that high, ENTITY occurs much more frequently in the MC CHI data than in 
the MOT data (MC CHI: 7.1% vs. MOT 1;9-2;11: 2.7%). This makes the category 
the third and fifth most frequent targets, respectively. STATE OF AFFAIRS, on the 
other hand, has a much lower frequency in the MC CHI data than in the MOT data 
(MC CHI: 3,6% vs. MOT 1;9-2;11: 8.7%). In the MC CHI it is the fifth most often 
occurring target – or rather, the least frequent one –, and in the MOT 1;9-2;11 it is 
the fourth most frequent. 
In terms of construal, we see that the children in the MC construe OBJECTS 
as integral parts of pretend play situations more often than mothers in the MOT data 
as well as Thomas in the TC CHI data. This makes sense in the context of the dis-
cussion in Section 5.1.2, in which it was established that children start out with 
object-based pretend activities (cf. Smith 2005; Smolucha & Smolucha 1998: 45; 
Sachet & Mottweiller 2013). 
One other interesting contrast is the sharp difference in the frequency of 
BEING ENTITY in the MC CHI and MOT 1;9-2;11 data. One possibility is that 
this could relate to the internal structure of the MOT data. To test this, let us contrast 
the BEING ENTITY data for the age span of 1;9-2;11 in the MC and TC data. 
Concerning this category, we find that the number of occurrences in the MC MOT 
is 7, whereas for the TC MOT data, there are 95 instances in the age span from 1;9-
2;11. In terms of percentages, this means that for the TC MOT data, BEING EN-
TITY has a relative frequency of 27.9%, whereas it only has a relative frequency of 
4.1% in the MC MOT data. However, if we compare the MC MOT-only data to the 
MC CHI data for the category BEING ENTITY, we find that they occur roughly 
with the same frequency (MC CHI: 4.1%, MC MOT: 4.6%). This means that the 
strong difference in frequency between the MC CHI data and the MOT 1;9-2;11 
data is due to the higher frequency of BEING ENTITY in the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 
data.  
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Overall, we find that the MC CHI data are in some respects much more 
similar to the MC MOT data than the MC MOT data are to the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 
data (Fig. 6.18). 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Relative frequency of pretend targets for the TC MOT 1;9-2;11, MC MOT and MC 
CHI datasets 
As we can see, MC CHI and MC MOT are similar to each other in the frequency of 
OBJECT, BEING ENTITY, and ENTITY. However, in terms of ACTION, the MC 
children tend to use this category more often than the MC mothers, whose frequency 
of ACTION targets is much closer to that of TC MOT 1;9-2;11. The relative fre-
quency of STATE OF AFFAIRS, on the other hand, is higher in the MC MOT data 
than in the MC CHI data. 
To some degree and in some aspects, the MC dataset supports a relationship 
between child-directed speech and children’s utterances. This is not necessarily a 
surprising result, but it is still interesting to note that the frequency of some pretend 
targets seems to be discourse-driven and related to the cooperative construal of pre-
tend situations as opposed to a more general developmental time course. However, 
as noted, children in the MC do use more ACTION targets, whereas mothers in the 
MC use more STATE OF AFFAIRS targets. 
With the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data, we cannot make a similar comparison as 
there are no occurrences of pretend in the TC CHI data before age 3;00,25 (I pre-
tend this be one; 3-00-25.cha). 
 
6.3.3 Comparing TC MOT 1;9-2;11 and MC MOT Data 
This section will compare the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data with the MC MOT data. We 
have already seen that the BEING ENTITY schema occurs at a much higher fre-
quency in the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data than in the MC MOT data. This of course also 
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indicates that pretending to be something or someone plays a more prominent role 
in pretend play situations between Thomas and his mother than in pretend play sit-
uations in the MC data. In both the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 and the MC MOT data, the 
ACTION category occurs with a similar frequency (TC MOT: 35.5% vs. MC MOT: 
36%). This makes it the most frequent category for the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data, but 
only the second most frequent category in the MC MOT. The first-ranked category 
in the MC MOT is OBJECT with almost half of all pretend utterances (45.3%). 
OBJECT, in turn, is the second most frequent category in the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 
data. However, it has a a much lower overall frequency (29%) in the TC MOT 1;9-
2;11 data compared to the MC MOT data. Following closely behind, the third most 
frequent category in the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 is BEING ENTITY (27.8%), which, as 
mentioned above, comes fourth in the MC MOT data. However, with 4.6% it only 
occurs with 1/6th of the frequency of the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data. The STATE OF 
AFFAIRS category occurs at a more similar frequency in both corpora. It has a 
relative frequency of 6.9% in the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data, making it the fourth most 
frequent category, and a relative frequency of 9.8% in the MC MOT data, making 
it the third most frequent category. Finally, ENTITY occurs at a percentage below 
1% in the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data, whereas it has a relative frequency of 3.7% in 
the MC MOT data.  
As mentioned, we cannot compare the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data to Thomas’ 
utterances for the same time span. We also cannot compare the MC CHI pretend 
utterances to TC CHI data for the same time span, because Thomas only starts using 
pretend after the MC CHI sample range of 2 to 3 years. However, we can compare 
the TC CHI data and TC MOT 3;0 – 4;11 data to see if there are relationships be-
tween their linguistic construals of pretend situations and to what extent they differ.  
 
6.3.4 Comparing TC CHI and TC MOT 3-4;11 
Comparing these two datasets, two things are notable at first sight. First, we find 
that the TC CHI data have more instances of pretend than the TC MOT 3-4;11 data 
(TC CHI: 265; TC MOT: 207). This means that in the time span after he started 
using pretend, Thomas talks more about pretend play situations than his mother. 
This is in stark contrast to the MC CHI vs. MC MOT data, where there are many 
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more MOT tier utterances than CHI tier utterances (MC MOT: 434 vs. MC CHI: 
84). This pattern not only holds for the accumulated MC data, but also for each 
child-mother pair in the individual sub-corpora.  
The second observation is that the range of pretend categories for TC MOT 
3-4;11 and TC CHI is much more diverse in both datasets than in the MC MOT, the 
MC CHI and also the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data.  
As already discussed in Section 6.1.2, the TC data contain categories not 
found in the MC data which are of particular interest in the context of children’s 
developing sociocognitive and mentalising capacities. So the fact that we do not 
find these categories in the MC CHI data indicates a developmental progression 
regarding both the cognitive capacity and motivation for theory of mind. In addi-
tion, it is interesting to note that METACOMMENTS and EXPLANATIONS adopt 
a viewpoint of a situation that is outside the situation. In the framework of Cognitive 
Grammar, these METACOMMENTS and EXPLANATIONS can be said to exhibit 
a high degree of perspective-taking. This is the case because these utterances in-
volve a viewing arrangement that not only consists of what is being conceptual-
ised/pretended, but also the subject of conceptualisation. That is, utterances like 
these make the conceptualisers/pretenders part of the conceptualisation, thus adopt-
ing what Langacker (1987: 128-31) terms an objective construal of a conceptuali-
sation (cf. Pleyer & Schneider 2014: 45).  
Examples of pretend metacomments in the TC can be found in examples (2) 
to (5) below: 
 
(2)  MOT:   we’re doing an awful lot of just pretending aren’t we  
 (4-10-10.cha) 
 
(3)  CHI:   she’s pretending did you know . 
(4-10-08.cha)  
 
(4)  MOT:  well do you know what I think your favorite saying is ?  
CHI:  no .  
MOT:  <just pretend> [/] <just pretend> [/] just pretend .  
MOT:  just pretend . 
(4-04-05.cha) 
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(5)  MOT:   you’re not very good at pretending , are you ? 
(Becky06b.cha) 
 
As mentioned above, regardless of these general patterns that differentiate the TC 
data from the MC data, there are also other differences between the TC MOT 3-
4;11 and TC CHI datasets when we explore their relative distribution. 
 
6.3.4.1 Overall Distribution of Relative Frequencies of Pretend Targets for the 
TC MOT 3-4;11 and the TC CHI Data 
Fig. 6.19 gives an overview of the differences in the relative frequency of pretend 
targets. 
 
Figure 6.19: Relative frequency of pretend targets for the TC MOT 3-4;11 and the TC CHI data 
In the TC CHI data, STATE OF AFFAIRS is the most frequent category with 
33.6%. In the TC MOT 3-4;11 data, it is the second most frequent category, albeit 
at 23.7%, it occurs at a much lower rate. ACTION is the second most frequent cat-
egory in the TC CHI data with 26%. In the TC MOT 3-4;11 data, ACTION only 
occurs about half as often, with 13.5%. OBJECT is the most frequent category in 
the TC MOT 3-4;11 sample with 36.2% and only the third most frequent in the TC 
CHI sample with 23.8%. The third most frequent category in the TC MOT 3-4;11 
data is BEING ENTITY with 17.9%. In the TC CHI data, it is the fourth most fre-
quent pretend target category with 9.4%. The rate of BEING ENTITY in the TC 
MOT 3-4;11 and the TC CHI data is therefore distinctly higher than in the MC 
MOT and MC CHI data. As pretending to be someone/something else, as men-
tioned above, requires increasing perspective-taking and theory of mind capacities, 
it is to be expected that this kind of pretend play will occur later in development.  
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The other pretend targets occur at a much less frequent rate, but there are 
still some interesting observations to be made about them. EXPERIENCE, for ex-
ample, only occurs in the TC CHI data, and MENTAL STATE also has more in-
stances in the TC CHI data (TC CHI: 9; TC MOT: 2). Regarding EXPERIENCE, 4 
of 5 cases are about seeing (e.g., just pretend you saw; 04-10-05.cha; just pretend 
you didn’t see a till; 04-01-04.cha) and one is about “noticing,” i.e. becoming con-
sciously aware of something (now just pretend you notice Thomas was [running to 
a train]; 04-04-05.cha). MENTAL STATES, on the other hand, revolve around con-
ceptual situations such as wanting and remembering as well as complex mental 
states such as knowing and not knowing (now just pretend you know I was asleep; 
04-01-01.cha; just pretend you didn’t know; 04-04-06.cha). Knowing and not know-
ing as pretend targets are of special interest here. This is because children as young 
as 18 months can grasp wanting or not wanting something (Repacholi & Gopnik 
1997), but the concepts of knowing and not knowing are much more challenging 
for children as they require the attribution of complex mental states (Bartsch & 
Wellmann 1995; see Section 2.3.2).  
 
6.3.4.2 ACTION 
One specific domain where the TC MOT 3-4;11 and the TC CHI data differ quite 
strongly is that of ACTION. The ACTION data are similar to the MC data regarding 
the fact that in the MC, too, children used the ACTION pretend target category 
more often than their mothers. This fits with the general developmental pattern that 
much of early and subsequent pretend play can be seen as the extension of action 
schemas in a pretend play frame (Piaget 1962: 96; Rakoczy 2006: 114; see Section 
3.1.2). And not only does Thomas talk about pretend actions more often than his 
mother, he generally takes a more active role than her in coordinating and instruct-
ing pretend play situations that involve actions. 82.4% of his utterances with the 
pretend category ACTION are imperatives directed at his mother, e.g., Mummy, just 
pretend you say help [/] help (03-10-02.cha) or just pretend the train was waiting 
(4-11-08.cha). In this time span, there are only three instances where Thomas’ 
mother uses utterances with a direct imperative intention. In all three cases, she does 
not initiate pretend play but instead uses language to coordinate it. 
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The first two examples of Thomas’ mother using imperatives are in the con-
text of talking about an electric plug lying on the ground:  
 
(6)  CHI:  can I pretend to tread on it ?  
CHI:  pretending .  
MOT:   oh , well only pretend . 
(04-00-07.cha) 
A few lines later, we have the second imperative pretend construction in the same 
context: 
(7)  CHI:  I will pretend .  
CHI:  over here .  
CHI:  <la la la la la> [=! sings] .  
MOT:  you just pretend . 
(04-00-07.cha)52 
 
In using the construction we could pretend that (4-10-10.cha), the last example, (8), 
does not contain a direct imperative, but it serves to coordinate and negotiate a pre-
tend play situation. Here, Thomas, aged 4;10.10, and his mother decide to play the 
theater game (4-10-10.cha) where people going to a theatre have to hand in their 
tickets. It is worthwhile to discuss this exchange in its entirety, as it exemplifies 
how child and mother negotiate and coordinate a pretend play situation in this con-
text. Thomas is cutting up toy tickets with scissors, and he and his mother are talk-
ing about what game they want to play next, using the tickets. But before that, 
Thomas’ mother wants to talk about the other children in Thomas’ class, and we 
can see how they negotiate conversational goals in the form of pretend play.  
 
(8)  CHI:  <would you> [<] like to come to the Monsters_Inc show ?  
MOT:   I’d love to come to the Monsters_Inc show but I’d like to  
  know Ayisha’s surname first please .  
CHI:  don’t know .  
MOT:   what other little girls are there in your class ?  
CHI:  aw I want to play the theater game .  
MOT:   alright then well I’ll tell you what .  
CHI:  mm .  
MOT:  if we’re playing the theater game does this mean that every-
one who comes to the theater has to hand a ticket in ?  
CHI:  &um .  
CHI:  yes .  
 
52 Descriptions in the format “[=! text]” indicate paralinguistic material (MacWhinney 2019a: 71).  
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CHI:  I’ll give you a ticket .  
MOT:   what [>] ?  
CHI:  and [<] .  
CHI:  and [>] then I cut it .  
MOT:   what [<] .  
CHI:  no .  
MOT:   oh I see you [>] snip it you punch it do you ?  
CHI:  xxx [<] .  
CHI:  yeah .  
CHI:  xxx .  
MOT:  well what I was think was we could pretend that everybody 
who takes a ticket is somebody from your class and you could 
call out their names 
CHI:  yeah .  
MOT:  how about that ? 
 (04-10-10.cha)53 
In this conversational exchange, we see how Thomas’ mother offers a cooperative 
solution to both interactants’ conversational goals in that she combines Thomas’ 
goal of playing the theatre game with her own goal of talking about the other chil-
dren in Thomas’ class. She does this by construing the pretend play action in a way 
that includes aspects from both parties’ interests. After this exchange, Thomas and 
his mother then go on to coordinate the game and their respective roles in it.  
As this case shows, pretend play is one of the loci of cooperative negotiation 
and creating a joint perspective for action. However, as we have discussed above, 
when we consider the whole corpus, we find that Thomas’ mother follows his re-
quests for action and tries to interpret them much more often than instructing pre-
tend play herself. Out of the 28 TC MOT 3-4;11 ACTION utterances, more than ¼ 
(8) are questions. For the TC MOT 1;9-2;11 data, both the percentage and absolute 
frequency of questions are even higher, at 44.7% or 94 instances. And although 
Thomas himself does not use the word pretend in this time span, his mother does 
not use imperatives much more frequently (5.3% or 5 instances). As with the pre-
vious examples, these utterances can again be seen as coordinative imperatives with 
less illocutionary force than direct instructions, e.g., well I think what you’ve got_to 
do is look at these pictures and pretend it’s a jigsaw (02-08-29.cha); you could just 
pretend to bang (02-09-11.cha); well just pretend the tin’s open and pretend to take 
 
53 The markers “[>]” (overlap follows) and “[<]” (overlap precedes) indicate conversational overlap. 
For example, in (8) the preceding utterance MOT: what [>]? overlaps with the following utterance 
CHI: and [<]. 
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some out (02-10-28.cha). The results for the ACTION category therefore mirror the 
distribution of imperatives and questions in pretend speech acts in the TC in gen-
eral. Thomas himself generally uses more imperative speech acts, while his mother 
uses more questions and declarative speech acts (see Section 5.2.5). The distribu-
tion of speech act types in the ACTION category therefore support the following 
observations: In the TC, one important feature of maternal utterances regarding pre-
tend play is the scaffolding of developing pretend play situations, whereas Thomas’ 
utterances – and actions, regardless of whether they are accompanied by pretence-
related utterances or not – are more instrumental in constructing pretend play situ-
ations.  
 
6.3.4.3 OBJECT 
As seen above, the TC MOT 3;0-4;11 data exhibit a higher frequency of the OB-
JECT pretend target domain than the CHI data. The higher rate of the pretend target 
category OBJECT is likely due to the fact that there are many cases where it is not 
entirely clear what kind of object Thomas is pretending something is. In these cases, 
his mother is often either asking questions about what he is pretending or is com-
menting on Thomas’ pretence to assure and negotiate a shared perspective on an 
entity. There are many cases where Thomas is explicitly negotiating a shared per-
spective on an entity (e.g., just (pre)tend it’s honey; 3-04-01.cha; well just pretend 
these were bills; 4-04-06; I’m pretending it’s a train; 4-08-08.cha; just (pre)tend it 
was real money, 04-10-06.cha). But even if Thomas introduces a pretend object, 
sometimes explicitly using pretend as a marker, Thomas’ mother has to ensure mu-
tual understanding within a pretend play situation. This can be illustrated in exam-
ples (9) and (10): 
 
(9) CHI:  I’m eating honey .  
MOT:   pardon ?  
CHI:  I’m eating honey . [+ SR]  
MOT:   you’re eating honey ?  
CHI:  yeah .  
CHI:  (pre)tend this is honey .  
MOT:   no .  
MOT:   it’s marmalade .  
CHI:  just (pre)tend it’s honey .  
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MOT:   oh you’re pretending it’s honey ?  
MOT:   why ?  
MOT:   are you pretending you’re Winnie_the_Pooh ?  
CHI:    mhm. 
(03-04-01.cha)54 
 
(10) CHI:  &uh this box is your Smarties over there .  
CHI:  there’s one there .  
MOT:   you’re pretending that’s my Smarties, are you ?  
MOT:  the fridge magnets? 
(03-06-00.cha) 
 
Especially when Thomas engages in pretend play without explicit linguistic pre-
tence marking, this often leads to follow-up questions or comments on the nature 
of an entity in a particular pretend play situation, as in (11): 
 
(11) MOT:  this is a curly cable , isn’t it ?  
MOT:  it stretches .  
MOT:  can you see ?  
MOT:  is it like a hosepipe ?  
[…]  
MOT:  no <bring it back to me Thomas , please> [<] .  
CHI:  I’m just putting out the fire .  
CHI:  psst@o .  
CHI:  and hose are here .  
MOT: I thought you would turn it into a hosepipe because it’s a bit 
like a curly cable „ isn’t it ?  
CHI:  xxx turn it into a curly cable .[+ PI]  
CHI:  then here it is . . 
CHI:  big lectric@c plug .  
CHI:  pfft@o .  
CHI:  shall the gas go to you ?  
MOT:  are you pretending it’s a gas pipe now ?  
MOT:  come on .  
MOT: <I think you didn’t> [//] you need to stop playing with it now. 
(4-00-07.cha)55 
 
As we can see in this excerpt, Thomas uses the cable first as a hose to put out a fire, 
which he announces without a pretence-indicating verb (I’m just putting out the 
fire), but with accompanying onomatopoeia of the sound made by water coming 
 
54 The symbol [+ SR] marks self-repetition. 
55 “@o” is used to mark onomatopoeia; “[+ PI]” is used to partially intelligible utterances; “@c” 
marks a child-invented form. 
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out a hose (psst@o). He then changes the pretend function of the object. Again this 
is not marked by a pretence-indicating verb, but by onomatopoeia, this time of gas 
going through a pipe (pfft@o) and a direct question within the pretend play frame 
(shall the gas go to you?). He thus extends an action schema to a pretend context, 
with the schema then being interpreted and linguistically negotiated by his mother. 
In cases like these, where Thomas’ pretence intention regarding an object is not 
always explicitly marked, Thomas’ mother uses comments or questions like are you 
pretending it’s a gas pipe now? as devices that coordinate and establish shared per-
spectives. Generally, pretend play is often accompanied by onomatopoeia and 
sound symbolism both by children and caregivers (e.g. Farver 1992; Lillard & 
Witherington 2004; Nakamichi 2015; Creaghe et al. 2020). Thomas therefore does 
use some cues consistent with pretence activity. However, his mother still explicitly 
marks the activity as a shared pretence perspective and linguistically negotiates 
what kind of pretend activity is taking place. 
Overall, these examples illustrate one reason why there is a higher frequency 
of the OBJECT pretend target category in the TC MOT 3-4;11 data.  
 
6.3.4.4 STATE OF AFFAIRS 
STATE OF AFFAIRS is more frequent in the TC CHI data than in the TC MOT 3-
4;11 data. However, it is still the second most frequent category for the TC MOT 
3-4;11 data. Let us look at an example: 
 
(12)  MOT:  I am being a nice lady , Thomas .  
MOT: because if I give you too many strawberries and you have a 
poorly tummy you’d be crying and saying oh Mummy not a 
nice lady.  
MOT:  she gave me all those strawberries and my tummy hurts now.  
CHI:  my tummy hurts now , Mummy .  
CHI:  0 [=! makes a noise] .  
MOT:  did you enjoy your breakfast ?  
CHI: Mummy , 0i [*] 0am [*] just telling 0you [*] about lots_of 
strawberries in my tummy .  
CHI:  0 [=! makes a noise] .  
CHI:  I’m poorly .  
MOT: you’re pretending you’ve got lots_of strawberries in your 
tummy and you’re poorly now , are you ? 
(03-05-03.cha) 
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In this example, Thomas again employs an action schema based on a pretend state 
of affairs without explicitly marking it as pretend. He instead initiates the pretend 
play situation by enacting a hypothetical state of affairs introduced to the common 
ground by his mother with an if-clause (because if I give you too many strawber-
ries….). He performs a sociodramatic role-play pretend act by making noises as if 
hurting and through verbalisation (my tummy hurts now, Mummy). What is espe-
cially interesting about his verbalisation is that it makes use of the process of reso-
nance activation and interactive alignment (e.g., Pickering & Garrod 2004; Brône 
& Zima 2014; Du Bois 2014) by repeating part of his mother’s counterfactual ut-
terance. When this does not succeed he explicitly appeals to the conversationally 
introduced common ground of a counterfactual situation (Mummy , 0i [*] 0am [*] 
just telling 0you [*] about lots_of strawberries in my tummy). Here, Thomas en-
gages in metacommunication, negotiating a shared perspective on the pretend play 
event he is enacting. After this metacomment, he goes back and repeats his role-
play enactment, again through noises and verbalisation. Again, in his pretend en-
actment Thomas shows resonance activation and alignment by lexically aligning 
his utterance with his mother’s word choice in a previous utterance (MOT: …you 
have a poorly tummy…; CHI: I’m poorly). Whereas Thomas uses enactment and 
role-play to initiate the pretend play situation his mother uses a STATE OF AF-
FAIRS pretend utterance to establish and make explicit the pretend play situation 
once she has understood Thomas’ pretend action schema, connecting her utterance 
to his through resonance activation and alignment (you’re pretending you've got 
lots_of strawberries in your tummy and you’re poorly now , are you ?).  
 
6.4 Pretend Targets, Perspectivation and Cognitive Construal 
This section will analyse in more detail two pretend target domains in the corpus 
that are of special interest from the viewpoint of perspectivation, perspective-taking 
and construal. One is that of STATE OF AFFAIRS, which is closely related to as-
pects of cognitive construal. In particular, it is based on the cognitive capacity for 
conceptual blending. In Section 6.4.1, I illustrate the larger context of pretend ut-
terances with the target category STATE OF AFFAIRS within a longer stretch of 
conversation using the conceptual blending framework. For this, transcript 03-09-
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03.cha will be analysed in in more detail. In Section 6.4.2, I inspect another partic-
ularly frequent pretend target category that makes use of very complex capacities 
of perspective-taking, namely that of pretending to be someone or something else, 
a category I have termed BEING ENTITY. 
 
6.4.1 Qualitative Analysis of STATE OF AFFAIRS Pretend Situations 
In this transcript, Thomas and his mother are having breakfast, and they have con-
flicting interactional goals. Thomas wants to play whereas his mother wants him to 
eat breakfast. What examining this longer stretch of conversation does is show how 
Thomas and his mother are trying to negotiate perspectives on their interaction, one 
based on action in the real world (eating breakfast), and the other adopting a per-
spective in which eating breakfast is part of a pretend play situation (being a fire-
man). Both of them try to establish a dominant perspective on the situation and 
subsequently establish a cooperative, coordinated perspective that encompasses 
both interactants’ goals. Pretend utterances like the one in this transcript, therefore, 
have to be seen in this larger context of negotiating and establishing perspectives. 
Relatively at the beginning of the transcript, Thomas announces that he 
would like to play with his mother later. 
 
(13) CHI:  play together later .  
MOT:  you and Purdie ?  
CHI:  no .  
CHI:  me and me and you . 
[…] 
MOT:  well let’s have our breakfast first then we can play .  
CHI:  no .  
 (03-09-03.cha) 
 
Thomas then takes his toy fire engine and puts it on the table, instructing his mother 
on what she should do. In this way, he tries to initiate a play situation.  
 
(14) CHI:  and Mummy, you have_to say “oh dear, what (h)as  
happened here”? 
CHI:  haven’t you ?  
MOT:  Thomas , are you going to go and sit in your chair please ?  
CHI:  and you could hear the sounds and you think it’s 0an 
[*] ambulance.  
CHI:  nee_naw@o .  
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CHI:  nee_naw@o .  
[…] 
MOT:  well I’m going to get breakfast ready now .  
MOT:  would you like some cornflakes or Rick_Krispies ?  
CHI:  excuse me .  
CHI:  I’m too busy putting the fire out . 
(03-09-03.cha) 
 
Here, we can clearly see Thomas applying an action schema and trying to get his 
mother to coordinate and participate in the pretend play situation. He is adopting 
the role of a fireman and using sociodramatic play to establish a certain perspective 
on the situation, which he wants his mother to adopt. He also uses a gerund con-
struction in I’m too busy putting the fire out. This conceptualises Thomas as being 
engaged in a specific activity. While the cognitive functions of gerunds are highly 
complex (see, e.g. Kleinke 2002; Fonteyn 2019 for discussion), one important fea-
ture of the gerund construction used by Thomas is that it construes the entirety of 
the specific activity he is engaged in as a combination of processual and nominal-
ised aspects, which leads to a reification of the event (cf. Langacker 1991: 31ff., see 
also Kleinke 2002). Kyratzis (2009) has shown that children often use ‘perspective 
statements’ featuring progressive and gerund constructions like this in negotiations 
and conflicts over interactants’ goals. For example, one of the examples Kyratzis 
(2009: 45-48) discusses is 29-month-old Marcus, who wants to prevent other chil-
dren from taking his tools by saying It’s my tools. That’s for working. That for 
working. It’s bang, bang. In these cases, the gerund serves a generic reference func-
tion with a prototypically atemporal schematic meaning (Fonteyn 2019: 78-84). A 
similar strategy is used by Thomas here, as he portrays himself in an involved per-
spective in the nominalised, reified action, with the implication that he is therefore 
unable to align with his mother’s interactional goals. This also involves his ono-
matopoetic rendition of the sound of an ambulance (nee_naw@o). In this segment, 
Thomas’ mother keeps her focus on the real-world situation, using indirect requests 
(Thomas , are you going to go and sit in your chair please?), declarative statements 
regarding her actions using the progressive (well I’m going to get breakfast ready 
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now) and questions related to real-world action schemas (would you like some corn-
flakes or Rick_Krispies ? 56). 
Both interactants then try to establish their perspective as the dominant per-
spective to guide future action: 
 
(15) CHI:  I’m just doing [*] a game . 
MOT:  Thomas , I’ve asked you a question .  
MOT:  would you like cornflakes or Rick_Krispies ? 
CHI:  no thank you .  
MOT:  no thank you ?  
CHI:  no .  
MOT:  just a jam sandwich ?  
CHI:  yeah .  
MOT: and when your food comes you’ve got_to move the fire en-
gine .  
CHI:  okay .  
MOT:  alright ?  
(03-09-03.cha) 
 
Here, Thomas adopts a meta-perspective on the ongoing situation, classifying it as 
a game. In the terms of Cognitive Grammar, Thomas adopts a restricted viewing 
frame, using a progressive construction to stress the dynamic, ongoing nature of the 
pretend play action he is actively involved in (I’m just doing [*] a game) (cf. Cook-
Gumpertz & Kyratzis 2001; Kyratzis 2009). In addition, his metacomment on the 
situation involves the lexical item game, which serves as a meta-classification of 
the situation. He therefore tries to establish the dominant perspective of game as an 
action-guiding concept. His mother, however, stays on the real-life level and also 
addresses the situation with a metacomment regarding their ongoing interaction 
(Thomas, I’ve asked you a question) and then repeats her question (would you like 
cornflakes or Rick_Krispies ?) to achieve her conversational goals. By repeating 
her question, Thomas’ mother succeeds in getting her conversational goal across 
and Thomas steps out of the pretend play frame and answers her question (no thank 
you). Following this, they negotiate and ensure mutual understanding through back 
and forth feedback.  
 
 
56 In the recording, Thomas’ mother actually says Rice_Krispies, so this seems to be a transcription 
error. 
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(16) CHI:  and they say “oh dear , what (h)as happened here” ?  
CHI:  nee_naw@o .  
CHI:  nee_naw@o .  
CHI:  0 [=! hissing noise] .  
MOT:  is it an ambulance ?  
CHI:  it was a fire engine . 
(03-09-03.cha) 
 
Thomas then steps back into the pretend play frame and continues playing with his 
fire truck, commenting on the pretend action and again enacting it with onomato-
poeia. His mother, after successfully getting Thomas to share her real-life perspec-
tive to communicate about breakfast, now accepts Thomas’ pretend play action as 
a valid perspective. She demonstrates this through a metaquestion about objects in 
the pretend play situation. Thomas then continues to verbally elaborate on the pro-
gress of the pretend play situation and enacts it with onomatopoeia, for example, 
hissing to demonstrate fire. His mother follows up with questions for clarification. 
Through this, she helps Thomas develop the unfolding pretend play situation. 
Thomas then tries to draw his mother into the pretend play situation through direc-
tives and imperative statements directing and establishing joint attention (Mummy, 
look what’s happening …. Mum). With his attempts of drawing her into the pretend 
situation, he also metaphorically acts as a stage director, using imperative construc-
tions requesting the performance of an action schema to get his mother to participate 
in the pretence actively instead of only on a meta-level (Mummy say “don’t forget 
your hose”). After pretend playing with the fire truck first goes into a different 
direction, Thomas again reminds his mother to tell the Fireman that he forgot his 
hose. 
 
(17) MOT: I suppose he needs to know before he goes to fight the next  
fire (be)cause he can’t fight a fire without a hose , can he ?  
MOT: hopefully he (h)as got his mobile phone with him and I can 
ring him up .  
CHI:  and he did .  
MOT:  0 [=! ringing noises] .  
CHI:  hello ?  
MOT:  hello ?  
MOT:  is that Fireman_Sam ?  
CHI:  yes .  
MOT: Fireman_Sam , I’m terribly sorry but you left your hose pipe 
there and it’s just lying in the road .  
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MOT: I thought you would need to know before you had to fight 
anymore fires .  
(03-09-03.cha) 
 
Here again we see that this pretend play situation simultaneously exists in two di-
mensions, and that both interlocutors can step out of the pretend play frame to ne-
gotiate the situation on a meta-level. We see this especially on the level of pronouns. 
At first, Thomas’ mother talks about Fireman_Sam using the third person singular 
pronoun “he” (I suppose he needs to know before he goes to fight the next fire 
(be)cause he can’t fight a fire without a hose , can he ? […] hopefully he (h)as got 
his mobile phone with him and I can ring him up). 
 In this segment of the interaction, which is in a way outside of the pretend 
play frame, Thomas adopts the same metaperspective in his answer (and he did). 
Mother and child then switch back into the enactment/role-play pretend frame. 
Thomas’ mother uses onomatopoetic ringing noises and then within the pretend 
play frame calls Thomas/Fireman Sam, who answers within the BEING ENTITY 
role as Fireman Sam. This is also indicated by the switch from third person singular 
pronoun forms to the second person singular pronoun you (Fireman_Sam , I’m ter-
ribly sorry but you left your hose pipe there and it’s just lying in the road .[…] I 
thought you would need to know before you had to fight anymore fires).  
Both agree within the pretend play frame that Fireman Sam will come back 
to collect the hose. Thomas’ mother then goes back to integrate her as of yet not 
fully satisfied interactional goal into the pretend play frame. That is, she wants 
Thomas to continue eating breakfast and tries to achieve this by blending it into the 
pretend frame.  
 
(18) MOT:  are you going to come back and collect it ?  
CHI:  yeah . 
MOT: well I’ll make you a jam sandwich and you can have that 
while you’re coming . 
CHI:  right .  
(03-09-03.cha) 
Negotiations of pretend play situations are clearly very complex endeavours as both 
children and caregivers try to establish and integrate different perspectives on the 
237 
 
situation. Cognitively, these processes of dynamic meaning construal can be cap-
tured quite well by blending theory (e.g., Fauconnier & Turner 2002). This will be 
the focus of the next section. 
 
6.4.1.1 Pretend Play and Conceptual Blending 
Negotiations of pretend play situations can be described in terms of conceptual in-
tegration/conceptual blending of mental spaces (Fauconnier & Turner 2002). In 
blending theory, mental spaces are small conceptual packets. They are constructed 
dynamically, ‘online’ in interaction and cognitive processing. Each mental space 
contains a multitude of conceptual elements. Their structure derives from contex-
tual and linguistic cues made salient in interactive scenarios. In addition, they draw 
on cognitive models and frames, and other stable representations of conceptual 
knowledge stored in long-term memory (cf. Pleyer 2012a: 292-293).  
 
 
Figure 6.20: A mental space/conceptual integration network 
In blending theory, this is called the generic space. For example, the lexical 
item buy functions as a space builder that sets up a mental space involving concep-
tual roles such as BUYER, SELLER, GOODS, etc. These conceptual roles are drawn 
from the commercial event frame that is stored in long-term memory (cf. Pleyer 
2017b: 184-186). In an unfolding discourse, mental spaces are dynamically set up, 
modified, and connected to each other. Importantly, different mental spaces can be 
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conceptually integrated yielding a new, blended space that contains conceptual el-
ements from both input spaces that function as its source (Fig. 6.20).  
Blended spaces can also contain new meaning elements that arise out of the 
blend. For example, the utterance my doctor is a butcher represents a blend of two 
different mental spaces, a doctor mental space and a butcher mental space. These 
become integrated, and the blended space possesses features from both spaces, a 
doctor acting like a butcher, and a new element, namely that if a doctor acts like a 
butcher they are a bad doctor (cf. Kövecses 2010: 313-315). 
 
 
Figure 6.21: Blended space for the utterance well I’ll make you a jam sandwich and you can have 
that while you’re coming  
In the blended space created by Thomas’ mother through the utterance well 
I'll make you a jam sandwich and you can have that while you’re coming, we have 
two input spaces: the real-world mental space in which Thomas is supposed to eat 
a jam sandwich for breakfast, and the pretend play mental space in which Fireman 
Sam is going to collect the hose he forgot. Her utterance can be seen as an updating 
of previous blended spaces, in which there is one input space of Thomas acting, and 
another input space of Fireman Sam’s actions in a pretend scenario. In this blended 
space, features from both input spaces are conceptually integrated, yielding a 
blended space in which Thomas is pretending to be Fireman Sam through his ac-
tions. In the blended space for well I'll make you a jam sandwich and you can have 
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that while you're coming it is Thomas pretending to be Fireman Sam who is sup-
posed to be eating the sandwich. Fig. 6.21. represents the so-called conceptual in-
tegration network for this blend: 
As we can see in Fig. 6.21, both input spaces draw from stored frame 
knowledge and derive roles such as the REALITY frame, ACTOR/AGENT, a SITUATION 
frame, and a GOAL frame from the generic space. In input space 1, these roles are 
filled with the values of real for the REALITY frame, Thomas for the ACTOR/AGENT 
slot, breakfast for the SITUATION frame and Thomas eating sandwich as the GOAL 
frame. In input space 2, on the other hand, the REALITY frame slot is filled with the 
value pretend, the ACTOR/AGENT slot with the value Fireman Sam, the SITUATION 
frame with the value driving a firetruck, and the GOAL frame has the value getting 
a hose. In the blended space, the REALITY frame takes over the pretend value from 
input space 2. The ACTOR/AGENT slot draws from both input spaces, yielding 
Thomas being Fireman Sam. The SITUATION frame also combines values from both 
input spaces, yielding the combined situation of Thomas/Fireman Sam driving his 
fire truck to the breakfast location. Finally, the GOAL frame also draws on both input 
spaces, resulting in the combined goal of Thomas/Fireman Sam driving to get his 
hose and also eat a sandwich. As this analysis shows, conceptual integration net-
works can be dynamically set up to blend and negotiate different perspectives and 
goal-driven scenarios to yield a unified, integrated blended space representation that 
can be introduced into the discourse as an action-guiding perspective. 
As discourse unfolds, perspectives are negotiated, changed and can also be 
reintroduced. For example, as the interaction in transcript 03-09-03.cha progresses, 
Thomas/Fireman Sam arrives at his destination and retrieves his hose. However, 
his mother tells him  
 
(19)  MOT:  you raced along so quickly (.) that I haven’t made the  
sandwich yet . 
 (03-09-03.cha) 
 
Instead of waiting for the sandwich, Thomas/Fireman Sam decides to put out an-
other fire: 
 
(20) MOT:  so there is another fire somewhere „ is there ?  
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CHI:  yeah .  
[…] 
MOT: well you go and do the fire and don’t worry about the sand-
wich .  
MOT: my little boy Thomas will eat the sandwich instead, Fire-
man_Sam . 
 (03-09-03.cha) 
 
Here we see that Thomas’ and his mother’s interactional goals clash again. Within 
the pretend frame, Thomas wants to continue to have Fireman Sam put fires out, 
whereas his mother wants Fireman Sam to eat a sandwich. In order to satisfy her 
higher-order interactional goal, Thomas eating a sandwich, she introduces this goal 
into the pretend play frame: my little boy Thomas will eat the sandwich instead, 
Fireman_Sam. In terms of conceptual integration, my little boy Thomas becomes 
part of the pretend play frame. Thomas eating a sandwich was first changed into the 
blend of Fireman Sam eating a sandwich, but in order to satisfy this interactional 
goal, Thomas’ mother uses a new construal in which Thomas himself becomes part 
of the blended space. In interaction, blended spaces therefore can serve as input 
spaces to new blended spaces that reflect the unfolding discourse and the negotia-
tion of discourse goals (Ehmer 2011).  
 
6.4.1.2 Pretend Play and the Negotiation of Blended Perspectives in Interaction 
As my analysis in terms of conceptual blending has shown, Thomas and his mother 
are negotiating and trying to establish as dominant their contrasting perspectives 
using the process of conceptual blending. What is important is that this is a dynamic, 
unfolding process, which is made evident when we follow the course of the inter-
action in the transcript. As shown above, Thomas’ mother tries to introduce a blend 
that achieves her interactional goal of having Thomas eat his sandwich. However, 
the interaction takes a turn that prevents Thomas’ mother from achieving her inter-
actional goal:  
 
(21) CHI:  Mummy , 0do [*] you know where the fire is ? 
CHI:  on your sandwich .  
MOT:  is it ?  
CHI:  look .  
CHI:  oh .  
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CHI:  xxx .  
CHI:  nee_naw@o .  
CHI:  0 [=! hissing] .  
CHI:  it’s [*] got all [*] water on it .  
MOT:  oh .  
MOT:  on the sandwich ?  
CHI:  yeah .  
MOT:  oh dear .  
MOT:  that’s not very good „ is it ?  
CHI:  you (h)ad better dry it off , Mummy .  
MOT:  do you think Daddy would like a sandwich ?  
CHI:  not all wet one .  
 (03-09-03,cha) 
 
Thomas steps out of the pretend play frame here, signalled by addressing his mother 
as Mummy and asks a metalevel question about the location of the fire. The question 
here is a rhetorical question, used to coordinate and ensure joint attention toward 
the location of the fire and the establishment of a shared perspective on the situation. 
Thomas then puts the fire on the sandwich out, enacting this with the use of ono-
matopoetic hissing to symbolise the sound of the hose. He then makes another meta-
comment it’s [*] got all [*] water on it. Regarding conceptual integration, he cre-
ates a new blended space in which the sandwich is the location of a fire that has 
been put out and is therefore wet. After his mother responds, and therefore validates 
the shared perspective and the blended space introduced by Thomas, he tries to 
draw his mother back into the pretend frame and enlist her as an actor in it through 
directives: you (h)ad better dry it off, Mummy. Thomas’ mother then tries to step 
out of the pretend frame and back into the real world frame and change the topic: 
do you think Daddy would like a sandwich? However, with his reply not all wet 
one, Thomas insists on his pretend play construal of the sandwich being wet. 
Thomas’ mother still wants him to eat the sandwich, but Thomas insists on his con-
strual, in the process adopting the role of Fireman Sam again: 
 
(22) CHI:  I can’t eat that one (be)cause it’s all soggy .  
MOT:  there you are .  
CHI:  from my hose .  
MOT:  there you are .  
CHI:  ha .  
CHI:  no that isn’t .  
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CHI:  what’s this ?  
CHI:  xxx .  
CHI:  don’t want it .  
CHI:  I 0will [*] go back home .  
MOT:  okay .  
MOT:  bye bye , Fireman_Sam .  
MOT:  you go without anything .  
CHI: I 0will [*] be on the fire station (be)cause there’s lots_of 
room for me .  
(03-09-03,cha) 
 
That this is Fireman Sam speaking is indicated by Thomas’ use of pronouns: my 
hose, I 0will [*] go back home, I 0will [*] be on the fire station. Thomas’ mother 
first tries to give Thomas the sandwich (there you are), but Thomas refuses and, as 
Fireman Sam, says he will go home. This is acknowledged by his mother by saying 
goodbye to Fireman Sam: okay. bye bye, Fireman_Sam . She still comments on the 
fact that Fireman Sam does not take the sandwich with him (you go without any-
thing). But Thomas does not reply to this. And with this, the Fireman Sam pretend 
episode is over. However, Thomas’ mother still has not achieved her interactional 
goal, as Thomas first asks for other things to eat and still refuses to eat his sandwich. 
 
(23) MOT:  you asked for a jam sandwich , Thomas .  
MOT:  I’ve made it .  
CHI:  0i [*] don’t want to .  
MOT:  Thomas .  
MOT:  you were only pretending to wet it .  
MOT:  don’t be silly .  
MOT:  it’s perfectly dry . 
(03-09-03.cha) 
 
Here, Thomas insists on the pretend play perspective that the sandwich is wet. 
Thomas’ mother uses another metacomment and the verb pretend to contrast the 
pretend situation with the real situation. In terms of mental spaces, you were only 
pretending to… functions as a space builder that sets up a mental space marked as 
pretend. Wetting the sandwich is hereby explicitly relegated to a pretend mental 
space, contrasting it with the reality mental space that Thomas’ mother wants to 
establish and where the sandwich is perfectly dry. 
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Thomas finally accepts his mother’s perspective and stops trying to establish 
his pretend reading of the sandwich as wet:  
 
(24) CHI:  no .  
CHI:  I don’t want to .  
CHI:  0i [*] don’t like jam .  
 (03-09-03.cha) 
 
Here, Thomas has returned to the reality space and answers with reference to his 
own desires and wants. Eventually, Thomas settles on eating cereal so that Thomas’ 
mother’s interactional goal is satisfied. 
After Thomas eats his breakfast, he continues with pretend play, which he 
also announces as a way to end the breakfast scenario he is currently involved in: 
 
(25) MOT:  you think you would like some more cornflakes ?  
CHI:  hm ?  
CHI:  no (be)cause I 0will [*] go and see my Mummy in a minute .  
MOT:  pardon ?  
CHI:  I [*] go to see my Mummy in a minute .  
MOT:  you [*] go to see your Mummy in a minute .  
MOT:  you’re pretending you’re still in Spain ?  
CHI:  0 [=! makes noises] .  
MOT:  are you missing Mummy in Spain ?  
CHI:  I remembered I (h)ad better go .  
CHI:  hello , Mummy .  
MOT:  hello .  
MOT:  oh , Thomas .  
MOT:  did you have a nice holiday , sweetheart ? 
 (03-09-03.cha) 
 
In this segment, Thomas’ mother again uses the lexical item pretend as well as the 
pretend category STATE OF AFFAIRS. She asks a question to establish a shared 
perspective with Thomas. As these examples above show, pretend play and negoti-
ations around it to a large part seem to consist of assuring mutual understanding and 
creating and negotiating shared perspectives on pretend play through the process of 
conceptual blending.  
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6.4.2 Analysis of Targets of BEING ENTITY  
The previous section has offered a cognitive account of pretend play situations fea-
turing STATE OF AFFAIRS pretend targets. This section analyses another pretend 
target category that is of particular interest from a sociocognitive point of view, 
namely BEING ENTITY. The BEING ENTITY category is the one that is most 
clearly associated with perspective-taking skills, as it deals with children or care-
givers adopting a particular role, pretending to be somebody or something else in a 
pretend play interaction. 
First, we will examine the distribution of BEING ENTITY targets in the 
different corpora. Here we will first investigate the CHI corpora, and then the MOT 
corpora. But before that, we will survey the general categories that BEING EN-
TITY pretend play falls into.  
One fundamental distinction is whether what someone pretends to be is con-
ceptualised as having a REAL correspondence in the world or if the entity whose 
existence is pretended is FICTIONAL. This is a kind of overarching category that 
does not relate to the other analytic categories directly. Nevertheless, children’s un-
derstanding of fictionality and the development of their concept of fiction, fantasy 
and imagination is a much-researched field in cognitive development (e.g., Taylor 
2013; Sharon & Woolley 2004; Woolley & Ghossainy 2013), which is why this 
distinction is of high interest in the context of cognitive development and perspec-
tive-taking. 
Consequently, we will first look at the REAL vs. FICTIONAL category in 
the corpora, before moving on to the other categories that instances of BEING EN-
TITY can be sorted into, namely ANIMATE vs. INANIMATE and their subcate-
gories. 
 
6.4.2.1 REAL vs. FICTIONAL 
As has been noted often in the research literature (e.g., Bunce & Harris 2008), from 
the pretend occurrences alone it is often difficult to judge whether children indeed 
categorise an entity as being fictional or if they do not, in fact, make this distinction. 
For example, if a child pretends to be Santa Claus (Goldstein & Woolley 2016), 
does it make sense to see this as an instance of pretending to be a FICTIONAL 
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character? As experimental work has shown, children do in fact often believe that 
Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, and other fictional beings are real (Sharon & Woolley 
2004; Shtulman & Yoo 2015). This is especially the case when their parents pro-
mote the reality of such cultural fictional characters (Goldstein & Woolley 2016). 
For this analysis, pretend targets were coded as FICTIONAL when children pre-
tended to be someone that they likely were only acquainted with through some nar-
rative medium such as stories, books, audiovisual media or via toys. For example, 
pretending to be a fireman as a general role was coded as belonging to the category 
of REAL, whereas pretending to be Fireman Sam from the animated children’s pro-
gramme of the same name was coded as FICTIONAL. Of course, from the corpus 
data alone we cannot draw conclusions whether Thomas conceptualises characters 
such as Fireman Sam as FICTIONAL or not, so that the coding is based on adult 
conceptualisations of the categories, which is an important caveat. 
In total, there are 132 instances of REAL pretend entities and 24 instances 
of FICTIONAL entities in the corpora. For REAL, there are 25 instances in the CHI 
data (MC CHI: 3 vs. TC CHI: 22), and 107 instances in the MOT data (MC MOT: 
17 vs. TC MOT: 90). For FICTIONAL, there are 3 instances in the CHI data (MC 
CHI: 0 vs. TC CHI: 3), and 21 instances in the MOT data (MC MOT: 2 TC MOT: 
19). Overall, then, children and mothers pretend to be REAL entities much more 
often than they pretend to be FICTIONAL entities. This is also illustrated in Fig. 
6.22 below.  
As we can see, references to REAL entities outweigh references to FIC-
TIONAL entities by far. In addition, the distributions are quite similar for all cor-
pora, with the exception of the MC CHI corpus. This corpus, however, also only 
has 3 instances of BEING ENTITY in the first place. The percentages of TC CHI 
and MC MOT are quite similar (REAL = TC CHI: 88%; MC MOT: 89.47%; FIC-
TIONAL = TC CHI: 12%; MC MOT 10.71%). The relative frequency of FIC-
TIONAL BEING ENTITY instances, on the other hand, is slightly higher in the TC 
MOT data (REAL = 82.57%; FICTIONAL = 17.43%). FICTIONAL entities there-
fore clearly play a role in children’s and mothers’ pretend play behaviour, but pre-
tending about REAL entities is far more frequent.  
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Figure 6.22: Relative distribution of REAL vs. FICTIONAL pretend entities in the BEING ENTITY 
frame for CHI, TC CHI, MC CHI, MOT, TC MOT, and MC MOT 
We will now turn to the finer-grained categories that BEING ENTITY be-
haviours can be sorted into.  
 
6.4.2.2 ANIMATE vs. INANIMATE 
Whereas the distinction between FICTIONAL and REAL cuts across categories 
and can apply to all instances of BEING ENTITY, the next categories to be intro-
duced are transitive and stand in hyponymic and hyperonymic relations to each 
other. This means that whereas ANIMALS and HUMANS can be either FIC-
TIONAL or REAL, they are directly related to their hyperonymic category ANI-
MATE. This also automatically implies that they do not belong to the category of 
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INANIMATE (cf. Cruse 1986: 112-156; Cruse 2011: 127-148). Infants exhibit an 
awareness of the animate-inanimate distinction from very early on (Rakison &    
Poulin-Dubois 2001; Opfer & Gelman 2011: 219). According to Mandler (1992, 
2004), they do so by categorizing perceptual data into prototypically structured im-
age schemas such as self-motion, animate-motion, and caused-motion. These image 
schemas then serve as the conceptual primitives from which concepts such as inan-
imate, animate, and agency are built (cf. Sloutsky 2015: 493). Children’s 
knowledge of this distinction then gets richer throughout development (Opfer & 
Gelman 2011: 220-226) and as they acquire language they build up increasingly 
complex taxonomies of sense relations that employ this distinction (cf., e.g., Clark 
2018). The distinction between ANIMATE and INANIMATE is the first distinction 
that can be found in the corpora. Overall, there are 122 instances of ANIMATE 
(CHI: 23; MOT: 99) and 34 instances of INANIMATE (CHI: 5; MOT: 29). This 
shows, somewhat unsurprisingly, that children pretend to be animate entities much 
more frequently than they pretend being an inanimate entity. The distributions of 
these categories will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
6.4.2.2.1 ANIMATE: HUMAN vs. ANIMAL 
In the ANIMATE category, instances of BEING ENTITY either fall into the HU-
MAN or ANIMAL category. Just as with the category of ANIMATE, pre-linguistic 
infants already seem to be able to distinguish between humans and non-humans, 
indicating that they have abstracted a perceptually schematised sortal concept of 
HUMAN (Bonatti et al. 2002; Medin et al. 2015: 352; cf. Carey 2009: 276-277). 
Infants also begin to develop the conceptual domain of ANIMAL in their first year 
of life based on perceptually analysing and categorising the behaviours of entities 
into image schemas (Mandler 1992: 590-591; Mandler 2004: 84-89). At 9 months 
of age, they already react and behave differently towards humans and animals, re-
spectively (Ricard & Allard 1993; cf. Siegler et al. 2014: 273-278). 
In fact, words such as dog, woofwoof, kitty, cat and duck appear to be among 
children’s first spoken words (Tardif et al. 2008). During the preschool years, chil-
dren’s concept of ANIMAL becomes more complex as their folk biological 
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knowledge increases (Herrmann et al. 2010, 2012). For example, 8-month-olds al-
ready expect entities categorised as animals to have filled insides and not be hollow 
(Setoh et al. 2013). What the cognitive domains of ANIMAL and HUMAN have in 
common is that they have agency and goals and exhibit perceptual and attentional 
states (Carey 2009: 158-162; Opfer & Gelman 2011).  
However, the question how children’s concept of HUMAN is different from 
ANIMAL is less clear and has been the subject of intense debate (e.g., Carey 1985; 
Medin & Waxman 2007; Herrmann et al. 2012). English speakers seem to operate 
with two different concepts of ANIMAL, namely ANIMALinclusive and ANIMAL-
contrastive. The latter concept does not include humans, and is found in sentences like 
don’t eat like an animal (Medin et al. 2015; Leddon et al. 2012). Children mostly 
seem to operate with the concept ANIMALcontrastive. For example, both 3- and 5-
year-old children respond negatively when they are explicitly asked if humans are 
animals (Leddon et al. 2012).  
This conceptualisation seems to be dependent on culture and socialisation, 
as young children’s conceptualisations of ANIMAL seem to differ depending on 
whether they live in urban communities, rural communities, non-Western commu-
nities, and also on factors such as their experience with picture books featuring an-
thropomorphic animals (Herrmann et al. 2010; Medin et al. 2010; Waxman et al. 
2014). In the corpora, there are 80 instances of HUMAN (CHI: 15; MOT: 65) and 
41 instances of ANIMAL (CHI: 8; MOT: 33). Children therefore pretend to be a 
human being about twice as often as they pretend to be an animal. In the HUMAN 
category, there are 46 instances of PERSON/GENERAL (CHI: 11; MOT: 35) and 
34 instances of PERSON/SPECIFIC (CHI: 4; MOT: 30). This means that children 
more often adopt general roles than that they pretend being a specific individual. 
 
6.4.2.2.2 INANIMATE: OBJECT and VEHICLE 
In the INANIMATE domain, infants also learn quite early to distinguish between 
global kinds of categories such as objects and vehicles based on image schema rep-
resentations. They show evidence of distinguishing these categories from 7-9 
months on, based on image schemas such as self-propelled motion and other per-
ceptual factors (Mandler & McDonough 1993; Mandler 2004; however, see Carey 
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2009: 274-275). In the INANIMATE category, there are 19 instances of OBJECT 
(CHI: 3; MOT: 16) and 16 instances of VEHICLE (CHI: 2; MOT: 14). Children 
therefore show roughly the same frequency of pretending to be an object and pre-
tending to be a vehicle. The distinction between OBJECT and VEHICLE was made 
because of the high salience of the VEHICLE concept in the corpus, indicated by 
its relatively high frequency. Just as the other distinctions, these conceptual distinc-
tions therefore offer insights into the cognitive organisation of pretend play in terms 
of the frequently occurring conceptual targets of pretend interactions. Overall, in 
the vein of a developmental Cognitive Linguistics approach, these finer distinctions 
can help us gain more insight into the conceptual distinctions that underlie chil-
dren’s pretend play interactions. These distributions, sorted into the CHI and MOT 
tier, can be found in Fig. 6.23. 
In the next section, we will focus on the results for the individual corpora. 
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Figure 6.23: Distribution of ANIMATE and INANIMATE pretend domains and their subcategories 
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6.4.2.3 BEING ENTITY in the CHI Dataset 
For the MC CHI, as mentioned, we do not have many instances of BEING ENTITY 
(3 to be precise). They all fall in the category ANIMATE, HUMAN, and then PER-
SON/GENERAL (prince (2); workman). For the TC CHI, we have many more in-
stances of BEING ENTITY (25). 20 fall into the category of ANIMATE and 5 fall 
into the category of INANIMATE. Out of the 5 instances of the INANIMATE cat-
egory, 3 belong to the OBJECT category (machine, sewage, statue) and 2 to the 
VEHICLE category (train, truck). Out of the 20 instances of the category ANI-
MATE, 8 fall into the category of ANIMAL (elephant, butterfly, cat (3), bird (3)) 
and 12 into the category of HUMAN. In the HUMAN category, 4 were PER-
SON/SPECIFIC (Percy, Woody, Wendy, Holly) and 8 fall into the category PER-
SON/GENERAL (baby, delivery guard, mummy, guard, nice lady, post man, shop-
keeper, bee keeper). 
 
6.4.2.4 BEING ENTITY in the MOT Dataset 
The MOT data are much richer and therefore offer a much more complex view of 
children’s pretend behaviour and the way it is negotiated by mothers and children. 
In the MC MOT data, we have 13 instances of the ANIMATE category and 6 in-
stances of the INANIMATE category. In the INANIMATE category, there are 2 
instances of OBJECT (doll, play+dough) and 4 instances of VEHICLE (train, mo-
torbike (2), truck). In the ANIMATE category, there are 3 instances of ANIMAL 
(penguin, cat, dog) and 10 instances of HUMAN. Out of these 10, 4 are instances 
of PERSON/SPECIFIC (santa (2), grandma (2)) and 6 are instances of PER-
SON/GENERAL (mummy, prince (2), doctor (2), workman).  
For the TC MOT data, we have 109 instances of BEING ENTITY in total, 
86 of which belong to the ANIMATE category, and 23 of which belong to the IN-
ANIMATE category. In the INANIMATE category, there are 14 instances of OB-
JECT (noo_noo, telephone (2), firework (2), fire, gate, hosepipe, lottery machine, 
sewage, shop till, skip, cloud) and 10 instances of VEHICLE (dustbin lorry, aero-
plane (2), ambulance, digging machine, submarine, train (4)). In the ANIMATE 
category, there are 30 instances of ANIMAL (dog (2), cat (10) kangaroo,                    
Winnie_the_Pooh, butterfly (2), bee, crab, crocodile, duck, elephant (3), horse (2), 
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lion, snake, fly) and 55 instances of HUMAN. Out of these 55, 26 are instances of 
PERSON/SPECIFIC (Postman_Pat (4), Aunty_Mabel, Isabell, Aunt_Patricia, 
Dorothy, Missus_Goggins, Bob_the_Builder (2), Bella from the tweenies,                    
Fireman_Sam (2), Grandma (4), Granddad, Little Red Riding Hood, Michael the 
butcher, Holly, James’ driver, Julian the music teacher). 29 are instances of PER-
SON/GENERAL (doctor (2), dustbin_man (4), fireman (2), policeman, ambulance 
driver, baby (2), clown, boy, builder, fruit man, lorry driver, magician, passenger, 
popstar, shoe shop man, somebody, taxi driver, woodcutter, man, cab driver, per-
son shooting, tesco driver). 
Fig. 6.24 below displays the different distributions of ANIMATE vs. IN-
ANIMATE, HUMAN VS. ANIMAL; HUMAN/SPECIFIC VS. HUMAN/GEN-
ERAL and OBJECT VS. VEHICLE for TC MOT, MC MOT, and TC CHI: 
 
 
Figure 6.24: Distributions of ANIMATE vs. INANIMATE, HUMAN vs. ANIMAL, HUMAN/SPE-
CIFIC vs. HUMAN/GENERAL and OBJECT vs. VEHICLE for TC MOT, MC MOT, and TC CHI 
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In the previous sections, we have investigated the distribution of BEING 
ENTITY in the corpora as a whole, showing the conceptual distinctions underlying 
role-play scenarios in pretend play interactions. In the following section, we will 
turn to the question of development.  
 
6.4.2.5 Development of BEING ENTITY in the CHI Dataset  
Is there a developmental sequence, progression, or change in the frequency and use 
of BEING ENTITY categories? We will have a look at the development of the fre-
quency of BEING ENTITY categories by age and by Brown’s stages of develop-
ment. What we have to keep in mind here, however, is that with 156 instances of 
BEING ENTITY in total, and far less for the individual corpora, the conclusions 
we can truly draw from these data are very limited. Because of this, we will pool 
the CHI and MOT data, respectively, and discuss the TC CHI and MC CHI data on 
the one hand, and the TC MOT and MC MOT data on the other hand, together.  
 The distribution by age for the CHI data are represented in Fig. 6.25. 
 
 
Figure 6.25: Distribution of BEING ENTITY pretend targets for the CHI data by age 
With so few instances of the category, we can only explore some very general 
trends. If we consider the changes in overall frequency of BEING ENTITY by age, 
we can see that the number of instances of BEING ENTITY rises with age. The 
development of the frequency of BEING ENTITY is therefore very similar to the 
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development of pretend more generally (see Section 6.1). Regarding relative fre-
quency, there are no changes specific to BEING ENTITY, but instead, it follows 
the general pretend pattern. 
As mentioned above, most instances of BEING ENITY belong to the ANI-
MATE category so that for INANIMATE we only have 5 instances. However, it is 
interesting to observe that 4 of the 5 INANIMATE instances occur in the age span 
of 4;9-4;11, suggesting that explicit reference to pretending to be something inani-
mate might be a later development. In addition, there is some slight indication that 
there is an overall increase in the variety of types of BEING ENTITY.  
We will now turn towards relationships between Brown’s stages of devel-
opment and instances of BEING ENTITY. First of all, as we can see in Fig. 6.26, 
there are no occurrences of BEING ENTITY before Stage II. One further observa-
tion is that VEHICLE, MACHINE and OBJECT occur later than ANIMAL and 
HUMAN (VEHICLE: Stage Early IV, OBJECT: Stage Late IV/Early V, MA-
CHINE: Stage Late V). This is consistent with the CHI data sorted by age, where it 
was also found that references to INANIMATE objects appear after references to 
ANIMATE objects. Apart from them occurring at later stages in linguistic devel-
opment, we cannot make any claims about the development of the subcategories of 
INANIMATE (MACHINE, OBJECT, VEHICLE), as there are so few instances of 
them.  
 
Figure 6.26: Distribution of BEING ENTITY pretend targets for the CHI data by Brown’s stages  
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6.4.2.6 Development of BEING ENTITY in the MOT Dataset  
In this section we will turn to the distribution of BEING ENTITY for the MOT tier.  
As with the CHI dataset, I will first investigate the development of BEING ENTITY 
by age and then by Brown’s stages. 
As opposed to the CHI data, the number of instances of BEING ENTITY 
does not rise with age. In fact, for the MOT tier, BEING ENTITY behaves in the 
same way as pretend more generally. The relative and absolute frequency of BE-
ING ENTITY does indeed rise from age 1;9-3;2, but after that, both measures drop 
significantly. We can therefore observe a clear difference between the MOT 1;9-
2;11 data and the TC MOT-only 3;0-4;11 data. 
As observed above, the ANIMATE category is much more frequent than the 
INANIMATE category. If we look at the time span from 1;9-2;11 the frequency of 
ANIMATE in mothers’ child-directed utterances rises as children grow older. The 
converse does not hold for the TC MOT-only time span from 3;0 to 4;11. Again, 
however, ANIMATE does not behave differently than pretend generally does in the 
corpus.  
Summing up, regarding the development of the ANIMATE category in the 
MOT dataset, we can conclude that in the time span from 1;9 to 2;11, ANIMATE 
rises in frequency. After age 2;11, ANIMATE declines sharply, but it does so be-
cause we have fewer instances of pretend more generally.  
With INANIMATE, again there are not enough instances to draw firm con-
clusions (MOT: 30). One interesting finding here is that mothers’ references to IN-
ANIMATE BEING ENTITY occurrences seem to follow a different pattern than 
children’s references. Whereas children hardly make references to INANIMATE 
BEING ENTITY occurrences, and if so, not before age 3;6-3;8, in the MOT data 
we do find references to INANIMATE BEING ENTITY at age 2;0 and the highest 
occurrence around age 2;9-2;11.  
For the subcategories of ANIMATE, HUMAN and ANIMAL, we observe 
that while the HUMAN category stays relatively constant, the ANIMAL category 
rises in frequency as children grow older. At least it does so until age 3;2, after 
which the frequency sharply declines, which is likely due to the drop in frequency 
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of pretend more generally. As opposed to the CHI data, the variety of types of BE-
ING ENTITY does not increase with age in the MOT data. The distribution of BE-
ING ENTITY pretend targets for the MOT dataset sorted by age can be found in 
Fig. 6.27 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.27: Distribution of BEING ENTITY pretend targets for the MOT data by age. 
Let us now turn towards the relationships between instances of BEING ENTITY 
and Brown’s stages of development.  
In contrast to the CHI data, we already have some instances of BEING EN-
TITY at Stage II. The frequency of BEING ENTITY by linguistic stage peaks 
around Stage III and then drops dramatically. As with the CHI data, this pattern 
conforms to the general pattern of pretend by MLU. So, the higher the general fre-
quency of pretend, the higher the frequency of BEING ENTITY.  
As opposed to the CHI data, there is no developmental progression in when 
a BEING ENTITY category appears in mothers’ speech. VEHICLE, MACHINE, 
ANIMAL and HUMAN are all present from Stage II onwards. In fact, apart from 
Early I and Post V, where we do not have any instances of BEING ENTITY at all, 
Late V is the only stage where we cannot observe all four BEING ENTITY catego-
ries in the corpus data. The overall distribution of BEING ENTITY by MLU can 
be found in Fig. 6.28. 
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Figure 6.28: Distribution of BEING ENTITY pretend targets for the MOT data by Brown’s stages 
 
6.5 Summary  
This chapter took a cognitive-semantic view of the conceptual targets evoked and 
referred to in children’s and mothers’ pretend utterances. I first looked at the overall 
distribution of pretend targets in the CHI dataset before turning to the MOT data. 
The most significant result for the CHI data was that as children grow older, the 
number of different pretend target categories becomes more diverse, indicating that 
children’s pretend utterances become more conceptually complex. This pattern was 
not as pronounced if we looked only at children’s linguistic development, although 
here as well we could see an increase of pretend targets from very early stages to 
later stages, with the number of different target categories peaking at Brown’s stage 
Early IV.  
In addition, when comparing the MC CHI data, ranging roughly from ages 
2 to 3, and the TC CHI data, ranging roughly from ages 3 to 5, we also find that 
Thomas uses a higher number of different pretend targets than the younger children 
in the MC data. What is especially interesting here is that there are categories that 
are only used by Thomas. These include categories which are associated with per-
spective-taking abilities and perspectival statements on a situation, objects, and 
events. Moreover, the MC and TC data differ with regard to which pretend target 
categories are most frequent. The younger children seem to refer more often to more 
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narrowly defined target categories tied to their immediate environment, such as 
ACTION and OBJECT. Thomas, on the other hand, more frequently takes a broader 
perspective on pretend play, most frequently referring to STATE OF AFFAIRS. 
Thomas, it can be said, therefore exhibits more complex, holistic pretend utterances 
instead of predominantly focussing on specific aspects or actions within a pretend 
scenario. 
Interestingly, for MOT utterances the number of different pretend categories 
referred to does not significantly change with development. This holds true both for 
age and linguistic complexity. However, as in the CHI data, references to AC-
TIONS also become less frequent in the MOT data as children grow older and as 
their language becomes more complex. Both the CHI and MOT data therefore sug-
gest that the focus on specific objects and simple actions decreases as children grow 
older and gives way to more complex conceptualisations of pretend scenarios.  
I then compared different subsections of the MOT and CHI data, which 
showed a number of similarities but also differences in terms of the frequencies of 
pretend target categories. For example, it was found that when comparing MOT 
data from 2 to 3 years of age (MC MOT and TC MOT) with the TC-MOT-only data 
from 3 to 5 years, the latter data show an increase in the number of different pretend 
targets. This means that while there was no clear increase in the different number 
of pretend targets when taking a more fine-grained look at the data binned into 
three-month sections or stages of linguistic development, the results look different 
if we take a broader look at longer age sections. In addition, the TC MOT 3 to 5 
data also show that just as with the CHI pretend target categories, references to 
pretend activities involving perspective-taking and complex pretence perspectiva-
tion seem to be more frequent for the older age range.  
One other marked difference was that the MC CHI data have a higher fre-
quency of focussing on OBJECTS as focal elements of pretend scenarios, indicating 
differences in the way they perspectivise pretend play. BEING ENTITY, on the 
other hand, is a category that is more frequent in the TC MOT and TC CHI data 
than in the MC data. Overall, the distribution for MC MOT and MC CHI can be 
said to be relatively similar, whereas the TC MOT and TC CHI data showed more 
differences both from each other and from the MC data. 
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One aspect that was especially interesting was that whereas in the MOT 
data, mothers used pretend much more frequently than their children, the same does 
not hold for the TC data. Here, from the time Thomas started using pretend at age 
3, he uses the lexical item more frequently than his mother during the same time 
span. This is evidence that Thomas takes on a more active role in negotiating and 
talking about pretend scenarios as he grows older, especially compared to the data 
for the younger children in the MC CHI dataset. 
When comparing the TC CHI and TC MOT 3-5 data in more detail, key 
differences were observed in the domains of ACTION, OBJECT, and STATE OF 
AFFAIRS. Specifically, Thomas uses more pretend utterances that instruct his 
mother to perform or share in particular pretend ACTIONS, and overall takes a 
more active, instructing role than his mother does. Thomas’ mother, on the other 
hand, more often uses pretend utterances focussing on OBJECTS in order to ensure 
a shared perspective on an object in a pretend scenario. Lastly, STATE OF AF-
FAIRS is the most frequent pretend target category used by Thomas, but is also 
used relatively frequently by his mother. Thomas most often uses this pretend cat-
egory to evoke or refer to a general pretend scenario he wants to enact, whereas his 
mother most often uses references to STATE OF AFFAIRS to clarify the overall 
perspective on the pretend situation as a whole.  
I then analysed the STATE OF AFFAIRS and BEING ENTITY target cat-
egories in more detail from a qualitative perspective. Specifically, I discussed spe-
cific examples of Thomas and his mother negotiating perspectives on pretend 
STATES OF AFFAIRS and showed that these negotiations can be captured in a 
conceptual blending framework. For the BEING ENTITY category, I took a closer 
look at the underlying conceptual distinctions of role-play behaviours, such as 
REAL vs. FICTIONAL and ANIMATE vs. INANIMATE, and their development.  
Overall, this chapter has shed light on the concepts that are evoked in chil-
dren’s pretend interactions with their mothers, offering a window into children’s 
social, cognitive, semantic, conceptual, and linguistic development as well as into 
the interactional practices that characterise their pretend play. In the next section, I 
will analyse these developments in another framework within Cognitive Linguis-
tics, namely that of event schemas.  
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7. Pretend Play and Event Schemas 
In this section, we will analyse pretend utterances of mothers and children in the 
corpora by the event schemas they are associated with. Event schemas are a way to 
conceptualise the patterns into which we sort types of events and situations (cf. 
Dirven & Verspoor 2004: 78). That is, they present a conceptual architecture for 
which aspects of an event are evoked and focussed on in a particular utterance. 
When referring to an event or situation, we select those elements and roles with the 
highest saliency in the current context. Each utterance, and therefore also each pre-
tend utterance, construes events and situations in particular ways, directing atten-
tion to specific elements within the conceptualisation. This, of course, is one of the 
most central features of construal and perspectivation in general (see Section 2.1).  
In a Cognitive-Linguistic framework, humans are seen as categorising 
events and situations by evoking certain conceptual schemas. Event schemas are 
“complex concepts essential for the cognitive processing of events” (Kleinke 2010: 
3358). These conceptual schemas, which differ regarding which participants and 
aspects they focus on, are called event schemas (Dirven & Verspoor 2004: 69). 
Event schemas represent a small set of basic configurations of roles within a con-
ceptualised situation or event. That is, they define the configurations and relation-
ship of different participants or roles. As Radden and Dirven (2007: 267) put it, 
event schemas “characterise the conceptual core of situations.” The theory of event 
schemas and their semantic roles presented here can be seen as one Cognitive-Lin-
guistic approach to the research area of semantic roles and thematic relations in 
language and their underlying conceptual and cognitive prototypes. Starting with 
Fillmore’s (e.g., 1968) seminal work, and Gruber (1965) and Jackendoff’s (e.g., 
1972) foundational contributions, research in this area has produced a vast amount 
of theorising and analysis both in Cognitive Linguistics and other theoretical frame-
works (e.g., Dowty 1991; Pustejovsky 1991; Konerding 1993; Busse 2012; Ziem 
2014; Saeed 2016: 149-188). 
Event schemas can be seen as a particular type of frame knowledge (cf. Ziem 
2014: 23-25; Busse 2012: 543-546), which is why they are also sometimes referred 
to as event frames (Kleinke 2010: 3357). Event schemas are also closely related to 
idealised cognitive models (Lakoff 1987) or mental models (Johnson-Laird 1980). 
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Event schemas and frames more generally refer to ways in which humans structure 
events and actions that are stored in long-term memory and laid down in entrenched 
neural pathways (cf. Hanson & Hanson 2017: 235-237).  
The process of acquiring event schemas in ontogeny is based on the general 
human ability for embodied categorization (MacWhinney 2015b: 320; Sloutsky 
2015; Hanson & Hanson 2017: 235-237). As such it represents one part of the more 
general acquisition of semantics (cf. Löbach 2000; Clark 2017, 2018) and concep-
tual development (Carey 2009; Sloutsky 2015). Children first identify perceptual 
units that make up an event and then categorise combinations of perceptual units 
into hierarchically structured event schemas (Zacks & Tversky 2001; Hard et al. 
2006). This means that this type of knowledge is acquired via abstraction and sche-
matisation when perceiving and talking about events and situations (cf. Mandler 
2004; Ziem 2014: 19-23; MacWhinney 2015b: 320, 327; Sloutsky 2015).  
Regarding event categorisation, the brain is sensitive to the natural statistics 
of entrenched events and builds up prototypically structured, schematic, embodied 
event representations during processing (cf. MacWhinney 2015b: 320, 327; Hanson 
& Hanson 2017: 235-237; Thomas et al. 2018). Event schemas therefore represent 
“the stereotypical design and structure of events” (Kleinke 2010: 3357). 
In the terminology of Cognitive Grammar, event schemas differ in which 
participants they conceptualise as saliently standing out as ‘figure’ against the 
‘ground,’ therefore providing a particular ‘windowing of attention’ on a situation 
(Kleinke 2010: 3357; cf. Langacker 1987: 120-122; Dirven 1999: 285; Talmy 2000: 
259; Dirven & Verspoor 2004: 77-86). These different types of event schemas will 
be described in the next section. 
 
7.1 Types of Event Schemas 
Radden and Dirven (2007: 272) posit that there is a small set of types of events that 
we represent cognitively. They partition event schemas into three different “worlds 
of experience,” which refer to basic distinctions in human categorisation. Event 
schemas can be classified as belonging to either the material world, the psycholog-
ical world, or the force-dynamic world.  
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The material world refers to our conceptualisation of “the structured world 
of entities as they exist, change or undergo processes. The material world also in-
cludes humans who do not take an active part in shaping it” (Radden & Dirven 
2007: 272).  
The psychological world refers to our conceptualisation of “the internal 
world of people’s sensations, emotions, perceptions and thoughts. It is the world as 
experienced and conceptualised by sentient humans” (Radden & Dirven 2007: 272). 
It is therefore related to our capacities for theory of mind, mentalising, and perspec-
tive-taking. 
The third category is the force-dynamic world. It relates to our conceptuali-
sation of “the external world of action, force, and cause and their effects. In this 
world, human agents figure prominently as the instigators of events” (Radden & 
Dirven 2007: 272). 
In line with the Cognitive-Linguistic view of concepts and categorisation, 
these three worlds of experience should be seen as being prototypically structured. 
That is, in many ways these worlds can be seen as overlapping and not clear-cut. 
These worlds of experience therefore can be conceptualised akin to idealised cog-
nitive models or frames (cf. Lakoff 1987; Ungerer & Schmid 2006: 207-217; Ziem 
2014). This means that they also relate to the way our embodied cognitive system 
processes and categorises information. So on a cognitive reading, this classification 
scheme relates to some form of conceptual organisation, boiling down to neurolog-
ical structuring and activity, of how we categorise and interpret events. However, 
on a more careful interpretation, it can also be treated mainly “as a framework that 
allows us to structure the inventory of event schemas” (Radden & Dirven 2007: 
272). Analysing pretend play in terms of event schemas represents a complemen-
tary approach to the analysis of pretend targets in Chapter 6. As will become clear 
in terms of the analytical categories, there are some overlaps between categories. 
For example, the pretend target categories of POSSESSION, MENTAL STATES, 
and EXPERIENCE have correspondences in particular event schema subschemas. 
However, the analysis in terms of event schemas in this chapter relates categories 
to an existing Cognitive-Linguistic framework, thereby offering an additional, com-
plementary system of categorisation. Taken together, the approach taken in Chapter 
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6 and in this chapter explicate the acquisition of perspectivation in pretend play in 
compatible ways that highlight different aspects of the general phenomenon at 
hand. In particular, analysing event schemas allows us to observe more general, 
coarse-grained trends and tendencies in the data, as event schemas represent a more 
schematic, higher-order level of categorisation than the pretend targets analysed in 
Chapter 6.  
The three worlds of experience of the material world, the psychological 
world and the force-dynamic world contain a number of subschemas. Subschemas 
of the material world event schema are the following: occurrence schemas, spatial 
schemas, and the possession schema. Occurrence schemas describe the processes 
(OS: P) or states (OS:S) that an entity is in, as in just pretend it was open (4-01-
02.cha) for the OS:S. As in this example, states are prototypically expressed with 
the copulative construction consisting of a subject (it), a copular verb (was), and a 
complement (open). Processes (OS:P) refer to events such as it’s pretend snowing 
yet (becky28b.cha).57 The subschema relevant to the spatial schema is the location 
schema (SS: LS), which describes the location of an entity, as in pretend I was at 
crab hospital (3-11-03.cha).58 Lastly, there is also the possession schema (POSS), 
which construes the relationship between possessor and the entity that is possessed, 
as in who’s pretending they’ve got a sweetie? (3-04-01.cha). 
In the psychological world, there are two subschemas. The emotion schema 
(EMS) frames emotional processes or states experienced by a human sentient being, 
as in no, but just pretend you are very sad (4-00-07.cha). The perception/cognition 
schema (PERCOG), on the other hand, “describes an experiencer’s perceptual or 
mental awareness of a thing” (Radden & Dirven 2007: 299), as in Mummy, just 
pretend you’ve forgotten your [>] little boy (3-08-02.cha).  
The force-dynamic world is characterised by four subschemas. First, there 
is the action schema (AS), in which an agent acts upon an entity, generating energy 
that the entity is affected by. The self-motion schema (SMS) describes self-initiated 
motion by an agent, such as I’m going to pretend you arrived at Burger_King (04-
 
57 In other publications, the OS:S is also referred to as the “being schema” and the OS:P as the 
“happening schema” (Dirven & Verspoor 2004: 79). 
58 The motion schema represents another subschema of the location schema, but as it plays no role 
in the analysis it will be excluded here. 
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10-05.cha). The caused-motion schema (CMS) characterises “events in which an 
energetic force brings about the motion of a thing to or from a location” (Radden & 
Dirven 2007: 299), for example in She sneezed the foam off the cappuccino (cf. 
Hilpert 2014: 47). Such schemas can also be applied metaphorically, as in my ham-
mer then I 0will [*] bang the rain away and the clouds away then I 0will [*] 
(pre)tend it just sunshine (CHI, 03-04-03.cha). Interestingly, in this specific exam-
ple, the caused motion meaning “X causes Y to move (from/to) Z” cannot be at-
tributed to the main verb bang or a simple compositional meaning. Instead, the se-
mantic caused motion interpretation is licenced by the English caused motion con-
struction [Subj [V Obj Obliquepath]] (Goldberg 2019: 35, cf. Goldberg 1995: 152). 
Lastly, there is the transfer schema (TS), which describes the passing of an entity 
from an agent to a recipient, as in perhaps you could pretend to give one to Rhona’s 
cat (MOT, john10b.cha). Overall, utterances can be associated with event schemas 
either through compositional expressions, constructions, or, through pragmatic in-
ference depending on the conversational context.  
These subschemas will be described in more detail in their respective sec-
tions. Section 7.2 will present the overall distribution of pretend utterances sorted 
into event schemas. Section 7.3 will present the distributions of pretend event sche-
mas in the material world. Section 7.4 will turn to the distributions of pretend ut-
terances in the domain of the psychological world. Lastly, in Section 7.5, we will 
investigate the distributions of pretend in the force-dynamic world. 
Let us now turn to the distribution of pretend according to which of the three 
worlds of experience they belong to. 
 
7.2 Distributions of Pretend by Event Schemas 
This section will first present an overview of the distribution of the relative fre-
quency of coarse-grained event schema types. The relations of interest here are to 
what extent the distribution of event schemas differs between the CHI and the MOT 
tier. If we compare the overall frequency in the CHI and MOT dataset, we find the 
following distribution: In the CHI data, the pretend utterances evoking the material 
world event schema are most frequent, with 58.8%. The force-dynamic world is the 
second most frequent, with 32.8%. The psychological world is least frequent with 
265 
 
8.4%. For the MOT data, we have the same ordering. The material world event 
schema is most frequent with 66.3%, the force-dynamic world is second most fre-
quent with 33.3%, and the psychological world is least frequent with <1%. As we 
can see here, the most significant difference is the fact that the psychological world 
plays a more prominent role in CHI utterances than in the MOT utterances. The 
frequencies of the force-dynamic world are very similar, but concerning the mate-
rial world, the MOT data contain a higher frequency of the material world event 
schema than the CHI data. However, we find that the data for the TC and the MC 
differ quite significantly, so that we need to consider these relations as well.  
 
7.2.1 Comparing CHI and MOT Data 
This section will first discuss the CHI data, then portray the MOT data, and then 
compare the two. First, concerning the CHI data, I will compare the TC CHI and 
the MC CHI data. First of all, we still find that the material world event schema is 
the most frequent in both datasets, and the force-dynamic world is the second most 
frequent. The material world frequencies are very similar for both TC CHI and MC 
CHI (TC CHI: 59.3% and MC CHI: 57.3%).  
The force-dynamic world frequencies, however, differ quite strongly. 
Although they still are the second most frequent category in both datasets, force-
dynamic event schemas occur much more frequently in the MC CHI than in the TC 
CHI data (TC CHI: 29.5% and MC CHI: 42.7%).  
The most striking difference can be found for the psychological world. 
Whereas pretend utterances in the psychological world account for 11.2% of event 
schemas in the TC CHI dataset, there are no pretend utterances of that kind in the 
MC CHI at all. This means that the frequency of psychological world event schemas 
is due to the frequency in the TC CHI data alone. As the MC CHI data range from 
2-3 years, and Thomas only starts using pretend from age three onwards, these re-
sults are likely due to the development of increased perspective-taking and mental-
ising capacities discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.1. As Bartsch and Wellman (1995) 
have found in their corpus study, children start using mental state language such as 
want and mad from 24 months of age onwards. Mental state language referring to 
266 
 
beliefs and thoughts such as think and know only appears around three years of age 
(cf. Wellman 2011: 172; see also Shatz et al. 1983). 
However, as Diessel and Tomasello (2001) have shown in their corpus anal-
ysis of finite complement clauses in English, 3-year-old children often use verbs 
such as think in quite formulaic constructions “that do not require a conceptualiza-
tion of mental states or perspectives (e.g., ‘I think it’s raining’ just means, for them, 
‘Maybe it’s raining’)” (Tomasello 2018: 8495; cf. Tomasello 2007: 1138; 
Tomasello 2019: 68-69). Only around four years of age do children start to under-
stand complement constructions using mental state language as expressing and con-
trasting particular perspectives on the world (Diessel & Tomasello 2001; see also 
Lohmann & Tomasello 2003; Perner et al. 2003, 2005; cf. Section 2.3.2).  
When analysing psychological uses of pretend we therefore have to bear in 
mind the discussion of children’s pretend understanding in Section 3.1.7. There it 
was argued that on a critical view, pretend might first be understood as referring to 
actions and not to an expression of a cognitive perspective on a pretend play situa-
tion involving mental states. Mentalistic understanding generally is not found be-
fore ages 3 to 4 (cf. Kavanaugh 2011: 297; Lillard 2015: 434). Interestingly, in the 
corpus data first occurrences of pretend utterances evoking the psychological world 
cannot be found before age 3;6 in the TC CHI data. In fact, the majority of instances 
of event schemas in the psychological world occur after age 4, the age theory of 
mind is generally seen as being fully developed (Wellman et al. 2001; Wellman 
2011). 
 If we compare the TC MOT and the MC MOT data we get the following 
distribution: In the TC MOT data, the material world pretend schema is the most 
frequent with 70.8%, and the force-dynamic world is the second most frequent with 
27.6%. Pretend utterances evoking the psychological world occur with a frequency 
of <1%. In the MC MOT dataset, the material world event schema is also the most 
frequent, but with 60.6% it occurs less often than in the TC MOT data. The second 
most frequent category, just as in the TC MOT data, is the force-dynamic world, 
but it occurs with a higher frequency at 38.5%. Unlike in the MC CHI data, there 
are some instances of pretend utterances evoking the psychological world, but they 
also account for <1% of event schema utterances. Overall, we can attest that in the 
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MC MOT data the force-dynamic world occurs more frequently than in the TC 
MOT data, whereas in the TC MOT data the material world has a higher frequency 
than in the MC MOT data.  
Finally, let us turn to a comparison of the MOT and CHI data. If we compare 
the TC MOT and TC CHI data, we find that they are similar when it comes to 
utterances evoking the force-dynamic world (TC CHI: 29,5% vs. TC MOT: 27.6%). 
However, the frequencies of the material world event schema utterances differ quite 
strongly (TC CHI: 59.3% vs. TC MOT: 70.8%). Thomas’ mother thus talks more 
about pretend scenarios in the material world than Thomas himself does. Compar-
ing the MC CHI and the MC MOT data, we find that these two datasets are more 
similar to each other than is the case with the TC data. For both MC CHI and MC 
MOT, the distributions for the material world (MC CHI: 57.3% vs. MC MOT: 
60.6%), and the force-dynamic world are relatively similar (MC CHI: 42.7% vs. 
MC MOT: 38.5%). The key difference, as discussed above, is that there are some 
instances of the psychological world event schema in the MC MOT data, but none 
in the MC CHI data.  
 In line with the observations on pretend target categories in Chapter 6, the 
distribution of event schemas seems to indicate that mothers and children predom-
inantly talk about the pretend identity of material entities. This makes sense if we 
consider that what an object stands for might be more in need of clarifying negoti-
ation than actions, which have a higher degree of iconicity. For instance, in utter-
ances such as shall we pretend this is a buggy? (MOT, anne14a.cha) the object that 
stands for the buggy is not immediately recognisable as being a buggy. However, 
once an object has been assigned a pretend identity such as being a buggy, subse-
quent pretend actions such as putting a baby into the buggy are less in need of being 
referred to explicitly using pretend, because the affordances of the pretend scenario 
have already been identified. In such cases, introducing objects as pretend entities 
already explicitly introduces the pretend scenario and opens up a pretend frame. We 
can therefore say that identifying objects as pretend seems to be the most frequent 
strategy to establish a pretend perspective. However, clarifying pretend actions also 
takes up a significant portion of pretend interactions. As we saw in Chapters 5 and 
6, this often happens in contexts where children are explaining what they are doing, 
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or where mothers are trying to understand what their children are pretending. In 
addition, especially for the TC CHI data, utterances associated with the force-dy-
namic world are often also reflections of Thomas actively instructing pretend play. 
The distributions for all six datasets can be found in Fig 7.1. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Comparison of the relative distributions of material world, psychological world, and 
force-dynamic world event schemas for TC CHI, TC MOT, MC CHI, MC MOT, CHI and MOT 
 
7.2.2 Development of Event Schemas  
So far, we have analysed the overall relative frequencies to be found in the various 
datasets. The question we are going to address next is if and how the distributions 
of the three world of experience event schemas change over time and with linguistic 
development. I will first analyse the overall distribution and the development of 
pretend event schemas by age, and then present the overall distribution of event 
schemas in terms of stages of linguistic development. 
269 
 
First, let us analyse developmental patterns by age for the CHI dataset, rep-
resented in Fig. 7.2 and Fig. 7.4. The overall pattern for the CHI data is the same as 
for the development of pretend in the corpus more generally. That is, as children 
grow older, there are more instances of event schemas. The most interesting ques-
tion is whether the relative frequencies of the individual worlds of experience 
change over time. When considering the corpus data as a whole, the data seem to 
fluctuate so that no clear patterns are apparent. One interesting observation, how-
ever, is that when we look at the TC data alone, the relative frequency of material 
event schemas decreases over time. Indeed, we find a statistically significant high 
negative correlation between the relative frequency of material world event sche-
mas and age for the TC CHI data (r = -0.72, p = 0.045). This means that as Thomas 
grows older, he uses less pretend utterances that evoke the material world event 
schema relative to other schemas. Conversely, for the TC data, both the force dy-
namic and psychological world event schemas begin to make up higher percentages 
of pretend utterances. As mentioned above, for the event schemas in the psycho-
logical world, the most interesting observation is the timeframe in which they ap-
pear, which correlates with the general timeframe of the emergence of more sophis-
ticated mentalising skills. We have to note, though, that regarding the psychological 
world, we only have a very small set of utterances (n = 30) in the whole corpus, 
which makes it difficult to make statements about their fine-grained development. 
Fig. 7.2 represents the distribution of the relative frequencies of the different worlds 
of experience in the pretend CHI data. 
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of relative frequencies of worlds of experiences in pretend utterances for 
the CHI data 
When we analyse the MOT data, as represented in Fig. 7.3 and Fig. 7.5, the absolute 
frequencies again behave in a way similar to the MOT pretend data overall. 
This is why it is again more fruitful to consider the relative frequencies of 
event schemas. However, as with the CHI data, the relative frequencies seem to 
fluctuate with age in the MOT data so that no clear patterns are discernible. In-
stances of psychological world event schemas have a tendency to occur later in 
development, but just as with the CHI data, we have to keep in mind that the total 
number of pretend utterances evoking the psychological world is very small (n = 
10). Fig. 7.2. and Fig. 7.3. show the data for the overall relative frequencies of the 
three types of event schemas for the CHI and MOT data, respectively. Fig. 7.4 and 
Fig. 7.5 do the same but contain both coarse-grained and fine-grained event schema 
categorisations. As always, it has to be noted that for the CHI data, the data from 
1;9-2;11 only represent utterances from the MC CHI dataset, and the 3;0-4;11 data 
only represent utterances from the TC CHI dataset. The more fine-grained distinc-
tions will be discussed in later sections, but one thing that we can take from this 
development is that as was also shown in Chapter 6, Thomas generally seems to 
adopt a more ‘mentalistic’ and ‘holistic’ way of talking about pretend scenarios. 
That is, instead of focussing on clarifying specific material entities involved in pre-
tence, he more frequently takes a broader perspective on the pretend situation as a 
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whole, highlighting their psychological dimension as well as a more dynamic per-
spective that more often concentrates on actions. 
 
Figure 7.3: Distribution of worlds of experience in pretend utterances for the MOT data 
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Figure 7.4: Event schemas (coarse-grained and fine-grained) by age for the CHI data
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Figure 7.5: Event schemas (coarse-grained and fine-grained) by age for the MOT dataset 
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Next, we will discuss correlations of event schema types with linguistic de-
velopment. Let us turn to the CHI data first. If we examine the development of the 
relative frequencies of worlds of experiences by Brown’s stages, there are also no 
apparent patterns. Again, the one indicative trend that we can observe is that psy-
chological world schemas seem to occur later on in linguistic development. The 
development of relative frequencies can be found in Fig. 7.6 (coarse-grained) and 
Fig. 7.8 (coarse-grained and fine-grained). 
 
Figure 7.6: Distribution of worlds of experience in pretend utterances for the CHI data 
For the MOT data, in terms of relative frequencies, we do find one developmental 
pattern (Fig. 7.7 and Fig. 7.9). With increasing complexity of their children’s utter-
ances, mothers use relatively more material world event schemas in their pretend 
utterances, and less force-dynamic world event schemas. For material event sche-
mas, Pearson’s test shows a statistically significant high positive correlation with 
linguistic complexity (r = 0.87; p = 0.0055). Conversely, for the force-dynamic 
world, we find the opposite pattern. For this event schema, there is a statistically 
significant very high negative correlation with linguistic complexity (r = -0.91; p = 
0.002). For the psychological world, the frequency is too low to draw any conclu-
sions. 
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Figure 7.7: Distribution of worlds of experience in pretend utterances for the MOT data 
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Figure 7.8: Event schemas by Brown’s stages for the CHI dataset
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Figure 7.9: Event schemas by Brown’s stages for the MOT dataset  
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In summary, for all corpora the material event world schema is by far the 
most frequent, with frequencies ranging from 57% (MC CHI) to 71% (TC MOT). 
We can therefore clearly state that most pretend utterances relate to event schemas 
involving material entities and their relations. The force-dynamic world is second 
most frequent in all corpora, with frequencies ranging from 28% (TC MOT) to 43% 
(MC CHI). So, pretend utterances also relate to a significant degree to actions and 
dynamic events. By far the least frequent world of experience is the psychological 
world, ranging from no occurrences at all (MC CHI) to a frequency of 11% (TC 
CHI).  
In terms of development, the key observation is that for the TC CHI data, 
material world event schemas decrease in relative frequency over time, whereas 
references to the force-dynamic world and the psychological world increase. For 
the MC CHI data, no such changes are apparent. For the MOT data, there are also 
no clear changes when we look at development in general. However, when looking 
at linguistic complexity references to the material world seem to increase whereas 
references to the force-dynamic world seem to decrease in the MOT data. This is 
likely due to children taking a more active role in pretend play interactions when 
the overall linguistic complexity of their utterances is higher. This means that chil-
dren with higher MLUs more actively instruct pretend actions and establish pretend 
scenarios, to which mothers respond by clarifying aspects of the material world that 
are part of the pretend play scenarios and actions established by their children.  
We will now explore the distribution of pretend in the material world in 
more detail. 
 
7.3 Distributions of Pretend in the Material World 
The material world contains situations and events that relate to the occurrence of 
entities in states and processes, the location of entities and their possession. As de-
scribed in Section 7.1, Radden and Dirven (2007: 272) divide the material world 
event schema into three subschemas: the occurrence schema, the location schema, 
and the possession schema. The occurrence schema describes states and processes 
that entities are in. These are coded here as occurrence schema: states (OS:S) and 
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occurrence schema: processes (OS:P). Spatial schemas describing a locative rela-
tion are coded here as spatial schema: location schema (SS:LS). There are also spa-
tial schemas referring to the relation of an entity and a trajectory as in The ball 
rolled down the hill. However, as this schema does not play a role in the corpus, it 
will be neglected here. Lastly, the relation between a possessor and an entity pos-
sessed by the possessor is captured by the possession schema (POSS). 
Of course, complex utterances can also evoke more than one event schema, 
and these are also marked as such, for example, OS:S/SS:LS: you were pretending 
that was a car and you were sitting in one box and you had the other one on your 
head didn’t you? (MOT, anne28.cha). In this example, the pretend event schema 
that is expressed features an occurrence schema expressing a pretend state of affairs 
with a copulative construction (you were pretending that was a car). But in addi-
tion, it also features a spatial location schema (you were sitting in one box). 
If we investigate the overall relative distribution of the subschemas of the 
material event schema, we find the following: For the CHI data, OS:S is by far the 
most frequent material world event schema, with 85.7%. The second most frequent 
category is SS:LS, which accounts for 7.6% of all material world event schemas. In 
third place is the POSS schema, with 4.8%. The least frequent categories are OS:P 
with 1.4% and utterances that evoke both OS:S and SS:LS with <1%. Dividing the 
CHI data into MC CHI and TC CHI we see that the distributions look quite differ-
ent. OS:S is the most frequent category for both, with 98% of all utterances in the 
MC CHI dataset, and 81.8% for the TC CHI data. However, in the MC CHI data, 
there is only one other category that occurs in the material event schema data, and 
that is OS:P with 2%. In the TC CHI data, in contrast, there are five categories in 
total. For the TC CHI data, SS:LS is the second most frequent category with 10.1%. 
POSS is third most frequent with 6.3%. As in the CHI data overall, OS:P (1.3%) 
and OS:S/SS:LS (<1%) are the least frequent. Overall, with 18% of the TC CHI 
data belonging to categories other than OS:S, the data beyond age 3;0 are therefore 
more complex in which aspects of the material world event schema they relate to. 
For the MOT data, we find that these are in many respects quite similar to 
the CHI data. OS:S is the most frequent category with 88.3%. The combination of 
OS:S/SS:LS is the second most frequent category with 5.1%. It is followed closely 
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by POSS (4.6%) and SS:LS (4.2%). OS:P belongs to the least frequent categories 
with 1.9%. The combinations of OS:S/OS:P and SS:LS/OS:P both account for <1% 
of the data, respectively. If we divide the MOT data into their MC MOT and TC 
MOT subparts, we find that they are more similar to each other than the MC CHI 
and TC CHI data. For both TC MOT and MC MOT, OS:S is by far the most fre-
quent category, both with a distribution of 88.3%. In the TC MOT data, SS:LS is 
the second most frequent category with 4.9%, and the third most frequent category 
is POSS with 3.2%. In the MC MOT data, the order is reversed, with POSS being 
the second most frequent with 6.4%, and SS:LS being the third most frequent with 
3.4%. OS:P is in fourth place for both datasets, with 1.3% for the MC MOT and 
2.3% for the TC MOT. OS:S/SS:LS and OS:S/OS:P occur in both datasets with a 
frequency below 1%. Moreover, SS:LS/OS:P only occurs in the TC MOT with be-
low 1% frequency. What we can also glean from this distribution is that there is 
quite a strong difference between the CHI and MOT data in some domains. How-
ever, this also holds when comparing TC CHI and TC MOT, and MC CHI and MC 
MOT with each other, respectively. The overall relative frequencies of material 
world event schemas can be found in Fig. 7.10. 
 
 
Figure 7.10: Comparison of the relative distributions of material world subschemas for TC CHI, TC 
MOT, MC CHI, MC MOT, CHI and MOT 
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Both mothers and children in the corpus data therefore overwhelmingly conceptu-
alise static pretend situations when talking about the material world. Dynamic pre-
tend situations occur much less frequently, and the same holds for other types of 
material world conceptualisations. In addition, Thomas’ material world pretend ut-
terances are conceptually more complex than the MC CHI utterances. 
After discussing the overall distributions of pretend utterances in the mate-
rial world, the next section will examine the distributions sorted by age and Brown’s 
stages. In Section 7.3.2, I will then analyse the distribution of the subcategories of 
the occurrence schema: states (OS:S) event schema, which is the event schema with 
by far the most occurrences in the category of event schemas in the material world. 
 
7.3.1 Distributions by Age and Brown’s Stages 
If we look at how the relative distribution of material world event schemas changes 
with age for children, the key observation is that the variety of subschemas increases 
with age, especially for the TC CHI data. That is, the material world event schemas 
become more diverse as children grow older. As all material event subschemas 
other than OS:S have a very low frequency it is difficult to make any meaningful 
comparisons about changes in their distribution. However, it is still interesting to 
note that age 3;3-3;5 is the first age range where three different subschemas of the 
material world appear, and that it is the last age range of the TC CHI data, 4;9-4;11, 
where this number increases to 4. This increasing complexity of material world 
subschemas is consistent with the hypothesis that children’s pretend play utterances 
become more complex as they grow older. The distribution of the material world 
subschemas can be found in Fig. 7.11. If an utterance was coded as an instantiation 
of more than one target category, such as OS:S/SS:LS, the utterance was counted 
as an instance of each subschema. 
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Figure 7.11: Pretend target event schemas in the material world for the CHI data sorted by age 
No such developmental changes are apparent in the MOT data (Fig. 7.12). In terms 
of relative frequency, we do not find any consistent changes in how often the cate-
gories of the material world occur relative to each other across age. Moreover, in 
contrast to the CHI data, the number of different subschemas stays roughly the same 
as children grow older. In general, what we can glean from these data is that in 
terms of material event subschemas, the complexity of pretend play does not nec-
essarily increase. However, what seems to become more complex is children’s lin-
guistic contribution to the negotiation and coordination of pretend play situations 
evoking the material world event schema. 
A similar picture emerges for the distribution of material world event sche-
mas sorted by Brown’s stages. For the CHI data (Fig. 7.13), the first stages of lin-
guistic development only have one type of event schema (OS:S) and build up to 
four different event schemas by stage Early IV. For the MOT data (Fig. 7.14), on 
the other hand, even in the earliest Stage of Early I, mothers use three different 
types of material world event schemas, reaching four different material world event 
schemas by Stage Late I. So as children’s utterances become more linguistically 
complex, they tend to use more types of material world event schemas. For the 
MOT data, on the other hand, the complexity of material event schema pretend 
utterances does not seem to change.  
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Figure 7.12: Pretend target event schemas in the material world for the MOT data sorted by age  
 
 
Figure 7.13: Pretend target event schemas in the material world for the CHI data sorted by MLU 
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Figure 7.14: Pretend target event schemas in the material world for the MOT data sorted by MLU 
Overall, then, in the material world of experience, OS:S is by far the most frequent 
subschema, ranging from 82% (TC CHI) to 98% (MC CHI). The relative frequency 
of the OS:P ranges from 2% (MC CHI) to 7% (MC MOT). The SS:LS ranges from 
no occurrences at all (MC CHI) to 10% (TC CHI). All other subschemas, such as 
POSS, or combinations of subschemas, occur with very low frequency.  
Regarding development, the range of subschemas becomes more diverse in 
the CHI data both measured by age and linguistic complexity. For the MOT data 
there are no such changes in complexity.  
In the following section, I will therefore explore the internal structure of this 
category in more detail. 
 
7.3.2 Distribution of Occurrence Schema: States Subcategories 
The occurrence schema: states (OS:S) event schema can be divided into five sub-
categories. It can express the following meanings: property attribution, category 
inclusion, identification, representation, and the existential function. The property 
attribution function can be found in utterances such as The Burj Khalifa is one of 
the pinnacles of human technological and cultural advancement. In these expres-
sions, an entity is assigned a property. The category inclusion function is found in 
sentences such as The Burj Khalifa is a skyscraper. In these kinds of utterances, the 
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Burj Khalifa is included as being a member of a category, in this case, the category 
of skyscraper. Pretend utterance often make use of this function as it can be used 
to subsume a pretend entity under a category, as in just (pre)tend that’s a water (3-
07-01.cha). The identification function can be found in utterances that identify one 
entity with another thing, such as in The Burj Khalifa is the tallest building in the 
world (cf. Radden & Dirven 2007: 273). The identification function is also essential 
in pretend play scenarios, as it can be used to identify an entity as a pretend entity, 
as in it pretend to be my doll (Ruth31b.cha). These three cases can be seen as the 
most prototypical functions of the OS:S schema. However, there are also more pe-
ripheral instances of this schema. Two that are of interest in the present analysis are 
the existential function and the representation function. The existential function can 
be found in utterances that state the existence of some entity, such as There is a 
skyscraper (in Dubai). This function can be of higher importance in pretend play 
situations than in other contexts. This is because in pretend play, the existence of 
some pretend entity can be evoked through the existential function of the OS:S 
schema, as in just pretend there was a bell (4-10-04.cha). Another function that can 
be important in pretend play situations is that of representation. The representation 
function of the OS:S schema expresses a stand-for relation, in that one entity stands 
for another. This is the case for many pretend play utterances that transform an 
everyday object into a pretend entity, as in just pretending my tea is bananas cut up 
(3-07-03.cha).  
It has to be noted here, of course, that especially when it comes to pretend 
situations, it is sometimes difficult to interpret which function a particular pretend 
utterance belongs to. This is especially the case in the context of the question of 
when children understand pretence as representational as opposed to acting as if (cf. 
Section 3.1.7). Is a child identifying a particular entity as pretend, thereby making 
use of the identification function, or are they expressing a stand-for relation, thereby 
using the representational function? In the CHI data, most instances are implicit 
identifying utterances such as it pretend to be my doll (Ruth31b.cha). There are 
hardly any explicit expressions of pretence relationships, such as just pretending 
my tea is bananas cut up (3-07-03.cha). Although these could be seen as instances 
of the representation function, they were also subsumed under the identification 
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function. This was done because the difference between the two poles of identifi-
cation and representation for pretend utterances should be seen as a matter of degree 
and emphasis. Both categories have fuzzy boundaries with possible overlaps and 
only very few later utterances can be argued to be more on the representation end 
of the identification-representation continuum. In Sections 7.3.2.1 to 7.3.2.3 I will 
first give a general overview of the different distributions, before turning to what 
these distributions mean, and how they can be related to changing strategies of per-
spectivation and pretend play interactions in Section 7.3.2.4. 
 
7.3.2.1 Comparing MC CHI and TC CHI Data 
Studying the overall relative distribution of these five occurrence schema: states 
subcategories in the MC and TC corpora yields the following results: First, if we 
analyse the CHI data, we find that property attribution is the most frequent function, 
with 51.7%. It is followed by the identification function with 24.7% and the cate-
gory inclusion function with 18.4%. The three most prototypical functions of the 
OS:S schema are therefore also the ones that are most frequent in the CHI data. 
5.2% of children’s pretend utterances belong to the category of the existential func-
tion. If we divide the CHI data into TC CHI and MC CHI, we find that these data 
differ from each other in terms of which functions are more frequent. In both TC 
CHI and MC CHI the property attribution function of the OS:S schema is most 
frequent, but in the MC CHI data, it is much more frequent with 64% than in the 
TC CHI data with 46.8%. In the MC CHI data, category inclusion is the second 
most frequent category with 22%, and identification is the third most frequent cat-
egory with 14%. In the TC CHI, this order is reversed, with the identification func-
tion being the second most frequent category with 29% and the category inclusion 
the third most frequent with 16.9%. The existential function is only found in the TC 
CHI data, with 7.3%.  
 In terms of perspectivation strategies, this distribution shows that assigning 
a property to a pretend entity seems to be especially prominent in coordinations and 
negotiations of pretend interactions. From this we can draw the conclusion that for 
certain pretend goals property assignment is interactionally and cognitively more 
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useful than other strategies, a point I will look at in more detail when I discuss the 
development of these categories. 
 
7.3.2.2 Comparing MC MOT and TC MOT Data 
Investigating the MOT data, we also find the same general distribution for the three 
prototypical OS:S functions. Property attribution is most frequent with 55.9% 
(compared with 51.7% in the CHI data), and identification is the second most fre-
quent. However, with 38.7% it occurs at a much higher rate than in the CHI data 
(24.7%). Third most frequent is the category inclusion function, which with 19.7% 
occurs at a quite similar frequency as in the CHI data (18.4%). The representation 
function does occur in the MOT data, but with below 1%. The same holds for the 
existential function. This is especially interesting as the existential function occurs 
at a frequency of 5.2% in the CHI data. If we divide the MOT data into TC MOT 
and MC MOT we find that there are quite significant differences, however. Most 
interestingly, the frequencies of the three prototypical OS:S functions are almost 
reversed. In the MC MOT data, just like in the MOT data overall, property attribu-
tion is most frequent, with an even higher frequency of 64.6%. Category inclusion 
is second most frequent with 17.5%. The third most frequent is the identification 
function with 17.1%. The representation and existential function hardly occur at all, 
with 0.4%. In the TC MOT data, on the other hand, identification is actually the 
most frequent category, with 56.9%. Category inclusion is also second most fre-
quent, and with 21.5% it is also the category that differs least from the MC MOT 
data. However, in the TC MOT data, with 19.6% property attribution is the least 
frequent of the three prototypical functions. The representation function occurs 
more often than in the MC MOT data, but still only reaches 1.3%. The existential 
function occurs with a frequency of 0.6%. Looking at the MOT data in total there-
fore masks the vast underlying difference in relative distribution in TC MOT and 
MC MOT.  
 
7.3.2.3 Comparing CHI and MOT Data 
With this in mind, we can also compare how the CHI and MOT data relate to each 
other in their respective corpora. The data for the MC CHI and MC MOT are quite 
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similar. Property attribution is most frequent in both and occurs at almost the same 
relative frequency (MC CHI: 64%; MC MOT: 64.6%). Category inclusion is the 
second most frequent category, with only a slightly higher relative frequency for 
the MC CHI data (MC CHI: 22%; MC MOT: 17.5%). Identification is the third 
most frequent function, this time with the MC MOT data exhibiting a slightly higher 
relative frequency (MC CHI: 14%; MC MOT: 17.1%). As already mentioned, rep-
resentation and the existential function only occur in the MC MOT data, but at very 
low frequencies. Whereas the MC CHI and MC MOT data do not differ strongly 
from each other, the same is not the case when comparing the TC CHI and TC MOT 
data.  
Property attribution is the most frequent prototypical category in the TC CHI 
data with 46.8%. In the TC MOT, in contrast, it is actually the least frequent proto-
typical category with only 19.6%. Identification is the most frequent category in the 
TC MOT data with 56.9%. In the TC CHI data, it is second most frequent with 
29%. This again makes sense in light of the overall discourse strategies used in the 
TC data. As Thomas is often quite active in instructing and negotiating pretend 
scenarios, it stands to reason that his mother more often tries to clarify and identify 
the status of pretend entities that he includes in his pretend activities. So it is more 
frequent here than in the MC data, but still much less frequent than in the TC MOT 
data. Category inclusion is the category with the most similar relative frequencies. 
It has a relative frequency of 21.5% in the TC MOT, making it the second most 
frequent prototypical category. In the TC CHI data, it has a relative frequency of 
16.9%, making it the third most frequent category. In the TC MOT, the representa-
tion function is present, as mentioned, whereas the few unclear cases in the TC CHI 
data were subsumed under the identification function. Regarding the existential 
function, however, TC CHI displays a much higher relative frequency than the TC 
MOT, with 7.3% vs. 0.6%. Overall, then, the TC CHI and TC MOT data might be 
more similar to each other than the MC CHI and MC MOT data, respectively. How-
ever, they still differ from each other quite significantly.  
The relative frequencies of the individual datasets can be found in Fig. 7.15. 
One crucial question is whether some of these differences might be due to the fact 
that the individual datasets cover different time spans. To answer this question, we 
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can compare the relative frequencies of the TC MOT data divided into two age 
groups, 2;0-3;0 and 3;0-4;11. However, we find that the TC MOT 2-3 data are not 
more similar to the MC MOT data, which cover the same time span. In the TC MOT 
2-3 data, identification is still by far the most frequent function with 60.7% (vs. 
17.1% MC MOT and 56.9% TC MOT). Category inclusion is the second most fre-
quent in the TC MOT 2-3 data with 23.8% (vs. 17.5% MC MOT and 21.5% TC 
MOT) and property attribution the third most frequent with 14.3% (vs. 17.5% MC 
MOT and 19.6% TC MOT). Overall, then, in its relative frequency, the order does 
not differ significantly between TC MOT 2-3 and TC MOT, and is still quite dif-
ferent from the MC MOT data. 
 
Figure 7.15: Comparison of occurrence schema: states subcategories property attribution, category 
inclusion, identification, representation and existential for the TC CHI, MC CHI, CHI, TC MOT, 
MC MOT and MOT datasets 
When we consider the TC MOT 3-5 data, we find that the pattern differs slightly 
from the TC MOT 2-3 data. Identification is still the most frequent category, but 
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with 52.1% it is lower than for the TC MOT 2-3 data. The overall higher frequency 
of the identification function might also be part of the explanation why the TC CHI 
data have a much higher frequency of it (29%) than the MC CHI data (14%). Prop-
erty attribution is the second most frequent category for the TC MOT 3-5 data with 
25%, as opposed to the TC MOT 2-3 data, where it is the third most frequent func-
tion with 14.3%. Thomas’ mother therefore uses more property attribution when 
evoking the OS:S schema as Thomas grows older. Finally, the TC MOT 2-3 and 3-
5 data do not differ very strongly in the category inclusion function, with 20.1% for 
the TC MOT 3-5 data and 23.8% for the TC MOT 2-3 data (vs. 16.9% for the TC 
CHI data). The relative frequencies for TC MOT 2-3, TC MOT 3-5, TC CHI and 
MC MOT can be found in Fig. 7.16 and Table 7.1. 
 
 
Figure 7.16: Comparing the relative frequencies of TC MOT 2-3, TC MOT 3-5, MC MOT and TC 
CHI for subschemas of the OS:S schema 
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Occurrence 
Schema: 
States Sub-
schemas  
TC 
MOT  
TC 
MOT 
2-3  
TC 
MOT 
3-5  
TC 
CHI  
MC 
MOT  
MC 
CHI  
 
MOT  CHI  
Property At-
tribution  19.6% 14.3% 25% 46.8% 64.6% 64% 55.9% 51.7% 
Category In-
clusion  21.5% 23.8% 20.1% 16.9% 17.5% 22% 19.7% 18.4% 
Identification  56.9% 60.7% 52.1% 29% 17.1% 14% 38.7% 24.7% 
Representation  1.3% 1.2% 1.4%  / 0.4% / 0.9%  / 
Existential  0.6% / 1.4% 7.3% 0.4%  / 0.5% 5.2% 
Table 7.1: Relative distributions of OS:S subschemas for TC MOT, TC MOT 2-3, TC MOT 3-5, 
TC CHI, MC MOT, MC CHI, MOT and CHI; the most frequent category is shaded grey 
In the next section, we are going to discuss how the distributions of the oc-
currence schema: states subschemas change with age and MLU. 
 
7.3.2.4 Distributions by Age and Brown’s Stages 
Are there significant changes in the frequency of the OS:S subschemas across age? 
We will answer this question for the CHI data first and then turn to the MOT data.  
For the CHI data, the changes in relative frequency can be found in Fig. 7.17.  
Two prima facie observations we can make is that as children grow older, 
the distribution of OS:S functions becomes more varied, and that the TC CHI data, 
starting at 3 years of age, are more varied than the MC CHI data from 1;9-2;11. The 
property attribution, category inclusion and identification functions can be found 
from 2;0-2;2 onwards, whereas the existential function only appears in the age 
range of 3;3-3;5. The existential function of OS:S pretend utterances therefore 
seems to be more cognitively complex than the other functions. This makes sense 
when considering the cognitive complexity involved in pretending the existence of 
an entity. On the one hand, these can relate to a state of affairs, such as <&um (.) 
just (pre)tend> [<] [//] just (pre)tend there’s a problem (3-04-03.cha) or Mummy 
[<] just pretend there’s a fire (3-09-01.cha). 
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Figure 7.17: CHI occurrence schema: states distribution by age 
But these utterances can also relate to pretending the existence of an object without 
having a direct ‘stand-in’ object that represents it, such as in pretend there’s a phone 
(4-10-04.cha). As discussed in Section 3.2, younger children often still have prob-
lems with pretence situations in which there are no ‘stand-in’ objects. In fact, it is 
only around three years of age that children are increasingly showing pretend be-
haviours without the use of props (Sachet & Mottweiler 2013: 177), which is con-
sistent with the TC CHI data on the emergence of the existential function. Of course, 
with only nine data points for the existential function, we are not in a position to 
make very reliable pronouncements. 
Let us now turn to the functions of occurrence schema utterances as a whole. 
Fig. 7.18 combines the data for the functions of the OS:S event schema with the 
functions of other subschemas of the occurrence schema. There are not enough data 
points to draw any conclusions about changes in the relative frequency of individual 
functions. However, what we see is that for the corpus as a whole, the variety of 
different occurrence schemas seems to increase at a moderate level. The age range 
of 2:9-2;11 is the first one where we find four different occurrence schema func-
tions, and it is only in the age range of 4;9-4;11 where this number increases to six.  
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Figure 7.18: CHI occurrence schema: states and occurrence schema: processes functions by age 
The MOT OS:S data in Fig. 7.19, on the other hand, do not seem to change 
in complexity, a result consistent with previous assessments of the MOT data. How-
ever, there are still some interesting trends to observe. For one, the relative fre-
quency of the property attribution function seems to decrease consistently from age 
1;9 to 3;2, whereas the identification function seems to increase in relative fre-
quency overall. In terms of the complexity of pretend play, the identification func-
tion can be seen as more complex than the property attribution function, but it also 
points to different discourse functions. When coordinating a pretend play situation, 
the property attribution function will likely be more prominent as it concerns the 
properties of entities within a pretend play situation. This can relate to marking an 
entity as pretend such as in it’s just a pretend one (MOT; becky02b.cha) when talk-
ing about a toy. But it can also relate to negotiating the properties of a pretend entity, 
as in shall we pretend it’s purple or do you want it to be yellow? (MOT; 
becky25a.cha). The identification function, on the other hand, relates to what a par-
ticular pretend entity is to be conceptualised as, such as that could be pretend to-
mato sauce (MOT; Joel26b.cha) or is that your pretend castle? (MOT; 
ruth33b.cha). Such a conceptualisation involves more conceptual content and can 
therefore be seen as more complex, which can be seen as one of the reasons why its 
relative frequency rises with age. But it also reflects children becoming more active 
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contributors to pretend play situations so that mothers more often have to use the 
identification function to ensure that they share a joint perspective on what is being 
pretended. 
When looking at the occurrence schema by Brown’s stages we can make the fol-
lowing observations. First of all, for the CHI data, the category occurrence schema: 
processes (OS:P) only occurs very infrequently. There is one instance of change of 
state (&um just (pre)tend <I was> [//] then (.) I turned into a Daddy bird; 4-10-
06.cha; Late IV/Early V), two instances of a steady process (it’s pretend snowing 
yet; becky28b.cha; &uh [//] I [//] just pretend I was the sewage popping out; 4-09-
06.cha; III and Late IV/Early IV), and one instance of uncontrolled change (pre-
tending that a boat has capsized, gail12a.cha; Early IV). The only inferences we can 
really draw from this limited dataset is that OS:P occurs relatively late in linguistic 
development, with no instances for Brown’s stages Early I to II. In addition, focus-
sing on static entities and assigning pretend status to them seems to be a much more 
frequent and practical perspectivation strategy for the establishment of pretend per-
spectives.  
The pattern we do see is that the instances of the occurrence schema: states 
event schema become more varied. In Brown’s Stage I, there is one instance of 
property attribution. For Brown’s Stage II we have three OS:S categories, as for 
Brown’s Stage III. Starting with Brown’s Stage Early IV through Stage Late V, we 
find all four different OS:S categories. This only changes for Brown’s Stage Post 
V, which is likely because there are only two transcripts for this stage. Thus, there 
is a clear increase in the variety of OS:S occurrences. So as the linguistic complexity 
of children’s utterances increases, so does the number of different types of occur-
rence schemas they use to talk about pretend states. A graphic representation of the 
development of OS:S and OS:P pretend targets can be found in Fig. 7.20. 
Looking at the MOT data, we find a different distribution. Again, we do not 
have many occurrences of OS:P for statistical judgements (change of state: 1; 
steady process: 2; uncontrolled change: 1). As opposed to the CHI data, there is no 
apparent change in the number and variation of different OS:S categories. This 
means that there is no apparent correlation between the complexity and distribution 
of OS:S categories for the MOT data. 
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Figure 7.19: Distribution of function of occurrence schema: states utterances in the MOT data sorted 
by age 
 
Figure 7.20: CHI occurrence schema: states and occurrence schema: processes functions sorted by 
MLU 
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If we see this in terms of child-directed speech, there is no evidence that 
mothers use less complex pretend language in the domain of OS:S that correlates 
with their children’s linguistic development. Instead, mothers’ linguistic pretend 
language complexity remains constant, and it is children’s pretend language that 
develops (see also Section 6.2). The MOT OS:S and OS:P distribution can be found 
in Fig. 7.21 below. 
In summary, the distribution of OS:S subcategories differs significantly be-
tween corpora. The MC CHI and MC MOT categories are very similar, with prop-
erty attribution being the most frequent, category inclusion being second most fre-
quent, and the identification function coming third. The same frequency rating can 
be found in the TC CHI data. However, the TC CHI data also contain instances of 
the existential function (7%), which does not occur in the MC CHI data and hardly 
occurs in the MC MOT data at all. The TC MOT data are quite different, with the 
identification function being most frequent, followed by the category inclusion 
function and the property attribution function. 
 
 
Figure 7.21: MOT occurrence schema: states and occurrcence schema: processes functions sorted 
by MLU 
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In terms of development, the TC CHI data are more varied than the MC CHI data, 
with the diversity of OS:S subcategories increasing with age and linguistic com-
plexity. In addition, it can be argued that cognitively complex occurrence schema 
subcategories occur later in development. There is no such change in the MOT data, 
where the key difference is between the overall distribution of OS:S subcategories 
in the MC MOT and TC MOT data. 
 
7.4 Distributions of Pretend in the Psychological World 
Radden and Dirven (2007: 281) describe the psychological world event schema as 
a cognitive model that relates to people’s experiences. On the one hand, these can 
relate to emotions, and on the other hand, they can relate to thoughts and percep-
tions. The psychological world event schema thus deals with an experiencer be-
coming and being cognitively aware of an entity or situation. Radden and Dirven 
(2007) divide the psychological world event schema into two subcategories. One is 
the emotion schema, which “describes the emotional state or process which a sen-
tient human experiences” (Radden & Dirven 2007: 181). As outlined in Sections 
2.3 and 7.1, children start understanding emotional states and desires from 18 
months onwards (Repacholi & Gopknik 1997) and start talking about their own and 
others’ emotions by 24 months of age (cf. Bartsch & Wellman 1995; Harris et al. 
2016: 294; Widen 2016: 308). By 3 years of age, children show clear evidence in 
their spontaneous conversations that they understand emotions such as anger, sad-
ness, being happy, or being scared, as internal states (Widen 2016: 308). They keep 
developing more complex and more differentiated emotion scripts as they get older 
(Widen 2016: 309-316).  
The perception/cognition schema, on the other hand, “describes an experi-
encer’s perceptual or mental awareness of a thing” (Radden & Dirven 2007: 299). 
By two years of age children not only understand simple emotions and desires, but 
also simple perceptions and attention, and they demonstrate this understanding in 
their language use (Bartsch & Wellman 1995: 156). But only as they grow older do 
children develop a more complex understanding of their own and other people’s 
cognitive states (cf. Section 2.3.2.; see Wellman 2011 for a review). The emotion 
schema, but especially the perception/cognition schema relate strongly to children’s 
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developing sociocognitive and theory of mind capacities, and this also holds for 
their expression in pretend play situations (see also Section 3.1.7). Because of this 
close relation, these schemas are of special interest regarding children’s sociocog-
nitive development.  
 
7.4.1 Development of Pretend in the Psychological World and Cognitive Devel-
opment 
What we can state from the outset is that pretend utterances evoking the psycho-
logical world do not occur very often, and only start to appear quite late in devel-
opment. This is not particularly surprising, for two reasons: First, as we have seen, 
complex sociocognitive capacities develop quite late in childhood. Secondly, hy-
pothetical statements, both in general and about mental states in particular, pose 
quite challenging for young children, although they perform better in pretence sce-
narios (Lillard et al. 2011: 292).  
In total, there are only 40 pretend utterances evoking the psychological 
world event schema in the corpus data. 31 of these belong to the perception/cogni-
tion event schema, and 9 to the emotion schema. Most of these can be found in the 
TC CHI dataset (emotion schema: 2; perception/cognition schema: 28), some are in 
the TC MOT dataset (emotion schema: 1; perception/cognition schema: 5), and 
some in the MC MOT dataset (emotion schema 2; perception/cognition schema: 2). 
The MC CHI dataset does not contain any instances of the psychological world 
event schema. The two MC MOT emotion schema utterances can be found in the 
Anne corpus data at age 1;11.18 and relate to imperatives to pretend that Anne likes 
cakes, in one instance, and cheese, in the other (Anne04b.cha). In both cases, the 
situation is not addressed explicitly, but only with the imperative pretend, with the 
illocutionary force and event schema to be derived from the context. They therefore 
both relate to the schema of people liking or not liking particular kinds of food, a 
concept that young children understand by around 18 months of age (Repacholi & 
Gopnik 1997). One instance of the perception/cognition schema can be found in the 
Carl corpus, with his mother telling him to just pretend (carl31b.cha) at age 2;10.25. 
From the context, we can derive the interpretation that this imperative relates to the 
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perception/cognition schema, more precisely, pretending to have an olfactory ex-
perience. His mother tells him to just pretend that he can smell chips. In the last 
example, at age 2;5.18, Gail’s mother asks her are you pretending? (Gail17b.cha), 
inquiring whether she is pretending to read the newspaper. 
It is important to stress here that from an adult perspective, these utterances 
refer to emotional states like liking, perceptual states like smelling, and cognitive 
processes such a reading. But as we have seen in our discussion of pretend play in 
Section 3.1.2, especially at this young age, it is not clear if children understand such 
pretend activities as truly cognitive, or more as acting as if. So in the case of reading, 
for example, Gail’s mother might herself express a perception/cognition schema, 
but her daughter might simply interpret it as evoking an action schema, where pre-
tending to read a newspaper is not necessarily bound to cognitive awareness and 
mental processing, but to certain behaviours, as in opening the newspaper and mov-
ing your eyes up and down. Evidence for this view comes from the fact that children 
have significant problems interpreting the mental states of people who are not ac-
tively engaged in an action. In fact, before age 6 to 8 they do not consistently judge 
people who are engaged in reading, listening and talking as also engaged in cogni-
tive activity, or thinking, at the same time (Flavell et al. 1995: v; Wellman 2011: 
269). 
 
7.4.2 Development of Pretend in the Psychological World: TC CHI and TC 
MOT 
So let us now investigate occurrences of the psychological world event schema in 
the TC. First of all, it is interesting to recall that the frequency of pretend utterances 
evoking the psychological world event schema is higher for the TC CHI data than 
the TC MOT data. Secondly, the timing of their occurrences is also quite interesting 
(Fig. 7.22). The perception/cognition schema does not occur in the TC CHI data 
before age 3;6-3;8 (3 instances), and then shows a drastic increase and peak around 
4;0-4;2, the age in which theory of mind has been shown to properly take off con-
ceptually (Wellman et al. 2001).  
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Figure 7.22: Instances and frequency of the emotion schema (EMS) and perception/cognition 
schema (PERCOG) for the TC MOT and TC CHI data 
It is interesting to observe that there are no pretend utterances evoking the percep-
tion/cognition schema in the TC MOT data that precede the TC CHI utterances, 
suggesting that the association of pretend with perception and cognition is due to 
the child’s cognitive conceptual changes, and not a direct result of his mother’s 
previous pretend utterances.  
Regarding the emotion schema, the first TC MOT utterance is a comment 
on Thomas’ behaviour: you needn’t pretend you are (3-05-02.cha), namely, pretend 
to be upset. Thomas’ emotion schema utterances are imperative constructions in-
structing behaviour or states of affairs. In his first utterance (4-00-07.cha) he tells 
his mother no, but just pretend you are very sad. Also, in his second utterance (4-
10.06.cha) he tells his mother to just (pre)tend that birds like particular kinds of 
food and ends his utterance with a tag ascertaining shared understanding and con-
firmation of this perspective: okay? As children do understand emotions and lik-
ing/not liking things around 18 months of age, respectively, these utterances are 
well within this timeframe.  
A list of the perceptual and cognitive states evoked in the corpus data can 
be found in Table 7.2. below. This table also incorporates information on the first 
occurrence of these psychological schemas both in pretend play and in the corpus 
in general. 
 
1 1
2
11
3
1
3
4 4 4
1 1
3 ; 3 - 3 ; 5 3 ; 6 - 3 ; 8 3 ; 9 - 3 : 1 1 4 ; 0 - 4 ; 2 4 ; 3 - 4 ; 5 4 ; 6 - 4 ; 8 4 ; 9 - 4 ; 1 1
Psychological World Event Schemas
PERCOG TC MOT EMS TC MOT PERCOG TC CHI EMS TC CHI
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Perceptual/ 
Cognitive 
State 
Freq Neg FO 
(PP) 
FO 
(C) 
Example 
being 
shocked 
1 0 4;1.5 4;1.5 just pretend you’re shocked 
(4-01-05.cha) 
being tired 1 0 4;8.6 2;00.18 I’m pretending . (4-08-
06.cha) 
feeling sick 1 0 4;1.1 2;04.28 I’m pretending . (4-01-
01.cha) 
forgetting 3 0 3;8.2 2;8.10 Mummy, just pretend you’ve 
forgotten your (>) little boy  
(3-08-02.cha) 
hearing 3 3 4;0.7 2;05.28  just pretend I couldn’t hear 
anything .(4-00-07.cha) 
hurting 1 0 4;1.2 2;03.23 shall I pretend if it hurts my 
knee ? (4-01-02.cha) 
knowing 5 2 4;1.1 2;01.17 now just pretend you know I 
was asleep . (4-01-01.cha) 
noticing 1 0 4;4.5 3;1.2 now just pretend you notice 
Thomas was . running (?) to 
a double train (4-04-05.cha) 
remembering 1 0 4;7.10 2;07.27 don’t (/) don’t just pretend 
you remembered . (4-07-
10.cha) 
seeing 8 4 3;6.0 2;0.12 
 
just pretend &um (.) you 
didn’t see me because I was 
in the wine shop . (4-07-
10.cha) 
thinking 1 0 4;11.8 2;4.15 you just pretend . (4-11-
08.cha) 
wanting 2 0 4;1.5 2;0.27 
 
<just pretend you wanted to 
open> (>) the post box . (4-
01-05.cha) 
Table 7.2: Perceptual/cognitive states evoked by Thomas in the TC CHI data sorted by overall fre-
quency (Freq), frequency of utterance featuring negation (Neg), first occurrence in the context of 
pretend play (FO (PP)) and first occurrence in the corpus generally (FO (C)) 
As this shows, for most perceptual/cognitive states, children begin to talk 
about these much earlier than when they first employ them in pretend play situa-
tions. Thomas therefore shows an awareness of perceptual/cognitive states before 
he talks about them in pretend play situations, indicating that talking about pretend-
ing to experience a perceptual/cognitive state is cognitively more complex. Indeed, 
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adopting a pretend play frame involves a second-order metaperspective on a situa-
tion: “X pretends [cognitive/perceptual state 1] that Y experiences Z [cognitive/per-
ceptual state 2].” Such second-order metaperspectives, or “thinking about think-
ing/perceiving” are a hallmark of theory of mind development (e.g. Wellman 2011). 
Table 7.2 also includes information on when Thomas pretends that a cognitive/per-
ceptual state is not being experienced. This is relevant as negation also requires a 
complex metaperspective, as a complex mental space structure is first built up cog-
nitively, and then an additional negative cognitive operation is performed which 
involves complex hypothetical thinking. 
 
7.5 Distributions of Pretend in the Force-Dynamic World 
As we have seen above, the force-dynamic world event schema is the second most 
frequent event schema category in the corpus data. However, pretend targets in the 
force-dynamic world are much less diverse than, for example, in the material world.  
In general, and as we will see below in more detail, the action schema pre-
dominates by far. If we analyse the CHI data, we see that 92.3% of all CHI FDW 
event schema utterances belong to the action schema category. The transfer and 
caused-motion schemas make up for 0.85% each. Finally, the self-motion schema 
accounts for 6% of all CHI FDW utterances. However, this overall view of the CHI 
data masks an underlying stark difference between the MC CHI and the TC CHI. 
For the MC CHI, the AS, in fact, makes up 100% of event schemas, meaning that 
the TS, SMS and CMS percentages all ultimately derive from the TC CHI data 
alone. For the TC CHI data, the AS makes up for 88.6% of FDW utterances. Trans-
fer and CMS make up for 1.3% each, and SMS makes up for 8.9% of the data.  
This also means that in terms of relative frequency, the TC CHI data repre-
sent the most varied and complex FDW profile, as the MOT data are also predom-
inated to a stronger degree by the AS, with 97.2%. For the MOT data, the Transfer 
schema and SMS occur with a frequency of 1.2% and the CMS has a frequency of 
0.3%. The TC MOT and MC MOT data are more similar to each other than the MC 
CHI and TC CHI data are to each other. They are also more similar to each other 
than to either the TC CHI or MC CHI data. Of course, for both MC MOT and TC 
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MOT, the AS is by far the most frequent category with 96.3% and 97.9%, respec-
tively. In the MC MOT data, Transfer occurs with a frequency of 0.7% and SMS 
with a frequency of 2.9%, whereas CMS does not occur at all. For the TC MOT, 
Transfer occurs with a frequency of 1.6%, CMS with a frequency of 0.5% and SMS 
does not occur at all. The overall frequencies of all datasets can be found in Fig. 
7.23 below. 
 
 
Figure 7.23: Comparing relative frequencies for subtypes of force-dynamic world event schemas for 
TC CHI, MC CHI, CHI, TC MOT, MC MOT and MOT 
As stated above, the TS, CMS, and SMS hardly occur in the FDW data, if they 
occur at all. However, the fact that they occur at all indicates that it will be fruitful 
to investigate these instantiations in more detail.  
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Regarding developmental progression, for the MC CHI data, the AS is the 
only force-dynamic world schema used at all, so there is no change in the variety 
of types of FDW schemas. For the TC CHI, we also have instances of the transfer 
schema, the caused-motion schema and the self-motion schema. If we consider the 
data in total, this suggests that as children grow older, their use of the force-dynamic 
world event schema becomes more varied. The distribution of force-dynamic world 
event schemas can be found in Fig. 7.24. 
 
 
Figure 7.24: Pretend target event schemas in the force-dynamic world for the CHI data sorted by 
age 
When looking at Brown’s stages of development, we find that the number of dif-
ferent force-dynamic world event schemas increases with children’s growing lin-
guistic complexity. It is also interesting to note that event schema categories other 
than the AS do not occur before Stage Early IV. This development can be seen in 
Fig. 7.25. 
Turning to the MOT data sorted by age, we again see that the AS is by far 
the most frequent event schema category. In fact, the other schemas only occur very 
infrequently (transfer schema: 4 instances; self-motion schema: 4 instance; caused-
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motion schema: 1 instance), and there is no developmental progression in the vari-
ety of force-dynamic world event schemas. This is evident when looking at the data 
sorted by age (Fig. 7.26) and Brown’s stages (7.27). 
 
 
Figure 7.25: Pretend target event schemas in the force-dynamic world for the CHI data sorted by 
MLU 
 
Figure 7.26: Pretend target event schemas in the force-dynamic world for the MOT data sorted by 
age 
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Figure 7.27: Pretend target event schemas in the force-dynamic world for the MOT data sorted by 
MLU 
For the CHI data, we can therefore state that subschemas other than the action 
schema occur in later stages both in terms of age and linguistic complexity. For the 
MOT data, on the other hand, these subschemas appear from quite early on.  
In summary, the force-dynamic world schemas are much less diverse in their 
underlying distribution of subcategories. The action schema is by far the most fre-
quent, ranging from a relative frequency of 89% (TC CHI) to 100% (MC CHI). The 
self-motion schema makes up 9% of the TC CHI FDW data, but only makes up 3% 
of the MC MOT data, and does not occur in the TC MOT and MC CHI data. In 
terms of development, the only instances of the TS occurs at age 3;3-3;5, and the 
SMS starts occurring in the age range of 3;6-3;8. The CMS only occurs in the very 
last age range of 4;9-4;11. In terms of linguistic development, FDW subschemas 
other than the AS do not occur before Stage Early IV. For the MOT data, there are 
no such changes in the diversity of FDW subcategories. What can be concluded 
from this is that as children grow older, their verbalisations relate to more dynamic 
aspects of pretend play situations, and to the causal effects and relational structure 
of actions. 
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7.6 Summary 
In this chapter I analysed the distribution and development of event schemas asso-
ciated with children’s and mothers’ pretend utterances, adopting the framework of 
Radden and Dirven (2007). Specifically, I looked at event schemas in the material 
world, the psychological world, and the force-dynamic world, as well as their sub-
schemas. For both MOT and CHI, pretend utterances associated with the material 
world were most frequent, with the force-dynamic world coming second and the 
psychological world a distant third. Most pretend play utterances, then, relate to 
physical entities and concrete objects, with actions, forces, and causes also playing 
a significant role. These event schema distributions were tied to different discourse 
strategies. Mothers and children either focussed on the pretend identity of objects 
involved in a pretend scenario in order to clarify what was being pretended, or they 
focussed on the pretend action and what it stands for.  
In terms of development, for all but the TC CHI data, there are no clear 
patterns that are apparent. However, for the TC CHI data, as Thomas grows older, 
we begin to observe fewer pretend utterances about the material world. This was 
linked to developing mentalising and perspective-taking abilities, resulting in more 
complex pretend play scenarios. This coincides with a general decrease in the focus 
on objects in the material world in the TC CHI data. What this indicates is that 
Thomas’ pretend play overall becomes more ‘mentalistic.’ In addition, it indicates 
that his pretend utterances more frequently become associated with dynamic ac-
tions with longer durations and pretend situations as a whole. This often replaces 
an exclusive focus on specific static objects involved in pretence. Interestingly, 
mothers’ pretend utterances focussed more on the material world when their chil-
dren’s utterances were generally more linguistically complex, which was inter-
preted as a response to more complex and active perspectivation in children’s pre-
tend play. When children are more active in elaborating pretend scenarios, mothers 
more frequently clarify the pretend identity of individual material entities, or what 
is happening to these entities, within the general pretend frame or script established 
by their children.  
I then looked at the distribution and development of the three worlds of ex-
perience and their subschemas in more detail. First, regarding the material world, 
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references to static entities were by far most frequent, with one interesting observa-
tion being that Thomas’ material world event schema utterances were conceptually 
more complex than the MC CHI utterances, as they were associated with a higher 
number of different subschemas. This was also true when looking at the most fre-
quent material world subschema and its subfunctions, the occurrence schema: 
states. Here as well, the number of subfunctions increased with age, with the 
Thomas data being most diverse. Moreover, assigning properties to an entity seems 
to be the communicatively most common perspectivation strategy in pretend play. 
In general, different subfunctions were found to have different discourse functions.  
I then looked at the distributions of pretend in the psychological world, which was 
connected to children’s sociocognitive development in the domain of perspective-
taking. While the overall frequency of this world of experience was very low, it is 
still interesting to observe that most instances occurred later in development, coin-
ciding with the time frame in which children begin to develop more complex men-
talising and perspective-taking abilities.  
Lastly, I looked at the force-dynamic world. Here, the data consisted almost 
exclusively of action schemas. For the Thomas dataset, there were some small 
trends indicating that as he grows older, and especially as his utterances become 
more complex, the number of force-dynamic world subschemas increases. How-
ever, we have to keep in mind that the token frequency here generally was too low 
to make strong statements.  
Overall, then, children’s pretend utterances become more diverse in terms 
of the event schemas and subschemas that they relate to as children grow older and 
as the complexity of their utterances increases. For mothers, on the other hand, no 
changes in complexity and diversity of event schemas and subschemas are apparent. 
This can be seen as one of the main conclusions of the analysis of pretend play in 
general, which show evidence of an increase in complexity and diversity of pretend 
play when analysing children’s utterances, but not when analysing mothers’ utter-
ances.   
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8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I summarise the most important points from Chapters 2 to 7. I will 
also briefly outline additional areas of further research and approaches that could 
prove relevant to expanding on the research and conclusions of this study. I will 
then elaborate on how this research relates to broader issues of the study of perspec-
tivation, pretend play, and language, cognition, interaction, evolution, and culture 
more generally.  
This study has analysed the structure and development of particular aspects 
of perspectivation in language acquisition in the context of pretend play. Specifi-
cally, I have performed a corpus analysis of utterances containing the lexical item 
pretend within a Cognitive-Linguistic framework. In doing so, I have followed the 
commitments of CL and have drawn on research from language acquisition, devel-
opmental psychology, and other cognitive sciences. One goal of this study was to 
analyse how children abstract a pretend schema from instances of actual language 
use in interactions with their mothers. The other goal was to examine the cognitive 
categories and behaviours pretend play is associated with in language acquisition. 
That is, the study was interested in which conceptualisations and construals were 
evoked in child-caregiver pretend play interactions.  
The two central concepts of this study, perspectivation and pretend play, 
were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively.  
In Chapter 2, I introduced the concepts of perspective-taking, perspectiva-
tion, and construal, and then gave an overview of their relation to Cognitive Lin-
guistics, language acquisition, and cognitive development. Cognitive Linguistics 
and constructionist, usage-based approaches see language as shaped by usage and 
are interested in how constructions express and evoke conceptualisations in inter-
action. From the point of view of “Developmental Cognitive Linguistics” (Ibbotson 
2020), one of the central questions is how children acquire constructions that ex-
press particular perspectives, how they and caregivers use them in interaction, and 
what cognitive mechanisms the acquisition and use of these constructions is based 
on. Research on language acquisition also demonstrates that perspectivation and the 
acquisition of constructions are closely linked. From a developmental point of view, 
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the development of linguistic perspectivation is based on and intertwined with chil-
dren’s rich sociocognitive abilities, including the shared intentionality infrastruc-
ture, as well as children’s developing capacities for joint attention, common ground, 
perspective-taking, and theory of mind.  
Chapter 3 gave a detailed overview of research on the development of pre-
tend play and its linguistic and interactional expression. Pretend play – although 
there can be significant differences in its cultural expression – is a universal human 
behaviour related to a suite of cognitive abilities, most importantly those of per-
spective-taking and perspectivation. Children’s pretend play becomes more com-
plex as they grow older, and they also become more and more active in its initiation 
and negotiation. This is also reflected linguistically in that children and caregivers 
at first mostly use implicit ways of negotiating perspectives on pretend play. These 
become more explicit as they grow older and their sociocognitive abilities become 
more sophisticated. Overall, there is a strong connection between language devel-
opment and the development of pretend play, which is likely due to a number of 
reasons. These include the fact that both language and pretend play heavily rely on 
symbolic cognition and the ability for perspectivation. In addition, pretend play has 
been argued to represent a context which fosters the use and acquisition of complex 
language and methods of linguistic perspectivation, due to its interactional and cog-
nitive complexity. Here the lexical item pretend occupies as special role in chil-
dren’s developing pretend vocabulary: It is the lexical item most unambiguously 
and directly related to pretence activities, and also represents a cognitive, pretend 
frame-evoking lexical item that can serve as a window into the conceptualisations 
associated with children’s and caregivers’ pretend play.  
Chapter 4 described the corpora used for the current study and described 
methodological issues surrounding the study. The corpora used for this analysis, the 
TC and MC, are part of the CHILDES database, and together represent data for 13 
British, middle class, English-speaking children from the age of 2 to 5. They repre-
sent longitudinal, naturalistic data with high ecological validity. They also have a 
relatively high token frequency, which makes searching for relatively rare struc-
tures such as pretend more successful. However, as outlined in this chapter, ques-
tions of representativeness still have to be kept in mind. We have to acknowledge 
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that the nature of the data we are dealing with limits the degree to which these find-
ings can be seen as representative of other developmental contexts and other cul-
tural, socioeconomic and language backgrounds. Chapter 4 then went on to describe 
the concrete methodology of this study. Instantiations of pretend in the TC and MC 
were annotated for the morphological constructions they contained, the conceptual 
categories associated with individual pretend utterances, and the event schemas and 
subschemas they were associated with. These data were then subjected to quantita-
tive and qualitative analyses, including statistical measures. In particular, pretend 
utterances were analysed in terms of their absolute and relative distribution in the 
corpora, and in terms of their distribution by age and linguistic complexity. These 
analyses were the subject of Chapters 5 to 7. 
In Chapter 5, I have shown that first instances of pretend occur quite early 
in development for many children, and that instances of pretend can be found more 
frequently in child language acquisition data than in other corpora. Moreover, the 
frequency of pretend indeed increases as children grow older and as they become 
more sophisticated language users. I have analysed the frequency of pretend and its 
word forms in the Thomas corpus and the Manchester corpus, looking at children’s 
as well as mothers’ pretend utterances. Not only was the distribution of pretend 
word forms analysed, but also the distribution of pretend morphological construc-
tions and the speech act types used in pretend utterances.  
For the CHI data, pretend is by far the most frequent word form, followed 
by pretending. The same goes for the MC MOT data. In the TC MOT data, on the 
other hand, the progressive form pretending is the most frequent category. This 
result was interpreted as showing that Thomas’ mother often adopts a restricted 
viewing frame that focusses on the dynamic, processual nature of a pretend event 
or action. In doing so, Thomas’ mother’s pretend utterances often serve a narrating 
or commenting function. Most often, however, Thomas’ mother uses progressive 
pretend utterances in order to negotiate or clarify a shared perspective on a pretend 
play situation. This is also supported by the high frequency of questions and ques-
tion tags in her pretend utterances. Thomas, on the other hand, most often employs 
a maximal viewing frame and often uses imperative constructions to instruct and 
negotiate pretend play. In the MC CHI data, on the other hand, we find a very high 
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frequency of constructions being used to explain or comment on an ongoing pretend 
play situation the child is involved in, with very few imperative acts and a signifi-
cant amount of direct repetitions of their mothers’ utterances. Conversely, in the 
MC MOT data, there is a higher degree of imperative constructions instructing pre-
tend play. In both MOT datasets, mothers use questions and question tags to clarify 
and negotiate pretend play situations, but the mothers of younger children (2 to 3 
years of age) seem to do so to a higher degree than those of older children. Overall, 
then, these data show that mothers linguistically scaffold pretend play interactions 
using a number of different strategies, and these change as children grow older and 
become more adept language users. In turn, children themselves become ever-more 
active contributors to the negotiation and coordination of perspectives in pretend 
play.  
In Chapter 6, I analysed the semantic targets of pretend utterances. One of 
the most important results of this analysis was that for children, the diversity of 
pretend target categories increases with age and linguistic complexity. The growing 
complexity of children’s pretend play can therefore be seen in the diversification of 
pretend targets. For the MC, OBJECT and ACTION are the most frequent catego-
ries. Other categories such as references to ENTITIES, BEING ENTITY and 
STATE OF AFFAIRS are much less frequent. For the TC, on the other hand, 
STATE OF AFFAIRS is the most frequent target category, followed by ACTION, 
OBJECT and BEING ENTITY. Moreover, references to MENTAL STATES and 
EXPERIENCES, as well as OBJECT PROPERTIES and POSSESSING OBJECTS 
only appear in the TC, which can be related to the emergence of theory of mind and 
complex perspective-taking skills around age 4. For both CHI and MOT, however, 
no clear-cut changes in the relative frequencies of pretend targets could be dis-
cerned. However, some slight trends did emerge. For one, mothers referred less to 
ACTION pretend targets as their children got older and their utterances became 
more complex, whereas references to STATE OF AFFAIRS increased both for 
MOT and CHI.  
In addition, two pretend targets were explored in more detail. One was 
STATE OF AFFAIRS. In a qualitative analysis of an extended segment of a pretend 
play interaction, I showed that both mothers and children make use of the cognitive 
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capacity for conceptual blending in order to negotiate perspectives on pretend play 
situations in discourse. The second pretend target category was that of BEING EN-
TITY, which was shown to become more diverse as children grow older and as the 
complexity of their utterances as well as their sociocognitive abilities increases.  
Whereas Chapter 6 focussed on the distribution and development of indi-
vidual pretend target categories, Chapter 7 presented a complementary approach in 
which the conceptualisations related to pretend utterances were analysed in terms 
of the event schemas that they belong to. Pretend utterances were analysed in terms 
of their association with the three worlds of experience underlying event schemas 
proposed by Radden and Dirven (2007). In line with the overall trend observed in 
the previous chapter, children were found to produce more complex pretend utter-
ances in terms of the diversity of event schemas and subschemas that they were 
related to, whereas no such trend was found for mothers. It was found that pretend 
utterances associated with the material world were by far the most frequent cate-
gory, with the force-dynamic world being second, and the psychological world be-
ing by far the least frequent category. In terms of cognitive development, these re-
sults can be interpreted as showing that pretend utterances relating to the static ma-
terial world of the here and now occur first. Cognitively more complex event sche-
mas involving dynamic relations, causes, effects, and emotional and mental states 
become more prominent as children grow older and the complexity of their utter-
ances rises.  
 Overall, then, all three chapters analysing the structure of development of 
perspectivation in pretend play found an increase in complexity and diversity in the 
conceptualisations underlying pretence interactions. Children were shown to be-
come more active in their contributions to the initiation, coordination and negotia-
tion of perspectives in pretend play. That is, their growing ability for perspective-
taking and -sharing was reflected in their pretend utterances.  
As science is an open-ended, continuous process of discovery and refine-
ment, the current study evokes a number of open questions and desiderata for fur-
ther research. These can be grouped into two main areas of future inquiry: One is 
open questions and suggestions that could improve on and extend the current study 
on perspectivation and pretend play in language acquisition. That is, we can ask 
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what kinds of questions and follow-up studies are suggested by this study. The sec-
ond area concerns possible ways in that the interdisciplinary integration advocated 
for in this study could be used to gain further insight into the research questions of 
this study. 
Regarding the first area of inquiry, Section 4.2 has outlined in detail the 
limitations and problems of the corpus study. One issue is representativeness and 
sample size. As we have seen repeatedly, for many of the categories that were ana-
lysed, there were not enough data points to draw adequate conclusions, let alone 
warrant the application of statistical methods. In a future study, therefore, the da-
taset could be extended, for example by adding further DDBs such as the MPI-
EVA-Manchester Corpus (Lieven et al. 2009) or longitudinal corpora such as the 
Lara corpus (Rowland & Fletcher 2006).  
One aspect that was not considered in the present study was to which degree 
pretend utterances evoke and relate to conceptualisations explicitly and to which 
degree they relate to pretend conceptualisations implicitly by virtue of their inter-
actional context. As Veneziano (2002) has pointed out (cf. Section 3.2.4), in their 
pretend play children start out with a low-informative period in which they do not 
make explicit the elements their pretend utterance relates to. They then move on to 
a high-informative period, where they increasingly specify pretend elements in their 
utterance. The current study has provided insight into which pretend conceptuali-
sations occur in child-caregiver interactions, but a future study could extend on 
these results by analysing how children learn to explicitly construe pretend play 
situations in their utterances. This also holds for the analysis of event schemas pre-
sented here, which did not take into consideration which participant roles of a given 
event schema were explicitly marked in an utterance (cf. Dirven & Verspoor 2004: 
77-86; Radden & Dirven 2007: 298; Kleinke 2010: 3357-3361). A future study 
could therefore investigate the event schemas and semantic roles evoked by pretend 
utterances in more detail. 
In addition, this study has only looked at utterances containing the lexical 
item pretend. However, as discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.3.1, pretend is just one 
node in a complex network of constructions used by children and caregivers to ver-
balise, negotiate and coordinate pretend play. To investigate the pretence network 
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that children acquire, it would be a fruitful enterprise to analyse pretend play situa-
tions in more detail and to extract frequent constructions used to negotiate perspec-
tives in pretend play, especially those that do not feature the lexical item pretend. 
Future studies could also introduce interrater reliability ratings to put the coding of 
pretend utterances on a more reliable footing.  
Moving beyond the examination of linguistic structures, the analysis of dis-
course strategies and speech acts involved in pretend utterances and utterances per-
spectivising pretend could also be extended. As noted by Cameron-Faulkner (2014: 
36), “[w]hile the behaviours used by children to express intent are external and thus 
to some degree measurable, the underlying psychological characterisation of intent 
is much more elusive.” This of course presents a general problem for cognitive 
analyses of child language, but a broader pragmatic coding of pretend utterances 
than the one performed in the present study could be based, for example, on the 
Inventory of Communicative Acts (INCA, Ninio & Wheeler 1986), which repre-
sents the most comprehensive taxonomy for coding the pragmatic dimension of ut-
terances to date (Cameron-Faulkner 2014: 41), or its abridged version, INCA-A 
(Snow et al. 1996).  
This study has also only discussed relatively few areas related to construal, 
such as viewing frames, pretend target domains, and event schemas. However, re-
search in CL has proposed a wealth of taxonomies for construal operations (e.g., 
Langacker 1987; Talmy 2000; Croft & Cruse 2004: 40-73; Radden & Dirven 2007: 
21-31; Verhagen 2007; Hart 2014). A future, much more expansive study could 
follow up on the analysis presented here and investigate these construal operations 
in pretend play interactions. 
Furthermore, this study has analysed perspectivation in pretend play in Eng-
lish, but it would be a very promising endeavour to extend this analysis to other 
languages to see to which degree the results obtained also can be found when stud-
ying children acquiring other languages. 
The second key area for future research that follows from the current anal-
ysis concerns interdisciplinary integration to yield a more complete picture of the 
development of perspectivation and pretend play. This study has mainly integrated 
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research on perspectivation and pretend play from CL, and usage-based, construc-
tionist approaches, language acquisition research and developmental psychology. 
References to other relevant research in the cognitive sciences, such as psycholin-
guistics, comparative psychology and language evolution research have been made 
throughout this study, but these could be extended upon. In addition, research from 
dialogic syntax (e.g., Du Bois 2014; Köymen & Kyratzis 2014; Kyratzis 2017), 
emergent grammar (e.g., Hopper 2015), second language acquisition (e.g., 
Littlemore 2009; Niemeier 2017), conversation and discourse analysis (e.g., Hart 
2015; Kyratzis & Cook-Gumperz 2015; Kyratzis 2017) and the study of talk-in-
interaction (e.g., Graumann & Kallmeyer 2002) could also be integrated into this 
approach, as these approaches stress the interactive, dynamic nature of perspectiva-
tion. All these areas of research, and many others present a wealth of relevant re-
search whose integration and synthesis into the current approach would prove 
highly profitable (cf. Pleyer 2014b: 255-256).  
One further avenue in which the current study could profit from interdisci-
plinary integration is in explicating its theoretical foundations and in spelling out in 
more detail a framework underlying investigations of the development of perspec-
tivation and pretend play that is in line with current theorising in cognitive science 
and developmental psychology. In cognitive science, action-based, constructivist, 
relational, embodied, enactive, and interactive theories have increasingly become 
more prominent (Carpendale et al. 2018: 7). These approaches include, for example, 
dynamic systems theory (e.g., Thelen & Smith 1996; Mascolo & Fischer 2015), 
developmental systems theory (e.g., Lerner 2015; Mascolo & Fischer 2015), and 
neuroconstructivism (e.g., Mareschal et al. 2007; Carpendale et al. 2018: 29-31). In 
these approaches, development is understood as a dynamic developmental system 
in which a multitude of factors interact in the emergence of human cognitive, lin-
guistic, and interactive behaviours. In future studies, then, explorations of the emer-
gence of perspectivation and pretend play could be couched more explicitly in the 
study of complex adaptive systems (Beckner et al. 2009) and within new emerging 
frameworks which have been referred to by unwieldy descriptive titles such as evo-
lutionary developmental comparative cognitive science (Ploeger & Galis 2016) or 
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embodied evolutionary-developmental computational cognitive neuroscience 
(Poirier et al. 2017). 
Most importantly, future studies could be more explicit in relating analyses 
of the emergence of perspectivation and pretend play in a process-relational frame-
work and a relational developmental systems perspective. As Lerner (2015: xviii; 
see also Overton 2015) summarises,  
relational developmental systems posit the organism as an inherently active, self-creating, 
self-organizing, and self-regulating nonlinear complex adaptive system, which develops 
through embodied activities and actions, as they co-act with a lived world of physical and 
sociocultural objects. 
Central to any analysis within such a framework is the view that the emergence of 
behaviours such as perspectivation and pretend play is fundamentally a co-con-
structive process in which children and caregivers increasingly coordinate their 
shared activities within a dynamic, emergent developmental system influenced by 
each interaction, and in which the biological and social dimension are interwoven 
and cannot be separated (Carpendale et al. 2018: 6-7).  
In summary, this study has shed light on perspectivation and pretend play in 
language acquisition in a Cognitive-Linguistic framework. As such, this study has 
not only contributed to illuminating the acquisition of pretend, but to the interactive 
processes of the dynamic emergence of pretend play in interaction, on the basis of 
children’s developing skills for interactive perspectivation and their mothers’ strat-
egies for interactive scaffolding. 
What this study has shown is that, just as we have the capacity to construct 
impressive and technologically sophisticated buildings such as the Burj Khalifa, we 
are able to construct complex situations and communicate structured conceptuali-
sations using language. In fact, our ability to construct and convey such conceptu-
alisations can be seen as one of the most fundamental preconditions enabling us not 
only to build skyscrapers but to participate and actively contribute to complex hu-
man culture more generally.  
Language and other cultural artefacts make human culture cumulative 
(Tomasello 1999; cf. Whiten et al. 2009). Humans are born into a world of symbols, 
artefacts, as well as cultural and cognitive technologies. But with the aid of lan-
guage, they can go beyond simply internalising these cultural artefacts. Instead, 
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they can build on and improve on the accumulated cultural advancements of previ-
ous generations, and the same goes for generations after them. This cumulative na-
ture of human culture, which in large parts is enabled by linguistic interaction, 
seems to be a uniquely human attribute.  
Other animals learn and internalise complex cultural behaviours such as 
tool-use, potato washing, and complex communicative behaviours, but they do not 
seem to build on previous cultural technologies in a piecemeal, incremental fashion 
(Tomasello 1999: 26-40). In addition, they are not ‘taught’ these behaviours in the 
same way humans are (Csibra & Gergely 2009: 149). The development of scaffolds 
for the emergence of human cognition and culture through interaction in a myriad 
of scenarios, timescales and domains seems to be a fundamentally human phenom-
enon (Carporael et al. 2014). 
Both in the introduction and above I have phrased our ability for complex 
cultural creations as “advancements.” It has to be noted, of course, that from a bio-
logical point of view, it is extremely difficult to establish criteria for vague terms 
such as advancement and evolutionary progress (Carpendale et al. 2018: 2; see Nee 
2005; Rosslenbroich 2006 for discussion). However, what we can say is that lan-
guage and our capacity for perspectivation to our current knowledge represent 
uniquely human cognitive specialisations that distinguish us even from our closest 
relatives, or, in the terminology of evolutionary biology, they represent “human 
cognitive autapomorphies” (Suddendorf 2008: 147). As this study has shown, these 
specialisations not only enable us to engage in complex cultural behaviours such as 
building skyscrapers, they are also already evident in young children’s pretend play 
with their caregivers.  
Evidence from comparative psychology and developmental psychology 
suggests that the cognitive specialisations such as language, perspective-taking and 
pretence are based on our evolved biological capacities. However, this study has 
stressed the importance of interaction and culture in the development of these spe-
cialisations. This point is made even more explicit by Heyes (2018), who argues 
that capacities such as language and perspective-taking are not “cognitive instincts” 
(Pinker 1994), but “cognitive gadgets.” These  
are distinctively human neurocognitive mechanisms – such as imitation, mindreading, and 
language – that have been shaped by cultural rather than genetic evolution. New gadgets 
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emerge, not by genetic mutation, but by innovations in cognitive development; they are 
specialised cognitive mechanisms built by general cognitive mechanisms using information 
from the sociocultural environment (Heyes 2018). 
On this view, perspectivation and pretend play are biologically grounded, but they 
are shaped and brought into existence through processes of cultural evolution, on-
togenetic development, and interaction. Such a view underlines the fundamental 
influence of environmental and cultural factors as well as of developmental pro-
cesses in the emergence of human cognitive specialisations and human cognition 
more generally (Heyes 2018). 
In one of his last writings, published when he was 98 years old, Bruner 
(2014: 221) phrases the dual embeddedness of humans in biology and culture in the 
following way: 
the human condition is shaped both by the biological constraints inherent in our nature as a 
species living in a physical environment, and at the same time by the symbolically rich 
cultures that we humans construct and in terms of which we live our lives communally. 
Humans have constructed ‘symbolic niches’ through processes of cultural transmis-
sion over multiple generations that fundamentally influence human development. 
These are established by our interactions with cultural and symbolic artefacts and 
with each other. That is, humans have adapted to these symbolic niches and at the 
same time they continuously shape and co-construct these niches from ontogeny 
onwards (Deacon 2012: 33-34), a fact also emphasised by niche construction theory 
and evolutionary developmental biology (evo devo) (Laland et al. 2008). As Bruner 
(2014: 221) stresses, the cultures we humans create are based on our ability to im-
agine, and also create possible worlds. The capacity to talk about, and create, these 
possible worlds in turn is based on the capacities that are evident in young children’s 
abilities for pretence and for sharing and negotiating perspectives in pretend play. 
As such, this study has contributed to the endeavour of uncovering some of the most 
fundamental factors involved in the cognitive and interactional processes underly-
ing the emergence of human cultures and human cognition. 
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